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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
For the nation to embark on a robust space program which includes the deployment
and operation of the Space Station Freedom (SSF), the human transportation
function to and from low Earth orbit (LEO) over the next several decades will have
to be accomplished routinely, affordably, reliably, and safely. Currently, the United
States relies on the Space Shuttle to provide its human transportation needs, as well
as the bulk of its cargo transportation needs. However, over the past several years,
there have been numerous system concept development efforts investigating what
the next human transportation system might be. Some of these alternative
transportation architectures take as their underlying premise the replacement of the
Space Shuttle orbiters at the end of some useful lifetime. Other alternative
scenarios assume that it is more expedient to evolve the Space Shuttle,
recommending modifications that range anywhere from minor to substantial. Still
other alternative scenarios assume the eventual replacement of the Space Shuttle
with other concepts which rely extensively on the use of advanced technology. Yet
other scenarios have been constructed which involve augmenting the Space Shuttle
with another independent transportation system to achieve "assured access."
As could be expected, these divergent, underlying, initial assumptions about the
fundamental purpose of a new vehicle have given rise to widely disparate system
concepts for the next human transportation system. For example, the NASA
Langley Research Center is currently studying the characteristics of a horizontal
lifting body vehicle, designated the HL-20, as a personnel carrier. Its primary
mission is to support crew rotation to and from the SSF. The Johnson Space Center
(JSC) also investigated personnel carriers for this same reference mission, focusing
primarily on biconic shapes. These concepts only address the transportation of the
crew and do not include any provision for the transportation of cargo. Other
concepts, such as the Crew and Logistics Vehicle (CLV), have been developed which
include a small amount of cargo on the personnel carrier. Several system concepts
have also been proposed that are based on evolving the Space Shuttle by
incorporating increased safety and performance features, while retaining the ability
to carry cargo. The Advanced Manned Launch System (AMLS), Single-Stage-to-
Orbit (SSTO), and the National Aerospace Plane (NASP) are concepts which have
been developed by those who believe that technological advances may offer
significant savings in operations costs by routinely achieving high flight rates. In
addition, conventional approaches such as launching small personnel carriers on
top of an expendable launch vehicle and more unconventional approaches where
the personnel carriers are mated to an air-launched booster, have also been
considered. Many of these system concepts could be used to provide alternate access
to the Space Shuttle.
Recognizing that limited resources will be available to accomplish the activities
required for missions to and from Planet Earth, the JSC, as the agency's lead for
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piloted vehicles, initiated this study under the sponsorship of NASA Headquarters,
Advanced Program Development Division. The purpose of this study was to
address the need and urgency for any next human transportation system, and
develop the decision materials to determine what the next human transportation
system should be. A large portion of the data for this study came from the
abundant, available technical information about various, alternative concepts that
have been developed in recent study and design efforts across the country.
1.1 Study Background
A fundamental tenet of the Human Transportation System (HTS) study was that
products and recommendations should be based on consistent and applicable
mission models, requirements, and attributes. Although several architecture
studies have been conducted over the past 7 years, they have not produced a clear
consensus on the results, for precisely this reason. These previous studies were the
Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS), the Space Transportation
Infrastructure Study (STIS), and the Next Manned Transportation System Study
(NMTS).
The STAS study was a combined effort of both NASA and the Department of
Defense (DOD). Many of its recommendations led to the beginning of the Advanced
Launch System (ALS) and the National Launch System (NLS) programs. However,
the STAS study had mission models that showed much larger traffic models than
are shown in the current NASA Civil Needs Database (CNDB). In some of the
mission models, this was a reflection of the expected payload size, weight, and flight
rate requirements for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) at the time of the study
(1985). The study also used cost as the only quantitative measurement of
comparisons between systems. For example, safety of the crew was assumed to not
be a discriminator, and therefore, was not a measured criterion. Since crew safety is
always of primary concern, it should be considered quantitatively when comparing
and defining transportation architectures.
The NMTS study was conducted without NASA funding but with industry
participation. The study did produce some enlightening data, however, since the
industry participants used their own funding, each study had its own process and its
own recommendations. There were no unified conclusions or recommendations.
The STIS study has been used effectively for performing specific trade studies ona
few possible transportation architectures. It can, for example, provide insight into
the effect on the cost of using NLS to off-load the Space Shuttle, or assess the impacts
of Earth-to-orbit (ETO) cargo carriers and transportation nodes on ETO transporta-
tion in support of various Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) scenarios. It does,
however, have a narrow focus (based on the number of ETO architectures compared
to each other) and is not trying to evaluate all the impacts of architecture differences
(safety, cost risk, reliability, etc.) that may be needed to truly judge (in the customer's
eyes) one architecture relative to another.
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While these studies did produce useful information, they did not develop rigorous
and measurable evaluation criteria (attributes) to compare differing transportation
architecture options. Moreover, many of the study assumptions (e.g., overly
optimistic traffic models) made them untimely for answering questions currently
being asked within the agency regarding future transportation strategies. To focus
the agency's human transportation efforts and to achieve the desired products, this
study was conceived with an objective to address the significant top-level
architectural considerations prior to conducting additional individual system
concept definition efforts. The HTS study approach examined the transportation
needs of the country, defined those transportation system attributes desired by the
customer, and evaluated various transportation architecture options against those
needs and attributes. The study horizon was from the present to the year 2020.
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SECTION 2
STUDY APPROACH AND GROUND RULES
From the beginning of the study, it was recognized that if some of the top-level
architectural considerations were to be answered, it was essential to have access to
the best data from previous concept design efforts. Also, since there was interest in
determining just what convergence existed in the data, it was decided that the study
approach should involve the best minds in the business, both in and out of the
government. It was determined that a partnership between NASA and industry
was essential, and hence the NASA-Industry Team (NIT) concept was formed. This
approach involved six major aerospace firms working together with NASA to
provide technical data to address the architectural considerations. These six firms
were selected by competitive process through an agency-wide evaluation to
participate in the NIT. These included Boeing, General Dynamics, Martin Marietta,
Rockwell, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas. NASA centers working together to
complete the NIT included JSC, Langley Research Center (LaRC), Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), as well as NASA Headquarters.
The industry team members conducted their study efforts under contracts of $425K
each, for a total of $2550K.
2.1 STUDY APPROACH
The study was divided into four tasks. The first two tasks involved determining the
transportation needs and transportation attributes. This essentially formed the
input requirements for the study. The third task was to evaluate the candidate
architectures. The fourth task was an evaluation of NASA's current business
practices which may be hindering, to some degree, the ability to develop, procure,
and operate any next human transportation system. These four tasks are described
in more detail in the following paragraphs.
2.1.1 Task 1: Transportation Needs
From the outset, it was felt that the mission of any next human transportation
system must be understood in terms of the transportation jobs that it must
accomplish. These jobs are the requirements which define what payloads need to be
transported and when. This indicated a needs-based study approach, as opposed to a
capabilities-based approach. Furthermore, the best solution for human
transportation can not be developed without taking into consideration the
transportation of cargo since optimization of the transportation attributes may
require the use of commonality between the personnel and cargo transportation
systems. In addition, addressing current national quest!ons as to whether any new
system was required as a replacement for the Space Shuttle, or whether a new
system was required to operate in conjunction with the Space Shuttle to assure
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human accessto space,could only be answered by a needs-basedapproach. Finally,
by taking a parametric look at the transportation needs as function of the major
space activities, the study approach was able to accommodate the large uncertainty
in the space agenda that the nation might eventually embark upon. Figure 2.1.1-1
illustrates how eight potential mission types were assembled into five levels of
space activity to comprise the components of the parametric transportation needs
model. This is the HTS "mission model."
2.1.2 Task 2: Customer-Desired Transportation Attributes
Attributes reflect what the customer considers important in the next human
transportation system. These attributes are determined by placing ourselves in the
customeffs shoes, and asking what factors would be considered in the decision-
making process. These attributes are typically related to cost, safety, reliability, risk,
etc. To be useful in a rigorous study, the definitions and measurements of these
attributes had to be precisely established. Also, to quantitatively define the
contribution of each individual attribute to the customer, utility functions,
describing how important the value of each attribute was to the customer, were
defined.
The customer for the next human transportation system was determined to be that
individual most responsible for (a) ensuring that the transportation needs are
accomplished, (b) resolving what the total (human-tended and untended)
transportation architecture should be, (c) determining how that architecture is
implemented and operated, and (d) deciding how the total architecture is funded. It
was the consensus of the study team that the NASA Administrator best fit this
description.
2.1.3 Task 3: Architecture Evaluation
The results from Tasks 1 and 2 were used as inputs for Task 3. The ultimate
objective of this task was to develop the system-level requirements on any indicated
next transportation system. This was accomplished by first addressing the inevitable
architectural considerations concerning how the next human transportation system
relates to the other existing and planned programs which now provide some degree
of the transportation function. The requirements that resulted from this task
address the need and urgency for any next system(s), and provide "marks" for the
safety, reliability, cost, etc. values that the next system should possess to be
architecturally competitive. Addressing these requirements was best accomplished
by defining a list of considerations to be investigated. These considerations
included:
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Figure 2.1.1-1.- Transportation needs "If" scenarios.
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• the degree of separation of people and cargo
,, the role of any new transportation system in relation to that of the Space Shuttle
• assessing the cost-to-benefit of alternate access, that is having two methods to
deliver and/or return people and cargo
• commonality with or influence on the ACRV
evolution of current systems
the size and features of an expendable booster developed specifically from the
outset with human transportation in mind
the benefit that could be realized by using transportation systems employing
advanced technology approaches.
To address these considerations, a set of approximately 20 architectures was
constructed. An architecture is that set of transportation systems that accomplishes
the transportation needs over some specified time frame. To be unique, an
architecture must include the introduction dates of new systems and retirement
dates of old systems, numbers of expendable vehicles, fleet size for reusable vehicles,
and the supporting ground infrastructure supporting the flight systems. Evaluation
of the attribute values for these architectures as they perform the different levels of
space activity provides valuable target values for future systems to achieve if they
are to accomplish improvements over the current systems they are replacing.
It was recognized early in the study that an automated decision support tool would
be required to manipulate the large volume of data generated in support of the
evaluation process. In addition, the use of an automated tool would allow
sensitivity analyses on the relative weights of the attributes and their associated
utility functions to be conducted. Finally, an automated tool would allow the
architecture performance assessment across six levels of space activity to be confined
to the last months of the study, thereby allowing maximum time for the
development and collection of quality data from the team members. An automated
tool would also facilitate updating the results of the study in subsequent years,
should that be required.
2.1.4 Task 4: New Ways of Doing Business Better
The way transportation system elements are procured, managed, designed, and
operated has a significant bearing on their ability to provide routine, affordable,
reliable, and safe transportation. The objective of this task was to identify any new
ways of doing the future transportation business that would result in more
favorable values of the transportation attributes. Most of the effort associated with
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this task was directed at reducing the costs of ownership. The ultimate intent of this
activity was to identify current barriers to lower ownership costs so that manage-
ment could develop subsequent plans for their removal and so that the most
significant of these findings could be implemented at the conclusion of the study.
The data from this activity was developed by interviewing top program and project
managers within industry and government, who were requested to provide their
insight into those organization, management, policy and procedures, and funding
and budget practices that, if done differently, would result in the largest
improvement in transportation system costs.
Figure 2.1.4 shows the study schedule. The team members were in residence at JSC
for the entire first month of the study. One benefit of being together for the entire
month was that the team better understood the strengths that each member brought
to the study, both organizationally as well as personally. During that time, the team
defined the detailed study approach jointly with the government so that all team
members had ownership not only of the study intent, but also of the process by
which the study was to be conducted. The team then spent the remainder of that
first month in concentrated work sessions, developing both the transportation
needs, i.e., what had to be transported to and from space and when, and the
important attributes of the transportation architecture. Three week-long meetings
where held over the next 5 months to define systems, architectures, and associated
manifesting philosophy, to refine the study flow as needed, and to divide the work
activities according to the strengths of the team. An additional month-long
working session was then conducted at JSC to assemble the final system and
architecture data, and to obtain team approval of this data prior to its being loaded
into an automated Architecture Evaluation Tool (AET). One final review was held
at the conclusion of the study to evaluate the final results, perform any required
sensitivity analysis to gain a better understanding of what the results meant, and
obtain consensus on the single, final report.
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Figure 2.1.4.- HTS study schedule.
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2.2 ARCHITECTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE HTS STUDY
The principal considerations assessed in the study were:
Separation of peoA3_le and cargo. This consideration addressed whether it is better
to physically separate people and cargo onto different launch vehicles if the
people and cargo have a common destination. There is a perception that crew
safety or other factors can be enhanced through this separation. In other words,
what impact does carrying cargo have on crew safety and mission success?
Alternate access. This consideration addressed the impact of having an
alternative way to deliver and return both people and cargo. The principal
advantage of having alternate access is that there is a greater probability that a
required mission or payload can be accomplished. The principal disadvantage is
the cost of simultaneously operating multiple systems to do the same job. Note
that the term "assured access" is not used, since it was felt early-on by the study
team that there was no way to assure access or to measure whether, through
systems design, it could be achieved.
Commonality with or influence on the ACRV. This addressed the impact of
either having an ACRV and its effect on the resultant system choices that would
be made in a transportation architecture, or identifying whether other systems
could perform the emergency crew return function instead of a separate ACRV
vehicle.
Which booster to use for human launch applications. This addressed the
relative advantages and disadvantages of using a new versus an existing
expendable launch vehicle for delivery of astronaut crews to low Earth orbit.
Role of advanced technology (new concepts). This consideration addressed the
degree to which new or advanced technology enhanced the cost, safety, etc. of a
transportation architecture. For this study, this included only new technology
systems, rather than technology advances at the subsystem or component level.
Evolution of current systems. This addressed the relative advantages and
disadvantages of evolving the current mixed fleet of launch vehicles, compared
with development of completely new systems.
Effect of return cargo requirements. This consideration quantified the impact of
return cargo requirements on the transportation architecture. Having a return
cargo requirement is a principal systems consideration in an architecture, as it
requires a distinct vehicle (either expendable or reusable) to return a payload. In
most cases, this would preclude delivery of the payload on an ELV.
Other considerations were not addressed in this study. Although these other
considerations may be important in and of themselves, they were judged by the
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study team to be of lesser importance, or significantly more difficult to quantify,
compared with the above considerations. Also, since the team believed that it
would encounter resource limitations and difficulty in getting valid data to make
comparisons of options which would address these considerations, it decided to
defer an assessment of these for this study. However, the team felt that all of these
warranted additional study. These are summarized below:
Influence of total SEI transportation requirements. Because transportation
requirements for SEI would be of such a magnitude greater than Earth-to-Orbit
requirements, and given the uncertainty of these requirements, the study team
chose only to include the impact of crew delivery to support SEI missions on the
ETO transportation systems.
Use of foreign assets. This would address the use on non-U.S, transportation
assets for delivery or return of people or cargo. Though the study team felt this
was an important consideration, it was not able to get the pertinent data (launch
vehicle cost, reliability, etc.) from foreign sources within the required study time
frame.
Reusable versus expendable personnel carriers. This referred specifically to the
trade of reusable versus expendable personnel launch system (PLS) concepts.
This was deemed to be a lower level effect than the architecture-level focus of the
study would indicate.
The extent of evolution for the .Space Shuttle. This addressed the idea that,
given that evolution is the "right" answer, what level of evolution makes the
most sense. Again, this was deemed to be a trade-study to be done at a level
lower than the architecture-level focus of this study.
The degree to which technology should be "pushed" to meet an early need. This
would explore the relationship between funding and technology readiness, i.e., if
a certain technology was required, what level of near-term expenditures would
be required to meet a specific program schedule. The study team felt it did not
have sufficient information to assess this effect.
2-8 Rev. E
2.3 GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
In the real world, initial constraints often exist that will constrain the trade space to
be explored in an architecture study. These extremely top-level requirements or
groundrules, called "stone tablet" requirements, are not tradeable and must be met
by all architectures without exception. These requirements were developed by the
NIT consensus, and represent the best estimation of what types of groundrules
would be considered inviolate by senior agency management. Some are based less
on engineering trade studies than on perception or policy. One way to see these
requirements is to think of the customer asking the following question: "I don't care
what the architecture looks like, as long as it does the following: "
On August 16, 1991 the NIT held a brainstorming session to develop a list of stone
tablet requirements. The inputs were subsequently grouped into different types of
ideas:
• Space Policy
• Minimum Attribute Values
• Operational Constraints
• Baselined Architecture Solutions
At this point, debate on each suggestion ensued until consensus was reached on
which items should survive as stone tablets. Both the six items that survived and
the list of rejected items are presented here, in no particular order, along with some
elaboration on the decision to accept or reject the idea.
2.3.1 MTS Stone Tablet Requirements
There can be no reliance on foreign countries to develop elements.- The proper
role of existing foreign elements within an architecture is left as a trade or
sensitivity to be explored through alternative architectures (see section 3.3). In
deference to those who consider space hardware development as much a
contribution to national prestige, knowledge, and future competitiveness as it is
to science, no architectural scenario will require the development of any
element for its successful implementation. In addition, the United States would
have little control over the development schedule of an element for which it
did not have any budget authority. An example would be a fully operational
Hermes in support of the SSF permanently manned capability (PMC) which
represents a schedule risk that is not within NASA's purview and also aids and
abets the technological prowess of a competitor. This did not preclude use of
existing foreign assets.
SSF will be assembled with the Space Shuttle up to PMC.- The design of the
SSF, which could theoretically be changed, was deemed mature enough to
assume that the station elements are designed in a way that can only be
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deployed or assembled by a Space Shuttle Orbiter. To avoid the concern that this
reinforcing logic could perpetuate the Space Shuttle beyond a date where it may
be undesirable for other reasons, it was decided that SSF activities after PMC
could be supported by some other transportation element(s). This implies, for
example, that growth modules could be redesigned for launch on an ELV.
The SSF design through PMC is fixed.- The design of the SSF and its
experiments, which could theoretically be changed to better match the
capabilities of a given architecture, was deemed mature enough to assume that
the station elements' mass and volume are already set. To avoid the concern
that this reinforcing logic could perpetuate the Space Shuttle beyond a date
where it may be undesirable for other reasons, it was decided that SSF activities
after PMC could be supported by some other transportation element(s). This
implies, for example, that logistics modules and/or their constituent cargo could
be significantly redesigned, including exploring expendability options.
The operational requirements, procedures, and constraints of the SSF and other
on-orbit assets are fixed.- Although the approach to transporting payloads and
people may vary, the operational rules associated with SSF and certain on-orbit
assets must be adhered to. For example, the rendezvous and docking procedures
for the SSF imply the element must have the capability of controlling the
velocity vectors within the SSF-specified levels.
Mixed fleet manifest will be used to define the architecture through
1996.- Although it may be shown that certain elements may be phased out as
soon as possible in the best interests of the architecture, it was assumed that the
planning and procurement of transportation elements, and the flight and
facilities manifesting that goes with them, has already commenced and is
unlikely to be altered until after 1996.
No international treaties will be violated.- It has been, and remains, the stated
policy of the United States to cooperate with other nations so that the benefits of
space reach all humankind. This cooperation takes the form of joint efforts,
international contracts, and compliance with international law and treaties. In
some cases, the generated architectures have no relationship to these treaties;
when the specifics of operations are explored, there may be some consideration
due to these international agreements. The following treaties and conventions
have been ratified by the United States and are in effect.
"Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space,
and Underwater," in force October 10, 1963. Context is self-explanatory;
impact to this study precludes the manifesting of any DOD flights that
would include nuclear weapons.
"Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," in
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force October 10, 1967. This so-called "Outer Space Treaty" establishes
celestial bodies as open to all scientific investigation by any state and
precludes any nation from claiming sovereignty, or from placing weapons
of mass destruction on those celestial bodies, or in space. Similar to the
Antarctica Treaties, there still is some question as to how commercialization
and/or resource utilization would be handled. To achieve compliance,
within the scope of the architectures (extending to 2020), exploration should
be limited to a national program, such as SEI, and commercial ventures
(such as the Lunar Hilton) should be omitted.
"Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space", in force December 3, 1968.
The spirit of this treaty ensures the return of astronauts who land in foreign
terrain or on the high seas. The implication is that emergency/abort to a
signatory state is acceptable. Performance capabilities to reach the
continental United States in any contingency, for example, should not be a
requirement.
"Converition on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects", in force October 9, 1973. This is a complex treaty that basically states
that liability is assessed to the state from which the object was launched. For
example, the United States is liable for damages that a spent stage might
cause to another country after a launch of a commercial launch vehicle.
There are several other conventions, such as the "Convention of the
Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space," the International
Telecommunications Convention (frequency allocations), and patent law, that
are assumed to be met by all candidate elements. The legal policies for space
environment (pollution) and jurisdiction are still evolving. For a
transportation system, legal jurisdiction is governed by the launching countries'
rules from the time the hatch is closed on the launch pad to the time the
payload is delivered to orbit.
2.3.2 Rejected Stone Tablet Requirement Ideas
National Security is a top priority.- Historically, the DOD has provided for its
own launch facilities and vehicles. It is conceivable, however, that future
architectures may include a more integrated use of transportation assets. In the
event of a crisis situation where access to space is considered a national
imperative, civilian manifesting could be altered to accommodate the DOD. It
was the opinion of the majority of the NIT that accounting for this possibility
would require a level of modelling sophistication that may not be justified,
since it would be unreasonable to expect full manifest resiliency in the event of
a major national crisis.
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No use of foreign launch services is permitted.- The argument against using
foreign launch services is based on a heritage that found it advantageous to use
U.S. assets exclusively for reasons of national security, internal economic
growth, less scheduling risk, and national prestige. The next 30 years promise to
be significantly different, with international ventures and contracts increasingly
more commonplace. In the area of launch vehicles, technology transfer is
becoming less of an issue as several nations have mature systems. In general,
the United States is opposed to protectionist policies, and seems to be moving
toward accepting the legality of allowing the user to select their preferred launch
service provider. The proper role of foreign assets will be explored in the
architecture options (see section 3.3).
Must be consistent with National Launch Policy (NLP).- Existing national policy
enables governmental leadership to plan space development efforts within an
accepted framework. A goal of the HTS study is to quantify the impact of the
NLP on an architecture over time. For example, there are no current plans to
build any more Space Shuttle Orbiters; what would be the impact if two more
were added to the fleet? Rather than limit the study to options that are wholly
consistent with national policy, other possibilities will be explored to document
the effect of alternative "policies".
Must ensure dual access.- Dual access is defined here as the ability to do all the
"jobs" two separate ways. While this seductive possibility would virtually
eliminate issues of dependability, availability, resiliency, and loss of prestige
associated with a major failure, it could be very expensive. The requirement for
dual access was thought by some to be a reaction to a series of failures in the
mid-1980's, and not a rational groundrule for all future operations. Dual access
may be addressed in the architecture options.
New ways of doing business must be included in candidate architectures.- Some
of the most fertile areas for realizing future improvements in cost and
operability involve the successful implementation of new methods of doing
business and/or operations (see section 3.4). It is not a forgone conclusion, in
the opinion of this group, that the customer would chose to implement these
suggestions for all elements, especially existing ones. To that extent, it was
decided that the best place to explore the benefits of these ideas would be in
"Task 4: New Ways of Doing Business" (see section 2.1.4).
New elements must advance the state-of-the-art.- In the past, it was a foregone
conclusion that each new element would and should advance the nation's
scientific and engineering knowledge. Within the context of a perceived shift in
priorities that places more budgetary emphasis on the payload and less on the
transportation system itself, the NIT consensus was that, in many cases, the
dictate to use new technology is often incompatible with the stated
transportation goals of low cost and high safety and should, therefore, not be a
requirement. This would not preclude NASA from pursuing new technology,
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but would distinguish operational systems (used to meet the transportation
needs defined in this study) from developmental systems.
The government is not the developer nor the operator of the human-tended
transportation elements.- This concept is similar to the fifth item. Again, while
this requirement may be an excellent idea, it was thought that it could best be
explored in section 2.1.4.
No new system will achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) before
1999.- Given the typical development and manufacturing cycle of new
aerospace hardware, this constraint is probably a realistic one. It was decided,
however, that there is no reason to preclude the possibility of an aggressive, new
program that could come into use sooner than 1999, leaving it instead as an
architectural option that would be accounted for in terms of cost and risk.
The Industrial Space Facility (ISF) will be deployed by the Space Shuttle.- As
currently envisioned, the ISF is designed to be deployed by the Space Shuttle. It
is conceivable, given that the ISF hardware has yet to be produced, that it could
be designed to be launched on another vehicle, in which case this requirement
was viewed as an unnecessary constraint..
Use only Western Test Range (WTR) and Eastern Test Range (ETR) launch
sites.- Developing new launch sites is an expensive proposition. National
security may also require a limitation on the number and location of launch
sites. Also, by only specifying these two launch sites, any cost estimations
(including operations, facilities, range safety, etc.) would reflect a high degree of
confidence in the data. If properly accounted for, a new launch site could be
included in an architecture. This proposed requirement will not be considered
because of the absence of any quantifiable data on the undesirability of another
launch site.
No west coast launch sites.- This proposed requirement is similar to the above
item. In this case as well, the requirement will be dropped from further
consideration, in the absence of specific measures of merit for limiting launch
sites.
SSF and all "Big Science" type payloads will be prevented from falling from orbit
at all costs.- The consequences of a premature entry of complex, large, orbital
payloads can be considerable in terms of cost (hardware, lost data, etc.), prestige,
and impact hazards. There is a strong impetus, therefore, to make the
establishment of procedures, hardware elements, and scheduling to prevent the
entry of these large payloads a priority. As was the case in some other suggested
requirements, the NIT felt that it would be difficult to credibly predict when a
crisis would occur; since a crisis would be dealt with at that time with available
resources, it would not, therefore, be a separate requirement.
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Current systems are restricted by current range-safety constraints.- Over the
years of operating launch vehicles, NASA and the DOD have developed very
clear and effective range safety procedures that have resulted in superior safety
records. The proposed requirement seeks to limit current systems to using those
proven features and constraints. The NIT concluded this policy should result
from careful range safety studies for new and existing systems, not from a
mandated requirement.
Provide 2 days additional loiter time to achieve additional landing
opportunities.- Additional on-orbit loiter time enables a low energy phasing to
occur that would result in more landing opportunities in the event that the
planned landing has been waved off. It was the group's feeling that whether the
capability is 2 days, x orbits, or whatever, it should be determined as a system
trade, not a levied requirement.
Minimize extravehicular activity (EVA).- This is an activity that is both a risky
and expensive aspect of spaceflight, and should be minimized. It was felt that
this idea would be more appropriate as a design guideline, than as a stone tablet,
in that it would be impossible to define what an acceptable minimum level of
EVA would be.
All new elements are to be largely reusable.- There is a widely-held perception
that reusability is a desirable system feature. Recurring and manufacturing costs
can be reduced. Expendability, however, also has a place in an architecture,
especially in cases where only a few flights are needed. It was decided to defer
this issue to an architectural option, rather than legislating an unsubstantiated
assertion as a requirement.
Human systems will accommodate "average" deconditioned humans.-The
trend in human spaceflight has been away from the test pilot astronaut and
towards the scientist/mission specialist astronaut. These latter individuals tend
to come from a more average physical population than the extraordinary
physiological capabilities exhibited by a test pilot population. Future systems
must account for the decrease in average tolerance to g-levels, dexterity, etc.
While there was no dispute with the statement, the group felt that this policy
requirement is superfluous in the context of discriminating between candidate
architectures.
The average system downtime after a major failure will be TBD months.- This
proposed requirement falls under the category of minimum attribute values.
To that end, the NIT decided that this idea is not a stone tablet requirement, but
will be addressed in the attribute discussion (section 3.2).
Personnel vehicles must have on-board intervention capability.- The ability of
on-board personnel to have input to the events that occur during flight has been
debated for 30 years. The proposed requirement reflects policy and philosophy,
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rather than a technical decision. We could not hope to conclusively resolve this
issue in this study; it was determined that this represents a level of design detail
that won't be considered in the elements anyway, and is therefore unnecessary
as a top-level requirement.
Personnel vehicles must be "piloted".- The role of a human "pilot" has also
been a subject of recent debate both in the spacecraft and aircraft communities.
Technically, the nation has reached a level of technological sophistication where
flight vehicles can be safely flown with no trained pilot onboard. When it will
be permitted for human-tended vehicles to be operated in this fashion is
unknown. The NIT declined to include this requirement, based on previous
studies that showed the gross technical differences in the elements of weight,
cost, etc. for piloted and non-piloted versions were insignificant to the
architecture as a whole.
All the "jobs" must be done on time.- To enable an exact comparison between
architectures, it would be necessary to demand that each candidate completes the
delivery of all payloads and completes all other mission types before 2021. This
requirement could, however, mandate excessive resiliency or excess capacity
when accounting for random, worst-case scenarios. The NIT decided that as
long as the proposed architecture has the basic capacity to complete all the jobs
in the absence of major schedule disruptions, it will be acceptable.
The architecture can survive a catastrophic loss.- In the event of a catastrophic
loss involving one or more major elements, there is always the possibility that
national leadership could decide to cancel programs or elements, rather than
proceeding with a recovery plan. While it was acknowledged that such a
possibility could occur, the NIT decided against declaring whether or not an
architecture will always return to it's original element mix.
Probability of launching priority payloads is greater than TBD.- This proposed
requirement falls under the category of minimum attribute values. To that end,
the NIT decided that this idea is not a stone tablet requirement, but will be
addressed in the attribute discussion (section 3.2).
Reliability is greater than TBD.- This proposed requirement falls under the
category of minimum attribute values. To that end, the NIT decided that this
idea is not a stone tablet requirement, but will be addressed in the attribute
discussion (section 3.2).
Dependability of 95 percent within 2 weeks of scheduled launch.- This proposed
requirement falls under the category of minimum attribute values. To that end,
the NIT decided that this idea is not a stone tablet requirement, but will be
addressed in the attribute discussion (section 3.2).
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Q All systems must be at least as safe as TBD.- This proposed requirement falls
under the category of minimum attribute values. To that end, the NIT decided
that this idea is not a stone tablet requirement, but will be addressed in the
attribute discussion (section 3.2).
Total Life Cycle Cost (LCC) is less than TBD.- This proposed requirement falls
under the category of minimum attribute values. To that end, the NIT decided
that this idea is not a stone tablet requirement, but will be addressed in the
attribute discussion (section 3.2).
The transportation system should be environmentally "friendly".- Recently, a
large amount of attention has been given to our impact on the environment,
including space launch activities. As stated, the requirement lacks an acceptable
threshold. It was decided to treat environmental impact as an attribute, which
could reflect the continuum of relative impact a given architecture might
exhibit.
Humans must remain in the launch decision process.- In the advent of
automated procedures and vehicle health monitoring technologies, it is possible
to fully automate the launch decision process to account for all measurable data.
There will continue to be value in the role of a human to make a judgement,
based on the data presented. Even accounting for human error, it was
considered unacceptable that a computer could commit to the launch of a
personnel vehicle. While there was no dispute with the statement, the group
felt that this policy requirement is superfluous in the context of discriminating
between candidate architectures.
Abort must be provided for in all flight phases.- There has been much scrutiny
(especially post-Challenger) of the ability of a vehicle to safely abort at all times
during its flight. The time periods where no escape exists in the event of a
catastrophic failure are typically short, but the loss of personnel is unacceptable,
regardless of when it occurs. The inclusion of abort capability can impose
significant performance penalties. The consensus of the group was that, while a
worthy goal, the proposed requirement was better served by trade studies that
adequately account for costs of providing and costs of not providing (cost of
failure) an all-aspect abort system.
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SECTION 3
STUDY TASKS
3.1 TASK 1 - HTS NEEDS ANALYSIS
3.1.1 Introduction
To facilitate identification of the requirements and potential options for the next
HTS, a needs analysis was performed from which space transportation architectures
were created and analyzed. This analysis identified the number, mass, type, and
destination of human and untended payloads to space. The payloads were then
broken into several categories based on a common mission or theme.
The needs model is based on the NASA Mixed Fleet Manifest and the CNDB FY90
version with Space Station restructure modifications and an additional
representative DOD mission model. Upper-stage weights for those payloads going
beyond LEO and required support equipment were not included. This was,
however, accounted for when flight manifests were generated for the transportation
architectures. Payloads were categorized as "Untended" or "Human Receipt at
Destination." The only missions requiring a human categorization were for SSF
and SEI crew delivery. All other missions were dassified as "Human Receipt." All
mission payload crew sizes were four persons, although extra persons might be
required to support and operate the human vehicle.
Needs-Based versus Capability-Based Approaches
To compare architectures on an even basis each architecture must meet the same set
of requirements. This needs-based approach was accomplished by establishing a
common model of the space transportation needs. The architectures could then be
compared because each was performing the same set of missions.
The alternative is to compare architectures by the capabilities of the space
transportation elements that comprise them. The underlying assumption is that the
user community will make use of any vehicle that is available (i.e., let the
transportation system drive the payload design and operational requirements as a
higher priority to the mission). Although there may be some realism to this
philosophy with respect to how new systems are sold to Congress, there is a danger
in developing a launch system that does not meet user requirements or that
requires extensive modifications to payloads or their carrying vehicles. In addition,
it becomes difficult to compare these architectures or systems to each other. For
instance, larger payload capability does not necessarily mean cost efficiency because
some flights may only be partially filled. Also, minimum cost architectures may not
meet the flight rate or performance requirements of the users.
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Previous Studies
One of the more notable studies performed on the future of space transportation
was the STAS, which was performed in the mid-1980's. At this time, the budget for
space activities was expected to grow significantly over the coming years. The
mission models developed for that study, which were later to become the CNDB
were extremely optimistic, greatly exceeding anything that could reasonably be
expected today. These missions included the SDI in its largest scale, aggressive
Lunar and Mars Initiatives, human missions to Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO),
and extensive ETO and in-LEO infrastructures. The smallest STAS mission model
(Constrained Model) is equivalent to the largest mission model currently developed
for this study.
Since the STAS, several other architecture-level analyses have been performed.
Many of these studies were performed within the scope of a specific vehicle
development program (e.g., NASP-derived vehicle (NDV) Task 11, ALS, etc.). The
purpose of these studies usually focused on assessing the role of a specific
transportation system within the national space architecture. The mission models
developed were often modified to enhance the characteristics of the system being
studied.
The Next Manned Transportation System (NMTS) study was performed in 1989 to
assess future human transportation requirements. The needs model for this study
was primarily based on the CNDB with a series of additional groundrules.
More recently, the STIS at MSFC has been analyzing architectural impacts of various
systems, missions, and operations. The STIS has taken a similar approach to the
HTS Study in the needs analysis area. The difference between STIS and HTS lies less
in the needs model area and more in the choice of architectures selected for study
and the evaluation process used.
3.1.2 The CNDB
Background/Description
The CNDB was established in 1985 by NASA Headquarters to project future, civil-
space payload requirements. These requirements are developed in the various
NASA Headquarters Codes and are then integrated and released by the Office of
Spaceflight Development. The payload types range from Space Station build-up and
logistics support, to Spacelab missions, to Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS)
deployment, to small experiments such as growth of frog eggs and fruit flies. Each
payload in the database has a description of the mass and volume requirements,
return payload requirements, whether the payload requires human interaction, the
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date of first launch, the number of required launches, and programmatic points of
contact.
Analysis of the CNDB
For the FITS study, the standard RBASE version of the CNDB was converted for use
on the Macintosh using the Acius 4th Dimension database management program.
The payloads of the CNDB were then divided into seven distinct mission types:
SSF, Satellite Servicing, Support Assets, Industrial Space Facility, Sortie Science,
Base, and SEI. In addition, a DOD mission model was incorporated into the study.
These mission types are described in detail later.
One of the most interesting results found in reviewing the CNDB is that the
proposed mass to be sent to orbit during the next 15 years is seven times greater than
that sent to orbit during the past 15 years (see Figure 3.1.2-1). This reflects the
expectation of increased space flight activity (e.g., SSF). Nearly two-thirds of all non-
SEI, non-DOD mass that will be delivered until 2020, is to build and support SSF.
Also, 43 percent (by mass) of payloads require crews to be aboard the launch vehicle.
Finally, one quarter of all mass sent to space is to be returned; the majority of that is
the return of Space Station logistics modules. Two-thirds of the payloads (by
number) weigh less than 1000 pounds and 80 percent weigh less than 10 000 pounds
(see Figure 3.1.2-2). For the return payloads, 83 percent of these payloads weigh less
than 1000 pounds, and 94 percent weigh less than 10 000 pounds (see Figure 3.1.2-3).
Shortcomings of the CNDB
There were several difficulties in using the CNDB for the HTS study. Some of these
were compensated for by simplifying assumptions in the HTS Needs Model. Others
could not be handled, and their inclusion in future versions of the CNDB would
enhance results obtained in future space transportation architecture analyses.
First, many payload requirements are based on the current transportation
architecture. Examples include requiring payloads to be returned based on Space
Shuttle flight-return capability rather than a true need for the returned payload, and
requiring SSF payloads to be serviced at each crew rotation opportunity. It is
recommended that hard payload requirements should drive the systems which
comprise the space transportation architecture, not the reverse.
Second, a large number of payloads in the CNDB claim to require human
interaction with the payload (e.g., Advanced X-Ray Astronomy Facility (AXAF)).
Many of these payloads could be placed on cargo vehicles or could simply require
personnel at the destination, such as for SSF payloads. Similarly, many payloads
have a return requirement, the necessity of which should also be carefully
considered.
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Third, one of the problems in analyzing payloads from the CNDB is that there is no
sense of the urgency or criticality for launching a particular payload at a particular
point in time. An attempt to avoid this has been made by defining mission types
which have roughly the same level of need. If a mission type is included within a
transportation architecture scenario, all missions within that type will be flown.
Some payloads may require a very specific launch window (e.g., a Pluto fly-by or
Mars Observer) which might make that payload much more critical in terms of on-
time launching than perhaps an LEO Great Observatory. To this end, NASA should
develop a way to assess or rank a payload based on its criticality. These criticality
levels should appear with the payload descriptions in the CNDB. This could be
done in four levels:
• Loss of life or major infrastructure component (e.g., SSF reboos0
• Loss of mission opportunity window (e.g., Mars flight)
• Loss of minor infrastructure component or mission (e.g., Hubble Space Telescope
(HST), Long-Duration Exposure Facility retrieval)
• Little or no impact of delays to mission success (e.g., Spacelab Simulator-I,
Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) deployment).
Finally, there are at least two ways of skeptically viewing the payload model
credibility of the CNDB. The first view claims there are many more payloads in the
data base than will be flown. While it is true there are many placeholders in the
data base, and that future payload projections are much higher than the nation has
launched into space in recent history, it is also true that the space program is
proposing much more ambitious endeavors in space by building a permanent space
station, attempting to return to the Moon, and going to Mars. The second view
states there are many more payloads "out there" than have been incorporated into
the data base and/or if the transportation infrastructure had enhanced capabilities at
reduced cost, there would be many more payload requirements.
As a result, some believe that because the CNDB does have shortcomings, it should
not be used or that a mission model approach is not appropriate. Shortcomings
should not invalidate the use of mission models, rather their presence demands
greater rigor in developing hard payload requirements.
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3.1.3 HTS Needs Model
3.1.3.1 Modifications to the Needs Model
A principal implication of using the CNDB in an unmodified form would be to
require an architecture that includes a system with Space Shuttle-like characteristics.
Because of the "Human" requirement specified by many of the payloads in the
CNDB, the systems that carry crew and cargo on the same vehicle are the only ones
that would correctly capture these missions (i.e., Space Shuttle). In addition, because
of the identified delivery and return payload sizes, at the least a Space Shuttle-like
capability would be required to perform certain delivery and return missions.
Payload Requirements
Due to the difficulty in understanding what true human requirements were, all
"human" and "Space Shuttle" requirements were changed to "Human Receipt at
Destination". This means that instead of requiring that personnel fly with the
payload or that a payload must fly on the Space Shuttle, a payload was only required
to have human interaction with the payload while on orbit. This allowed
transportation architectures which would separate people and cargo. While it was
highly likely that a Spacelab mission would be flown aboard the Space Shuttle, it
was not required.
Smoothing
Because the near-term (before 2000) space transportation needs are easier to predict
than the longer term (after 2000), the CNDB exhibits a "bow wave effect", that is,
payload requirements in the next few years greatly exceed the out-year requirements.
Many believe that this requirements.bow wave will continue to exist at any point in
time because of the emphasis on near term mission planning. Designing an
architecture to meet this type of time-phased effect would be shortsighted. To
effectively assess the architectural impacts through 2020 and the life cycle cost of
various systems, the HTS study needed a mission model that accurately reflected the
most probable space missions through this time period. Therefore, the study team
chose to perform a smoothing on the mission types that would otherwise dwindle
to near zero in the out-years. Figure 3.1.3.1 illustrates the idea of smoothing on the
level of mission type flight activity. Five of the mission types were subsequently
smoothed in this fashion.
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3.1.3.2 Mission Types
The payloads in the HTS Needs Model were divided into eight mission types or
groups of activity that had similar characteristics. These mission types are described
below. Appendix A (see Volume II) provides a summary of the mission model
payload requirements by mission type and year. Commercial payload requirements
were not included, since these would have little or no cost impacts to any proposed
transportation architecture.
DOD
This category includes piloted and unpiloted DOD missions. Though not a part of
the CNDB, the NASA-Industry team believed it was important to include DOD
requirements, since their Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) and human flight
requirements, as well as ground-processing facility requirements, would have a
synergistic effect on the costs of a particular transportation architecture to NASA,
and because they resulted in government expenditures whereas commercial
missions did not. The unpiloted data for this category was obtained from the MSFC
Space Transportation Infrastructure Study and is expressed in terms of vehicle class
launch rates, rather than specific missions or payloads. This is a capability-based
(number of expected flights) model due to the classified nature of the needs.
To select the DOD piloted mission requirement, 10 of the 45 Space Shuttle flights
since 1981, have been dedicated to DOD, an average of about one per year. (In the
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NASA Mixed Fleet Manifest, there is an additional flight in 1992, with no additional
flights forecasted or manifested after this.) Based on this information, DOD will
continue with a human mission requirement of one per year. It is also assumed
that the DOD piloted missions will require some cargo, but not necessarily on the
same flight or vehicle. This is a reduction from the requirement used in the NMTS
study in 1989 which identified a piloted mission requirement for future DOD
missions of three flights per year.
Base
This category is comprised of basic science and technology development payloads
which have low return requirements. Example payloads are GRO, Earth
Observation System (EOS), Cassini, and the Combined Release and Radiation Effects
Satellite (CRRES). It also includes the middeck-size payloads flown aboard the Space
Shuttle. All payloads in this category have a return requirement of less than 1000
pounds. This category should not be confused with the CNDB Base Model.
The Base mission type is comprised of the EOS, Planetary, LEO-Large (11 000 lbs.),
LEO-Small, and LEO-Human Receipt payloads. Each of these smoothed payloads are
flown once a year for an annual mass to orbit of 65 000 pounds. The LEO-Human
Receipt has the only return requirement.
Supports Assets
This category constitutes high-priority, space-based infrastructure satellites for
communications, tracking, and data relay. The nine payloads in this mission type
reflect operational versus scientific or developmental systems, and would have a
very high launch priority compared to other science or exploration missions.
Example payloads are TDRS, GN&C Orbital Environment Simulation, and the
International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT). There are no human requirements
in this category, although a few of these payloads will be carried aboard the Space
Shuttle.
The Support Asset mission type is smoothed by destination. It includes GEO-large,
Sun-synchronous, GEO-small, and mid-inclination payloads. The average mass
delivered per year is 5000 pounds.
Industrial Space Facility
This category includes those payloads which comprise the Industrial Space Facility
(ISF). For the HTS study, a reduced-scale ISF payload model was used based partially
on recommendations from the MSFC STIS. All payloads in this mission type have
a common destination.
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,Sortie Scienc_
This category includes larger, "Spacelab-type" missions which have return
requirements greater than 1000 pounds. Example payloads are Space Life Sciences,
the Astronomy Ultraviolet Telescope (ASTRO), and the International Microgravity
Laboratory. Payloads requirements in this mission type strongly reflect Space
Shuttle-based transportation architecture.
The Sortie Science mission type is categorized by four different types of payload
mixes being flown once a year from 1998 to 2020 (total of 69 000 lbs. per year). These
include Office of Space Science and Applications Cargo, Material Sdences, Earth/
Astronomy Observation, and other pressurized cargo. It is assumed all delivered
mass is returned.
Satellite Servicing
This category includes satellite servicing missions for repair, reboost, maintenance,
retrieval, and upgrade of LEO satellite systems. It does not include servicing
missions for SSF or SEI.
The Satellite Servicing mission type was smoothed from 2011 to 2020 to reflect
alternating requirements for large and small servicing flights for a total of 19 000
pounds per year. The Large Deployable Reflector and HTS servicing missions are
included prior to 2010 (8600 Ibs.).
SS__EF
This category includes those payloads which comprise SSF. This includes assembly,
utilization, logistics, crew rotation, and expansion flights modified to the latest SSF
design configuration restructure. However, the actual user payloads were the same
as those of the FY90 version of the CNDB. Even though the restructure activity will
greatly impact non-core, SSF-related payloads, developing a new payload model
with a reasonable degree of confidence would have been very difficult for this study.
Since these payloads represented only a fraction of the core station weight, it was
assumed that the overall mass of these payloads would not change significantly
from the FY90 CNDB. This assumption must be revisited, since it is likely that after
the restructure, payload requirements far exceed available capability. Therefore, data
for all non-core, SSF-related payloads came from the FY90 CNDB. However, all first
flights for the payloads were shifted later by 2 years to reflect the changes in the
station design and schedule due to restructure.
The SSF mission type was further broken down into a PMC model which included
assembly, operations, and support of the PMC configuration, and an expansion
model which included any non-SEI expansion to the PMC configuration
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(e.g., Eight-Man Crew Capability (EMCC)). All payloads in the SSF mission type
have a common destination.
In the SSF mission type, the SSF logistics and utilization flights were smoothed to
reflect a continuation Of the PMC support requirements through 2020. Similarly,
"If" scenario D was smoothed to continue the EMCC support requirements.
Since no official SSF crew rotation policy exists, the following assumptions were
made for the study so that the number of flights required to support SSF crew
rotation could be established.
The entire four-person crew during the PMC phase will be rotated every 90 days.
(After some certification, the crew would probably be rotated every other flight
for longer duration tours of duty.)
• During an eight-crew phase, only four crew members can be rotated during a
human flight. This implies a 180-day tour of duty.
• All Space Shuttle flights to the SSF have a crew of seven. Other personnel
Vehicles have crew sizes ranging from four to seven.
SEI
The model for SEI in the HTS study is based on a high-and-low traffic requirement
for crew-to-LEO to support human missions to the Moon and Mars. This
requirement was established based on recommendations of possible SEI activity
levels from the NASA 90-day Study and the Synthesis Group report. The
manifesting considered only delivery missions, since it was assumed crew return
would be handled by direct return or rendezvous with SSF. Lunar and Mars cargo
requirements were not considered since these requirements are still emerging and
the proposed scope of activities would mean large differences in the payload
requirements. Also, since it is likely that a heavy-lift launch vehicle would be
required and that this vehicle would be oversized for crew transportation
requirements, there would be little synergism between this vehicle and one required
for transporting crew to LEO. This assumption will be revisited in future studies.
3.1.4 HTS Data Base Summary
Once the above modifications had been incorporated, the resultant needs set was
renamed the HTS Data Base. Table 3.1.4 shows the total mass delivery and return
requirements by mission type for the study data base over the study time frame.
Note again that the overall delivery mass in the HTS data base excludes the SEI
cargo requirements. Individual mission type requirements are somewhat higher
than the CNDB requirements since (smoothed) payloads have been added in the
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out-years to account for ongoing support requirements. Appendix A (see
Volume II) provides a summary of the mission model by mission type and year.
TABLE 3.1.4.- SUMMARY OF HTS MISSION MODEL PAYLOADS
BY MISSION TYPE (1991-2020)
Mission Type Total Mass Up Total Mass Down
(klbs) (klbs)
SSF find science) 7405 4487
Sortie Science' 2531 2565
212 0Support Assets
ISF
Sat Serv (no SEI or SSF)
107 13
259 214
i
Base 1463 182
SEI - -
,i
DOD - -
TOTAL 11 9"77 7461
Finally, the eight mission types were combined into five levels of possible future
space activity. These levels are called "If" scenarios, i.e., "If the range of expected
space activity includes..." These levels are additive and represent increasing levels
of requirements, not only in terms of payload to and from space but also additional
vehicle capabilities (RMS systems, on-orbit stay times, etc.) Dividing proposed space
activity into different levels gives the customer insight into the effect of various
payload requirements on the space transportation architecture.
The five activity scenarios are shown in Figure 3.1.4-1. "If" scenario A represents
what would likely be the minimum level of space activity the nation would pursue.
"If" scenario B represents the current level of space activity. "If" scenarios C and D
represent the addition of SSF and its proposed expansion. Finally, "If" scenario E
represents the inclusion of the SEI crew missions. These "If" scenarios are then
used to manifest the system concepts of interest across the range of transportation
architectures to be studied. Figures 3.1.4-2 and 3.1.4-3 show the Human Receipt mass
required to be delivered and returned per year for the various activity levels.
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Figure 3.1.4-1.- HTS "If" scenarios, "If the range of expected
space activity includes...".
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Figure 3.1.4-2.- Human receipt mass up per year for each "If" scenario.
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Figure 3.1.4-3.- Human receipt mass down per year for each "If" scenario.
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3.2 TASK 2 - IDENTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ATTRIBUTES
The HTS Study was initiated to gather data to determine the right transportation
system architecture(s) needed for human access to space. To determine this set, a
method for comparing the candidate systems had to be defined. Attributes are the
means that the HTS study team used to make those comparisons. Attributes allow
comparison of elements that meet the requirements and the needs (mission model).
This section discusses the need for and definition of attributes, as well as the process
used to determine them.
3.2.1 Approach
One of the first tasks that the HTS team set out to address was the definition of the
attributes that would be used in the FITS study. The attributes chosen and the
measurement techniques used determined what information would be needed
about each of the concepts being investigated. The attributes ultimately chosen by
the HTS team were derived from a list of nearly 130 attributes that were initially
proposed. Certain techniques used in Quality Functional Deployments (QFD) were
used to arrive at consensus on the final list.
The attributes defined in detail for this study are: Funding Profile, Probability of
Mission Success (PMS), Human Safety, Architecture Cost Risk (ACR), Launch
Schedule Confidence (LSC), Environment, Dependability, Availability, Resiliency,
Alternate Access, and Mission Growth Potential. Each of these is listed below along
with its definition.
Midway through the study it became apparent that some of the lower-weighted
attributes were taking a large percentage of the available study time to calculate. It
was also felt by the HTS team that the measurements needed for two of the
attributes in particular (Dependability and Availability) were difficult to generate
and more difficult to justify. Therefore, the calculation of these five attributes was
deferred to a follow-on phase. These attributes indude: Dependability, Availability,
Resiliency, Alternate Access, and Mission Growth Potential. While the
Environment attribute was judged to be less important than the other five, its
calculations were essentially completed, and so the HTS team decided to continue to
use it and observe its effect on the architecture decisions. Its relative importance,
however, was not increased above those that had been deleted. Given that the three
operations-related attributes; Dependability, Availability, and Resiliency, were
eliminated in this phase, the group felt that some indication of an architecture's
ability to meet launch schedules should be included. Therefore, the LSC attribute
was defined. It is simpler to calculate than the others, but unfortunately is also a less
accurate indicator of an architecture's ability to meet schedules.
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3.2.1.1 Definition of an Attribute
Attributes are the means by which an architecture's "goodness" is determined in
order that it may be compared with other architecture options. Attributes must
have certain characteristics in order to be useful in performing this comparison
function. Many of these characteristics have been effectively described by Dr.
Deming in the context of how important measurement is in improving the quality
of any system. These important characteristics of attributes are listed below.
a. To be useful in comparison, the attribute must be defined and be measurable.
"An operational definition puts communicable meaning into
a concept. Adjectives like good, reliable, uniform, round, tired,
safe, unsafe, unemployed have no communicable meaning until
they are expressed in operational terms of sampling, test, and
criterion."1
b. The measurements must be repeatable, which in turn means that the
calculations are well understood and the assumptions are clear and used
consistently across each architecture.
"An operational definition.., must be communicable, with
the same meaning to vendor as to purchaser, same meaning
yesterday and today... Without an operational definition,
investigations of a problem will be costly and ineffective, almost
certain to lead to endless bickering and controversy. "1
c. A level of detail and accuracy of the measurements needs to be agreed upon.
There are no absolute right or wrong values for any measurement.
"Any physical measurement is the result of applying a given
procedure. Likewise with the count of people in an area. It is to
be expected that two procedures for measurement or for
counting will give different results. Neither of the two figures is
right and the other wrong. The experts in the subject matter
may have a preference, however. "I
d. Also, no new system will have the detail or empirical data that the Space
Shuttle system has until the system is built and flown for over 50 flights.
However, the agency cannot afford to build every option and fly it before it
makes a decision. Therefore a preferred procedure specifying the level of detail
and accuracy adequate to make decisions at the chosen level must be defined.
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"A preferred procedure is distinguished by the fact that it
supposedly gives or would give results nearest to what are
needed for a particular end... "1
The weighting of each attribute relative to the other attributes must be
determined. It is the combination of all the weighted attribute scores that
determines the best answer. Weighting is important to understand, because
every customer does it in the process of making decisions, whether he does it
consciously or unconsciously. The magnifying of one attribute, by expending
resources and placing emphasis on it solely, misses the fact that few decisions
are made based on a single criterion.
3.2.1.2 QFD Process for Determining Study Attributes
To determine the attributes, it was important to do two things. The first step
involved getting a large cross-section of the aerospace community's views,
opinions, and ideas about what important characteristics (attributes) the next
should have. The second step required getting a consensus from this group as to
what the most important of these characteristics (attributes) would be. These would
be the attributes used in the Frrs study. The first objective was met by creating the
HTS team, as described in section 2.1.1. Members of the team included
representatives of the major aerospace corporations, as well as the major NASA
centers. A forum was set up to accomplish the second objective. The forum was
comprised of representatives from each of the HTS team centers or contractors.
Rules for discussion (some derived from QFD techniques) were established in order
to facilitate the meeting of the objective. The HTS forum began by using three 8-
hour sessions. At the end of these three sessions, the name and definition of the
major attributes had been agreed to. During the next three months, detailed
measurement techniques for the attributes were developed and later agreed to by the
forum in follow-up meetings. The major rules of the forum were as follows.
ao
b°
c.
Keep the forum to a controllable size. This allows adequate time for each
member to participate. The HTS forum was limited to 12 people. If other
persons in a representatives group wanted to add something, they would funnel
it through the forum representative of that group.
Keep the membership of the forum consistent and make attendance mandatory.
If the people on the forum are constantly changing, much time is lost educating
the new members on the previous work of the forum.
Use a facilitator. The facilitator should be knowledgeable on the subject being
discussed and be able to focus the group and keep it on track without controlling
the discussion.
d. Allow each member to discuss their position without being interrupted.
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e. The time allotted for the forum must be adequate for the group to reach
consensus.
The forum proceeded using the following process. First, an agreement on who the
customer for the next transportation system would be. The forum began by defining
the responsibilities of the person who was likely to be the customer. Those
responsibilities included (a) ensuring that the transportation needs are
accomplished, (b) resolving what the total (human and untended) transportation
architecture should be, (c) determining how that architecture is implemented and
operated, and (d) deciding how the total architecture is funded. After much
discussion, the HTS forum agreed that the NASA administrator best fit this
description.
The forum then proceeded to brainstorm on what attributes the customer would
consider important. Over 100 separate attributes were suggested. Then similar
attributes were grouped and definitions were refined. The first gathering of
attributes is shown in Table 3.2.1.1-1 (no prioritization is implied).
TABLE 3.2.1.1-1.- FIRST GROUP OF ATTRIBUTES
Schedule/l_k Group
Cost Risk
TechnicalRisk
Schedule Risk
Launch-On-Demand
Schedule Assurance
Cost Group
Production Cost
Fixed Cost
Marginal Cost
Non-recurring Cost
Procurement Cost
Discounted LCC
S/Flight
Operations Costs
UnreliabilityCosts
Peak Year Funding
Affordable
Cost Less
$/Ib
Lowest LCC
Opportunity loss to
grounded fleet
Assure;] Access Group
'Assured' Access
Dual Access
Alternate Access
_eliability Group
Dependability
Supportability Routine
Robustness
Reliability
Avoilability Group
Availability
Maintainability
Operability
Resiliency
'Other' Group
Facilities
Complexity
MTBF
Capability
STS Complimentary Ops
Support of STS Phaseout
IOC date
Flight Rate
Responsiveness
Enabling Group
Longer Duration
Excess Payload Capability
Servicing Missions
High Inclination Orbits
Growth Potential
Enhanced Capabilities
Supply-Side Capability
S_fetyGroup
Robust Abort Capability
Number ofCat. Failure
Modes
Abort inAllPhases
Abort Capability
Minimize Crew Losses
No gaps in crew escape
Landing Opportunities
Complexity
Crew can survive cat. loss
Crew Impairment
Publicperception Group
NationalPrestige
Confidence
PoliticallyAcceptable
Spinoffs
Broad Constituency
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TABLE 3.2.1.1-1.- FIRST GROUP OF ATTRIBUTES (CONCLUDED)
Flexibility Group
Operational Versatility
Landing Opportunities
Level of Autonomy
International Capability
ACRV Functionality BIT
All Inclination Launch
'Other' Group - Concluded
New Technology
New Elements push SOTA
Uninterrupted Fit. Ops
Number of Failure Modes
Must do all jobs on time
Fewer Problems
Ease of System Upgrades
(Modularity)
Public Perception Group - Concl.
Environmentally Friendly
Excitement
Aesthetics
Early Results
The next attempt at consensus resulted in a reduced list of attributes (again, in no
particular order). These discussions involved critically evaluating each attribute,
removing requirements, and removing unmeasurable items. The reduced attribute
set is shown in Table 3.2.1.1-2.
TABLE 3.2.1.1-2.- REDUCED LIST OF ATTRIBUTES
Flexibility
Safety
DDT&E Cost
LCC
Availability
Cost of Failure
Supportability
Schedule Risk
Job Complete
Procurement Costs
Operational Versatility
Maintainability
Fixed Cost
Robustness
Reliability
Funding Profile
Resiliency
Margins
Technical Risk
Operations Costs
Other (perception)
PMS
Producibility
Dependability
Enabling
Marginal Cost
Operability
AssuK_l Access
Routine
Cost Risk
Alternate Access
Further debate and voting ensued to reduce the list to its final form. The votes
taken were not to enforce majority rule, but to limit the list to the attributes the
group thought most important. If, for instance, a member of the forum was the
only member to think a particular attribute was highly weighted, it was not auto-
matically eliminated. A discussion ensued where the defender of the attribute
would propose why he felt the attribute was important. This allowed the group to
see each others point of view. Many of the disagreements concerning the final list
were handled this way. Table 3.2.1.1-3 shows the final list at this point in the
process.
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TABLE 3.2.1.1-3.- FINAL LIST OF ATI'RIBUTES
Safety
Mission Growth Potential
Funding Profile
PMS
Environment
Availability
Program Risk
Resiliency
Dependability
Alternate Access
The rationale for excluding certain previously suggested attributes is also important
as it may provide insight into the NIT group psychology. The following terms
attempt to capture the primary reasoning behind the exclusion of certain attributes.
• Producibility - Producibility will show its effect under cost. However, its effect is
small compared to the other cost drivers.
Supportability - The effect of supportability should show its effect as part of
availability. A concept with poor supportability will lengthen its own average
turnaround time.
Assured Access - The factors that contribute to assured access include reliability,
dependability, and PMS; which are attributes in themselves. Additionally,
alternate access will be one of the architectural considerations, and comparison of
competing architectures should reveal the benefits and costs associated with
assured access. The group felt that alternate access was a better attribute because
of the implied certainty of assured access.
Job Complete - It was resolved that the HTS study would manifest all jobs to be
competed by the year 2021 and therefore, no system or architecture would have
done less than the complete list of jobs.
• Cost of Failure - Cost of failure is accounted for in cost attribute.
• Marginal Cost - Marginal cost was included in the calculation of architecture cost.
• Routineness - Routineness was thought to be similar to dependability.
• Margins - Margins would be reflected in values for safety, risk, reliability, etc.
• Maintainability - Maintainability was considered part of the availability and/or
dependability attributes.
• Flexibility - Flexibility was be rolled up into the dependability and availability
attributes.
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Cost Risk, Technical Risk, and Schedule Risk - These were assembled into a
larger risk attribute.
Operability - The group was at first divided on whether this would be included in
cost or dependability. Since those are covered as attributes, operability did not
need to stand as a separate attribute.
Procurement Cost - The study will provide all costs at a top level breakdown.
The customer can break out procurement cost separately, but it was felt there was
no need to distinguish it as a distinct attribute.
Technology Advancement - Technology should be viewed as a means to an end
for the transportation job. Only if the technology helped to reduce cost or
maximize the value of any important attribute, would it be used.
Reliability - Reliability will be incorporated as an element of PMS or some
similar attribute.
Operations Costs, DDT&E Costs, LCC, Fixed Costs, etc. - All costs will be rolled up
into a funding profile attribute. All these line items should be apparent in the
HTS data, but it was determined that one group could not meaningfully (as the
customer might) weight these various elements of cost.
3.2.1.3 Determination of Attribute Weights and Utility Curves
The FITS team decided to develop an analytical/mathematical process, whereby the
attribute scores could be combined and the ranking of the architectures could be
determined. The _ team understands, however, that the results of this process
can not, in and of itself, be accepted as the final answer. Careful attention must be
paid to the impact of the analytical/mathematical process itself on the answer. The
process used by the HTS team did, however, provide valuable insight into the major
trends and drivers that affect an architectures ranking.
Two analytical/mathematical processes were proposed in the I-ITS study. The first
method, called the direct method, begins by converting the attribute value, dollars
for cost, crew loss events for safety, etc., into a non-dimensional value. Utility
curves can be used for this purpose. This technique requires that the HTS team
determine the shape and boundaries of the utility curve. The group determined
that since there was no minimum or maximum acceptable value for any attribute
(otherwise it would be a requirement), the utility curves should range linearly from
the best attribute score in each "If" (activity scenario) being normalized to 1.0, to the
worst attribute score being normalized to 0.0 (see Figure 3.2.1.3-1). A linear utility
curve relationship was chosen as a simplifying assumption, since a more complex
mathematical relationship could not be justified. In Figure 3.2.1.3-1, the cost values
of roughly $50 billion and $150 billion are examples of the best and worst funding
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profile attribute values for all the architectures in a particular "If" scenario. The
weighting of one attribute versus another must also be determined. The HTS
members assigned each attribute a weight. The weights of the individual attributes
must add up to 100. The results of this scoring were shown to and commented on
by high-level representatives of the customer (i.e., JSC Center Director). This was
essential, since if the weightings are not consistent with the customers views, the
conclusions could be inaccurate. Weights for the initial set of attributes as well as
the weights for the final set of attributes are shown in Table 3.2.1.3-1.
Normalized
utility score
$50 B $150 B
Lowest cost of all Highest cost of all
Architectures in Architectures in
this "If". this "If".
Funding Profile
Figure 3.2.1.3-1.- Example attribute utility curve.
TABLE 3.2.1.3-1.- BASELINE ATTRIBUTE WEIGHTINGS
Attribute
Fundin$ Profile
Human Safety
PMS
Architecture Cost Risk
Dependability
Mission Growth Potential
Alternate Access
Resiliency
Availability
Environment
Launch Schedule Confidence
Total, %
Complete Set Weisht
22
18
,, ,,,
16
13
9
6
5
4
4
3
Abbreviated Set Weight
27
29
19
13
4
8
100 100
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The second method, called the trade-off method, involves comparing attribute
scores directly, one to one with each other, and determining the relative weightings.
The intent of the trade-off method is to find a set of equally preferred outcomes such
that the decision-maker is indifferent between them. An example is shown below
in Figure 3.2.1.3-2 for the trade-off between the two attributes of funding profile
(cos0 and crew loss events (safety). The decision-maker is initially offered the choice
between A (the best outcome on safety paired with the worst outcome on cost) and B
(the worst outcome on safety paired with the best outcome on cost). The decision-
maker's choice will depend on the two considerations. First, which attribute is
more important to the decision-maker. Second, what is the range (difference
between the worst and best outcomes) for each attribute. In this example, the
decision-maker chose B and continued to prefer the B choices until the best outcome
on the cost axis was diminished to B'". At that point, the decision-maker was indif-
ferent between A (the best outcome on safety paired with the worst outcome on cost)
and B'" (the worst outcome on safety and a cost defined by B'").
Safety
( Crew loss events)
1= Best
A
N Decision-maker indifferent
2 X between choices A and B'"
Options B, B', and B"
3 __ an preferred to a
4 _B"' B" B'
5 = Worst af _ Jk B
Worst = $150 B. $100 B Best = $50 B
Funding Profile
Figure 3.2.1.3-2.- Example attribute trade-off curve.
Since the decision-maker is indifferent between these two pairs of outcomes, the
sum of their weighted utilities must be equal since,
(cost wt)*(utility of A cost) + (safety wt)*(utility of A safety)
= (cost wt)*(utility of B'" cost) + (safety wt)*(utility of B"' safety).
This indifference equation can be solved for the relative weights between cost and
safety by setting all the worst outcome scores for each attribute equal to zero and the
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best outcome scores equal to one. Since the decision-maker is interested in the
relative desirability of the various choices (architectures), a relative scoring method
with a zero-one convention for the worst and best outcomes simplifies the analysis.
The utility curve between these two points can assume any shape. Typically, when
the outcomes are certain and the Government is the decision-maker, the most
practical utility for the intermediate outcomes is linear. A linear utility curve
means that each additional dollar spent or the next crew loss is just as undesirable as
the previous one.
The utility scores for the above outcomes are substituted in the above equation. For
the worst cost outcome (utility of A cost) and the worst safety outcome (utility of B'"
safety), the utilities are both 0. For the best safety outcome (utility A safety), the
utility is 1. If the utility scores for cost between worst and best is linear, then the
utility for B'", which is halfway between the worst and best, is .5. The above
equation reduces to the following:
(cost w0 * 0 + (safety wt) * 1 = (cost wt) * .5 + (safety wt) * 0
( safety wt)/(cost wt) = .5
This trade-off relationship indicates that the safety attribute is one-half as important
as the cost attribute, given these specific ranges for each attribute.
Thus, the tradeoff assessment between pairs of attribute outcomes reveals their
relative weights. The rationale for the weights is based on specific preferences for
different sets of attribute outcomes. The trade-offs and the reasons for them are
based on the decision-maker's inherent preferences for specific combinations of
outcomes. Both the preferences and rationale can be communicated and discussed,
and the audit trail of the decision-makers thinking is preserved for future reference.
The number of tradeoff assessments required, of the type shown in Figure 3.2.1.3-2,
to compute the relative weights between N attributes is N-1 tradeoff pairs. Typically,
one attribute is selected as the reference attribute and the tradeoff relationship is
found between it and all the others. The most important attribute is generally used
as the reference, and for many evaluation studies of this type the most important
attribute is often cost. As a consistency check, other attributes were used as the
reference in the tradeoff as a partial consistency check.
A comparison of weightings resulting from this method and the direct method is
given in Table 3.2.1.3-2. Notice that, except for the slight lowering of the PMS
weighting, the results are very similar. The basis of this study uses the direct
method. These weightings are a good measure of the relative importance of the
major attributes that should be used in judging human launch systems.
In the final analysis, the only attribute weightings that matter are those that the
NASA administrators chooses (the customer). The process he uses to combine the
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attributes will also affect his choice of the next human transportation system.
Therefore, while the HTS team believed that the analytical/mathematical method it
developed was useful in identifying trends and drivers affecting the architecture
rankings, the results of this method are not reported in the findings section (3.3.12).
What will be reported are the major attribute values and key drivers effecting those
values that the HTS team believes will affect a customers decision.
TABLE 3.2.1.3-2.- COMPARISON OF ATTRIBUTE WEIGHTING METHODS
Attribute Direct Method
27Funding Profile
Human Safety
PMS
Architecture Cost Risk
Launch Schedule Confidence
29
Trade-off Method
30
33
19 11
13 11
8
Environment 4
Total, % 100
8
7
100
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3.2.2 Funding Profile
This section contains the definitions of the Funding Profile attribute and its
measures, a discussion of the process by which the architecture cost estimates were
generated, the FITS cost analysis groundrules and assumptions, and a discussion of
the utility curves for this attribute.
3.2.2.1 Definition
The Funding Profile attribute is evaluated through the consideration of two
subattributes, Total Architecture Cost (TAC) and Peak Year Funding (PYF). The
definition of Funding Profile adopted by the NIT is:
The sum of the system costs of an architecture, by year, incurred over
the time period of study interest (1992-2020), to deliver all missions
flown from 1998 through 2020. The costs per year include the non-
recurring and recurring element/system costs associated with
providing the capability to satisfy the mission model as defined in the
particular 'If' scenario of interest.
The subattributes of TAC and PYF are defined as:
The TAC is the total architecture cost over the life of the study,
including the cost of unreliability. The PYF is the dollar amount in the
year of peak (maximum) costs.
3.2.2.2 Measurement of Attribute
The following describes the methodology used to develop the cost
data used for the funding profile of each architecture.
3.2.2.2.1 Cost analysis data flow.- The cost analysis was carried out as an integrated
process, requiring key inputs supplied by each of several different NIT groups
developing and measuring different architecture attributes. Resulting architecture
cost estimates were passed to the AET for final processing and inclusion in the
overall architecture scoring process. Figure 3.2.2-1 outlines the Funding Profile
attribute data flow.
The manifesting lead supplied yearly flight rates and system IOC dates for each
system. The operations lead defined architecture asset requirements, including
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Operations Lead
• Reusable hardware
and facility require-
ments by year
• Unscheduled
maintenance
.System Data
Gathering
• System definition
sheets
• System cost data
input sheets I
Manifesting Lead
• Yearly flight rates
by system
Prob. Mission
Success and
Safety Leads
• System reliability
percentage
• Probability
catastrophic
loss-manned
vehicle
_r _' _r
ili[Funding_Profile [i ill iiii_iiiii
[Attribute Integrator [ii iiiiiiiil!iiiiii
_,'_ii',ilTAC/Peak funding by !!',',',',',iiiiiiii',iiii',iiiiiiiiiii!ill_,
i!iiilsystem,byyear,by ii!iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
iiii_iiiiii!iiiii!ii!iiiiiiiiiii_ii_ii_iiii_iiiii_ii_i![ life cycle phase ]iiiiii!i!ii!i!iiiiiiii_iiiiiiiiiii_iiiii__
• Wraps
• Scoring
AET
• Escalate, Discount (Optional)
• Cost reports
Figure 3.2.2-1.- Funding profile attribute architecture cost analysis data flow.
ground facilities and reusable hardware production quantities (if hardware
quantities were driven by ground processing times instead of flight rates). The
system data leads provided system cost input data for each system, including the
non-recurring costs for DDT&E and facilities, as well as flight-rate-sensitive
recurring production and operations cost inputs. These were in the form of
Theoretical First Unit (TFU) costs plus learning and rate curves, and/or fixed per
year and variable per flight costs. As part of their inputs, system data leads also
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provided year-by-year spread factors for each cost element to reflect the year in
which costs were incurred.
The architecture cost "model" utilized to generate the architecture level cost
estimates was a series of electronically linked Excel computer spreadsheets, each
calculating some portion of TAC. A separate model of linked spreadsheets was
developed for each architecture, modifying the spreadsheets to tailor them to reflect
the specific systems included in each unique architecture. Figure 3.2.2-2 illustrates
the general input-process-output connections within the cost model.
3.2.2.2.2 Cost analysis definitions.- The TAC of an architecture includes the total
cost of all transportation systems in the architecture, where total system life cycle
cost is the sum of non-recurring, recurring, and transportation system failure costs
as defined below
The TAC for each architecture system includes all applicable Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) systems and subsystems for the following phases of the system's
life cyde:
• Non-Recurring - Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E), Non-
Recurring Production, Facilities, Pre-Planned Productivity Improvement (P3I)
• Recurring - Recurring Production, Operations
• Transportation system failures
The WBS used is shown in Table 3.2.2-1.
DDT&E includes the cost of the following for each applicable WBS item for new
vehicle development and existing vehicle modifications consistent with a Full Scale
Development program:
Hardware (Ground and Flight) - design, prototype manufacturing and assembly,
test and evaluation, integration of all vehicle and ground support equipment
(GSE)/peculiar support equipment (PSE) WBS items to next higher assembly
through system level integration, systems engineering, program management
• Software (Ground and Flight) - systems analysis (design), coding, test and debug,
system integration, validation and verification, and program management
Facilities costs include architecture and engineering, construction of facilities (C of F
or "brick & mortar"), Real Property Installed Equipment, and site activation for any
new, additional, or modified production, launch, flight, or associated facilities.
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NON-RECURRING RECURRING SYSTEM LOSSES
DDT&E ELEMENT 1
DDTE, N/R Prod, P3I ELEMENT 1
By System Prod, Ops ReflightsReu Hdwe
FACILITIES ELEMENT 2
By System/Facil ELEMENT 2 Reflights
By Year Prod, Ops Reu Hdwe
ELEMENT "n"
ELEMENT "n" Reflights
Prod, Ops Reu Hdwe
TOTAL ARCHITECTURE COST
Cost per year
Cost by element
Cost by phase
CY 1992 $'s
to AET
Figure 3.2.2-2.- Architecture cost modeling process.
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TABLE 3.2.2.-I.-HTS WBS
LEVEL:
LABEL:
o I i I II I "l I iv
_chilec_ure System Se<jme.'_ E1emenl Subsystem
n+0 ARCHITECTURES 1 TO 18 [
1.0"rRANSPORTAT;O.SYSTE_-COMMONSYSTEUB
L I PROGRAM SEGMENT
t.1.1 Program Management & Support
1.1.2 Syslel _s E r_,Ine._dr_ & Inlegtetlon
L2 VEHICLE SEGMENT
1.2.1 to 1.2.6 ELEMENTS (t thru 6}
t+2.1.1 IAT
1.2.1.2 Struclur es
1.2.t .3 Separation Sys
1.2.1.4 Recovery & Landing Bys
] 1.2.1,5 Thermal Protection
I 1.2.1.6 Main Engine Prop
1.2.1.7 AJJ_d_ary Propulsion
1o_1.8 Propulsion Feed Sys
1.2.1.g Power Gen & Dist.'ib
i 1.2.1.10 CoNrol System1,2.1.11 Avionics
I 1+2.1.12 Envlr Ctl & UIa Sup_
1.2.1.13 Tooling
I 1.2.1.14 Suppo_ Equlpmenl
1.2.1.15, Spares & Repair Parts
1.2.1.16 Me, Overhauls
I 1.3 GROUND SEGMENT
t.3.1 FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT
i 11.3.1.1 Launch Ped
1.3.1.2 VerlJcal Process FaO]
1.3.1.3 Horizontal Pro¢ Fadl
11.3.1.4 Launch C11Cotr
11.3.1.5 Iv_s,don Control Ch"
1.3.1.6 Cumin Network
1.3.1.7 Test Fadlities
I 1.3.1._ Mar_Jlacludng Fedl[ .n Other Fac_Itles
' 1.4 TEST & OPERATIONS SEGMENT
14.1SYSTEMTEST__VALU^T_O.
I 1 . ,I I iv
System _,11en¢ . Elemem t Subsystem
I 1.4.1 .I Development Tests
i 1.4.1.2 Operallonal Tests
1.4.2 SYSTEM OPERATIONS & SUPPORT
1.4,2. I Training
l.4.2.2 Launch Operations
1.4.2.3 F_ght Operations
1.5 soFTWARE SEGMENT
1.5.1 FLIGHT SOFTWARE
1.5.2.1 Operating System
11.5,2.2 Guidance. Nav,& Ctl
11.5.2.3 Subsystems MOt
[1.5.2+4 ComrrVTe_emetry
]1.5.2.$ Other
1.5.2 GROUND SOFTWARE
1.5.3+1 GSE Operations
• 1.5.3.2 Pra Launch Ops
Jl.5+3.3 Launch Managemenl
! _1.5.3.4 Posl Launch Ops
',:':;_i+:_!J +++_':'++:!_++:+:+_._,_1 ll.S._.s Other
2.01o n.0 TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM - INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS
LEVEL: 0
LABEL A,'ch/t_fure
=
= V
i Subsystem Definitions (As App_cable - Items .L,isled. Examples O_ly}
For elemenls common between syslems In an architeclure
All stages, pk_ shrouds, crew modules, reusable cargo car_fe_
Element integration, assembly. & test
Tanks. Adapters. Skins, Wings, Empennage, Fuselage
Separation systems, Ordnance, Disconnects
Parachutes, Landing Gear
'13_es. Blankets, MU. Carbon/Carbon, SOFI
engines. Solid motors
TVC, RCS, OMS
Feed lines, Fill & drain. Propellant Utilization, Pressurtzellon
Batteries, Fue_ Calls. Cables & harnesses, Power Distrib Unlis
Hydraulics, EMA=
GN&C, Cumin & Track, Da_a Process, Instrumentation, Telemetry
Range Safety, Active thermal control
Atmosphere CII, Consumables & wa_e mgl, A_rloc_
Design, manulac_ure, and maintenance of production rate tooling
Syslem-paoJliar (or common for 1,0) ground sup, pod equipment (GSE")
Sum of ell element i_ul0_ystem spares
Major overheut Of en_/{e e_ement, Including al_ subsystems
Foe eli Iacili_es: Non-Reo, Jrr_ng . Architecture & Engineering
[A&E'), Consm,¢llon ol Facility (C o! F'), Site Activation (SA);
F:tecordng - Fadltty malntenence
Government Owned/Contractor Operated (GOCO) only
+Whatever other fadliiles apply _O _pect'f__$yste m ......................
V
Subsystem. Defi,'_l_ns (As ApIdfceble. Items Lh=ted. E_amp_es One)
Subsystems - aerolhermal, acoustic shock & v'_bration, fluids
Integrated syslem ground, flight
Sta,l-up training program for personal assodafed with oper-
alions, recurring crew and f'_ght controller training
Vehicle launch processing, Cargo lntegralion, Right-to-fllght re-
fud01shment, Base opa support, Liquid propellanIs. Landing &
recovery ups, Un,schedulecl msintenence
Fligh! planning & design+ Real-time n_ss_on conlrol. Ana_yt.lcal
payload integration, Crew operations
For ell software: Non-Recurring = System design, oodlng, test &
debug, Independent Verification & Vei'idation;
Recurring - Software maintenance, Right-to-flight reconliguration
For each individual S_slem in an architeclure
_:_:_k_;_ +_+:_! !:.+."._,_+_#:+:'__i_:: _++:_,;_kJ_ ,"_'.+ .
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Non-Recurring Production includes the cost of the following for each applicable
WBS item:
• Tooling - design and manufacture of production-rate tooling.
Initial Training - start-up training for all personnel associated with recurring
phase activities, such as production manufacturing personnel, ground
operations technicians, and flight controllers.
• Initial Spares - initial lay-in of vehicle spares and repair parts.
• Prototype Refurbishment - cost associated with refurbishing a development
prototype unit for production use.
• Support Equipment Acquisition - fabrication, assembly, and initial lay-in of
spares and repair parts of GSE, including common and peculiar equipment.
Preplanned Productivity Improvement includes continuing modification and
upgrade programs. For example, for Space Shuttle, these would include: an
interface monitoring unit (IMU), general purpose computer, and auxiliary power
unit (APU) upgrades, Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO), and Space Shuttle main
engine (SSME) turbopump redesign.
Recurring Production includes:
Hardware - procurement, fabrication, assembly, integration and checkout of all
reusable and expendable vehicle flight hardware, program management and
manufacturing support activities (tooling and plant maintenance, scheduling,
quality assurance, etc.), transportation to launch site, major off-line overhauls of
reusabIe vehicles, and vehicle spares and repair parts.
Recurring Operations includes:
Launch - hands-on launch vehicle processing and integration, payload-to-vehicle
cargo integration, flight-to-flight refurbishment and checkout (reusables), launch
processing support activities (ground software maintenance, launch facility and
GSE maintenance/recurring spares, base operations support, and program
management), liquid propellants, landing and recovery ops, and unscheduled
maintenance operations and support.
Flight - flight planning and design, flight-to-flight mission software
development and reconfiguration, flight software simulation and test, crew and
flight controller recurring training, real-time mission control, analytical payload
integration, systems engineering and integration, program management, crew
operations, base operations support, and communications network support.
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* On-Orbit - on-orbit space transportation operations and support activities.
Transportation System Failure costs include the cost of vehicle replacement and
reflight. The number of failures was determined by multiplying the individual
element or system total flights in the architecture by one minus the element or
system's PMS. This number was used to determine the number of reflights to be
included in the cost of unreliability. This cost was estimated using the variable
portion of operations cost. In the case of expendable systems, this cost also included
the cost of an additional vehicle. The production cost of the additional expendable
vehicles were costed at an average or nominal production rate for the architecture.
In the case of reusable vehicles, the number of crew loss events per element or
system per architecture was used to determine the number of replacements of
reusable vehicles which was added to the variable operations cost. Cost did not
include lost payloads, accident investigation and resolution, added cost during
backlog recovery, or cost of lost opportunities.
3.2.2.2.3 Cost analysis groundrules and assumptions.- All costs are reported in
constant 1992 dollars. Data normalization to 1992 dollars and any HTS program
requirements to provide escalations of architecture funding profiles to inflation-
adjusted, then-year dollars is accomplished using the Code BA NASA New Start
Inflation Index escalation rates published May 13, 1991, shown in Table 3.2.2-2.
Present value discounting can be accomplished using the AET. The discount rates
are used on yearly funding streams of escalated (using the above yearly rates), then-
year dollars. (The study team chose to look only at the constant dollar costs for
analysis and comparison of architectures.)
The TAC assessment time horizon for all architectures is 1992 through 2020,
considering the non-recurring and recurring cost to support all missions flown from
1998 through 2020. The costs for missions flown from 1992 through I997 are not
considered part of TAC. As an exception, in the event architecture assets, including
ground facilities or new reusable hardware elements (e.g., launch pad or Space
Shuttle Orbiter) are required to support flights from 1992 through 1997, and are also
required subsequently to support post-1997 flights, the cost to provide those assets is
recognized in the years appropriate to support the pre-1998 flights.
Cost wraps - with the exception of existing systems, whose costs were assumed to
inherently include wraps, all architecture estimates provided to the architecture
evaluation tool did not include wrap factors for contractor fee, government support,
and contingency. The wrap factors are applied to the cost estimates within the AET.
Agreed upon baseline wrap factors are contained in Table 3.2.2-3.
Transportation system cost data inputs were supplied to the funding profile attribute
integrator using standard format cost data input sheets (see Table 3.2.2-4).
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TABLE 3.2.2-2.- CODE BA NASA NEW START INFLATION INDEX
5/23/91
1991 1992 19'93 19'94 19'95 19'96 19'97 1998 19'9'9 20C0 20Q1 2C,C2 200] 2005. 2005
6.0% 5.01[ 4.9"L 5.2_ 5.3% 5.0% 5.2% 5.2% 5.4% 5.6:( 5.0% 5.0"_ 5.07, 5.0_ 5.0_
1._0 1.050 1.0"49 1.052 1.055 1.050 1.052 1.052 1.0SI. 1.056 1.050 1.050 1,050 1.050 1.050
ItCN 19'_9 6.531 6.657 7,193 7.567 7.96.8 8.3.67 8.802 9.26,0 9.760 10.50,6 10.872 11.36'5 11.931 12.52T I].15¢ I_,_.,9
elc_ 19,_.,_ /,.262 6.57'S 6,&97 7.]55 7.640 8.02Z 8.(39 8.87_, 9.357 9.8.01 10.375 10.89,_ 11.1,39 12.011 12.611 _',_,_
imc_ 1961 6.067 6,571 6.6_5 7,030 7._,03 7.?'?3 8.177 6.603 9.6_7 9.5_ 10.05¢ 10.556 11.C_,4 11.6_.a 12._'?0 1961
ltc_ t9_,2 3.B_, 6,126 6,426 6.760 7.118 7.474, . 7._63 6.2?2 8.716 9.20? 9._._T 10.150 10.658 11.191 11.7"s0 1_,2
itc_ I_63 5.65? 5.919 t,.209 6.531 6.678 7.221 7.597 7.992 6.42¢ 6.895 9.3¢0 9._,07 10.297 10.612 11._,53 I_3
ltc_ 19_ 5.39_ 5.6_._ 5,_1 6.250 6.581 6.911 7.270 7._8 8.6_1 6.512 8.93_ 9._85 9.05_, 10.3c7 IO.t'.._ I_,_
ftr_ 1965 5.217 5.47? 5.7116 6.045 6.365 6.60] T.031 '7.596 T.?'96 6.732 8.6_.11 9.076 9.530 I0.007 I0.'_07 1r_'5
Ftr._ 196.6 _.921 5,_67 5.121 5.703 6.00], 6.305 6.633 6.978 7.)55 7.7_.6 8.155 6.56_ 8.9"71 9._;¢0 9.91_ I0(_.._,
IAC_ 1967 _.691 6.926 5.167 5.4_6 $.7_11 6.010 6.32], 6.652 T.011 7.404 7.7/4 6.16_ 8.571 8.999 9.4¢9 I_,_,T
ltC_ 19'_ 4.451 4,674 6.9'03 5.156 5.&31 5.703 5°999 6.311 6.652 7.024 7.376 7.7_._ 8.132 8.53_. 6.965 19/_
Itc_ 19_59 11._11 4./,ZZ 4.636 &.87'9 5.13_ 5.39"_ 5.676 5.971 6.29], 6.6_6 6.978 7.3_7 7.69], 8.075 6._2 1969
IJc_ 1970 ],.939 11.1_, 4.339 4._,65 _,._G6 5.04,7 5.309 $.565 $,_67 6.ZI7 6.5_'Y 6.85_ 7.196 7._.$6 7.9_, 1970
7tC_ 1971 ],.?Od, 3.891 _.0_ 6._94, 4,.522 4,.7_,8 4,,9'9_ 5,254, 5.53_ 5._,8 6.1_ 6.(46 6.7"70 T.IC_ 7.(6_, 197t
I_C_ 197"2 3.S_6 3.6,81 3,66_ 6.062 4.276 4,.692 4,.725 4.971 $.239 5.$35 $.609 6.100 6.1105 6.7"?5 7.C_1 1977
ltO_ 197] 3.]17 3.4&], 3.655 5.845 4,.0s.7 4,.249 4.4,70 4.703 4,.9'57 5.254 5._96 5.771 6.059 6.?,62 6.6_1 19;_
fton 1974 3.0_,,1 3.2¢9 3.40._ 3.505 3.TT_ 3.96.4" 4,170 ¢,367 11.67¢. 4,.8,_3 5.127 $.],55 5.657 S.935 6_737 1ca;(
lion 197_ _.Y93 2.932 3.076 5.2_hS 3.1107 3.578 3.76J, 3.9_9 ¢.,17], 11._.07 _,.627 11.859 5.102 5.)57 5.62C 19_.
Itc_ 1976 2,],62 2.6_ 2.822 Z.969 3.126 _.282 3.453 3,632 3.E29 &.043 _..2C5 4./.57 4.6_.0 4,.9i4 5.160 19r6
IlC_ 10 2.5O9 2.635 2.764 2.9_ 3.O62 3.215 3.382 3.558 3.750 3.960 4.158 ¢. 36_, 4.5ec 11.815 5.GSC to
_ton 1977 2.31] 2.1128 2.5117 2.6_0 2.8422 2.963 3,117 3.27"9 3.1156 3.650 3.&$2 _.024 11.775 4.._.6 _.6_. _971
_IC_ 197"B 2.145 2.255 ?._65 2.1186 2.616 2.74,9 2,891 3.0_2 3.206 3.3_.6 3.555 3.7._] 3.919 11.135 4.],21 19_'8
riO4 1979 1.9"59 2.057 2.156 2.270 2.391 2.510 2,6_1 2.770 2.928 3.092 3.?_6 3.¢0'9 3.579 3.758 3._¢6 1_,"9
I10_ 1960 1.770 1.858 1,94,9 2.051 2.159 2.267 2,385 2.509 2:6_5 2.7_3 2.9J], ].079 3.255 3.3_
Imc_ 1901 1.601 1.6,_1 1.771 1._,_3 1.9.61 2,059 2.167 2.279 2,4,02 2.537 2.e_6-¢. 2.797 2.9_7 3.C_1
li_.,_ 1952 I.(91 I,_.,6 1.d_2 1.T?8 1.819 1.910 2.010 2.114. 2.228 2,355 2._71 2.59¢ 2.7'211 2.0..',.,_
fllC_ 19&3 I._01 I._72 1.544 1.624 1.710 1.796 1._9 1.98[ 2.C,94 2,212 2.322 2.11],8 2.560 ?.6_
ll_ 19_ 1.330 1.]r,'_, 1.465 1.541 1.622 1.70,4, 1,792 I._,85 1.907 2,_0 2.?03 2.'51] 2.t,29 2.551
ItC_ 1985 1.266 1,350 1.416 1,4,90 1.569 1,6.48 1,_3 1.023 1.922 2,029 2.1_I 2,257 2.3_,9 2,_67
rtc_ 1966 1.2¢9 1.311 1.57_ 1.4&7 1.523 1.600 1,6_3 1.770 I. _.6 |.920 2.069 2.172 2.281 2.39'5
FtOn 19_7 1,199 I._9 1.321 1.390 1.1163 1.537 1.616 1.700 1.792 I,dg],
Ito_ 19_5 1.139 1.196 1.255 1.520 1.390 t,¢59 1.535 1.6tS 1.7o2 1,?'97
It04 1989 1._7 1.141 1.197 1.259 1.526 I.]92 1.465 1.5111 1.624 1.715
_'104 19'9<) I._0 1.0'92 1.146 1.205 1.269 $.352 1.402 1,4,_ 1.554 1.6.41
rt(._I1991
rtr.],_19'9_
ltC_ 199%
Im_ I_6
It04 19'97
p_ O,,q 19'9'9
ttC_ ZOO|
Ft_ 200_
fmc_ 2003
ItC_ _
| 1.050 1.101 1.159 _.220 1.281 1.348 l.'C 18 1,1194 1.578
1 1.049 1.10_ 1.162 1.220 1.2_ 1.350 1.1125 1.505
I 1.052 1.10_ 1.163 1.224, 1.287 1.3_7 1.433
I 1.053 1.106 1.16_ 1.224 1.290 1.362
1 1.050 1.105 1.162 1.225 1.293
I 1.052 1.102 I. 1,?._ 1.232
I 1.052 1.109 1.171
I 1.05_ 1,113
1 1,056
I
1.9_7 2,08Z 2.191 2.3_I
I._87 1.982 2.G._1 2.185
1.801 1.691 1.985 2.08S
1.723 t. BO? 1.900 1.99_
1.657 1.7_0 1,077 1.9t8
1.578 1.657 1,7_0 1.8_7
1,50¢ 1.580 1.659 1.7_2
I,_30 1,502 1,57T 1.655
1.358 1.¢26 1.(92 1.572
1.293 1.350 1,1126 I._92
1.229 1.291 1.355 1.11_
%.169 1.227 1.?_ 1.3S3
1.109 1.1_ 1.222 I.?E_.
1.050 1,10! 1.158 1.2t6
1.000 1.050 1.10], I.IS8
1,000 1.050 1.10_
1,000 1.050
3,56S 1_8_
3,256 1981
3.003 1980
2.821 t985
2.678 198_
2._90 1985
2,515 19_,6
2.41& 19_f
2. _ 89 1_89
2.01_, 19"91
1.918 1_'92
1.758 19"; (
1.6],1 19_S
_.572 19"_6
I.._.911 19",__
1.3_8 19"79
1.776 ?_1
I.?16 ?r_01
1.150 2002
1.105 2O0)
1.058 2004
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TABLE 3.2.2-3.-BASELINE WRAP FACTORS
iElement
Fee _
Program Support"
Reserves _'_*
HQ Taxes ***°
Combined TotalWrap Factor
Non-Recunln_ Costs
10%
20%
35%
2%
80.4%
R_uTI_ Costs
10%
I0%/15% #
20%
2%
47.4%/54,0% #
Notes:
* Percentage shown is of Prime Cost.
"* Percentage shown is of Total Prime Cost with Fee. Includes management and integration.
*** Percentage shown is of Total Prime Cost with Fee + Program Support.
**** Percentage shown is of Total Prime Cost with Fee.
# With No Primary Engine_/With Primary Engines
The Vehicle Cost Inputs Summary sheets were used as the cost data input to the
architecture cost model. It was the minimum system data required to conduct an
architecture cost analysis. It included top level non-recurring cost estimates for
DDT&E, Non-Recurring Production, p3I, and Facilities, as well as recurring element
estimates in a flight-rate sensitive format for TFU and learning and rate curves,
and/or fixed cost per year and variable cost per flight.
It also included per year cost-spread factors for each element, and other pertinent
information such as elements common with other systems, critical technologies,
facility dwell times, and reusable hardware useful life.
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TABLE 3.2.2-4.-VEHICLE COST DATA INPUT SUMMARY SHEET - SAMPLE
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Vehicle-specific assumptions of the following parameter values were provided by
system leads on a system-by-system basis:
• Design-useful life and flights per major overhaul (reusables).
• Ground and flight test program definition (number of prototypes, etc.).
• Schedules - IOC's, development and production schedules.
• Operations and personnel shifting assumptions.
The following costs are not included in architecture TAC estimates:
• Technology development not conducted directly as part of a system's Phase C/D
(FSD) program.
• Phase A/B concept design and demonstration and validation activities.
• Payload acquisition and launch preparation cost (except for transportation-related
payloads).
• Previous sunk costs for existing programs.
• SSF Acquisition and Operations cost, except for additional cost which might be
incurred to support transportation missions.
• Advanced solid rocket motor (ASRM) development.
The results of the Funding Profile Attribute cost analyses were passed to the AET,
where top level wrap factors for government support, contractor fee, and
contingency were applied. An example of the summary Funding Profile data
available from the AET is shown in Figure 3.2.2-3. The wrapped values of TAC and
PYF, expressed in constant 1992 dollars, were used within the AET to generate the
overall Funding Profile attribute score.
3.2.2.3 Funding Profile Utility Curves
Linear utility curves were developed for use in the AET to score the various
architectures with respect to their costs. Each architecture was examined, by HTS
Mission Model "If" scenario to determine the minimum and maximum values of
both TAC and PYF within the given "If". For each subattribute, the architecture(s)
with the maximum values of TAC or PYF were assigned a score of zero for that
subattribute. Conversely, the architecture(s) with the minimum values of TAC or
PYF were assigned a score of one. The subattribute scores for all other architectures
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in the "If" were determined through linear interpolation, based on their values of
TAC and PYF relative to the minimum and maximum values.
The final architecture score was obtained by combining the equally weighted scores
for TAC and PYF (essentially averaging the two scores) to obtain a single score
between zero and one. Since it was unlikely that a single architecture would have
both the lowest or highest score in both TAC and PYF, the range of combined scores
would most likely be greater than zero and less than one. For this reason, the
combined scores were then forced into a range from zero to one through a similar
linear interpolation process to that used for the subattribute scores. Again, the
highest combined score was given a one, and the lowest a zero. This then assured
that at least one architecture in each "If" scored a one or a zero.
7000.
_ 4000|
000,
Arch 8C, With Wraps
__Recu_msINonRecurring
1000,
O,
92 95 00 05 10 15 20
Year
Figure 3.2.2-3.- Example of the funding profile data.
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3.2.3 .Human Safety
The inclusion of safety as a comparative system attribute was based on the
perception that adequately providing for the well being of humans associated with
space flight endeavors has been, and will remain, an important consideration to the
customer (as well as the general public). Not only should a system exhibit an
acceptable level of safety as a moral and legal obligation, but as a means of sustaining
public confidence and hence congressional support. From the outset, it is
acknowledged that, from a systems engineering perspective, system safety could be
measured in terms of cost; the impact of a major mishap or loss has significant
program cost (hardware replacement and repair, schedule slides, insurance, etc.) as
well as more indirect costs associated with loss of prestige, public confidence, and
credibility.
3.2.3.1 Definition
The definitions of the term safety vary depending on the scope of the boundaries of
a system. In the broadest sense, the definition might best be:
Safety is freedom from risk to people
and property both public and private.
This represen_:s the ultimate goal of safety; however, the best that can ever be done is
to reduce that risk (through design, testing, and operational procedures) to some
agreed upon acceptable level, as risk can never be truly eliminated from any
endeavor. It is unlikely that an architecture will be rejected solely on the basis of
safety. It is possible that less than an optimum level of safety will be deemed
acceptable because of superior mission or cost performance (the Space Shuttle is a
typical example). This is acceptable as long as it done from a position of informed
consent and a clear understanding exists of the potential effects resulting from the
additional risk.
For the purposes of this study, the NIT consensus was to limit the scope of safety to
reflect the fact that some of the costs of a failure are covered under other attributes.
Based on group discussions, the HTS definition of safety is as follows.
Safety is the measure of risk in terms of
human loss caused by the elements and/or
operations associated with a given architecture.
Human loss is defined as death (or incapacitating injury) of flight personnel. No
attempt was made to determine loss of the general populace that would be
associated with a catastrophic event involving a major population center (such as a
crash in Orlando or a major chemical spill). This definition is also meant to exclude
the impact on property.
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The exclusion of ground personnel from the definition of safety was a point of
much discussion. Basically, it was thought that it would be extremely difficult to
measure losses of ground personnel, requiring Monte Carlo type simulations of
ground operations for systems which in some cases are strictly hypothetical.
Assuming the losses could be calculated, the question remains, "What is the impact
of ground personnel losses as compared to flight personnel (astronauts) losses?"
While it is probably true that flight crew losses result in larger cost and schedule
impacts, can or should a differentiation be made? The approach was not to consider
ground personnel and to assert that any endeavor or industrial activity involves
accidents and losses, not just activities related to spaceflight. To check this assertion,
recent accident rates for space launch operations personnel and typical aerospace
industry were compared. For KSC, (contractor and government personnel) an
average of 0.89 cases and 13.0 lost days per 100 workers is typical. The corresponding
figures for the aerospace industry were 4.5 cases and 114.7 lost and restricted days.
The establishment of the level of necessary and acceptable risk is a formidable task,
and is one not to be determined in this study. In other aerospace systems, a Military
Specification or Federal Aviation Administration Federal Airworthiness Regulation
would be used as a basis for identifying acceptable risk. For space systems, the nation
still seems a long way from such guidelines. Even the man-rating standards now in
development seem unlikely to assuage the public in the event of the loss of the
astronauts. In any case, once a level of acceptable risk has been defined, all systems
can be simply evaluated - either they conform or they do not conform. There is no
such thing as "safe, safer, and safest", only safe or unsafe.
3.2.3.2 Measurement of the Attribute
The approach taken to compare safety was to calculate a risk index for each proposed
element. Each architecture, in turn, would sum the indices for the elements it uses
to arrive at a total probable number of flight personnel losses over the duration of
the architecture.
Inflight emergencies can be caused by any number of failures and often involve
complex system interactions; some of these emergencies will require contingency
procedures. Because it was impractical to model all the possible failure modes and
effects, six major groupings of typical failures were evaluated for each flight phase
for each system. These categories are meant to define the primary cause of the flight
emergency - in many historical cases, the failures often involved elements from
several categories. For example, the primary cause of the Challenger accident could
be used as a structural failure of the aft solid rocket booster (SRB)/external tank (ET)
attachment; subsequent rupture of the ET lead to aerodynamic breakup, loss of
control, and some degree of explosion. The six categories considered in this study
were defined as follows:
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Explosion - a rapid, violent release of energy that is characterized by large change
in pressure and temperature. Hazards to crew members result from
overpressure to structures and human tissues, flash heating, and shrapnel
impacts.
Fire - an energy release characterized by elevated temperatures. In the process of
burning, oxygen available to the crew can be consumed, while at the same time,
hot gases, often toxic to humans, are generated.
Loss of Control - failure to maintain attitude and/or velocity that could place the
crew at risk. Hazards to the crew would occur because of overstress of structure
(aerodynamic or aerothermodynamic), acceleration or rotation rates in excess of
human tolerance, or placement in an unrecoverable locale (high orbit or Arctic
waters).
• Damaged Vehicle - failure induced by external sources that compromise the
integrity and functionality of the vehicle.
Benign Failure - a degradation in system performance that is characterized as
presenting no immediate life-threatening situation. Any failure that will
ultimately necessitate some contingency procedure represents an increase in
overall risk. This category includes all failures that do not fit in one of the other
five categories.
Hazardous Environment - a failure that creates a detriment to human health
within the crew enclosure. Hazards include toxic substances, loss of pressure, or
temperature extremes.
The method used to calculate risk involves a high-level reliability assessment and a
statistical (or postulated in new systems) grouping of the major types and effects of
failures. The reliability assessment uses the output from the PMS attribute; that is, a
reliability value for each distinct and significant flight phase. When a failure event
occurs (Probability of Failure = 1- PMS), there is a chance that any crew can survive
the short term effects immediately attributable to the failure condition. This
Probability of Survival (Ps) is determined for each of six major failure categories
through analogy to historical systems and through assessment by a group of safety
experts. Subsequently, for the cases where the crew has survived the failure, it is
assumed some abort or contingency procedures would be initiated. It is assumed
that throughout this attribute that the entire crew realizes the same fate - there is no
accounting of partial crew losses. Depending on the system design, flight regime,
and the nature of the failure, there will be some probability of a successful abort -
defined as the point where the crew has arrived on land alive and with no
incapacitating injuries. This Probability of Abort (PA) is also determined for each of
six major failure categories by historical analogy and assessment by a group of safety
experts.
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To determine the probability of a crew loss event, the probabilities of unsuccessfully
surviving and aborting are multiplied together with the relative percentage of
occurrence (F, in %) of the major failure category, and then summed to produce a
single risk index (called PD) for each flight phase. Mathematically:
6
PD = 1-_ {(F/100)*(Ps)i*(PA)i}
i=1
where "i" is the failure category.
An example of how a benign failure can effect safety is found in the case where an
ET fails to separate from the Space Shuttle orbiter. There will be no immediate
impact to the mission or to the safety of the crew; however, some contingency
procedure will need to be executed to successfully reenter the orbiter, and that
procedure may not be wholly successful, resulting in crew loss.
Figure 3.2.3.2-1 is a sample worksheet of how the PD value is derived; all the
worksheets can be found in Appendix B. Another way to look at the value of PD is
to use it as a ratio of loss events over the total failure events. The values for PD are,
in general, conservative; however, since all the elements were developed with the
same thinking and the same experts, the relative comparison should be valid.
For the entire mission, the PD by phase is multiplied by the value of unreliability of
that phase, and multiplied across all phases to arrive at a net Probability of Loss (PL)
defined as:
k
PL = 1- [ H { PMSj + (1- PDj) *(1-PMsj) } ]
j=l
where k is the total number of flight phases.
The value of PD takes into account (qualitatively) the duration of the flight phase
(exposure to risk), the flight environment (altitude, q, temperature, ambient
pressure, etc.), and the abort modes or contingencies available at that point in the
mission profile. Thus a value of PD of 0.05 is not simply ten times worse than a
value of 0.005; multiplication with (1 - PMS) amounts to an adjustment based on the
likelihood of failure.
Although typically the riskiest part of any space mission, the ascent phase is only
part of the total exposure to hazards for the crew. Should the safety attribute
quantify the risks during the rest of the mission? To test the premise that ascent
alone would represent all significant losses to be incurred for any given system, a
typical flight phase representation for on-orbit operations and descent and landing
operations was evaluated. The values of PD during on-orbit operations are well
below the level of descent and landing, which are typically an order of magnitude
below the ascent phase. As the on-orbit operations values are so low, and given the
high degree of variability that might be encountered from mission to mission, it was
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Element: HR Titan W/PLS
Flight Phase: Stage 1 (Core) Ignition
Emergency
Explosion
Probable Cause
Fire
Loss of Control
Damaged
Vehicle
Benign Failure
Hazardous
Environment
Propellant leak, turbopump
failure
Propellant leak, APU, fuel
cells
Actuator failure, GN&C
failure
Shock interactions, transient
loads
Software, failure of non-critical
system
ECLSS failure, leak in pressure
shell
%of
Failures
19
15
2O
5
4O
P
Survivable
0.5
0.3
0.07
0.5
0.9
0.97
P
Abort
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.8
0.97
0.9
100
PD= 0.1311
Figure 3.2.3.2-1.- Sample safety worksheet.
decided not to include on-orbit operations or descent and landing in the calculation
of the safety attribute at this level of study.
3.2.3.3 System Results
Although the most significant safety comparisons are made at the architectural level
(multiple systems with variable flight rates), it is informative to examine the
relative loss rates of different human systems used in this study. Figure 3.2.3.3-1
depicts the average number of flights between crew loss events for the thirteen
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Figure 3.2.3.3-1.- Relative loss rates for human systems.
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human systems. The table directly below points out some major features related to
safety that help in understanding the relative loss rates.
3.2.3.4 Utility Curves
Development of the utility curve for the safety attribute involved two areas of
significant discussion within the NIT: the nature of human loss which was to be
measured and the shape of the curve itself. Discussing human losses, especially as it
relates to the highly visible astronaut corps, is an emotional argument. To arrive at
the utility curve, some basic questions that the NIT debated at length were:
a. What would the nation be more concerned with, 3 failures of a human system
in the next 25 years, or a loss of 12 people in the next 25 years?
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b. Is the loss of one vehicle carrying six people the same as the loss of three
vehicles, each carrying two persons?
C° Is the rate Or timing of loss events important? For example, do two loss events
(before the year 2020) 2 years apart have the same score as two loss events, 10
years apart? Can this effect be responsibly modeled within this study?
d. Should loss calculations be rounded off? While only integers are valid to count
actual losses, can rounding up lead to erroneous conclusions? For example, is a
calculated value of 2.006 losses equal to two or three loss events?
Within the limitations of this study, the consensus of the group was to base the
utility curve on the number of total loss events (non-integer) over the duration of
the architecture.
The shape of the utility curve was debated at the NIT forum and the choices
narrowed to two general types of functions. One school of thought within the NIT
was that each loss event represents a serious blow to the credibility of the human
space program and the score would geometrically decrease by one-half for each
additional loss (refer to curve (a) on Figure 3.2.3.4-1). Another group within the NIT
felt that a trend similar to curve (b) of Figure 3.2.3.4-I would reflect the customers
limited tolerance for system failures. Public opinion may or may not be driven by
each failure, but the logic behind curve (b) was that the customer, the decision
maker, had the perspective that: past investment in the system(s) was substantial,
failures do happen despite the best efforts and are not necessarily symptomatic of a
generic flaw in the transportation approach, and the costs (fiscal and political) of
moving to a new system may be unacceptably high. Ultimately, curve (c) was
selected as an average representation.
The final version of the utility curve is depicted in Figure 3.2.3.4-1 as curve (c). The
range of values for the losses, where the utility score decreases from one to zero, is
determined by the minimum to maximum range of losses across all architectures
within a given "If".
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1.0
Utility
Score
0
(b)
Number of Loss Events
Figure 3.2.3.4-1.- Candidate utility curves for the Human Safety attribute.
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3.2.4 Probability of Mission Suc¢es_
3.2.4.1 Definition
The PMS is the number of successful missions, induding transportation elements,
but not payload, divided by the total number of missions, including reflights, to
work off the effects of failure. Successful missions are defined as accomplishing the
jobs described in the mission model, not necessarily returning the reusable
hardware or flight crew safely.
3.2.4.2 Measurements
Calculating the PMS begins with describing the phases of flight for each system and
constructing a system success tree. Equations are then defined to determine the
probability of success of each flight phase. The input values for each variable in the
equations are determined for each system and the final PMS is calculated. The
architecture value is obtained by flight rate averaging the value for each system and
then combining all of the system scores in that architecture.
System Success Trees
The foundation for quantifying PMS is the system success tree. The tree developed
for the Space Shuttle (Figure 3.2.4.2) is used here to explain its development. A full
complement of system success trees can be found in the section B.1.9.2 of the
Technical Appendix.
Initially, the mission profile was divided into three parts: ascent, orbit, and descent.
Each part was then subdivided into phases based on distinct flight events. These
phases represent distinct launch vehicle reliability and/or safety changes. For the
Space Shuttle, there are four different propulsive modes during ascent: SSME
ignition and thrust buildup (Phase 1), SRB ignition through burnout (Phase 2),
SSME operation from SRB jettison through main engine cut-off (MECO) (Phase 4),
and orbit drcularization (Phase 8). Two staging events; SRB and ET jettison, occur
during ascent. SRB jettison (Phase 3) separates Phases 2 and 4. The ET is jettisoned
(Phase 3) shortly after MECO. In addition, there is a coast period (Phase 7) between
ET jettison and orbit circularization.
Orbit success trees were developed for six distinct mission types: space station crew
exchange (internal, or pressurized), servicing, external servicing, sortie science,
deployment, and retrieval. Twelve different activities have been identified for on-
orbit operations. A job can employ any number of operations, but they all begin
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PHASE
SHUTTLE ASCENT SUCCESS TREE
u u
CATASTROPHIC y OUT OFORBITER AND OFF PAD
N fGO TOs'rs ABORTTREEY\ Lo OFcAE. I-;'1c"As "ic/
L/_I Y_ _ossOFc_Ew
DESCRIPTION
1 SSME IGNITION
2 SRB IGNITION
3 SSME/SRB BURN TIME
4 SRB SEPARATION
5 SSME BURN TIME
6 ET JETFISON
7 COAST
8 OMS CIRCULARIZATION
COMMENTS
IGNITION AND THRUST BUILDUP
IGNITION AND LIFTOFF
PARALLEL BURN TIME TO SRB TAILOFF
THROUGH MECO
INCLUDES IGNITION, BURN & CUTOFF.
Figure 3.2.4.2.- Space Shuttle ascent success tree.
and end with an orbit change. Each system flight can perform multiple jobs and
more than one of each job. These on-orbit trees are generic and apply to any system.
Descent trees are also generic. They are comprised of six different operations,
beginning with the deorbit burn. Vehicle alignment for entry (Phase 2) is crucial for
successful return. Phase 3 extends from entry interface to the point where
aerodynamic surfaces can be used. Terminal area energy management defines
Phase 4. The use of propulsive hardware during the return phase is covered by
Phase 5 (this applies to rocket engines or air-breathing engines). Landing and roll
out are included in Phase 6, which begins just prior to landing gear deployment.
On-orbit and descent phases were common across all systems and, therefore, did not
contribute to mission success comparisons between systems. For this reason the
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ascent phase was the only part of the mission trees that was modeled for reliability
analysis.
Modeling Syst.em Reliability
A review of space launch attempts shows that failures can be grouped into three
categories: engine failures, propulsion system failures (tanks, lines, etc.) and other
failures (avionics, electronics, etc.). The equations used in this study account for the
number of engines, stages, and their associated reliabilities. If a system has three
engines on one stage, the reliability is cubed. If a particular event (e.g., SSME burn)
occurs across several phases, the reliability for that functioning hardware is raised to
a power of one over the number of phases in which it operates. A cumulative
reliability for a candidate system is the product of the reliability of each phase.
As an example, the following equations were developed for the first five phases of
the Space Shuttle ascent.
RS1
AR
RL
RSS
= Stage 1 Propulsion Hardware
-- Avionics Reliability
= Liquid Engine Reliability
= Segmented Solids Reliability
Phase 1 - SSME ignition and thrust buildup
Rpl = RS11/4 * AR 1/8 * (RL3) 1/4
Phase 2 - SRB ignition
Rp2 = RS11/4 * AR 1/8 * (RL3) 1/4 * (RSS2) 1/2
Phase 3 - SSME and SRB burn
Rp3 = RS11/4 * AR 1/8 * (RL3)1/4 * (RSS2)1/2
Phase 4 - SRB Separation
Rp4 = AR 1/8 • 0.9999
Phase 5 - SSME burn to cut-off
Rp5 = RS11/4 * AR 1/8 * (RL3) 1/4
A complete list of system equations can be found in the Volume 2 Technical
Appendices, section B.1.9.3.
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Deriving System Engine, Stage, and Avionic_ Reliabilities
Two methods of calculating reliability values for launch vehicle hardware were
investigated. They were calculating mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) values and
calculating probabilities of success for hardware groups.
The first method was an attempt to develop a MTBF value for each hardware
component to take into account the effect of operating time on hardware
reliabilities. This method proved difficult for two reasons. The first reason was
that a credible method of estimating MTBF's for future launch systems could not be
found. The second reason this method was not used was that using MTBF data
would have caused an increase in the number of failures with an increased burn
time. Analysis of launch histories indicates that nearly as many failures are cycle-
dependant and occur early in a launch as are time-dependant and occur after
extended flight time. The spread of launch vehicle failures over time has been
confirmed by other reliability studies 2.
The second method, deriving a probability of success for hardware groups, was the
method that was chosen for this study. A database of Delta, Atlas, Titan, Saturn, and
Space Shuttle flight history was used to establish a reference reliability of the three
types of hardware system - engines, propulsion systems, avionics. The history of
each hardware type was researched to determine the number of flights the hardware
type was flown and the number of failures that have occurred. Flights were
accumulated based on the number of flights an item was flown (e.g., one Space
Shuttle launch is five flights of a liquid propulsion engine, three SSME's, and two
Orbital Maneuvering Systems (OMS)). The probability of success for a hardware type
was calculated using the following formula:
Reliability (component) = 1 - ( # FAILURES / # FLIGHTS)
Because the number of engines is not equal to the number of stage propulsion
hardware systems, the failures for this hardware were broken into two groups.
Failures occurring in pressurization systems, tanks, lines, and valves were used in
the calculation for the stage propulsion hardware reliability. Failures occurring in
the engine (i.e., combustion chamber, nozzle cooling system, and gas generators)
were used in the engine-reliability calculation. The following are some examples of
failures that were attributed to stage propulsion hardware:
DATE VEHICLE
8/7/66 ATLAS
8/9/84 ATLAS
9/1/64 TITAN
10/21/71 DELTA
CAUSE
Centaur propellant leak
LOX leak created lateral thrust
Transtage lost helium pressure
Oxidizer vent valve lost
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For those systems which could lose an engine during ascent and still achieve the
proper orbit, the following equation was used to account for the increase in PMS:
Rn engines with engine out -- RLn + (n * RL n'l * (1- RL))
The more engines a launch system relies on, the lower its reliability. The SSTO
system has the most engines of any system in the HTS study. Because it has engine-
out capability, only 11 of the 12 engines need to work. Its statistical probability of
success, therefore, is enhanced greatly by engine-out capability.
A sensitivity study was done to determine the need for including a parameter to
measure the effect of an engine failure causing catastrophic damage to the other
engines on the vehicle (engine correlation factors (CF)). A CF could expose the
down side to engine out, since the additional engines could have an increased
chance of failing catastrophically and damaging other engines. The SSTO was used
as the test for this trade as it has the most engines and has engine-out capability.
Using a CF of 0.2, meaning that 20 percent of engine failures propagate beyond the
initial failed engine and, therefore, cause mission loss, the difference in PMS was
decreased by only 0.005. With the SSTO flying 330 flights, this increased the number
of mission failures by only 1.65. It was decided that the effect was not large enough
to add value to the study results.
3.2.4.3 System Results
The final calculated PMS values for the systems used in this study are presented in
Table 3.2.4.3-1. It is important to note that the purpose of this analysis was to
provide a way of comparing relative reliabilities of different launch systems and not
to develop a point reliability value. In addition, since the avionics reliability value
was a single multiplier used on all systems and did not contribute any comparative
information, it was eliminated from the final score. The effect of eliminating the
avionics reliability was to increase the predicted system reliabilities by 1.6 percent.
Also, by using a single value based on all launch history since 1964 for a hardware
type (such as liquid engines), some existing individual launch vehicles have lower
combined reliabilities than their present launch history indicates. An example of
this is the Titan IV. If a PMS was calculated for this system according to its recent
flight history it would be 0.958. Using the study model yields a PMS for the Titan IV
of 0.9307. This bias, however, is applied across all systems and, therefore, does not
detract from the validity of its intended purpose as a tool for relative comparison.
Figure 3.2.4.3-2 depicts the results of the study along with indications of the major
features that effect the PMS Valuesi number and type of engines, engine-out
capability, and number of stages.
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3.2.4.4 Utility Curves
The utility curve for PMS is based on assigning a value of 1.0 to the architecture
with the highest PMS and a value of 0.0 to the architecture with the lowest PMS for
a given "If" scenario. By graphing the results with a straight line connecting these
two points, some value between 1.0 and 0.0 can be assigned to each vehicle analyzed.
It is important to note that the values of 1.0 and 0.0 are used only as starting and
ending points and do not indicate any judgment as to the value of a particular
vehicle configuration. These numbers are used only as a starting point for
comparison purposes.
TABLE 3.2.4.3-1.- PMS RESULTS
SYSTEM
AMSC
ATLAS IIAS
ATLAS EV
BETA II
DELTA
MLS-X(c rv)
MLS-X (RPC)
MLS-X (non SSF)
MLS-HL (NUS)
PMS STAGES
.9577
.9326
.9369
.9652
.9319
.9455
.9544
.9842
.9691
3
3
2
3
3
ENGINES ENGINE
OUT?
7L,4MS
5L,4MS
3
3L,10MS
10
12
6
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
MLS-HL (CTV) .9455 3 11 Y
MLS-HL .9543 3 12 Y
(RPC/LRV,
CRV,CLV)
NLS-20 (AUS) .9435 3 5 N
NLS-50 (CTV) .9455 3 10 Y
NLS-50 (RPC) .9544 3 12 Y
NLS-50 (NUS) .9842 1 6 Y
NLS-50 (AUS) .9455 3 10 Y
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TABLE 3.2.4.3-1.- PMS RESULTS (CONCLUDED)
NLS-HL (CTV) .9308 3 8L,2SS Y
NLS-HL (CRV) .9308 3 8L,2SS Y
NLS-HL (AUS) .9308 3 8L,2SS Y
SSTO .9691 2 -" i4 Y
Space Shuttle .9431 2 5L,2SS N
Shuttle evolution .9290 4 13 Y
RCV .9290 4 13 Y
TITAN II .9626 2 3 N
MR TITAN II .9323 3 7L,10MS Y
(RUPC)
TITAN Ill .9307 3 4L,2SS N
TITANev .9519 2 5L,2SS Y
.9166 4 7L,2SS Y
.9307 3 N
TITANev/CENT
TITAN IV (NUS) 4L,2SS
L - Liquid Engines Y - Yes
SS - Segmented Solids N - No
MS - Monolithic Solids
.99
.98
.97
.96
PMS
.95
.94
.93
.92
.91
.90
System Features
Liquid Fuel Engines
Solid Fuel Engines
Od- monolithic, S- _gmentecl)
Propulsion Systems
Engine Out
: : m
N IN I M II_
lOB2
Figure 3.2.4.3-2.- System features and PMS.
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3.2.5 Architecture Cost Risk (ACR)
This section contains the definitions of the ACR attribute, its measurements, and a
discussion of the process by which the architecture cost risk estimates were
generated.
3.2.5.1 Definition
After much deliberation, described in subsequent paragraphs, the NIT defined ACR
as the risk, or expression of uncertainty, in developing, producing, and operating all
systems in an architecture at their stated costs, based upon their present level of
definition. Although the expressions of risk approximate the relative cost risk
between architectures, the reader is cautioned against using the results obtained
from this methodology to predict uncertainity in absolute dollar amounts of the
estimates, or to estimate required levels of program reserves.
3.2.5.1.1 Architecture Cost Risk modeling.- The NIT reviewed and discussed
several methods for evaluating the risk attribute of space transportation system
candidates in the selected FITS architectures. These were used to form a consensus
on the most appropriate method of measuring the cumulative risk of any given
architecture. It was decided that the NIT should pick a modeling technique which
could handle all of the primary risk elements associated with human space
transportation programs. The selected uncertainty model should provide a
"standardized" framework, with common formats and scaling levels for all the
architecture elements (space system projects) to be analyzed.
The traditional program risk areas of Schedule, Management, Technical, and Cost
could be addressed in a cost risk model. The political and social risk areas were not
chosen to be addressed in the risk evaluations, since their associated-probability-
level selections would be hard to quantify and defend. Several cost risk modeling
methods and tools were considered. The two principal methods considered are
described below.
The @RISK Cost Modeling System
The @RISK modeling application software is.a commercially-available, analytical,
assessment product for risk evaluation. The model is basically a mathematical
probability and statistical analysis tool. It can be used for evaluating the risk ranges
of variable cost estimates or reliability estimates.
The @RISK model applies user-selected distribution curves to the program
elements being analyzed. The curve selections can be varied from beta (skewed,
unimodal) distributions, standard distributions, histogram distributions (square,
"step" curves), or even to the application of triangular distributions. The tool is
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available to all potential customers with a personal computer and enough computer
memory capability to operate the program.
The @RISK modeling tool was not selected because of the required setup and
background detail to properly document the risk evaluation inputs. The model was
viewed by many members of the NIT as more appropriate for an "in-depth" analysis
of the candidate architecture elements. This model could be used after lower detail
description levels are obtained for the system hardware projects to be analyzed (with
better test requirements and hardware characteristics definitions).
The Boeing Ranger Cost Uncertainty Model
The Ranger Cost Uncertainty Model was developed for internal cost risk
evaluations by Boeing Aerospace Company (now called Boeing Defense and Space
Group) in 1985. This proprietary model was developed for acquisition cost estimate
evaluation. Acquisition estimates include cost elements for the development and
production phases of an aerospace program. Ranger is used at Boeing to evaluate
risk with parametrically-derived or preliminary planning cost estimates (where a
minimal amount of program definition data is available to the analyst).
The Ranger model utilizes inputs of the program estimate by subsystem and task
elements. The program item estimates must exclude program contingency and
management reserve factors. The Ranger high value estimate outputs can be
compared later to the user-selected management reserve or contingency factors to
judge whether the factor levels are too high, too low, or just about right to cover the
modeled uncertainty environment. The model also uses a standardized uncertainty
factor selection scale, shown in Figure 3.2.5.1.1-1.
The preferred method for using the Ranger factors scale is to gather separate risk
factor inputs in the four risk categories for each estimated line item from design,
system engineering, management, manufacturing, and estimating personnel. A
consensus (using "Delphi" methods) interview is conducted with each functional
design or management area representative by an experienced cost analyst. A
successful interview requires the following information: a credible program master
planning schedule; the reference estimate inputs; the factor selection scale; and
system hardware or task descriptions at the subsystem level for each phase
evaluated.
System operation and support cost estimates are not addressed because the Ranger
model was not developed initially to evaluate "ownership" cost estimates. The
Boeing Ranger Uncertainty Model uses an "expert opinion" lookup table to set
range limits in the four acquisition risk areas. These limits were established by
Boeing senior managers and engineers in interviews concerning past space and
missile program development and production cost variance environments.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SCHEDULE DRIVERS
• Length
• Sypch with
mtertaces
• Dev/Prod
Overlap
PROGRAM DEFINITION
• Requirements
• Organization
• Funding
• Communication
• Management
TECHNICAL CHALLENGE
• State of Technology
• Experience
• Technical Approach
• State of Specs
ESTIMATING APPROACH
• Accuracy of Tools
• Estimator Experience
• Support from Program
• Reviews
Appropriate Too Long
Contingency Reasonable or Short Too Short
Time to Test Interfsv.e SeriM Loading Parallel Load Out of Syne
No Overlap Minimal Overlap Some Overlap Much O_ c, lap
Clear Minimal Ambiguity Ambiguous None
ClearCommand
and WeLl Staffed Well Staffed Inadcqulte Staffing Conflict
Adequate with Reserves Adequate and Steady Irregular Poor
Effective Conprehensive Comprehensive Incomplete Dysfunctional
Disruptive
Expedeaced Effective Experienced Inexperienced
Some Much New
OTS State of the Art Advance Advance Tech
New Line
Same Product Similar Product Same Tech New Tech
Complete
Standard New Processes Need Inovation New Approach
Available Some New All New No Standard
Extension of
Actuals Firm Quotes Good Parametrica Educated Guesses
Famili_ with Minimal
Familiar with Product Similar Product No Familiarity Experience
Uncertain Clear Sloppy Inputs
Good Inputs Inputs Minimid Staffing
Regular Ad Hoe None
Figure 3.2.5.1.1-1.- Boeing Ranger Cost Uncertainty Model selection scale.
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3.2.5.1.2 Ranger evaluation results.- Preliminary evaluations were accomplished
for most of the new system hardware elements in the 18 architectures. The
elements which were not evaluated either had only one summary cost estimate
number (with no subsystem detail information submitted), lacked a well-
documented program master schedule for reference, or had major information
voids present in all process inputs. The Ranger method was eventually not
considered useful in the initial HTS architecture evaluation process for the
following reasons:
Some system estimates did not contain sufficient definition to run the Ranger
model at the proper technology application risk evaluation level (the Ranger-
desired program cost estimate breakout inputs of structure, propulsion, avionics,
flight controls, software, and crew systems of personnel vehicles was not
consistent for all systems).
The risk factor selection inputs for some system production theoretical first unit
(TFU) estimates were inconsistent due to interviewee differences in levels of
manufacturing experience. Manufacturing and engineering personnel were not
always available for the interviews. Experience in using the Ranger model has
shown that lack of a mix of disciplines in a production estimate interview seems
to unfairly bias the outputs for both low ("marketeer" optimism) and high
(fabrication and delivery failures pessimism) values.
In some cases, a complete program master schedule with hardware and task
category development breakouts for each estimated line item was not available
for reference in the interview process. Many preliminary system master
schedules had no first unit production flows shown for the interviewees to use
as reference material for selection of uncertainty factors.
The Ranger outputs showed little "high" to "reference estimate" ratio sensitivity.
This resulted in the clustering of upper stage and scattering of booster risk
values. The clustering of vehicle risk factor results did not provide the desired
or expected differentiation to break ties between competing systems.
• Ranger is not applicable for addressing operations and support cost estimates, so
the total life cycle cost uncertainty could not be evaluated.
• The Ranger model is considered a company proprietary tool.
3.2.5.1.3 NIT consensus methodolo_.- Since each of the risk models identified
were either deficient or too detailed for the level of information available, the NIT
set out to determine its own relative measure of risk using the most significant
contributing factors to architecture cost risk. Using a "nominal group technique",
the architecture cost risk was determined to be a function of three primarily
parameters, or subattributes:
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Technical Challenge (TC).- The TC represents the degree to which a
transportation system's technology deviates from current technology. The
technologies of the candidate systems ranged from being essentially off-the-shelf
to entirely new technologies. The TC of transportation systems can be
determined - independent of how a system is used in any architecture.
Program Immaturity (PI).- The PI represents the current actual state of definition
of a system, based primarily upon a current drawing count. The PI of
transportation systems can be determined - independent of how a system is used
in any architecture.
Number of New Systems (NS).- The NS is simply the count of the number of
new systems in the candidate architecture, with credit acknowledged for families
of systems where vehicles which use significant common hardware with other
vehicles in that architecture are recognized as not being entirely new
developments. The NS is a direct architecture-level measurement.
Consensus weightings for the contribution of each subattribute to the overall
architecture cost risk was determined by the NIT to be as follows:
Technical Challenge 45%
Program Immaturity 30%
Number of new Systems 25%
3.2.5.2 Measurement of the Attribute
The following section describes the methodology used to develop the relative
architecture cost risk.
3.2.5.2.1 Technical challenge.- The relative technical challenge of each system
comprising the architectures was assessed by the HTS team. This was accomplished
by determining the technical challenge of each of the phases in the life cycle of each
system: the development, or non-recurring phase (which includes DDT&E, non-
recurring production, facilities, and pre-planned product improvement); the
production phase; and operations phase, and then cost-weighting the TC of each
phase by the cost of that phase. The relative assessment of TC for each phase was
made by having each NIT member assess an integer value from 1 (least technical
challenge) to 10 (most technical challenge) to each phase of each system. A
consensus value was then selected to represent the assessment of the NIT. Table
3.2.5-1 provides the consensus results of this phase-level assessment, along with the
range of inputs received during the process.
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TABLE 3.2.5-1.-PHASE-LEVEL TECHNICAL CHALLENGE FOR
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
System Non-Rec R Prod R Ops R
TC TC TC
AMLS 7 5-7 6 4-7 6 4-7
AMSC 6 3-7 4 3-7 6 5-9
ACRV 3 24 2 1-4 3 2-5
Atlas 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atlas Evolution 2 2-3 1 1-2 1 1-2
Atlas/Delta/Titan CTF 4 2-7 2 1-4 3 1-7
Beta II 8 7-10 7 5-9 8 6-9
i
CLV 5 2-6 3 1-5 3 1-5
CRV 4 2-5 3 1-5 3 1-5
CTV 4 ' 2-5 3 1-5 3 1-5
Delta 1 1 1 1 1 1
LRV 3 2-5 3 1-5 2 1-5
MLS 4 3-5 4 3-5 3 3-4
HR Titan 3 2-5 2 1-2 3 24
NASP Derived Vehicle 10 10 10 10 9 9-10
NLS -1 4 3-6 4 3-5 3 3-4
NLS - 2 4 3-6 4 3-5 3 3-4
NLS-' 3 4 3-6 4 3-5 3 3-4
RCV 3 24 2 1-3 3 2-3
RPC 5 2-5 3 1-5 3 3-7
RUPC 8 5-9 6 5-7 3 3-8
Space Shuttle 1 1 1 1 1 1
Shuttle Evolution 3 24 2 1-2 3 24
SSTO (Rocket) 9 5-10 6 4-10 9 6-9
1
Titan 11 1 1 1 1 1 1
i
Titan IV 1 1 .1 1 1 1
Titan IV Evolution 3 2-4 2 14 2 1-2
HR Titan [IS 3 2-4 2 14 2 1-2
NonRec = Non Recurring; Prod = Production; Ops = Operations; R = Range
3.2.5.2.2 Program immaturity.- The relative program immaturity of each system
was assessed by the I-ITS team. The relative assessment was made by having each
NIT member assess an integer value from 1 (least program immaturity) to 10 (most
program immaturity) based upon an estimate of the percentage completion of
applicable drawings. The HTS program immaturity scale, with the explanation of
3.2-44 Rev. E
the program immaturity levels, is provided in Table 3.2.5-2,and is based upon a
subset of the NASA-JSC Advanced Missions Cost Model.
TABLE 3.2.5-2.- FITS PROGRAM IMMATURITY SCALE
Rank
2
Explanation
Virtually 100 percent of the drawings exist and need not be
renumbered; the continuation of an existin $ product.
Predominant number of drawings exist; drawings may have been
renumbered.
3 Majority of drawings exist; minor resizing of hardware is possible.
4 Roughly half of the drawings exist; significant resizing of h_rdware
is possible.
5
6
Only a minority of drawings exist; however, existing drawings are
based on a familiar product line.
Drawings are essentially new; however, a design point-of-departure
is known to exist.
Drawings are new, the mission 'of the design are, in part, unfamiliar.7
8 Drawings are new, either mission or design concept is unfamiliar.
9 Drawings are new, both mission and design concepts are unfamiliar.
ii
10 Drawings are new, and the design concepts transcend the state-of-
the-art.
A consensus value was then selected to represent the assessment of the NIT.
Table 3.2.5-3 provides the consensus results of this assessment, along with the range
of inputs received during the process.
3.2.5.2.3 Number of New Systems.- The number of new systems comprising the
architectures was assessed by the HTS team. The relative assessment was made by a
count of the number of new systems in each architecture. Families of systems in an
architecture were evaluated for the number of distinctly new systems represented by
that family; in other words, a family was given credit for commonality. A consen-
sus value was then selected to represent the assessment of the NIT. Table 3.2.5-4
provides the consensus results of this assessment, along with the range of inputs
received during the process.
3.2.5.2.4 Total Architecture Cost Risk.- To make the relative linear assessment of
TC and PI more closely approximate the impact of TC and PI on the cost risk
experienced in real programs, an algorithm was developed to spread the consensus
input TC values
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TABLE 3.2.5-3.- SYSTEM LEVEL PROGRAM IMMATURITY FOR
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
System
Element List
Program
Immaturity
Range
AMLS 8 6-9
AMSC 7 6-9
ACRV 5 4-7
Arias 1 1
Atlas Evolution 3 2-4
Atlas/Delta/Titan CTF 4-8
NLS -1
i
Beta II 10 9-10
CLV 7 6-8
CRV 7 6-8
CTV 6 5-8
i
Delta 1 1
LRV 7 6-8
MLS-HL, MLS-X 6 5-7
HR Titan 4 3-6
,i
NASP Derived Vehicle 10 10
6 4-7
6NLS- 2 4-7
NLS - 3 6 4-7
i i
RCV 4 3-4
R.PC 6 4-7
RUPC 7 6-8
Space Shuttle 1 1
Shuttle Evolution 4 3-4
SSTO (Rocket) 8 7-10
Titan II 1 1
Titan IV 1 1
Titan IV Evolution 4 3-4
HR Titan IIS 3 2-4
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TABLE 3.2.5-3.- SYSTEMLEVEL PROGRAM IMMATURITY FOR
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS (CONCLUDED)
System
System List
Program
Immaturity
Range
Atlas/Delta CTF 6
CLV/MLS-HL 7 -
CRV/MLS 7 -
CTV/NLS-1 6 -
LRV/NLS-1 7 -
RPC/MLS-X 6 -
r ..........
RPC/HR Titan IV 6 -
RPC/NLS-2 ..... 6 ......
RPC/LRV/MLS-HL 7 -
i i
Titan IIS/RUPC 7 -
TABLE 3.2.5-4.- NUMBER OF NEW SYSTEMS
System
ACRV
Number of
New System s ....
1.0
Range
0.8-1.0
AMSC 1.0 1.0-1.2
Atlas Evolution 0.2 0.1-0.3
Atlas/Delta CTF 1.0 0.7-1.0
Beta II 1.7 1.0-2.0
CRV 1.0 1.0
CRV 1.0 1.0
CTV 1.0 1.0
LRV 1.0 1.0
MLS-X + RPC, MLS-HL 2.8 2.2-3.0
MLS-X and MLS-HL/CLV 2.7 2.0-3.0
MLS-X, MLS-HL + CLV 2.7 2.0-3.0
HR Titan II + RUPC "1.4 .................. 1.2-1.5
HR Titan IV + RPC 1.4 1.2-1.7
NLS-1,2 (w/AUS) 1.6 1.2-2.5
NLS-1,2 + RPC 2.5 2.2-2.6
NLS-1,2,3 (w/AUS), 2.5 2.2-4.0
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TABLE 3.2.5-4.- NUMBER OF NEW SYSTEMS(CONCLUDED)
System
NLS-1,2 + RPC
Number of
New Systems
2.5
NLS-1,2,3 + RPC
NLS-1,2,3 (w/AUS), 2.5
r,
3.4
SSTO
Shuttle Evolution + RCV
Range
2.2-2.6
2.2'4.0
3.3-3.5
1.0 1.0
1.0 0.5-1.1
Titan CTF 1.0
Titan Evolution 0.5
prior to developing the final relative architecture cost risk. That algorithm was then
applied to spread the TC for each phase of each system and the PI for each system.
The algorithm developed for the spread value of TC and PI was
sv = (1.6681) (n-l)
where n is the linear number assigned to TC or PI.
The TC or PI spread function is plotted in Figure 3.2.5-1.
' i°oT /
T /
_ 40.0
0.0 -
i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
TC or PI Value
Figure 3.2.5-1.- TC and PI spread function.
This function more closely approximates the experience reflected in more
sophisticated cost uncertainty models, which show that "beating" the midrange or
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nominal estimate for TC and PI does not appreciably mitigate the risk, while
underestimating the TC and PI results in a substantial cost risk.
The TC for each system was then derived by cost-weighting the exponentially spread
values of TC for each phase by the total cost of that phase. The total architecture TC
is the sum of the cost-weighted TC for each system in that architecture. The PI for
the entire architecture was derived by weighting the exponentially spread values of
PI for each system by the flight rate of that system in that architecture to account for
the impact of the relative usage rate of the individual systems. The NS for the
entire architecture was derived by adding the number of new systems in that
architecture using the values from Table 3.2.5-4. These final TC, PI and NS values
were then used as input to the utility functions in the HTS AET to aid in a relative
evaluation of the architectures.
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3.2.6 Launch Schedule Confidence (LSC)
3.2.6.1 Definition
@ Launch Schedule Confidence provides an indication of an architecture's ability
to meet its launch schedules. It is determined by the measurement of three
subattributes- schedule compression, schedule margin, and percentage of flights
with delays.
Schedule compression provides insight into the ability of a system's ground
processing flow to absorb unscheduled or unplanned activities while still
remaining on schedule.
Schedule margin compares the utilization rate of a system's ground processing
facilities associated with meeting the required annual flight rate relative to the
maximum annual throughput capability of those facilities.
The percentage of flights with delays is an estimate of a system's likelihood to
have a launch delay based on unscheduled maintenance items occurring at
critical times in the flow.
3.2.6.2 Measurement of Attribute
This attribute has three parts to its measurement, as described above. Each will be
measured separately and then combined. The architecture value is obtained from a
flight-rate-weighted average of the individual system's values.
The first two subattributes utilize data associated with the ground processing flow
for each element or system. To facilitate these first two measurements, summary
level, ground-processing-flow schematics were prepared for each element or system.
An example, representing the current Atlas launch vehicle, is shown in Figure
3.2.6-1. Pertinent information contained in the schematic includes the identification
of the major components of the system, the unique facilities and their number used
in the processing flow, and the processing time (in work days) and shift information
associated with the flow's critical path. Similar schematics for all the elements and
systems can be found in the Appendix B.
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ATLAS
(3 lines)
CENTAUR
(one line)
SHROUD
s/c
3 days
HANGER J
6 days
(5d-lsft)
PAYLOAD
(hazardous)
PROCESSING
FACILITY
4 days
(5d-lsft)
(one line)
SRM
FROM
STORAGE
v
One of
two pads
PAD
37 days
(5d-lsft)
5 days @
(1.75 sft equ)
7 days PAD
turnaround
Times Shown
Are Work Days
Figure 3.2.6-1.- Atlas processing.
Schedule compression.- This is a measure of a system's ability to make up schedule
slips by extending shifts and adding work on weekends to the processing flow.
Those parts of the ground operations flow that are in the critical path are boosted to
7-day-per week operation along with increasing the shift size by 50 percent. For
example, if the nominal processing flow has one 8-hour shift, the compressed flow
would have 1.5 shifts, or 12 hours. In cases where two 8-hour shift operation is the
norm, the compressed flow would have two 12-hour shifts, or round-the-clock
operations. This assumes that new crews ale not hired, but that existing crews work
overtime.
The compressed flow is expressed in consecutive days. This is compared to the total
number of calendar days required in the nominal flow. In the sample flow shown
above, the total calendar days in the nominal flow along the critical path is 66 days.
The compressed flow time is 34 days. For the last five days on the pad, no com-
pression is possible since the single crew is already working above the 50 percent
shift time extension. The difference between this compressed flow time and the
nominal flow time, 32 days (66 - 34), is divided by the nominal processing time
(66 days) to show how long the compressed time is relative to the normal process
flow (32/66 = 0.485). This number is independent of flight rate and is a constant for a
given element or system. The schedule compression for an architecture is the total
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system flight averaged schedule compression for all the systems manifested in that
architecture. This calculation is performed within the Architecture Evaluation
Tool.
Schedule margin.- This is a measure of a system's ability to make up schedule or
launch slips by using facilities and personnel that are not working at full capacity
since, for any particular year, there are fewer flights than those for which the
system's ground facilities are designed. This calculation is made using the most
process-time-limiting facility in the critical path. This is usually the facility
requiring the most time for throughput, however, this is not the case where there
are duplicate facilities for portions of the flow. The difference between the required
flight rate in a given year and the design (maximum) flight rate is converted to a
number of days. This is divided by the nominal processing time to give a ratio of
the added time relative to the normal process flow.
In the above Atlas example, the pads represent the "bottleneck" in the processing
flow. The total time a pad is tied up in the processing flow is 67 calendar days,
including 9 calendar days of pad turn-around time. Assuming a flight rate of six per
year, the pads are in use for 402 (67 x 6) days. With two pads, there are 730 (365 x 2)
days of available pad time. Therefore, the schedule margin for that year, or any year
with 6 flights, is 328 (730 - 402) days. The schedule margin for an architecture is the
sum of the annual flight rate averaged schedule margins for all the systems
manifested in that architecture. This calculation is also performed within the AET.
Percentage of flights with delays.- This measurement is based on a statistical
correlation using MTBF values developed for existing launch vehicles, space
systems, and military aircraft. This measurement predicts the number of delays
which occur in the final portion of the launch processing, i.e., the time during
which the vehicle and its systems are powered up just prior to launch. This
measurement does not, however, attempt to measure the length of the delays. The
mass, complexity, and mission duration of each system is used to calculate a number
of unscheduled maintenance action 0dMA) items that the system would be expected
to experience. Judgments, based on Space Shuttle experience and sensitivities of
airline-type operations to delays, are used to determine how many of those
unscheduled actions appear during the flight countdown, and how many of those
actually cause a delay.
Using the Atlas expendable launch vehicle as an example, and starting with the
predicted average MTBF for the Arias avionics during the launch phase of
23.76 hours, a value for MTBF during the ground checkout was derived. This
calculation was based on the observation that, on the average, the MTBF during
ground checkout is eight times greater than during the launch phase. This yields a
MTBF of 190.08 (23.76 x 8) hours. This ground checkout MTBF was then converted to
a Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) based on the observation that, on
average, there are 2.04 unscheduled maintenance actions for every failure. This
leads to a MTBM value of 93.176 (190.08/2.04) hours. Dividing the Arias' ground
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checkout time (35 hours) by this value yields 0.376 (35/93.176) UMA's or 0.1074
UMA's per hour. Assuming any UMA occurring in the final five hours before
launch would cause a launch delay due to insufficient time to repair, predicts 0.0537
(0.01074 x 5) UMA's or delays per launch attempt. In other words, 5.37 percent of
scheduled launches will be delayed. Similar calculations were made for the Delta and
Titan launch vehicles using their respective MTBF's and checkout times. The Titan
MTBF value, the highest of the three, was used in the calculations for the new
expendable launch vehicles. It was assumed that new vehicles would be at least as
good as Titan, so this was considered a threshold value for purposes of comparison.
The same basic procedure was used for calculating delays for the reusable vehicles. It
is reasonable to further assume that refurbished, reusable vehicles arrive at the pad
with undiscovered UMA's and failures resulting from previous flights. These
previously undiscovered UMA's and failures are detected during the prelaunch
checkout and are added to the UMA's and failures expected to occur during the
checkout. From contemporary military aircraft experience (F-16, F-15, FB-111, B-1B,
C-5, B-52, and C-141) on the average, about 8 percent of all unscheduled maintenance
needs are discovered just prior to flight (during preflight inspection and during
engine and system checks). Twenty-eight percent of those UMA's discovered result
in flight delay or ground abort. The situation is not quite the same for launch
vehicles since some systems (e.g., SRB's and other thrust-related equipment) cannot
be completely tested prior to liftoff. As a result, only about 40 percent of any existing
UMA's and failures can be discovered during prelaunch testing (prior to engine
ignition) on the pad. The remaining UMA's and failures become apparent following
liquid engine ignition, but prior to liftoff. These clearly result in launch delay.
"Percent of flights delayed" values, along with the governing input values and
assumptions, and intermediate calculated values are given in Table 3.2.6-1 for all the
element or systems in this study. The element and system values are rolled up into
architecture "percent of flights delayed" scores within the AET by flight-weighting
the individual scores.
3.2.6.3 System Results
Launch Schedule Confidence results for the systems in all architectures are not
presented here, as they are flight-rate (of "If" scenario) dependent. Architecture
values can be found in the Appendix.
3.2.6.4 Utility Curves
Utility scores, between zero and one for each subattribute, were obtained assuming a
linear distribution of the rolled up architecture scores for each subattribute. Within
an "If" scenario, the architecture with the best score received a one, the worst a zero.
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The final architecture score for LSC was obtained by combining the equally weighted
utility scores for the three subattributes, essentially averaging the three scores, to
obtain a single score between zero and one. Since it was unlikely that a single
architecture would be the lowest or highest in all three subattributes for a given "If",
the range of combined scores would most likely be greater than zero and less than
one. For this reason, the combined scores were then forced into a range from zero to
one through a similar linear interpolation process to that used for the subattribute
scores. Again, the highest combined score was given a one, and the lowest a zero.
This assured that at least one architecture in each "If" scored a one or a zero.
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TABLE 3.2.6-1.-PERCENT OF FLIGHT DELAYED
_ _ _
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TABLE 3.2.6-1.- PERCENT OF FLIGHT DELAYED (CONCLUDED)
O O O O O O
iti
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3.2.7 Environment
3.2.7.1 Definition
The NIT's definition of the Environment attribute is:
"The degree to which a given architecture has a long term effect on the
Earth's environment during the course of nominal operations."
Note that this definition is meant to exclude manufacturing processes and
materials, also excluded are abort situations where the immediate preservation of
human life is assumed to take precedence over any potential environmental
damage.
Effects on the environment can result from several distinct mechanisms. The
major groupings are discussed in the following paragraphs and include launch
vehicle effluents through the atmosphere, facilities associated with operations,
power required for ground operations, and space debris.
a. Environmental Effect of Launch Vehicle Effluents Through the Atmosphere.-
The exhaust products from chemical propulsion may produce local and global
effects that can be detrimental to life. In addition to the direct impact of acids,
halogens, trace heavy metals, etc., in the effluent, a number of secondary effects
and reactions are known to occur.
The work performed under the auspices of an American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) workshop entitled "Atmospheric Effects
of Chemical Rocket Propulsion", held in Sacramento on June 28-29, 1991, 3
formed the basis for much of the numeric data used in the HTS study. The
limitations of this work should be noted; in particular, the exit plane,
equilibrium chemistry that was modelled fails to account for the fact that much
of the important chemistry (with regards to detrimental effluent species) occurs
before and after the exit plane. Also, insufficient time exists for all but the fastest
reactions before the exit plane - this tends to be insignificant for propulsion
calculations, but not for precise exhaust chemistry characterization.
Environmental effects also vary as the vehicle flies through different zones in
the atmosphere. For example, HCI deposition is a major concern at high
altitude where ozone depletion is the issue; at low altitude, heavy metal
particulate deposition would be a concern. Ideally, the measurement of
environmental impact in a future study would account for the exhaust products
versus altitude.
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Environmental Impact Resulting from Operations Facilities.- Attempts to
quantify environmental impact as related to facilities is divided into three
categories. The first is a grouping of construction of facilities sites (primarily
buildings) exclusive of launch and landing sites that are characterized by a large
human presence for significant periods (power/water/sewer utilization and
parking facilities). The second grouping is related to the actual launch site,
arbitrarily defined as the area bounded by a security fence, where there are areas
of biodisplacement and habitat loss, soil contamination (propellants, burning,
and runoff from noise attenuation systems), and periods of high energy
exposure (heat, noise, etc.). The third grouping is associated with land landing
and recovery facilities involving large areas of biodisplacement or habitat loss
and runoff pattern alteration.
Environmental Impact Resulting from Power Required for Ground Processes.-
If the boundary of the space transportation system encompasses the entire range
of activities related to its operations, consideration must be given to the
potential impact that is related to the production of electrical power needed to
support all phases of activities. Specifically, production of propellants involves
large power requirements that may require additional generation capability
above and beyond what the regular social infrastructure would dictate. For the
time frame covered in this study, power generation will continue to be
dominated by thermodynamic conversion technologies (coal, oil, or fission) that
produce significant quantities of effluents that can contribute to smog, acid rain,
etc.
Space Debris.- Most new programs, such as NLS, are making an early, concerted
effort to minimize either the amount of hardware that stays on orbit and/or the
degree of fragmentation and degradation that can be expected during space
operations.
3.2.7.2 Measurement of the Attribute
A full simulation of environmental impacts related to launch vehicles is
significantly beyond the scope of this study. A simple, consistent, and traceable set of
metrics was developed to quantify differences between elements or architectures.
These measurements are described by impact category as discussed previously.
a. Environmental Effect of Launch Vehicle Effluents Through the Atmosphere.-
An attempt was made to derive a weighted score for each exhaust product based
on a perceived environmental impact. This net vehicle score implies a higher
value is 'worse' than a lower one. In this simplistic approach, five key types of
environmental concern were simultaneously considered:
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Ozone depletion - destruction of the Earth's protective ozone can be hastened
by the introduction of species that break down 03 into 02. Most significantly,
HC1 from solid rockets acts as a catalyst.
Acid rain - one of the largest contributors to acid rain is rocket exhaust and
the production of NOx. In this case, N2, normally considered benign as the
largest constituent of the Earth's atmosphere, is artificially weighted higher to
reflect NOx production.
Cloud nucleation - studies of high altitude aircraft contrails has shown a
correlation between cloud cover and surface temperature and light levels
(and subsequent oceanic biology levels). Water, OH, H, and H2 molecules, as
well as dust (trace elements in exhaust), can contribute to cloud nucleation.
Greenhouse gases - there are a multitude of anthropogenic sources of
greenhouse gases. Rockets that burn hydrocarbon fuels will add these gases
directly to the atmosphere.
Particulates - heavy particles can alter soil chemistry and biology (particularly
at the launch site) and can adversely affect marine life. Solid rocket exhaust
contains several heavy metal compounds.
For the purposes of this study, the impact factors used in developing a
weighted score (see System Results) considered the above effects.
Exhaust Product Impact Factor
CO 1.7
CO2 1.5
H2 0.1
H20 0.3
HC1 5.0
N2 0.3
OH 0.1
H 0.1
A1203 3.0
Rationale
greenhouse gas
greenhouse, many sources
secondary effects
cloud nucleation
03 depletion, acid rain
acid rain (NOx)
secondary effects
secondary effects
particulates
A more rigorous approach to developing these impact factors would almost
certainly change the weighted results. Any conclusions related to planning
transportation elements based on an environmental attribute must be viewed as
preliminary.
Environmental Impact Resulting from Operational Facilities.-In looking for a
correlation between facilities and space transportation size or type, a survey of
historical and existing systems was conducted. It was quickly apparent that,
even for similar type systems, simple relationships do not exist. Factors such as
local topography, operational philosophy, and time period seem to have a more
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significant effect than, say, gross liftoff mass. Given the large uncertainty that
would accompany any prediction of future systems' facilities, it was deemed
inappropriate to use any simple method for comparing a given architecture's
environmental impact as it would relate to the facilities employed.
Environmental Impact Resulting from Power Required for Ground Processes.-
As was the case in trying to correlate facilities with environmental impact,
attempts to relate the power required for a given element with its size, payload,
or other feature proved inconclusive. Based on these cursory investigations, it
was decided to exclude "power required" as a factor in determining
environmental impact.
Space Debris.- Given the trend towards design practices which should limit the
degree of additional debris caused by the launch of any new system, it is difficult
to predict with any certainty what any random mission will contribute to the
orbital debris environment. For the purposes of this study, specific
characterization of debris contribution was dropped from further consideration.
3.2.7.3 System Results
The environment attribute scores by element are shown in Table 3.2.7.3-1. The
effluent masses are in klbs. The bottom line "score" is derived by multiplying each
effluent specie mass per launch by the impact factor, as discussed previously, and
summing the number of flights to arrive at the architecture-level value.
TABLE 3.2.7.3-1.- ENVIRONMENT DATA
Exhaust '_ Space
Product Shuttle
CO 574.6
CO2 84_
H2 102.8
H20 1735.4
HCI 502.6
N2 208.8
OH 0.8
H O.8
A1203 72O.O
Total Mass
per Flight 3930.0
(klbs)
Score 6023
BY ELEMENT
Shuttle Atlas Atlas I Atlas Atlas Delta NLS- NLS- NLS-
Evol. E II IIAS II 20 50 HL
625.5 81.5 100.1 112.8 128.8 125.2 0.0 0.0 542.6
518.8 67.7 83.1 93.8 95.8 76.6 0.0 0.0i 482.
90.6 4,8 5.9 6.6 8.2 6.6 11.8 58.2 108.8
2286.7 101.1 124.1 140.0 '146.2 70.4 331.2 1628.2 1813,9
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 31.4 0.0 0.0 479.9
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 17.8 0.0 0.0 197.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 2.4
0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 20.0 450 0.0 0.0 851
3521.6 255.1 313.2 353.2 4i8.6 373 343 1686.4 4049.7
2079 254 308" 347 510 633 34 169 6203
Beta II
0.0
377.5
11.0
481.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
870.4
616
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TABLE 3.2.7.3-1.- ENVIRONMENT DATA BY ELEMENT (CONCLUDED)
Exhaust
Product
CO
CO2
H2
H20
HCI
N2
OH
H
A1203
Total Mass
per Flight
(klbs)
Score
Titan Titan Titan Titan Titan Titan Titan MLS-X MLS- SSTO AMSC
II II + III IV IV IV 14' IV HL
Cl_ SRM SRMU oore LRB
11.3 51.7 220.7 284.2 326.3 342.7 624 0.0 0.0 125.2 0.0
30.5 60.0 92.0 111.0 1172. 174.2 217.2 0.0 0.0 76.6 0.0
15.9 5.1 20.7 26.6 30.4 32.6 8.4 58.2 58.2 6.6 8.0
146.4 120.3 200.2 243.6 260.1 370.6 421.2 1628.2 1628.2 70.4 223.2
0.0 31.5 229.2 230.6 267.5 267.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.4 0.0
114.9 148.5 177.6 276.8 292.4 433.3 537.0 0.0 0.0 17.8 0.0
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.0 o.d 0.0 0.0 0.'0
0.0 45.0 254.1 330.0 382.8 38_2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.0 0.0
319.0 462.3 1195.1 1503.4 1677.5 2004.5 1807.8 1686.4 1686.4 373.0 231.2
116 528 2497 2903 3334 3500 1591 169 169 633 23
3.2.7.4 Utility Curve
The lowest environmental score within an "If" has a utility value of 1.0 and the
highest environmental score within the same "If" has a utility value of 0.0.
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3.2.8 Availability.
3.2.8.1 Definition
Availability defines a system's ability to meet launch schedules for planned and
unplanned missions. Different communities have evolved different approaches to
defining and measuring equipment availability. Some define it as readiness for
planned use, some for random or on-demand use. This is a crucial distinction - the
measurements are quite different - and it led us to define and measure availability
as the average of both. Therefore, Availability has two subattributes: Available
Time Fraction (ATF) and Response Time.
a, The ATF defines the ability of a system (booster plus spacecraft, but not payload)
to meet planned mission schedules. It counts the normal mission preparation
activities as Available Time, then estimates, as Unavailable Time, the delays in
these activities due to five factors: (1) unscheduled maintenance, (2) facility
delays, (3) logistics delays, (4) major modifications, and (5) fleet standdowns or
groundings. It is essentially a measurement of ground- processing reliability. It
is not dependent on the length of ground-processing time, only the probability
that this time will be exceeded.
b° Response Time is defined as the nominal time to prepare a system to launch an
unplanned payload. It gives credit to a system with a short ground-processing
time.
3.2.8.2 Measurement
a. ATF
System Measurement.- The data needed to measure this subattribute consists,
first, of the duration of each part of the normal processing flow summed (taking
into account parallel activities) to total Available Time. Then an accurate
estimate is needed, for each of the five factors listed above, of the probability of
its occurrence and the average duration of each occurrence. The product of
probability times duration gives an average number of days per mission that the
vehicle would be unavailable due to that delay factor. The sum of these five
times is Unavailable Time for that vehicle.
The ATF for a single system is then calculated as Available Time/ (Available
Time + Unavailable Time).
Architecture Calculations.- First, the increase in ATF due to the presence of
multiple systems (e.g., four Space Shuttles) is calculated:
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(1) The Unavailable Time Fraction (UTF) is calculated as 1-ATF
(2) Architecture UTF = System UTF/the square root of the number of Systems
(3) Architecture ATF = 1-Architecture UTF
Finally, the ATF's for multiple systems in an Architecture are combined as
above.
b. Response Time
System Measurement.- The normal processing flow times, as used in ATF, are
used to measure Response Time. For a single system, the longest Response
Time (RTmax) is the total processing time (the vehicle is assumed to be in flight
when needed for an unplanned mission.) The shortest Response Time
(RTmin) assumes that the system has completed preflight preparation up to the
time of payload integration; only integration and prelaunch processing times are
counted. System Response Time (RT) is the average of these two times.
Architecture Calculations.-With multiple systems in an architecture, the
response time for which a 50-50 probability exists decreases from the average
toward the minimum. This can be expressed by the equation: Architecture
Response Time = RTmin + (RTmax - RTmin)/n+l, where n = the number of
systems. Since the number of systems may vary from year to year, the value
must be calculated annually and averaged.
3.2.8.3 Utility Curves
The preliminary approach was to rank the architectures relative to one another. For
each subattribute, its score was converted to a value between 0 and 1 by the equation:
(Score-Lowest Score)/(Highest Score-Lowest Score). The architecture final score was
the average of the two subattribute scores. Since some insight is lost by this
averaging, the raw scores for each system were to be provided as well.
This attribute was dropped due to the complexity of estimating all the unavailable
times for new systems with no historical data.
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3.2.9 Mission Growth Potential
3.2.9.1 Definition
Mission Growth Potential is the ability of an architecture to enable specific new
desirable mission types which are not currently baselined.
This attribute rose out of the observation that the I-ITS mission model had no
human missions to inclinations other than 28.5 °, of durations longer than 7 days, to
altitudes higher than 220 nautical miles, or with room onboard for "passengers." It
was felt that some of these mission types were perceived as desirable by the
customer, even though none are absolute requirements. The capability of each
system and architecture was measured to enable these missions.
3.2.9.2 Measurement
The Mission Growth Potential score is the sum of three subattribute scores,
measured for each system:
a. Inclination
The largest inclination change from 28.5 ° that can be reached is determined. A
score is assigned based on a linear formula which yields 0 for 28.5 ° and I for 110 °
(Sun-synchronous).
That score is then multiplied by factors which express the system's payload and
altitude capability at this highest inclination. The upper limits for which these
multipliers give credit were determined by consensus as robust, but achievable.
The multipliers are: a multiplier for payload capability -1 for no payload, 2 for
30 000 lbs. A multiplier for maximum altitude achievable -1 for 150 n.m., 2 for
400 n.m. A third linear multiplier is used for the number of years the system is
available in this architecture: 1 for I year and 2 for 20 years. Twenty years was
chosen because the first new human system IOC is scheduled for 2000; the Space
Shuttle is not given credit for being in use prior to that year.
Example: Space Shuttle in Option I can reach 57 °, carries 19 000 pounds to that
inclination, can reach 324 NM, is available more than 20 years;
score -- 0.5"1.63"1.7"2 = 2.77.
b. Duration
The number of days this vehicle can remain in a standard orbit with a standard
payload and crew is determined. A score is assigned which yields 0 for 7 days
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and 1 for 30 days. A multiplier is used for the number of years the system is
available in this architecture, as above.
Example: SpaceShuttle duration now is 16days; score = 0.4*2 = 0.8.
c. Passengers
The number of people that can be carried in excess of (four + vehicle crew) is
determined. A score is assigned which yields 0 for 0 extra people, 1 for 4. A
multiplier is used for the number of years the system is available in this
architecture, as above.
Example: Space Shuttle carries vehicle crew of 3 + 4 payload crew;
score = 0*2 = 0.
Separate scores for Inclination, Duration and Passengers are calculated as above for
each human system in the architecture. For each subattribute, the highest system
score is selected. The three are summed for the raw architecture score.
In the above example, Space Shuttle is the only human system in Option 1; its raw
score is 2.77+0.8+0 = 3.57.
3.2.9.3 Utility Curves
A utility curve divisor was to be used to reduce the raw scores to a fraction between
0 and 1. The probable divisor was the highest architecture raw score.
This attribute was deferred because of its low ranking. If it was ranked higher, there
might have been a tendency to overdesign new systems to score well here, with a
corresponding impact on the other attributes.
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3.2.10 Resiliency
3.2.10.1 Definition
Resiliency is the ability of an architecture to exceed the flight rate requirements of a
given architecture to work off the backlog resulting from a standdown. This
attribute does not explicitly consider the resiliency benefits which result from an
architecture with alternate access (i.e., where another system can perform the
missions of a grounded system) because traditionally, launch systems are not
interchangeable.
3.2.10.2 Measurement
One difficulty in measuring a system's resiliency is determination of the standdown
times induced by various failures and simulating the occurrence of these failures
throughout a mission capture analysis. This would require a complex Monte Carlo
simulation and detailed Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the vehicles sub-
systems. A more deterministic methodology was sought to measure resiliency based
upon the ground-processing system's margin. The selected methodology involves
measurement of the nondimensional recovery launch rate factor (S). It is a measure
of the excess nominal capacity plus allowable surge of the systems ground segment
(see Figure 3.2.10-1). The excess nominal capacity is the remaining capability of a
system after it has performed the required missions. The surge capacity is the
difference between the maximum attainable launch rate and the designed capacity of
the system.
Max. Attainable
. .S.u.r_aci. Launch Rate
........ Designed
__O____'N_ Capacity
_ - Average
Year
Calculation:
S = (Surge Availability + Flight Rate Requirement)/Flight Rate Requirement
Surge Availability = Excess Nominal Capacity + (0.2) (Surge Capacity)
Figure 3.2.10-1.- Recovery launch rate factor measurement.
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The recovery launch rate factor represents the ability of an architecture to .exceed
nominal operations without constructing new processing or launch facilities. It
does not prohibit temporary manpower increases (e.g., second and third shifts or
extended work days or weeks), however, it does limit surge operations to an average
of 20 percent of total available work time (deemed to be a reasonable ground crew
workload). 4 The assumption is that new employees will not be used to meet surge
requirements because of the unpredictability of standdowns and the long training
time required for new employees.
Since architectures are to be comprised of multiple systems, the total resiliency is the
flight rate-weighted average of each systems measure, based upon its share of the
total mission capture. This methodology allows for the time phased increase or
decrease in resiliency resulting from the ramping in and out of different systems.
3.2.10.3 Utility Curves
One suggestion for a resiliency utility curve would give a score of 1.0 for a system
that has a recovery launch rate factor greater than or equal to 1.5. This means a
system can increase its flight rate capacity by 50 percent while in a surge mode (i.e., it
can work off the backlog created by a standdown in twice the duration of the
standdown).
Another method would give an architecture with the greatest resiliency a score of
1.0 and the least, a score of 0.0. All other architectures would be linearly separated
based upon their relative score. This would make all resiliency measures relative to
each other and not absolute.
Establishing a minimum value of S for a resilient architecture or system is difficult
because these requirements can only be determined by considering the availability
and reliability of the systems in each architecture. In other words, a system with low
reliability will need a higher resiliency so that it can work off backlogs induced by
the standdowns during failure analyses and resolution. On the other hand, a system
with a high reliability will not need a high resiliency because the likelihood of a
failure requiring a standdown will be less.
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As a final note, systems with a large share of their missions dedicated to commercial
flights may have an artificially high measure of resiliency (e.g., Atlas). This has
resulted from not including the commercial missions in the "If" Scenarios.
However, if you assume that the government can expropriate (take control of) all
space launch operations in the event of a crisis, then resiliencies may be compared
equally.
The NIT determined that this attribute was not a discriminator relative to other
highly weighted attributes such as cost, safety, and probability of mission success. In
order to dedicate more effort to the other attributes and analyses, this attribute was
deferred to follow-on activities. Therefore, a utility curve was not selected at this
time.
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3.2.11 Dependability.
3.2.11.1 Definition
The ability of an architecture to meet its own launch schedules.
3.2.11.2 Measurement of Attribute
There are three subattributes, each involving specific launch-time criteria:
(1) "Annual": probability of achieving at least Npeak launches per year, where Npeak
is the greatest number of launches required in a single year for this launch
system in the architecture and "If" is being evaluated
PN = Probability of _peak launches per year
(2) "Launch Day": probability per launch of __3 days slip after a launch date is
specified
PD = Probability of $3 days slip per launch after date set (T-1 week)
(3) '_Window": probability of launching within 10 minutes of planned launch time
PM = Probability of <10 minutes (after T-24 hours) slip per launch
The major factors affecting dependability are weather, fleet sizes and processing
facilities, and complexity and reliability. The Dependability Attribute for an
architecture will be improved by increasing the number and duration of built-in
holds that are incorporated into processing schedules and countdowns; by increasing
the reliability of GSE and obtaining back-up GSE, by providing margins in vehicle
equipment and on-board redundancy in excess of that required for launch, and by
planning for adequate staffing of support personnel and working normal shifts (i.e.,
overtime is also a margin that may be invoked for meeting schedules).
The calculation of the foregoing probabilities was assigned to the AET, using
extensive databases of site-specific weather and vehicle-specific systems data. In
order to determine probability of launch susceptibility to weather and hardware
delays, the following were input to the AET:
PD (weather) = probability of acceptable weather at time launch window opens
- considering all aspects, induding pad, abort sites, and winds
aloft
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pD(hardware) = probability of no launch scrub on day of launch due to
hardware - including GSE, flight equipment, corn net, facilities,
etc.
pM(hardware) = probability of no scrub during 10-minute launch window
The AET then calculates the following:
pD = pD(weather) * pD(hardware) = probability of launching on a given day
PD(D.q_3 days) = 1 - (1-pD) 3
Note: exponent reflects three successive day criterion. This formulation
assumes slips are one day at a time, and that two or more day slips are so
infrequent as to be insignificant. Historical distributions should be used when
available.
PM (M<10 minutes) = PM
Note: weather effects are totally reflected within PD, and do not affect PM.
Using the peak number of launches, Npeat,, of the relevant human system in a
single year needed to support the given "If" in the architecture under evaluation,
PN(>_N) values are determined and inserted into a table in the AET data base, for
N = 1 through 20.
PN (__.N) can be established from actual experience, or it may be calculated based upon
the following idealized model:
PN (>__N) = f [number of days available per year/
(number of days per launch x number of launches)]
Minimum possible launch rate per single-string system:
PN = 1, when Nmin < (365 - Tw - Tp/l)/(Tp+33)
Maximum possible launch rate per single-string system:
PN "- 0, when Nmax > (365 - Tw - Tp/l)/(Tu+Tp + _ - Tin)
Where:
N = number of launches/yr
Tp = minimum number of days between consecutive launches
(pre-flight processing time + mate to booster + pad time + countdown +
avg. flight time + post-flight processing)
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3 = standard deviation of Tp
Tu = unscheduled lost time (unplanned maintenance; equipment down
time)
T m = margin per launch that can be captured through increased
use of resources (cost, overtime, special equipment, etc.)
Tw = number of days per year with unacceptable weather = 365 * qD(weather)
Tp/l = number of days lost per year due to P/L or other non-t transportation
delays (including strikes, continuing resolutions, holidays, etc.)
Other values of PN must be computed by statistical procedures, using a probability
model for types of interruptions requiring use of margin times (Tm), fleet size,
bottleneck facilities, etc. At the point at which work on this Attribute was
discontinued it had not been decided whether an exact formulation, a Monte Carlo
approach, or a curve approximated from engineering judgment would be employed
for accomplishing this. These probabilities are also to be multiplied by the number
of duplicated facilities when taken through the critical path.
Finally, the AET calculates P(N>-Npeak) from its PN(>_N) look-up table and the value
of Npeak.
3.2.11.3 Utility Curves
There are no explicit utility curves associated with the Dependability Attribute.
Rather, the subutility components of the final attribute value are calculated by the
AET, weighted, and summed internally, as indicated in the following steps. Using
input values of subutility relative-weighting factors (WN, WD, and WM - See below),
and AET-calculated subutilities from curve fits of Utility vs. Probability, an overall
utility value for each launch system is calculated.
The overall Utility is thus the weighted sum of the three subutilities:
Utility of Launch System = U× = (WN UN + WD UD + WM UM)/(WN + WD +WM)
In the process, each launch system is categorized as to whether it is human-tended,
untended-critical, or untended-noncritical. The AET then calculates an overall
Utility for the architecture under consideration using the utilities for each separate
launch system and additional weighting factors that take into account the relative
importance of human vs. untended, critical payloads, etc. These weighting factors
were consensually established at the following values:
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fm = weighting factor for human systems = 10
fe, u = weighting factor for critical, untended payloads (e.g., because of a need to make
a certain launch window, or to resupply logistics to SSF) = 4
fn,u = weighting factor for non-critical untended payloads (no launch urgency) = 1
Ultimately, the aggregate Utility is the weighted sums of the utilities, expressed as
follows:
Utility of Dependability = (fm Um + fc,u Uc, u + fn,u Un,u)/(fm + fc, u +fn, u)
3.2.11.4 Status
Dependability was one of the attributes dropped at the mid-point of the HTS Study.
The effort involved in calculation of the attribute values was deemed excessive
within the funding constraints of the overall study relative to other, more
significant, attributes. The foregoing discussion describes the planned treatment of
the Dependability Attribute at the time work was discontinued on it.
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3.2.12 Alternat_ Access
The "Augustine Committee Report ''5 in its Recommendation #11, advised that
'TqASA initiate design activity so that human activity in the Space Station could be
supported in the absence of the Space Shuttle ..." The HTS study addressed the
concept in two ways. The first was as one of the 10 original attributes, discussed
herein; the second was via the preparation of architectures contrasting with respect
to the presence or absence of such a capability to continue personnel SSF operations
in the absence of the Space Shuttle (see section 3.3.7).
3.2.12.1 Definition
The definition of Alternate Access is the ability of an architecture to continue or
resume personnel and/or cargo flights in a timely manner to SSF in the absence of
the primary system for such flights.
3.2.12.2 Measurement of Attribute
Quantification of Alternate Access was in terms of the number of days required
from the unexpected termination of primary system availability until the
appropriate alternate personnel or cargo system was projected to be ready to launch.
3.2.12.3 Utility Curves
Piecewise continuous utility curves for both personnel and cargo Alternate Access
were developed (Figure 3.2.12.3-1). Each of these decreased slowly until the delay in
regaining access via the alternate method became so long as to (a) require use of an
ACRV for crew evacuation in the human situation, or (b) result in degradation of
SSF attitude control capability due to propellant depletion in the cargo situation.
For greater time delays, the utility curves yielded smaller values going to zero at an
18-month delay. The discontinuity in the human curve reflected study estimates of
the programmatic impact, and national and NASA "loss of face" from a forced crew
evacuation. The 18-month cut-off was based upon the estimation that any prime
system standdown was unlikely to last more than two years. As delays in resuming
operations via the Alternate Access system approached that time value, there would
be progressively less benefit from and pressure to use it.
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Alternate
AccessAttribute
Valuefor Given
Year:Range of 0 to 1.0
Notes:
1) Parameter measured is Time to First
Alternate Access along critical path of
system.
2) Relative Weights arbitrarily
assumed to be 80/20.
3) "Cargo" means Pressurized
Logistics Module or equivalent
and includes reboost propellant.
4) NSFP Probability is the proba-
bility that failure of an element
will NOT be common to both the
primary and alternate access /
systems concurrently. It equals: t 1-
Human
NSFP
Probability
Human AA Utility Function I
Time to First
Alt.Access
Probability
Cargo AA Utility Function
_t.A e to First
CC_*SS
Z (Majorfailureatesofcommon elements)
E (Major failure rates of all elements of primarysystem)
Figure 3.2.12.3-1.- Alternate access (composite).
)
The resulting personnel and cargo utility values were then "derated" individually
by a factor involving the failure rates of any elements common to both the primary
and alternate systems, divided by the overall failure rate of the primary system. The
derated personnel and cargo functions were then arbitrarily weighted 80/20,
respectively, and summed on a yearly basis.
3.2.12.4 Status
Alternate Access was one of the attributes dropped at the mid-point of the HTS
Study. Lacking the means for and a consensus to conduct a Monte Carlo (or similar)
simulation of launch vehicle failures, there was no way that the benefits of
providing Alternate Access within an architecture could be quantified. The attribute
itself was assigned a relatively low weight by the NIT. When combined with the
heavily weighted Cost Attribute, Alternate Access was overshadowed by the
increased cost of providing it. Consequently, Alternate Access was dropped as an
attribute, but remained as a feature for the subjective comparison of some
architectures.
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3.3 TASK 3 - ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
3.3.1 Task Approach
To understand whether a particular vehicle design option should be built, it must be
viewed in the context of the other elements which will be used to provide the total
transportation capability. This grouping of transportation elements is called an
architecture. Because an evaluation of a design option's characteristics and
attributes can only be evaluated in the context of what mission requirements it
meets and which vehicles are available to carry a required payload, it is impossible
to evaluate, for example, a PLS without an architectural context.
An architecture is defined as the total group of elements (launch vehicles, boosters,
capsules, etc.), with their associated capabilities and infrastructure, which are
providing transportation access to space over some defined period of time. As will
be described below, this architecture set was constructed by selecting a series of
considerations important to the customer, and then selecting the group of elements
which, in conjunction, provide a set of launch capabilities. The elements in the
architecture were then manifested to meet the HTS Needs Model, and attribute
values (cost, safety, risk, etc.) for each architecture were calculated to provide a
quantitative assessment of how potential concepts fared relative to one another.
Figure 3.3.1-1 is a flow chart to show how data was used in the study and the
relationships between data input and output in the progress of an architecture's
evaluation.
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I System I
[Element i
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Value
Meuunemenis
Flea Size
Facility Deft nlh_t
iPerformance Integration EvaluationCatpabllJtim Tool
Arc3h ltect u.re Indepe_ndent
At_b ute Values
Figure 3.3.1-1.- Study data flow.
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3.3.2 Architecture Option_ Development
3.3.2.1 Development Methodology
The architecture set for the HTS study was developed to gain understanding into a
set of considerations or issues which will affect the design of the next human space
transportation vehicle. These considerations are described in section 2.2.3. The
architectures were comprised of elements which provided crew and cargo delivery
and return functions from the present to 2020.
To understand the impact of these considerations on future system options, a set of
architectures was compared for each consideration. For example, to understand the
separation of people and cargo, three architectures were constructed. The first kept
people and cargo together by using the Space Shuttle or a miniature "Space Shuttle"
for Human Receipt at Destination payloads. The second completely separated the
two, with the crew going to orbit in a personnel carrier, and the cargo aboard a
separate ELV. The two would then be required to rendezvous on orbit to complete
the mission. The third separated people and cargo into distinct crew and cargo
modules which were launched on the same launch vehicle. These three
architectures were then manifested and their attributes were evaluated. A similar
approach was taken for the other considerations.
Approximately 30 distinct architectures were identified for study, which was
subsequently narrowed to 18 after review and consensus from the HTS Study Team.
From this group, three were subsequently deferred due to the unavailability of data
on the primary human elements of that architecture. For each architecture,
elements were identified which would provide people up (delivery), people down
(return), cargo up, and cargo down functions. Elements were phased in five-year
increments from 2000 to 2015. This was a simplifying assumption since it was
believed that a 1 or 2- year difference in vehicle IOC would have a small impact on
the overall architecture cost, risk etc. No vehicles were phased in or out prior to
2000 since it was unlikely that NASA would introduce new systems prior to this
date. Figure 3.3.2.1-1 shows an example of a template for a representative
architecture and Figure 3.3.2.1-2 provides a summary of the architectures considered
in the study. A detailed explanation of these architectures is provided in sections
3.3.5 to 3.3.11. Finally, for each architecture, a set of manifesting philosophies were
developed which governed how an element would be used. This allowed the team
to assign priority, consistent with the architecture intent, to different vehicles which
could carry the same payload.
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IFuncti°n I
People
Up
People
Down
Cargo
Up
Cargo
Down
2000
• Space Shuttle
• Space Shuttle
• ACRV
• Space Shuttle
• Delta, Aths
Titan
• Space Shuttle
] 2005
• Space Shuttle
• Space Shuttle
• ACRV
• Space Shuttle
• Delta, Atlas
Titan
• Space Shuttle
[ 201o
• Space Shuttle
• Space Shuttle
• ACRV
• Space Shuttle
• Delta, Atlas
Titan
• Space Shuttle
I 2015 I
• Space Shuttle
• Space Shuttle
• ACRV
• Space Shuttle
• Delta, Atlas
Titan
• Space Shuttle
Figure 3.3.2.1-1.- Example of an architecture template.
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Figure 3.3.2.1-2.- Architecture summary.
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In addition, other analyses, beyond the evaluation of the above considerations, were
conducted. For example, to assess the impact of return cargo requirements, a group
of architectures was selected and the needs model was modified by reducing return
cargo requirements. The architectures were then remanifested and compared with
the baseline results.
The _ architecture set is broad enough to gain insight into other considerations.
For example, comparison of the reference architecture (continued use of current
systems) with the architecture that adds the NLS gives insight into how many
payloads could be off-loaded from the Space Shuttle onto the new launch vehicle.
One could also gain insight into the effect of Space Shuttle system phase-out dates by
comparing architectures with early and late Space Shuttle phase-outs. One should
use caution, however, in trying to get absolute answers from these architectures
(e.g., how many more Space Shuttles NASA should buy), since the architectures and
the subsequent attribute scores are better suited for comparative purposes. In other
words, the study is better suited to understanding architectural implications of new
system alternatives compared to continued use of current systems It is not intended
to answer detailed issues within a given alternative. However, sufficient accuracy
and depth has been covered to meet the objectives of the HTS study.
3.3.2.2 Architecture Manifesting Groundrules and Approach
At the onset of the study, the study team defined a set of top level groundrules and
assumptions for the mission capture analysis. These groundrules and assumptions
are applied across all architectures consistently. Architecture-specific assumptions
were also necessary and were created and approved by the study team on an as-
required basis. Tables 3.3.2.2-1 and 3.3.2.2-2 list the general groundrules and
assumptions, respectively.
3.3.2.2.1 Mission capture and payload manifesting.- The General Dynamics
TRANSIT (Transportation Systems Integration Tool) was used to perform the end-
to-end mission model analysis, including system performance calculation, mission
capture, and payload manifesting. Mission capture is the matching up of a certain
mission or group of missions to the launch system while satisfying all mission
constraints and vehicle constraints, including performance. Mission constraints
include final destinations, payload mass and dimensions, or other operational
considerations (e.g., multiple, identical payloads must be flown separately). Vehicle
constraints include launch site, IOC, other availability limitations, cargo volume,
performance to the destination orbit, etc. Only when the two sets of requirements
are matched are missions "captured." When there is more than one vehicle that
can capture a particular mission, other secondary criteria must be provided to help
select between the candidate systems, such as cost-per-flight or system priority. For
the study, the team selected the other criteria based on the intent of the architecture.
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TABLE 3.3.2.2-1.- GENERAL MISSION CAPTURE GROUNDRULES
The mission models used for mission capture were the "If Scenarios"
defined by the HTS Study Team.
Mission capture and payload manifesting used only those systems in the
study-defined architectures.
The mission model period is 1992 to 2020.
• The NASA Mixed Fleet Manifest (August 1991) was used for
flight rates between 1992 and 1997, while the HTS Mission
Model requirements were used for 1998 and beyond.
15 percent Airborne Support Equipment is added to all payloads, except
for SSF logistics and ACRV.
Both payload mass and dimensions must be observed during manifesting;
when dimensions are not available, payload mass must still be observed.
SSF logistics, Satellite Servicing and Science Sortie payloads can be
resized to match new launch vehicle performance.
Payload delivery must be accomplished in the years specified by the
mission models.
Human DOD missions were flown with the lowest cargo system
capability available.
In the early years, "Unmanned" payloads are limited to untended systems
until new reusable systems such as the SSTO or TSTO are available to
fly them.
West coast Titan II total flights in any architecture will not exceed 55; 14
being refurbished by MMC, 41 still in storage by the U.S. Air Force.
• This constraint is lifted in Architecture 17, when it was
assumed more Titan Irs are built for RUPC transport.
ACRV payload and launch information in FITS CNDB was not up-to-date.
Therefore updated ACRV delivery mass to include FSE & ASE:
17,318 Ibs; return mass is 16,188 lbs; dimensions are 15.67 ft length x 14.5 ft
diameter.
• Also, extend ACRV launch schedule from 2010 to 2020
with similar traffic pattern for manifesting purposes
SEI human flights in "If E"are dedicated flights.
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TABLE 3.3.2.2-2.- GENERAL MISSION CAPTURE ASSUMPTIONS
Only east and west coast launch sites were considered.
For mission capture and payload manifesting purposes, system failures or
standdowns were not accounted for, i.e., flight rate results exclude
re flight consideration. Unreliability costs are accounted for in the life
cycle cost analysis.
New systems phase out existing systems nominally over a 5-year period.
Ramping was linear and based on maximum flight rate in architecture/
"If" scenario combination. It was not necessarily related to the system
development or program schedule.
The EOS payloads of 30 000 lbs to sunsynchronous orbit may be split into
smaller pieces to fit on the Titan IV flying out of the West Coast
Atlas E has only one vehicle left at this time; the remaining DOD Atlas E
class payloads will go on either west coast Delta II, or new vehicles, e.g.
NLS-20.
X-ray background survey explorer in HTS Needs Model is destined for 200
nmi, which is the only mission to this orbit; assume
220 nmi for manifesting purposes.
For those architectures having RPC replacing ACRV, one extra RPC flight
is added in 2002 to enable transition from 4-to-8 crew SSF.
For additional planetary missions beyond the current planning horizon,
assume:
• Delivery mass is nominally 12 100 lbs
• Average C3 requirement is 0 km2/sec 2.
Payload manifesting, on the other hand, is the selection of additional payloads to fly
on the flight of a given system once it has been chosen for the primary mission.
Once the mission's and system's match-up has been determined, TRANSIT begins
to manifest payloads together on the launch vehicles. The payload manifests for
this analysis do not produce flight assignments such as those for the Space Shuttle,
since (1) these are only projected payloads, and (2) payload compatibility, integration,
and other issues have not been considered.
Some payloads were resized to fit onto new launch vehicles. These were
a. the SSF Pressurized Logistics Module (PLM),
b. the SSF Mini-PLM (MPLM),
c. the SSF unpressurized logistics module cargo, and
d. all smoothed Satellite Servicing and Science Sortie payloads.
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Thesepayloads were broken up to best fit in the new vehicle, accounting for total
mass and launch schedule. For example, with the 29 748 lb PLM requiring three
deliveries every year, three Space Shuttle flights are required, each with additional
payloads to maximize payload efficiency. But for an SSTO (Rocket) launch vehicle
which has only a 15 000 lb capability to the SSF, the PLM is broken up into two
modules of
14 874 lb each, for a total of six flights per year. This was done to maximize launch
efficiency while keeping the manifesting simple.
Figure 3.3.2.3 shows the general mission capture and payload manifesting steps. The
figure shows five different payloads to be considered by the three candidate vehicles,
depicted by their cargo bay and fairing. Based on the understanding of the mission
objectives and requirements, the matching of mission and system determines which
mission can potentially be captured by which system. Further tests by TRANSIT as
to performance of the system to the mission destination, payload mass and
dimensions, vehicle cargo volume, east and west coast launch constraints, system
availability (year and maximum flight rate), etc., will determine if the system can
capture the missions.
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SSF l'lab Scientific Medium
Module Payload Log. Mod.
• Human Receipl '-C_oitalDelivery -SSF Unique• SSF Unique
© E
Small Log Unpreu.
.Mod. Prop. Mod.
-SSF Unique • SSF UniqueJ
• Servicing J
I !
Vehicle Req'ts* I .Any Human .Untended • Untended • Untended • Untended [
(Order of Priority) J -Shuttle • Any Human • Any Human • Servicing. I
• Mlsslon Orbital Destination (Thus Launch Site Req't) Applicable to All Missions
'MISSION
_EMENTS-
Vehicle Capabilities
ELV
F,.Irlr_
I • Untended
NDV Cargo
Bay
• Human
• Shuffle
• Untended
• Sewicin_l
[
Shuffle
Cargo Bey
• Human J
• Shuttle
• Untended
• Se_dncj
VERIF_.'_ "_
AvAI, I
PERFOI_'_
Figure 3.3.2.3.- Mission capture illustration.
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Once the mission-to-system match-up is done, actual manifesting, i.e., putting
payloads together with each other on the same flight, is done. Again, a series of tests
are utilized to verify if the payloads can be put together on the same flight. Criteria
for manifesting the tests include:
a. Payloads with higher priority are considered first; this ensures that critical
missions are provided before annual launch rate constraints take effect.
b° Both the payload mass and dimensions must be within the system's capability
(performance to destination orbit, cargo bay or fairing volume). If the launch
mass efficiency is low because the payload size is large, the launch vehicle must
still fly with low mass efficiency.
G Payloads allowed together on the same flight must have the same vehicle
requirements, i.e., they must require the same service from the system.
Otherwise, a detailed operational analysis must be performed to ensure the
vehicle can maneuver onorbit, change plane and/or altitude, etc., to satisfy
different mission needs.
TRANSIT applies this generic mission capture algorithm to all architectures for
each mission, vehicle system, and year in the mission model. At the completion of
the run, the outputs are tabulated. They include mission-to-vehicle capture, listing
of payloads on the same flight, manifesting efficiency, summary of flight results for
each launch site, and number of required launch systems. This information is, in
turn, used to determine the other flight-rate-weighted study attributes, including
number of required launch vehicles, and their associated launch costs.
3.3.3 Transportation Elements and Systems
The process of populating the architectures with element or vehicle concepts was
more difficult than developing the theme of the architectures themselves. A list of
roughly 25 elements was identified which could be incor-porated into the
architectures. Many of these elements were selected not only for their ability to fill a
capability or function gap in some architecture set but also to incorporate concepts
which are well known and have resources devoted to study them. For example, it
was important tO know how a PLS or an SDI SSTO vehicle fit into the spectrum of
possible design and architecture concepts. In the end, most of the concepts which
were of principal interest to the customer were incorporated.
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Table 3.3.3shows a summary of the elements used in the study. The table identifies
in which architectures these elements appear, as well as their phase-in and phase-
out dates. Small commercial vehicles (Pegasus, Taurus, Conestoga, etc.) and sound-
ing rockets (Scout, Aires, etc.) were not considered in this study since it was believed
that their use/flight rates would have a negligible impact on an architecture's
attributes. Detailed descriptions of these elements are provided in subsequent
paragraphs.
TABLE 3.3.3.- HTS ARCHITECTURE ELEMENTS AND OPERATION PHASES
Ea:th-to-Orbll ._'¢hltectum Optio_
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3.3.3.1 Space Shuttle
System Description
The Space Shuttle is NASA's only human ETO system at this time (Figure 3.3.3.I-1).
Performance specifications called for the ability to put 65 klb (18.2 mt) into a 100 nm
(185 km) orbit indined 28.5 degrees to the equator, 40 klb (18.2 mt) into a 100 nm
orbit at a 90 degree indination, and 25 klb (11.3 mt) into a 277 nm (513 km) orbit
inclined 55 degrees to the equator. To meet abort requirements for polar launches, a
1500 nm (2780 km) cross-range capability was required. The current Space Shuttle
system consists of a reusable orbiter, an expendable ET, and two recoverable SRB's.
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Figure 3.3.3.1-I.- Space Shuttle mission profile.
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Performance characteristics
At present, there are four operational orbiters: Columbia (OV Orbital Vehicle -102),
Discovery (OV-103), Atlantis (OV-104), and Endeavor (OV-105). The Space Shuttle
Orbiter has a design life of 100 missions. Its crew compartment accommodates up to
7 crew members and can handle 10 persons during emergency operations. The
Orbiter's cargo bay is 60 ft long and 15 ft in diameter (18.5 x 4.5 m). It can carry
payloads to and from orbits ranging from 100-600 nrn (185-1100 km) in altitude
(payload capacity as a function of inclination and altitude is given in Table 3.3.3.1-1).
Upon completion of its orbital activities, the Orbiter lands horizontally, as a glider,
at a speed of about 312 fps (95 mps) and a glide angle of 18 to 22 degrees.
TABLE 3.3.3.1-1.- SPACE SHUTrLE PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
INCLINATION
28.5
28.5
APOGEE X PERIGEE'
(nmi)
160 x 160
PAYLOAD
(klbs)
54.0
220 x 220 46.0
28.5 300 x 300 37.0
57.0 160 x 160 38.0
57.0 324 x 324 19.0
The Space Shuttle's propulsion is provided by the three SSME's located in the aft
fuselage and two SRB's. The SRB's operate during the first 212 seconds. After
thrust tail-off, they are jettisoned into the ocean for retrieval and refurbishment
operations. Fuel for the main engines is carried in the ET, which is jettisoned
shortly after SSME cut-off, at about 98 percent orbital velocity. In orbit, the Space
Shuttle is propelled by the OMS contained in two pods on the aft fuselage. The
Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS) is contained in the two OMS pods and a module
in the Orbiter's nose section. The RCS provides attitude control in space and during
reentry and is used during rendezvous and docking maneuvers. The Orbiter is
constructed primarily of aluminum and is protected from reentry heat by the
Thermal Protection System (TPS). The principal substructures of the Orbiter are the
crew module, forward fuselage, mid-fuselage, payload bay doors, aft fuselage, engine
thrust structure, wings, and vertical tail.
During ascent, the Space Shuttle has four abort alternatives, depending on mission
elapsed time when the failure occurs. They are: return to launch site (RTLS), trans-
Atlantic abort (TAA), abort once-around (AOA), and abort-to-orbit (ATO).
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_Operational Facilities
Space Shuttle operations involve three key NASA Centers: JSC (lead center, Orbiter,
mission operations), KSC (launch, landing and refurbishment), and MSFC (SRB's,
SSME's, and ET). In addition, Space Shuttle uses the Air Force's Dryden Research
Center as a primary and backup landing site. Test facilities at the Stennis Space
Center are used for on-going SSME life cycle and development tests.
A typical Space Shuttle processing flow schematic, indicating facility dwell times,
along with work day and shift information used in this study, is shown in Figure
3.3.3.1-2.
Attribute Values
System input data related to each attribute, as well as system specific attribute values
are discussed below. In most cases, system data is modified by flight rate or cost
associated with the particular architecture and/or "If" being evaluated. However,
some useful observations can be made at the system attribute level. These will be
discussed following the presentation of the Space Shuttle system data.
ao Human Safety.- Relevant system data for human safety consists of system
characteristics that enable the crew to detach or escape from the main body of the
system during ascent in the event of a mission failure. A single design feature
(the slide pole) of the Space Shuttle (added after flight 51L) allows for crew
escape from the Orbiter. However, its use is restricted to level, unpowered flight
at subsonic speeds, which occurs at the end of each abort mode (except ATO) and
near the end of the landing phase. It provides no relief during powered ascent.
On the other hand, several abort options (described earlier) exist and can be used
in the event of a non-catastrophic SSME failure. If an abort-to-orbit is executed,
it is possible that the mission will be a success. The Space Shuttle does not have
a means of aborting the crew should there be an SRB catastrophic failure. Other
salient features include having the crew module in the same element as the
liquid engines, but over 70 feet ahead of their location, and having the crew
module parallel to the propellant tank, as well as to the solid rocket boosters.
b° Funding Profile.- Cost information provided to the HTS study team included
the cost of new facilities, new Orbiters, variable and fixed costs per flight for each
flight element, launch and flight operations, and NASA's Research and
Program Management support. In addition, spread factors for each cost item
were provided, identifying how much of the total cost was spent in the years
preceding the need for flight date. Table 3.3.3.1-2 presents a summary of this
data.
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Figure 3.3.3.1-2.- Space Shuttle operations flow schematic.
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TABLE 3.3.3.1-2.- SPACE SHUTTLE FUNDING PROFILE INPUT DATA
SPACE SHUTI'LE
COST BREAKDOWN
CATEGORIES
NON-RECURRING
RDT&E
PRODUCTION
P3I
LAUNCH PAD
VERT ASSY BLDG BAY
ORB PROC FACIL
LAUNCH CONTROL
CTR
MOBILE LAUNCH
PLTFRM
RECURRING
NEW
ORBITER (new)
SSME (new)
FLIGHT TO FLIGHT
EXTERNAL TANK
SOLID ROCKET
BOOSTERS
SSME (refurb)
ORBITER/CE
LAUNCH OPERATIONS
FLIGHT OPERATIONS
R & M/SUPPORT
TOTAL
OR TFU
COST
($M)
0
0
1000/Y
R
973
252
268
54
LEARN
-ING
CURVE
(%)
1637 100 100
96 90 90
RATE COST COST Y Y Y Y FLT
CURVE PER PER -4 -3 -2 -1 YR
FLT YEAR
(%) ($M) ($M) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%)
15 40 40 5
i5 40 40 5
15 40 40 5
40 45 15
35 45 20
25 30 30 15
25 60 15
12 352 23 36 40 1
23 358 1 58 41
5 75 16 26 26 32
5 75 100
5 598 100
7 666 1 7 92
0 327 100
Probability of Mission Success.- A system description and flight profile contains
the required input in/ormation for this attribute. In summary, the Space
Shuttle has one liquid propulsion stage, three liquid engines (with engine out
capability per the abort descriptions), and two solid motors used during the
initial boost period. A mission profile and sequence of events is shown as part
of Figure 3.3.3.1-1.
Architecture Cost Risk (ACR).- Two of three subordinate attribute values for
ACR are Technical Challenge and Program Immaturity. Since Space Shuttle is
an operating system and is capable of meeting the needs without further
development, it received the best rating (score of 1.0) on both scales. The third
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component, Number of New Systems, is an architecture-level value. Space
Shuttle's contribution to architecture scores for this component of ACR is zero.
Launch Schedule Confidence (LSC).- As in ACR, there are three subordinate
attribute values for LSC: Schedule Compression, Schedule Margin, and Delays
due to unscheduled maintenance activities. Schedule Compression and Delays
are architecture independent while Schedule Margin is architecture dependent
since its values are a function of annual flight rates and available facilities and
Orbiters. Space Shuttle's Schedule Compression values are: nominal cycle time
- 129 days, compressed cycle time - 86 days, and compression ratio - 0.67. It is
estimated that launch delays will occur in 24.5 percent of the flights.
Environmental Impact.- The Space Shuttle uses liquid hydrogen and liquid
oxygen as propellants, as well as two solid strap-on boosters. Its propellant load
includes: oxygen - 1361.936 klbm, hydrogen - 227.641 klbm, and solid propellant
- 2216.0 klbm. Using the given propellant weights, major effluent constituents
were determined and are shown in Table 3.3.3.1-3. These values are based on
equilibrium, non-afterburning calculations.
TABLE 3.3.3.1-3.- EFFLUENT DATA FOR SPACE SHUTTLE
Exhaust Space Shuttle
Product (klbm)
CO 574.6
C02 84.2
H2 102.8
H20 1735.4
HC1 502.6
N2 208.8
OH 0.8
H 0.8
A1203 720.0
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3.3.3.2 Space Shuttle Evolution
System Description and Performance Characteristics
Space Shuttle Evolution looks like and has Similar operations to the basic Space
Shuttle System (section 3.3.3.1) except for specific system upgrades as identified by
the HTS study team. These improvements include: liquid rocket boosters (LRB),
electro-mechanical actuators (EMA), light-weight external tanks (LWET), advanced
thermal protection system (ATPS), light-weight Orbiter (LWO), long-duration
(90-day) Orbiter (LDO), single I-Load (SIL), SSME limit to 100 percent thrust (SSME
100 percen0, crew ejection seats, and the addition of a reusable cargo vehicle (RCV).
These 10 items were selected because they are currently being touted as enhance-
ments to improve Space Shuttle safety, increase performance, reduce turnaround
time, reduce operational costs, and reduce the number of human flights, while still
maximizing the use of Space Shuttle's existing infrastructure and its associated fixed
annual cost. Overall performance increase for the Space Shuttle Evolution Orbiter
is 13 500 lbs to 160 nmi or 12 000 Ibs to SSF. The RCV can place up to 80 000 lbs to
SSF. A summary of performance for specific altitudes and inclinations is given in
Table 3.3.3.2-1.
TABLE 3.3.3.2-1.- SPACE SHUTI'LE EVOLUTION PERFORMANCE
CHARACTERISTICS
INCLINATION
28.5
28.5
APOGEE X PERIGEE
(nmi)
160 x 160
PAYLOAD
(klbs)
ORBITER
65.6
220 x 220 57.5
RCV
88.5
82.0
72.028.5 300 x 300 48.5
_n
57.0 160 x 160 50.1 83.4
57.0 324 x 324 30.5 70.0
a. LRB's.- The LRB's selected for this study are expendable and use four pump-fed
LO2/RP-1 engines per booster. Each booster has engine-out capability from lift-
off. Switching from the original SRB's to these LRB's provides an additional
20 klb payload delivery capability. Supporting data for their design was obtained
from the Martin-Marietta LRB study contract (NAS8-37136).
b. EMA's.- Converting the Orbiter's control surfaces from hydraulic to electro-
mechanical actuation offers improved processing time, reduced operating costs,
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and increased payload performance. These improvements result from
elimination of the hydrazine APU, APU servicing, and its GSE; hydraulic
system and its GSE; "SCAPE" suit operations and area clears for actuator tests;
and potential for hydraulic leaks. Payload performance gains of about 5000 Ibs
are a direct result of eliminating current on-board hardware. Full implemen-
tation of this improvement is likely only for new Orbiter builds. Candidate
functions for EMA upgrades include aerosurface control, door actuation, wheel
deployment, brake actuation, umbilical retraction, and engine gimbal.
LWET.- A series of candidate changes in the design of the ET are being
considered in order to improve performance and reduce weight. The candidates
include Super Lightweight Ablator substitution, tumble valve deletion, deletion
of slosh baffle, ET range safety system revision, variable insulation spray pattern,
margin optimization-LO2; biaxial yield-LH2 tank; reduced weld land width;
margin optimization-LH2; biaxial yield-LO2 tank; TPS LO2 aft dome; LO2 aft
dome reduction, reduction of LO2 proof pressure, substitution of A1-Li for sheet
in the intertank area (I/T), I/T margin optimization, machining of I/T TPS,
two-stage GO2 (Gaseous Oxygen) vent valve, and tolerance weight reduction.
These changes would provide a cumulative weight savings of about 3000
pounds, providing nearly a 1-pound payload increase for each pound of weight
reduced from the ET.
ATPS.- Five major changes in the TPS are incorporated to provide increased
safety and reliability due to increased TPS strength and temperature limits and
reduced operations cost due to decreased maintenance between flights. These
changes include using Advanced Carbon-Carbon (ACC) for the nose and wing
leading edges (five times the strength and eight times the modulus of current
reinforced carbon-carbon), High Thermal Performance (HTP) tiles (higher
strength, temperature capability, and improved impact resistance), Nextel
insulation blankets (higher temperature capability than current Advanced
Flexible Reusable Surface Insulation), using PBI instead of Nomex felt (200-
300 °F higher temperature capability), and Nextel 312 gap fillers and thermal
barriers (permit higher mission-use life due to higher temperature capability).
LWO.- This effort, which is also called the Lightweight Aerosurface Structures
Program, improves reliability and safety, lowers operating costs, and increases
the Space Shuttle capability by incorporating several modifications: use of
lighter material (candidates are A1-Li, Graphite/Polyimide,Graphite/
Bismaleimide, and ACC) for the primary structure and components such as
control surfaces, application of developed technologies to additional
components such as the drag chute structure, and integration of advanced
materials into Orbiter production and retrofit (i.e., nose cap, chin panel and
wing leading edge). Besides a reduction of 300-500 lbs per vehicle through
retrofit, up to 6000 lbs can be eliminated from new orbiters.
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LDO.- The Space Shuttle LDO significantly increases the man-tended SSF crew
stay time up to a 90-day mission by adding eight tank set pallets containing H2
and 02, and using some SSF power. Orbiter mission durations of up to 44 days
are achievable without any SSF provided power. Changes in the Orbiter design
which will be required for the LDO include high density packing stowage
approach, autolanding capability to ensure safe return, N2 (storage required to
meet the crew cabin makeup gas requirements, implementation of long life fuel
cells, and a number of relatively minor modifications such as docking and
thermal control.
Single I-Load.- A single season I-load that can be used any time during the year
is another approach for reducing ascent design effort. The monthly and day-of-
launch
I-loads are concerned with absorbing wind and subsystem variations for a given
launch. These activities result in considerable launch support effort and cost.
To reduce this effort and complexity, a single season I-Load approach is incor-
porated. This change affects first stage, flight control I-loads, requires specific
structural modifications, reduces average performance, and significantly reduces
launch operations costs by eliminating day-of-launch software updates.
SSME Limit to 100 Percent Thrust.- SSME reliability has been shown to be
related to operational power level, with lower power levels offering greater
reliability. 6 By limiting SSME operation to no more than 100 percent thrust
level versus operating at 104 percent, it is estimated that its single engine
reliability against mainstage shutdown would be increased from 0.9860 to 0.9947.
These values compare with 0.9977 used in the HTS study analysis for all liquid
rocket engines.
Ejection Seats.- The ejection seat system was developed as part of the Space
Shuttle Evolution Phase II Crew Escape Study. The option used for this study is
capable of ejecting up to eight crew members in about 5 seconds. The oper-
ational sequence is: (a) blow off the roof structure above the flight deck, (b) eject
the three crew members seated behind the commander and pilot, (c) blow off
the section of the flight deck floor, and (d) eject the three middeck crew
members by pushing them up to and out of the flight deck, followed by the
commander and pilot. Use of this ejection seat system would provide an
alternative to the RTLS abort option and would only be used if an RTLS abort
could not be performed.
RCV.- The RCV design is based on the Space Shuttle Orbiter, and, in fact, has
the same outer mold line as the Orbiter. However, a small pressurized volume
replaces the Orbiter's crew module. This module provides the environmental
control for Space Shuttle avionics currently housed in the crew module. In
addition, specific subsystem items have been relocated forward to improve
vehicle center of gravity, and hence, return flight characteristics. Operationally,
it uses all existing Space Shuttle infrastructure.
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k. Abort Modes.- The abort modes for the Space Shuttle Evolution will be similar
to the current Space Shuttle with the exception of the ability of the crew to use
the ejection seats. This could occur anytime from the pad up to approximately
the following limits: V=700 fps, H=10 kft, and t=28 seconds from lift off. Ejection
is not possible between altitudes of 10 kft and 30 kft due to SSME plume heating
effects with all three SSME's burning. However, there is a 16-second window,
which opens at 30 kft altitude, where ejection is again possible (altitude range is
30 - 50 kft, velocity is between 1290 fps and Mach 1.86). If the number one SSME
is shut down before ejection, then the crew escape option is a continuous
window from the pad up to an altitude of 50 kft. During descent, the limits for
using the ejection seats are: V -< Mach 1, and H = 50 000 ft to 300 ft minimum.
This system can also be used after touchdown to provide an escape option for all
eight crew members.
It Implementation.- The IOC for Space Shuttle Evolution used in this study is
2000, although all items have a projected availability before the turn of the
century (Table 3.3.3.2-2). Also, some enhancements would be applicable to all
flights, while others (e.g., light-weight Orbiter, EMA's) would only be realized as
new orbiters are built.
Attribute Values
System input data related to each attribute, as well as system specific attribute values,
are discussed below. In most cases, system data is modified by flight rate or cost
associated with the particular architecture and/or "If" being evaluated. However,
some useful observations can be made at the system attribute level. These will be
discussed following the presentation of the Space Shuttle evolution data.
ao Human Safety.- Relevant system data for human safety consists of system
characteristics that enable the crew to detach or escape from the main body of the
system during ascent in the event of a mission failure. For Space Shuttle
Evolution, these include replacement of the SRB's by LRB's with engine-out
capability and the addition of ejection seats. The use of LRB's with engine out
increases the mission success rate and allows the boosters to be shut down and
expended during the first two minutes of flight. Ejection seats provide more
coverage (see Abort Modes above) of the mission profile than the slide pole,
described in section 3.3.3.1, and therefore decreases the probable rate of crew loss
events. Abort options (described in Section 3.3.3.1) remain and can be used in
the event of a non-catastrophic SSME or LRB engine failure. Other salient
features include having the crew module in the same element as the liquid
engines but over 70 feet ahead of their location, and having the crew module
parallel to the propellant tank as well as to the liquid rocket boosters.
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TABLE 3.3.3.2-2.- SPACE SHUTTLE EVOLUTION ENHANCEMENT PROJECTED
AVAILABILITY DATES
SPACE SHUTI'LE EVOLUTION AVAILABLE
ENHANCEMENT
SINGLE I-LOAD 1994
100% SSME MAX POWER LEVEL 1996
EJECTION SEATS 1997
LDO 1997
ATPS 1998
LWET 1998
EMA's 1999
LWO 1999
LRB'S 1999
RCV 1999
b.
C.
d.
Funding Profile.- Cost information provided to the HTS included the same
breakdown as for the Space Shuttle system. However, additional costs associated
with Space Shuttle Evolution development and operations have been included.
Table 3.3.3.2-3 presents a summary of th/s data.
Probability of Mission Success.- A system description and flight profile contains
the required input information for this attribute. In summary, Space Shuttle
Evolution, with either the Orbiter or RCV in the stack, has 4 liquid propulsion
stages and 13 liquid engines: 3 SSME's, 4 LRB engines per booster, and 20MS
engines. The system has engine-out capability on each of the LRB from lift off
and for the Orbiter and RCV per the abort descriptions in section 3.3.3.1. Its
mission profile and sequence of events is similar to that shown for Space
Shuttle in Figure 3.3.3.1-1.
Architecture Cost Risk.- Two of three subordinate attribute values for ACR,
Technical Challenge and Program Immaturity, are system dependent. These
were determined by the NIT through consensus. Since Space Shuttle Evolution
is a derivative of an operating system and requires development of one new
flight element (LRB) out of three (SRB, ET, Orbiter), plus a modified version
(RCV) of an Orbiter, it received relatively high ratings for Technical Challenge
and Program Immaturity. Specifically, Space Shuttle Evolution was a given a 3
(Non-Recurring), 2 (Production) and 3 (Operations) as part of its Technical
Challenge value. These scale ratings, out of a range from 1-10, translated into
values of 2.78, 1.67, and 2.78, respectively (see ACR discussion in
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TABLE 3.3.3.2-3.- SPACE SHUTTLE EVOLUTION FUNDING
PROFILE INPUT DATA
SPACE SHUTTLE
COST BREAKDOWN
CATEGORIES
TOTAL
OR TFU
COST
($M)
LEARN RATE COST COST Y Y Y Y Y Y FLT
CURVE] PER PER -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 YR
CURVE FLT YEAR
(%) (%) ($M) ($M) (_) (_) (_) (_) (_) (_) (_)
NON-RECURRING
RDT&E 1966
PRODUCTION 0
,L
P3I 1000/YR
LAUNCH PAD 973
VERT ASSY BLDG 252
BAY
ORB PROC FACIL 268
LAUNCH CONTROL 54
CTR
MOBILE LAUNCH 116
PLTFRM
LRB FACILITY 1140
RECURRING
NEW
ORBITER (new) 1756 100
SSME (new) 96 90
FLIGHT TO FLIGHT
EXTERNAL TANK
LIQUID ROCKET 176 90
BOOSTER
SSME (refurb)
ORBITER/CE
LAUNCH
OPERATIONS
FLIGHT
!OPERATIONS
R & M/SUPPORT
100
90
88
5 10 25 25
5 i 10
25 10
15 40 40 5
15 40 40 5
15 40 40 5
40 45 15
35 45 20
25 25 25 10
25 30 30 15
25 60 15
12 352 23 36 4O 1
1 58 41
2 44 16 26 26 32
10 229 100
5 58_ 100
2 664 1 7
0 327
92
100
Section 3.2.5). On a similar scale from 1-10 for Program Immaturity, Space
Shuttle Evolution was given a 4, which is a value of 4.64. The third component,
Number of New Systems, is an architecture-level value. Space Shuttle
Evolution's contribution to architecture scores for this component of ACR is
0.93.
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Launch Schedule Confidence.- As in ACR, there are three subordinate attribute
values for LSC: Schedule Compression, Schedule Margin, and Delays due to
unscheduled maintenance activities. Schedule Compression and Delays are
architecture independent, while Schedule Margin is architecture dependent
since its values are a function of annual flight rates and available facilities and
Orbiters. Space Shuttle Evolution's Schedule Compression values are: nominal
cycle time - 87 days, compressed cycle time - 62 days, and compression ratio - 0.73.
It is estimated that 24 percent of Space Shuttle Evolution's flights, both human
and RCV, will experience a launch delay.
Environmental Impact.- The Space Shuttle Evolution uses liquid hydrogen and
liquid oxygen as its main propellants, as well as liquid oxygen and RP-1 in its
two liquid rocket boosters. Its propellant load includes: oxygen - 2032.936 klbm,
hydrogen - 227.641 Mbm, and RP-1 - 268.700 Mbm. Using the given propellant
weights, major effluent constituents were determined and are shown in
Table 3.3.3.2-4. These values are based on equilibrium, non-afterburning
calculations.
TABLE 3.3.3.2-4.- EFFLUENT DATA FOR SPACE SHUTTLE EVOLUTION
Exhaust Space Shuttle
Product (klbm)
CO 625.5
CO2 518.8
H2 90.6
H20 2286.7
HC1 0.0
N2 0.0
OH 0.0
H 0.0
A120 3 0.0
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3.3.3.3 Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV)
System Description
The ACRV is currently the subject of a Phase B competition. The material in this
section is based on a candidate configuration, the Viking-SCRAM, developed in-
house at JSC. Cost and weight data are data supplied by the ACRV Program.
As a result of the Space Shuttle stand-down following 51-L, the need for an alternate
system for returning the SSF crew was identified. A number of studies were
completed to identify requirements and possible solutions. The conclusion was that
a dedicated, space-station-based vehicle is required to assure the safe return of the
SSF crew. Three design reference missions for this system are defined as follows:
• SSF crew return in the event of prolonged Space Shuttle stand-down.
• Return of ill or injured SSF crew person when Space Shuttle is not available, e.g.,
between normally scheduled Space Shuttle missions to SSF.
• Emergency evacuation of SSF and subsequent return of crew to Earth.
These design reference missions define a requirement for an operational mission
life of up to 24 hours. The crew capacity and the landing mode - vertical or
horizontal, land or water - are the major open trades to be determined in the Phase
B study.
One ACRV is to be delivered to SSF as a payload in the Space Shuttle cargo bay to
support SSF PMC, and a second is required at EMCC. After berthing at SSF, the
ACRV will remain on station in a quiescent mode unless called upon for a crew
return mission. Each ACRV will be returned to Earth, as Space Shuttle cargo, at
approximately 5-year intervals for refurbishment. Ground processing sites,
including facilities for refurbishment and pre- and post-flight processing, are also to
be determined.
Performance Characteristics
The Viking-SCRAM ACRV shown in Figure 3.3.3.3-1 is comprised of an 11-ft
diameter cylindrical crew compartment on a 14.5 ft-diameter Viking heat shield. An
8-ft diameter service module mounted forward of the heat shield is jettisoned after
the deboost burn. Berthing at SSF is enabled by a berthing adapter that flares to
accommodate a small (-36) in ACRV hatch mating at a standard (80 in) SSF hatch.
The mass summary for the flight segment, including flight support equipment (FSE)
and airborne support equipment (ASE), is presented in Table 3.3.3.3-1. Note that,
with an eight-man capacity, the ACRV cargo capacity is essentially nil.
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AaBured Crew Return VehJ_e (ACRV)
II crew, 24 hour misolon
Figure 3.3.3.3-1.- Viking-SCRAM ACRV.
TABLE 3.3.3.3-1.- ACRV MASS STATEMENT
All Masses are in Pounds
Functional
Sub-System
Code
1 Structure
2 Protection
3 Propulsion
4 Power
5 Con_ol
6 Avionics
7 Environment
8 Other
9 Growth
10
11
Dry Mass
Non-Cargo
Cargo
Inert Mass
12 Non-Propellant
13 Propellant
Gross Mass
C_w
Module
1,552
1,216
25O
856
0
99O
1,817
989
1,150
8,820
1,820
120
10,760
373
264
11,397
Service
Model
475
71
302
732
48
52
252
1,932
56
0
1,988
0
866
2,854
Berthing
Adapter
System
544
82
625
625
625
FSE
&
ASE
1,6oo
240
1,840
1,840
1,840
Meteoroid
Debris
Protect
523
79
602
602
602
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Attributes Values
a. Program Costs and Funding Profiles.- ACRV development and acquisition costs
in Table 3.3.3.3-2 and the ACRV development profile shown in Table 3.3.3.3-3
are based on data obtained from the NASA ACRV program office. A cost
breakdown is available for the flight segment only, while development and
acquisition costs are not available for either the ground segment or for the
mission control segment. The only operations cost available is an estimate of
$80M for the first 10 years of operation.
TABLE 3.3.3.3-2.- ACRV DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION COSTS
FY92 DOLLARS IN MILLIONS
INTEGRATION, ASSY, & C.O.
STRUCT & MECHANISMS
RECOVERY & LANDING
THERMAL PROTECTION
PROPULSION
POWER (BATTERIES)
ELEC DIST & CONTROL
AVIONICS
ECLSS & PERS PROV
IACO TOTAL:
OFT VEHICLE
TOTAL NON-RECURRING
RECURRING PRODUCTION:
TWO FLT UNITS @ 107.0
TOTAL DEVEL & ACQ:
171.9
41.6
37.3
70.8
3.0
49.6
193.2
58.6
626.0
107.0
733.0
214.0
947.0
bo Probability of Mission Success.- The ACRV is passive cargo in the Space Shuttle
cargo bay for delivery to the SSF. The PMS for this phase is counted as Space
Shuttle operations, and not as ACRV operations. The PMS for the ACRV crew
return mission is defined as the probability that the ACRV will successfully
complete the mission within the limits specified by the System Performance
Requirements Document (JSC 34000). The availability and performance of the
ground and mission support segments should not be considered except where
support functions are necessary to accomplish a safe landing. The mission is
successfully completed when splashdown or touchdown is within required
impact acceleration limits (does not include initiation, rescue,i or recovery
functions). Because the ACRV is not manifested as distinct flights, its reliability
does not contribute to the architecture's PMS score.
c. Architecture Cost Risk.- The ACRV is a low technology, moderately mature
study.
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TABLE 3.3.3.3-3.- ACRV FUNDING PROFILE
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d. Operational Flow.- As noted previously, the ACRV is carried as a payload in the
Space Shuttle cargo bay. The processing of this payload is an offline operation as
far as Space Shuttle processing is concerned. The span available for ACRV
ground processing (order of years) does not impact processing operations or LSC
scores.
el Environment.- Environmental contamination problems for launch systems are
addressed in this study. The ACRV does not use any propulsion system within
the sensible atmosphere, and as a result the only contaminants are those
produced by a low-thrust-level reaction control system that may be used to
provide attitude control during the descent phase.
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3.3.3.4 Cargo Transfer Function (CTF)
System Description
a, History.- In some of the HTS architectures, cargo delivery to specific
destinations is required. Using a low cost, expendable launch vehicle (ELV) is
desirable; however, most ELV's are not equipped with the specific hardware and
software features that would be required to perform a precision rendezvous. A
cargo transfer function might be necessary if the cargo was, for example, a
logistics element for the SSF. Depending on the ELV, the modifications to
perform this cargo transfer can be minor or significant. The CTF is not so much
a specific element as a common functionality which the ELV would incorporate
in an architecture where precision delivery is needed.
b. Configuration.- The cargo transfer function represents an added capability (and
cost) associated with precision rendezvous and delivery of untended payloads to
destinations such as the SSF. Typically, all versions of CTF include features
such as payload support and attachment structure, avionics, power,
communications provisions, attitude control thrusters and tankage, and
guidance software. In this study, the CTF is related to evolutionary versions of
the Delta, Atlas, and Titan launch vehicles. The CTF will correspond to
different designs depending on the launch vehicle, but all the concepts must
conform to the following mission groundrules and operational requirements
shown in Table 3.3.3.4-1.
c. Abort Modes.- The CTF is never used with human elements and has no specific
abort modes.
do Facilities.- The CTF facilities will be very similar to existing upper stage facilities
at the U.S. Eastern Test Range sites. In many cases, only minor modifications
may be required to use existing facilities for future operations at KSC or Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS). Each carrier booster element section
contains a description of the facilities requirement assumptions for the HTS
study. Since most CTF designs use bipropellant OMS fuels and hydrazine RCS
fuel, existing tank loading and settling facilities at CCAFS will need to be
retained.
e. Operational Flow.- The operational flows are very similar to the NLS Cargo
Transfer Vehicle and Advanced Upper Stage flows, except the flow time lengths
may be different due to smaller vehicle size and different subsystem conceptual
designs. The upper stage flow is considered parallel to the booster flow and
doesn't result in any schedule drivers.
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TABLE 3.3.3.4-1.- CTF GROUNDRULES, ASSUMPTIONS,
AND TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
• SSFis in 220 nmi circular orbit
• CTF element(s) is (are) physically attached to payload, but supplies no
services to the payload, nor does it receive services from SSF or other
destination infrastructure
• Payload c.g. is on longitudinal centerline
• Active mission time is 25 hours
• 14 days on-orbit survival time
MRMS (robotic arm) is the capture mechanism at SSF (two grapple
fixtures on the CTF are required)
No on-orbit maintenance of CTF
• CTF has sufficient GN&C capability to target payload to an envelop
(typically 10 foot in diameter by 10 foot long volume) and stabilize
attitude (nominally 0.05 de_/sec in x,y,z)
• Automated rendezvous
• Range rate and angle rate sensor
• GPS is used for navigation
• Person-in-the-loop proximity operations at SSF
• Ku band communications
TV to SSF for final 3000 feet of approach
• Telemetry (32 Kbps) through TDRSS
• 6 DOF control
Performance Characteristics
The CTF itself has no performance capability, rather it is a feature that is added to a
launch vehicle and is specific to that vehicle (see Figure 3.3.3.4-1 for Atlas example).
Although there would be additional mass for the CTF, with a resulting reduction in
payload capacity for a given launch vehicle, this effect was considered secondary.
Attribute Values
a, Funding Profile Summary.- The CTF estimates were developed by the three
NIT member sources responsible for the parent launch system inputs. Each
industry representative defined a new conceptual design and weight statement
(no known current bus stages meet the requirements for this function) for cost
estimating. Each NIT member assigned a CTF estimating task submitted a
parametric cost estimate (in constant-year 1992 dollars excluding NASA
program factors) for their respective CTF space flight element.
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SYSTEMS CTF
STAGE DIAMETER 8.3 FT
PROPELLANT 140o L.B
kC_lN IMPULSE NIA
RCS THRUSTERS 9& IOOLB
REMOTE RCS N / A
AVIONICS TMR
DOCKING AUTO
CQMMON CENTAUR / CTF TRANSFER SYSTEMS
MONO I BIPROPELLANT
(OFF-THE-SHELF)
__ AVIONICS
_ BASIC TRANSFER
_& & & RADAR REFLECTORS
[] _ ==(_] SENSORS. CAMERAS
Figure 3.3.3.4-1.- Atlas example.
A summary of the cost estimates for CTF are shown in Table 3.3.3.4-3. Appendix 2.4
contains the cost estimate inputs sheets for each respective CTF conceptual design.
TABLE 3.3.3.4-2.- CTF COST SUMMARY
(1992 Dollars in Millions)
Development:
C/D Phase
Facilities
Total -
Production:
Theo. 1st Unit
Supt./Equip. Set
Oper. and Support:
Variable Cost
Fixed Annual
Atlas
CTF Stage
$243
243
16
11
XX
X
Delta
CTF Stage
$243
243
16
11
XX
X
Titan
CTF Stage
$114
114
87
10
XX
X
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Probability of Mission Success.- The mission of the CTF begins after the CTF or
payload has been inserted into orbit. By definition, mission success only
considers flight phases up to orbital insertion. The CTF, therefore, has no
contribution to the overall PMS as it is defined in this study.
Human Safety.- The CTF is used in conjunction with untended missions and
therefore does not contribute to any safety score.
Architecture Cost Risk.- The CTF designs for the three versions were considered
similar to the point where one set of risk scores were adequate. For the non-
recurring portion of the Technical Challenge subattribute, a score of 4 reflects the
NIT view that the CTF is within the state-of-the-art. A Production score of 2 and
an Operations score of 3 are indicative of the small size and existing processes
required to produce a CTF. The Program Immaturity factor was a 6, which
reflects the lack of detail design at this point.
Launch Schedule Confidence.- The CTF operates in conjunction with other
systems and does not have its own score for LSC.
Environment.- The CTF involves operation of elements outside the sensible
atmosphere and does not contribute to the environment attribute score as it is
defined in this study.
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3.3.3.5 Delta H
System Description
a. History.- The Delta II is the newest, most powerful version of the Delta series of
launch vehicles. Originally developed by and for NASA/Goddard Spaceflight
Center, the Delta, using components from the USAF's Thor IRBM program and
the Navy's Vanguard launch vehicle program, was first launched on May 13,
1960. Through mid-1992 there have been 196 successful launches out of 206
attempts, demonstrating a reliability of greater than 94 percent.
b° Configuration(s).- The current 7000 series booster configuration, the most
advanced to date, was developed as the result of being selected by the USAF,
during the Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV-1) competition, to launch the Global
Positioning System (GPS). The first flight of this currently available Delta H
occured on November 26/1990. The characteristics of the Delta II launch vehide
are given in Table 3.3.3.5-1. Two-stage (7920) and three-stage (7925) versions are
operational at this time. Two different payload fairing (PLF) sizes are offered, 9.5
and 10 ft diameter. The overall vehide is shown with each of these PLF's in
Figure 3.3.3.5-1 for the three stage configuration. The overall dimensions of the
two stage are the same.
TABLE 3.3.3.5-1.- DELTA H VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS
Length if0
Diameter (ft)
Total weight (lb)
Engine/motor
Manufacture
Quantity
Propellants
Propellant weight (Ib)
Thrust (lb) - SL
- VAC
Isp (sex:)- SL
- VAC
Burn time (sec)
Expansion ratio
Strap-On-Solids First Stage Second Stage Third Stage
42.5
3.3
28,618 ea (GL)*
28,800 ea (At.)**
Hercules
85.6
8
224,239
RS-27/C
Rocketdyne
19.6
8
15,394
AJ10-118K
Aerojet
6 (GL)* + 3 (AL)**
Solid
25,800 ea
98,870 ea
110,820 ea
245.7
273.8
63
10.65:1
1
LOX/RP-I
211,147
201,000
237,000
255.6
301.8
265.4
12:1
1
N204/A-50
13,367
9,645
319.4
439.7***
65
6.7
4.1
4,721
Star-48B
MTI
1
Solid
4,430
15,100
292.6
87.1
54.8
*Ground lit
**Air lit
***Incl restarts
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Motors (GEMs)
I
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3.0
"]-5
Delta 7925 Delta 7925 - 10
12:1 Main
Engine Expansioo Ralto
Figure 3.3.3.5-1.- Delta 11 7925 configurations.
C. Operations.- Launch Operations: Delta vehicles are launched from Launch
Complex 17 (LC-17) at CCAFS. LC-17 contains two active pads, 17A and 17B.
The two pads can be used for simultaneous build up of two vehicles. The Delta
launch site operations flow and typical (nominal) launch ops timeline are
shown in Figure 3.3.3.5-2. Nominal operations can accommodate up to
12 launches per year from CCAFC.
West coast launches are from Space Launch Complex 2 West (SLC-2w) at
Vandenberg Air force Base (VAFB). Vehicle and payload processing operations
are performed at Building 836 in South Vandenberg and at the launch complex.
The Delta launch vehicle elements are delivered to VAFB from Huntington
Beach, California, where they have gone through the equivalent of the CCAFS
Area 57 Delta Mission Checkout (DMCO). SLC-2w activities are similar to the
LC-17 described in Figure 3.3.3.5-2.
Flight Operations.- Typical two- and three-stage mission profiles are shown in
Figure 3.3.3.5-3. Details of a three-stage (7925) vehicle geosynchronous transfer
orbit (GTO) mission profile are given in Figure 3.3.3.5-4.
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1st SDG_!
2nd SDG21
\
HANGER
M
Y
35 days (Sd-lsft)
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-AK_ ASTR°
TECH
GEMS
I PADS
17 A OR 17B
38 days (Sd-2sft)
4 day PAD
- TURNAROUND
1 day (Sd-lsft)
Figure 3.3.3.5-2.- Delta processing (ETR).
Resta_
_MECO
SECO 2 _ _ $ECO 1
Separation _
Two Stage Three Stage
Figure 3.3.3.5-3.- Typical mission profiles.
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100-nrni perigee.
Figure 3.3.3.5-4.- Typical Delta II 7925 mission profile - GTO mission.
Performance Characteristics
a. GLOW.- The gross lift-off weight of the Delta II, not including payload, is given
in Table 3.3.3.5-2 for both the two-stage (7920) and three-stage (7925) vehicles.
b. Cargo Envelope.- Details pertaining to the payload fairings and the available
envelopes can be seen in Figure 3.3.3.5-5. Information for the two-stage and
three-stage vehicles is shown for both the 9.5- and 10-ft diameter fairings.
C. Cargo Capacity.- The performance of the Delta II is shown in Table 3.3.3.5-3 as a
function of orbital destination or orbital energy level, in the case of
interplanetary missions.
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TABLE 3.3.3.5-2.- VEHICLE GROSS WEIGHT
(DOES NOT INCLUDE PAYLOAD)
Sediment:
Solids
6 Ground Lit
2 Air Lit
First Stage
Second Stage
Third Stage
subtotal;
Fairing(s)
Total(s):
9.5 ft
z,8,50
499,.579
2 Stg (7920)
171,696
86,400
224,239
15,394
NA
497,729
10 ft
2,200
499,929
Weight Lbs.
3 Stg (7925)
171,696
86,400
224,239
15,394
4,721
502,450
9.5 ft-
1,850
504,300
lOft
2,200
504,650
Payload
Fairing
Length
Diameter
MaSS
S(_:IiORS
StrtK;ture
MatenaJ
9.5 ff Diameter
2.SulO=
1140
2696
B6o
2184
N
96O _
.,Q__ ---
2,138
27.8 _ t8 47 m)
9.5. (2.9 m)
1850 Ib (8,H kg)
2
Isog6d base, skin-stringer wide-cylinder
Aluminum
I
T
L
)0
r
I
10 ft Diameter
3.Su_ [] u=_,_,*
2.SLago 3.Stage
1140
_
f.iJ
_1100 _ _460
960 _ 960 _ 960 .----e.-I
260 fl (7.92 m]
100 [I (305 m)
2200 |b {1000 kg)
3
Isogrid base, skin-slringer wide-cylincler
r
Aluminum
Figure 3.3.3.5-5.- Delta payload envelope.
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TABLE 3.3.3.5-3.-DELTA II PERFORMANCE DATA
Mass to Orbit (lbs)
28.5 degrees, 160 nm circular 10,900 2 stg
28.5 degrees, 220 nm circular 10,500 2 stg
57.0 degrees, 160 nm circular 8.800 2 stg
98.3 degrees, 450 nm circular * 7,000 2 stg
GTO 4,010 3 stg
3 stgInterplanetary
(28.7 degree 100 nm perigee altitude)
C3=0 Km2/Sec 2
C3 =25 "
C3=50 "
* WTR launch, all others ETR
2,830
1,700
1,030
Attribute Values
a. Funding Profile Summary.- The data in Table 3.3.3.5-4 was provided as input
for the calculation of the funding profile attribute.
TABLE 3.3.3.5-4.- FUNDING PROFILE COST INPUTS (MILLIONS OF $)
NON-RECURRING:
RDT&E $0
N/R $0
Production $0
RECURRING
(Includes; Prod, Launch Ops, Flight Ops, Prog Mgt&Sup)
: Fixed Cost/Flight $140 Fixed Cost/Flight $29
Year of
-3 -2 -1
Spread Factors Flight
14% 48% 8% 32%
b. Probability of Mission Success.- The flight profile shown previously in Figure
3.3.3.5-4 was used to derive the PMS reliability tree for the Delta vehicle.
Vehicle characteristics used in the calculation included the use of 2 liquid rocket
engines (first and second stages), 10 solid rocket motors (9 for thrust
augmentation and 1 for third stage), and 3 liquid propulsion stages (first stage
and the equivalent of 2 for second stage, due to restart of second stage). Because
Delta is an existing vehicle with a launch history, the actual flight reliability of
94.1 percent (175 successes out of 186 attempts - 1964 through 1992) can be
compared to the PMS calculated value of 93.2 percent.
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Human Safety.- Not applicable.
Architecture Cost Risk.- Two of the three subattributes were based on system
values, or scores. For the Delta vehicle, an existing vehicle, the NIT concensus
scores for those subattributes, technical confidence, and program maturity, were
both 1.0.
Launch Schedule Confidence.- As with ACR, two of the three subattributes
were based on system values, or scores. One of these, schedule compression,
was calculated based on the operations data given in section 3.3.3.5.1. The value
of schedule compression was calculated to be 53 days saved from a nominal I01
day processing time, or 0.52. The other value, percent of flights with delays, was
calculated to be 7.59 percent. Both of these calculated values, along with the
schedule margin subattribute, were subsequently used with architecture-
particular flight rate data to rollup the architecture schedule confidence attribute
and value. Historically, six percent to nine percent of Delta flights have been
delayed beyond the launch window due to hardware (six percent due to vehicle
hardware and three percent due to support hardware).
Environment.- The Delta vehicle first stage has an RP-1/liquid oxygen (LOX)
propellant load of 211 147 Ibm, the second stage has 13 367 Ibm of N204/A-50. In
addition, nine solid strap-ons with 229 308 total Ibm of propellant are used
during the boost phase. Although the Delta utilizes a third stage on some
flights, its use is outside the atmosphere and therefore does not contribute to the
effluent total.
Using the given propellant weights, the major effluent constituents (in klbs) are
shown in Table 3.3.3.5-5. These values are based on equilibrium, non-
afterburning calculations.
TABLE 3.3.3.5-5.- EFFLUENT DATA FOR DELTA II
Exhaust Delta 1I
Product Effluents
125.2CO
CO2 76.6
H2 6.6
H20 70.4
HC1 31.4
N2 17.8
OH 0.0
H 0.0
A1203 45.0
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3.3.3.6 Atlas Launch Vehicle Family
System Description
a. History.- The current Atlas launch vehicle family has steadily evolved from the
1950's Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program. Since then over
500 Arias launch vehicles have been flown in various configurations from both
east and west coast launch sites. The current family uses the same basic 1.5 stage
core vehicle as the early concepts, but also incorporates a state of the art
cryogenic (LH2/LOX) upper stage, Centaur.
b. Configurations.- Although various configurations of Atlas will be flown
throughout the next several years, the Arias IIAS configuration is being used as
the representative vehicle in the mission capture analyses from 1998 to 2020 (the
NASA Mixed Fleet Manifest is used from 1992 to 1997). Figure 3.3.3.6-1 shows
the Atlas ]]AS relative to the L II, IIA, and two evolutionary options. An
additional configuration, the Atlas E, has been flown frequently over the last
several years (not shown in the figure). This configuration is not used in
architectures beyond that specified in the Mixed Fleet Manifest (1997 and
earlier).
__1 1....:" Ill Ir[ _l!l
50 ...... _.
8ustaine¢ [
BoosW ' Sold Rod_e(
0 _r.w Molo_
_taimpr ....
E_ine
Atlas I AUas I! & liA Atlas IIAS
0 990) 0 992) (1993)
• LARGE (14 FT)
FAIRING
• NEW DATA
ACQU IS_TION
SYSTEM
• LENGTHENED ATLAS
• LENGTHENED
CENTAUR
• INCREASED ATLAS
ENGINE THRUST
• STATE OF THE ART
CENTAUR AVIONICS
• FIXED FOAM CENTAUR
TANK INSULATION
Atlas/CTF Atlas EvoluUon
Option Option
• REPLACED SOLID
ADAPTOR MODIFIED ROCKET MOTORS
TO PROVIDE CARGO WITH LARGER SRMS
TRANSFER FUNCTION • REPLACED RL-IOs
WITH SINGLE
ENGINE ON CENTAUI
• PRELAUNCH
PROCESSING
ENHANC EMENTS
. ADDED FOUR SOLID . ATLAS IIAS WITH
ROCKET MOTORS
(CASTOR WAs)
Figure 3.3.3.6-1.- Atlas launch vehicle family.
One evolutionary option of the Atlas IIAS includes a modification of the
payload adaptor to provide the CTF. The CTF enables a system to perform
rendezvous and proximity operations (including docking or berthing) with SSF
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or other LEO node destinations. The modifications to provide the CTF primarily
consist of relocating some Centaur equipment (e.g. avionics) and the addition of
off-the-shelf equipment needed for the proximity operations near SSF (e.g.,
sensors and thrusters). In addition, the Centaur will require some structural
uprating to handle the larger LEO payloads. Figure 3.3.3.6-2 depicts the
configuration and composition of the CTF.
STAGE DIAMETER 8.3 FT
PROPELLANT 1400 LB
MAIN IMPULSE N / A
RCS THRUSTERS 9 & 100 LB
REMOTE RCS N/A
AVIONICS TIMR
DOCKING AUTO
COMMON CENTAUR l CTF TRANSFER SYSTEMS
/ BIPROPELLANT
(OFF-THE-SHELF)
""_'_ AVIONICS
1 _V V V _U__ Is'rAGI::b-_rRUCTURI:
Figure 3.3.3.6-2.- AtIas/CTF configuration.
Another evolutionary option involves reliability, prelaunch processing, per-
formance, and cost enhancements to the Atlas IIAS. As seen in Figure 3.3.3.6-1,
this evolutionary option involves modification of the Centaur for a single
upgraded RL-10, larger SRM's, a Centaur Processing Facility (CPF), and other
enhancements to prelaunch processing.
Facilities.- The east coast facilities (CCAFS) used by the Atlas family primarily
consist of a booster processing facility (Hangar J), SRM storage facilities, an off-
line payload processing facility, and two launch pads (Pad 36A/B). A majority of
the integration and checkout between the booster, upper stage, solids, and
payload is done on the pad.
The west coast facilities are currently only equipped to handle Atlas E class
vehicles (i.e., no Centaur). The mission capture analyses did not include any
Atlas launches from the west coast beyond those specified in the NASA Mixed
Fleet Manifestl
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The Atlas with the CTF does not require construction of additional facilities,
however, minimal modifications to the existing support equipment are
anticipated and are included in the nonrecurring costs.
The Atlas evolution option includes the construction of a new CPF at the
CCAFS for off-pad checkout. This additional facility, along with some other
proposed or planned prelaunch processing enhancements, would reduce the
time between consecutive launches to 38 days. The Titan evolution concept also
benefits from the Centaur off-line processing.
Operational Flow.- The Atlas booster/sustainer and Centaur upper stage are
delivered to the booster processing facility for inspection and pre-integration
processing (3 and 6 days respectively). The Atlas is then transported to the pad
and erected (2 days). Once the Centaur has completed its receiving inspection
and preliminary checkouts it is moved to the pad and mated on top of the Atlas
(5 days). At this point a series of Atlas/Centaur/Ground System interface checks
and system tests including SIMFLIGHT (electronics and software) and Wet Dress
Rehearsal (fluids and cryogens) are performed (24 days). Next, the solids are
mated to the stack (4 days). At this point the encapsulated payload is delivered to
the pad and integrated onto the launch vehicle (2 days). A final certification is
performed on the entire stack after which the launch preparations and
countdown occur (5 days).
The processing flow for the Atlas IIAS is shown in Figure 3.3.3.6-3. The dwell
times in each facility are also noted. The assumed shift schedule for Atlas
processing is 5 days a week with one 8-hour shift. However, the last 5 days are
around-the-clock operations at a 1.75 shift equivalent. With pad refurbishment
and booster processing run in series, the minimum time between consecutive
launches is 52 days. This allows a theoretical maximum launch rate of 14 flights
per year (2*365/52) for 2 pads. Under nominal operating conditions (i.e. 365 days,
less weekends and holidays) up to 10 launches per year are achievable.
Since most of the CTF subsystems are simply relocated from the Centaur to the
payload adaptor, the processing flow for Atlas/CTF will be the same as the Atlas
IIAS (Figure 3.3.3.6-3).
The processing flow for the Atlas evolution is shown in Figure 3.3.3.6-4. The
CPF allows Centaur upper stages to be processed off-line for both Atlas and Titan
missions. The booster on-pad operations are reduced through a number of
planned and proposed enhancements to the vehicle and the ground segment.
These indude avionic and other vehicle subsystem upgrades, ground support
equipment and launch control system enhancements, and optimization of
manufacturing and launch operations.
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Figure 3.3.3.6-3.- Atlas IIAS processing flow.
Figure 3.3.3.6-4.- Atlas evolution processing flow.
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Performance Characterisfic_
The Atlas performance characteristics for the three configurations being used in this
study are shown in Table 3.3.3.6-1. The Atlas/CTF is only used for SSF deliveries;
therefore, the table only shows performance to 220x220 nmi, 28.5 °. The Atlas
evolution concept has been estimated at the same gross lift-off weight (GLOW) as
the current vehicle because most enhancements are in the ground processing area,
and those changes that result in mass differences tend to be offsetting (to the extent
that they have been analyzed).
TABLE 3.3.3.6-1.- ATLAS LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
Atlas HAS Atlas/CTF Atlas Evol.
GLOW (lbs) 515,900 523,000 515,900
Press. Volume (ft3) 0 0 0
Cargo Envelop (lxd)
Cargo Capacity (lbs):
160 nmi circ, 28.5 °
220 nmi circ 1 28.5 °
300 nmi circ 1 28.5 °
30x220 nmi, 28.5 °
GTO 1 26 °
Return Capacity (lbs)
Crew Capability (#)
Launch Site Limits
20x13.4
17,600
151700
7,700
0
20x13.4
n/a
161000
n/a
n/a
n/a
0
20x13.4
iii !i
181800
22,000...
I0,000
0
0 0 0
East Coast East Coast East Coas't
Attribute Values
a° Funding Profile Summary.- The Atlas costs for the three configurations being
used in this study are shown in Table 3.3.3.6-2. Because many of the cost
numbers are architecture dependent, the following numbers have been
calculated based upon several flight rates. The identified launch facility costs are
incorporated only if required by the architecture and "If" Scenario (i.e. flight
rates exceed capacity of current facilities). The CPF is only used in Architecture 2
and is used by both Titan/Centaur and Atlas/Centaur.
The Atlas/CTF development schedule is shown in Figure 3.3.3.6-5 as a function
of years from the start of Pre-Phase A studies of the system requirements. The
program follows the standard development stages and ends with an initial
operating capability in the seventh year.
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TABLE 3.3.3.6-2.- ATLAS LAUNCH VEHICLE COSTS
All Values in M925
DDT&E
N/R Prod
P3I
Facilities (if required):
AtIas IIAS Atlas/CTF Atlas Evol.
o ioo
0 24 0
0 0 0
Pad - ETR
SLC- WTR
Cent Proc Fac - ETR
CPF @ : 2/yr
4/W
6[yr
8/yr
 o/v"
12/yr
381
476
0
120
381
476
0
132
381
108
93 101 86
85 91 78
8580 74
78 83 72
76 80 71
PROGRAM YEARS
PROGRAM MILESTONES
ATLAS CTF PROGRAM
Requirements Definition
Vehicle Design
Avionics Development
Procurement
Planning_ Toolin& Mockup
Vehicle Fab. & Sub-Assembly
Test Vehicle Fabrication
Test Program
Component Dev. & Qualify
Structural & Modal Tests
9ys. Integration Tests
Design & Mfg.-GSE, ASE
GSE Installation & Validation
Software
Final Assembly & Checkout
Ground Launch/Rendezvous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
PreA Ph.A
ATPSDR PDR CDR
r-
m [
Figure 3.3.3.6-5.- Atlas/CTF development schedule.
ILC
V
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Probability of Mission Success.- The PMS estimate for Atlas UAS is based upon
the use of a 3-liquid engine booster/sustainer, 2-engine/2-burn liquid upper
stage, and four monolithic solids. The reliability tree for Atlas ILAS PMS is
included in the Technical Appendix. This reliability tree, the basic configuration,
and the historical reliability estimates for characterized subsystems results in an
Atlas IIAS PMS of 0.9326. Refer to the PMS section of this report to further
understand the measurement technique being applied (section 3.2.4).
For the Atlas/CTF, the CTF performs only on-orbit maneuvering, which is not
being accounted for in the current definition of PMS. Thus the Atlas IIAS and
Atlas/CTF have the same PMS value (0.9326).
The Atlas evolution concept employs a single-engine Centaur and therefore has
a different upper stage impact upon the PMS attribute. The PMS measurement
for Atlas evolution is 0.9369.
Human Safety.- The Atlas does not carry human vehicles in the architectures
currently being examined in this study and therefore does not have a
corresponding safety score.
Architecture Cost Risk.-The Atlas is an existing system which is currently
performing missions and therefore has little to no risk. In the Technical
Challenge subattribute the Atlas was judged with having no risk in all three
program categories (i.e., nonrecurring, production, and operations). The Atlas
was also judged to be a mature system and therefore warranting the lowest
Program Immaturity score. The Atlas evolution was judged to have a small risk
in the non-recurring development and to be less mature than the current flight
configuration. The Atlas/CTF was judged to have a moderate amount of risk
because it has yet to enter Pre-Phase A development. Table 3.3.3.6-3 presents the
Atlas family contributions to the ACR.
TABLE 3.3.3.6-3.- ATLAS FAMILY RISK SCORES
Atlas Risk
Attribute
Technical Challenge Sub-Attribute
Non-Recurring Production Operations
Atlas I 1 1 1
Atlas/CTF 4 2 3 6
Atlas Evolution 2 I 1 3
Prgm. Immaturity
Sub-Attribute
e. Launch Schedule Confidence.- As with ACR, two of the three subattributes for
LSC were based on system values or scores. One of these, schedule compression,
was calculated based on the operations data given previously in this section; its
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value represents the ratio of nominal processing time to the shortest processing
time (maximum compression of the critical path). The nominal processing time
is determined in calendar days (i.e., includes weekends). The other subattribute,
percent of flights with delays, was calculated based upon UMA's for the system
(see section 3.2.6). Table 3.3.3.14-4 shows the above two subattribute scores for the
Atlas launch vehicle family. Both of the subattribute values were subsequently
used with architecture-particular, flight-rate data to roll-up the architecture level
values. The schedule margin subattribute score is architecture-specific and is
described in Sections 3.3.5 through 3.3.11.
TABLE 3.3.3.6-4.- SCHEDULE CONFIDENCE SUBATFRIBUTE
SCORES FOR THE ATLAS LAUNCH VEHICLE FAMILY
Atlas
Schedule
Confidence
Attribute
Schedule
Nominal
Processing
Time (Days)
Compression SubAttribute
Compressed
Processing
Time (Days)
Ratio:
Nominal to
Compressed
% Flights With
Delay
SubAttribute
Arias 66 32 0.485 5.37
Atlas/CTF 66 32 0.485 5.37
Arias Evolution 39 19 0.487 5.37
f. Environment.- The Atlas booster uses RP-1 and liquid oxygen as propellants.
The IIAS has a sustainer/booster propellant load of 344.5 klbm, solid rocket
motor propellant mass of 22.3 klbm, and an upper stage propellant load of 37
klbm (liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen). However, the upper stage operates
outside the sensible atmosphere and does not contribute to the environment
score as defined in this study.
Using the given propellant weights, the major effluent constituents (in klbs) are
shown in Table 3.3.3.6-5. These values (klbm) are from the October 1991 AIAA
Workshop and Report on "Atmospheric Effects of Chemical Rocket
Propulsion". 7 They are based upon equilibrium, non-afterburning calculations.
Recognizing that this is a low-weighted attribute and that Atlas does not fly
extensively in most architectures (most of its missions are commercial, which
are not being considered in the current "If" Scenarios) it was assumed that
Atlas/CTF and Atlas evolution effluents were the same as the Atlas ILAS. The
environmental effects of larger solids for the Atlas evolution concept will be
assessed in later efforts.
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TABLE 3.3.3.6-5.- ATLAS IIAS EFFLUENTS PER LAUNCH
Exhaust Atlas IIAS Atlas/CTF Atlas Evol.Characteristics
(302 128.8 128.8 128.8
95.8 95.8 95.8
8.2 8.2 8.2
(302
H2
H20 146.2 146.2 146.2
HC1 14.0 14.0 14.0
N 5.6 5.6 5.6
OH 0.0 0.0 0.0
H 0.0 0.0
A120_ 20.0
0.0
20.0 20.0
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3.3.3.7 Titan Family
This family includes the Titan II, Titan HI, and Titan IV basic launch vehicles, as
well as various upgrades and improved versions postulated for future develop-
ment.
System Description
All Titan launch vehicles currently utilize a 10-ft diameter core containing storable
hypergolic propellants (Aerozine-50 and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO), with length
stretched according to needed lift capability. Independent propellant tanks (oxidizer
on top) are supported by aluminum monocoque construction. Two LR-87 gas
generator cycle engines with a shared-feed system, but separate turbopumps, power
the first stage. The second stage is of the same diameter and utilizes the same
propellants, but employs one LR-91 engine (similar to the 1st-stage engines, but with
lower thrust - 100 ldbf vs. about 500 klbf), a higher expansion ratio nozzle, and
higher vacuum specific impulse. Hydraulic systems are incorporated for core
engine gimbaling. Power is obtained from Ag-Zn batteries; no APU's are required.
Current versions of Titan allow for only one burn of the second stage. With the
addition of a "start-kit", the second stage could be restarted, after a coast to apogee,
for greater insertion into circular orbit capability (this option is not currently
incorporated in any of the FITS architectures due to the reliability penalty assessed by
the HTS methodology).
TABLE 3.3.3.7-1.- TITAN FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS
Cargo Only:
Titan II G No Upper
Stage (NUS)
Titan III/Cmfl Titan
Titan W (NUS)
Titan IV (Centaur)
*Titan W (CTF/LRV)
*Titan Evol (LDC)
*Titan Evol/Centaur
Crew Carriers:
*HR Titan IIS (RUPC)
*HR Titan IV (RPC)
No. and Type
Stase 0
N
2S
2S
2S
2S
w
12 L (1-out)
of Engines (#
Stage 1
2L
2L
2L
2L
2L
2L+2S
2L+2S
2 L + 10 GEM
2L
Engine Out)**
Stage 2
1L
1L+RS
1L+RS
1L
1L
1L
1L
1L
1L
Stage 3
w
2L+2RS
4L
1L+2RS
4 L (1-out)
3 L (1-out)
* Postulated designs (subject to change)
**Unless indicated, no engine-out capability
L--liquid engine; S--segmented solids (large); GEM=small monolithic solids;
RS=Restart
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Currently, the Titan III and IV have two large strap-on solid rocket motors; the Titan
US includes 4 to 10 solid strap-ons. Whereas the solids on Titan 1I are small,
monolithic grains, the two strap-ons for T-III and T-IV are segmented solid rocket
motors - 5.5 segments for T-III, 7 segments for the currently operational T-IV, and
the more advanced 3-segment composite case version known as the SRMU (solid
rocket motor upgrade), planned to be available for the T-IV in 1993. For evolution
(growth) of Titan, used in Architecture 2, additional vehicle development is
required. The implementation schedule for this development is shown in Figure
3.3.3.7-1. The "Titan IV Evolution" launch vehicle defined for this study is a
potential future development, featuring a large diameter core (14 ft) to achieve
higher payload lift capability.
The human-rated (HR) version of the Titan II (HR Titan IIS) employs 10 of the
small solids. The HR Titan IV concept incorporates the normal core, but with LRB's
in place of solids, in order to provide the capability for emergency shut down. Each
LRB is powered by six (or five) engines, with one engine-out and on-pad checkout
capabilities.
Reusable personnel carrier (RPC) and reusable ultralight personnel carrier (RUPC)
crew cabs are carried by the HR Titan IV and HR Titan IIS, respectively (see
Architectures 14 and 17). The RPC and RUPC are self-contained vehides with
integral orbital propulsion stages, launch escape systems, and all necessary thermal
systems to survive ascent heating without the benefit of a separate, external shroud,
as is the norm for cargo-only payloads.
Performance Summary
Titan vehicle lift capabilities are given in Table 3.3.3.7-2. Payload shrouds vary,
ranging from 10-ft diameter (by 20, 25, or 30-ft tall) for Titan IT, 13-ft diameter (by 35-ft
height) for Titan UI, and up to 16.7-ft diameter (by 56 to 86-ft height) for Titan IV.
TABLE 3.3.3.7-2.- TITAN PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES
Payload to Orbit (klbm)
"° IV LRB*Orbit Type
1. Standard (80x95 @ 28.5 °
2. Circ., 28.5 °, 160 n. mi.
3. Circ., 28.5 °, 220 n.mi.
4. Circ., 28.5 ° , 300 n.mi.
5. SSF Transfer (80x220)
6. Circ., 57 ° , 160 n.mi.
7. Circ., polar, 150 n.mi.
8. Circ., 98.7 ° , 445 n.mi.
9. GTO, (100x19330)
IIS
14.4
12.0
10.1
8.6
12.0
11.1
w°w
i w
llI
31.6
27.1
25.5
17.2
31.0
17.4
18.5
2.8
8.4
IV
45.3
44.7
43.5
41.3
47.0
42.6
36.3
7.0
25.4+
IV Ev*
64.3
62.1
60.0
58.2
62.0
59.2
51.9
9.5
35.3+
56.4
55.6
53.1
49.0
54.8
47.3
8.9
* Postulated designs (subject to change)
t Includes Centaur Class Upper stage (or Centaur Evol for T-IV Ev).
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Figure 3.3.3.7-1.- Titan IV growth vehicle implementation schedule.
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Attribute Values
Complete data on Attribute data for each of the Titan LV's in this family are
provided in the Appendices. In the following sections, noteworthy characteristics or
unique features of the Titan design are identified for each Attribute.
a. Funding Profile.- Titan system cost information used in the funding profile
summary calculation is shown in Table 3.3.3.7-3.
TABLE 3.3.3.7-3.- TITAN SYSTEM COST INFORMATION
DDTE
N/R Prod.
p3I
Facilities:
Pad-ETR
SLC-WTR
VIB-Hi Bay
SMAB
RUPC Test
Cost/Flight @
RUPC
1,425
145
Wl
mm
BW
II
3
Millions of '925 -- No
T-IIS T-IV T-IV T-IV
HR NUS w] w/
for ETR CTF CTF
RUPC
Wraps
0 0 0 102
0 0 0 12
518 0 0 0
2/yr
4/yr
6/yr
8/yr
10/yr
12/yr
300 477 477 477
- (596) (596) -
- 155 155 155
- 144 144 144
266 333 344
213 266 275
187 234 241
170 213 220
159 198 205
150 187 194
64 102
51 82
45 72
41 66
38 61
36 58
T-IV
NUS
Evol'n
0
0
403
477
w_
155
144
3O3
243
213
194
181
170
T-IV
HRw/
RPC
298
0
518
477
155
144
(1) 348
(2) 279
(3) 245
(4) 222
(5) 211
(6) 196
T-IIG
Refurb
0
0
0
38
30
Notes: 1. RUPC flight costs include refurb costs, and replacement after every 7th
use.
2. All launches are from ETR except T-IIG (refurb), from WTR.
3. T-W w/CTF if T-IV NUS + CTF.
4. HR T-IV w/RPC column is for T-W only; RPC not included; number In
parentheses is number of human flights out of year's total.
5. T-II w/RUPC column is for HR T-II only, RUPC not included.
6. RUPC cost/flight does not include T-II; total CPF for RUPC + T-II is the
sum of figures in both columns.
7. Flight rate for each column is considered in isolation, except as noted
above.
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b. Probability of Mission Success.- The Titan reliability philosophy has been built
upon design simplicity, robustness, extensive testing, design for enhancement of
reliability, and the use of high-reliability components that have been thoroughly
tested - rather than upon redundancy. This philosophy has resulted in a very
high success rate and has been proven to be very cost effective. Engine gimbals
are hydraulically actuated, with the engines providing the necessary
pressurization. Titan engines are conservative in design; for example, operating
at very modest chamber pressures (<860 psi). No igniters are needed because of
• the hypergolic nature of the propellant pair. High ullage pressures are not
required, and autogenous pressurization systems are used in-flight to maintain
positive expulsion flow rates (cold gas pressurization is an option for LRB's).
There is no coast phase associated with staging, so that positive-g maintains
propellant feed for subsequent stage ignition. The aluminum airframe is
rugged: the vehicle can be supported either vertically or horizontally, without
the need for propellant tank pressurization.
For human-rated vehicles the avionics equipment, engine actuators, and
control paths would be made redundant. Hydraulic actuators would likely be
replaced with electromechanical devices to gimbal the engines.
Titan reliabilities for engines and propulsion systems are at or above the average
across many different LV systems ("generic" failure rates), as seen in the
following table.
TABLE 3.3.3.7-4.- FAILURE RATES
Reliability ( per use)
Liquid Engines
Liquid Propulsion Stages
Monolithic solids
Segmented solids
HTS Titan
Generic
0.9977
0.9847
0.9983
0.9921
Historical*
0.9968
0.9929
N/A
0.9866
* Based upon launch results since the development phase completion for Titan 1I
(Dec. 1964), i.e., 2 engine failures out of 630 cases (210 flights of 3 engines each); 3
propulsion system failures out of 420 (2 propulsion stages per launch); 1 solid failure
in 88 flights. Note: for basic LV, does not include upper stage failures (Transtage,
Agena, Centaur).
The next table shows the calculated PMS, using both the HTS generic values and
those obtained using Titan-specific, historically-based reliabilities. It should be noted
that analytical reliabilities, based upon very detailed models, predict even higher
reliability for the Titan family. Also, the redesign of historically anomalous
components over the life of the program improves the reliability above those
quoted in the table.
3.3-52
Rev. E
TABLE 3.3.3.7-5.- TITAN FAMILY PMS
Vehicle
HTS
Generic
Rates &
Model
Reliability Basis**
Titan
Historical
Rates +
HTS Model
Titan
Program
Analytic
Reliab.
Titan
Demonstrated
Performance
Cargo Only:
Titan IIG (NUS)
Titan III/Cmrl Titan
Titan IV (NUS)
Titan IV/Centaur
*Titan IV (CTF/LRV)
same, but CTF1-
eng out
*Titan Evol (LDC)
*Titan Evol/Centaur
Crew Carriers:
*HR Titan US (RUPC)
*HR Titan W (RPC)
0.9626
0.9307
0.93O7
0.9100
0.9242
0.9519
0.9185
O.9323
0.9189
0.968
0.958
0.958
N/A
0.937
0.963
0.973
N/A
0.938
0.967
N/A
N/A
0.978
0.936
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1.000 (15/15)
0.%8 (150/155)
1.000 (5/5)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
* Postulated designs (subject to change)
**First two columns use FITS failure model, but different failure rates (see Table
3.3.3.7-4). Third column contains Martin Marietta internal Titan Program
estimates.
C, Human Safety.- The Titan vehicle has high reliability and safety performance as
demonstrated by the flight history since initial development, including the
perfect success in launching the human Gemini spacecraft.
Because the hydrazine-based fuels are intrinsically difficult to explode, the safety
risk from a major breech of a propellant tank is considerably less than with
other, more combustible fuels. When both fuel and oxidizer come into contact,
the fire-like reaction tends to drive the two sources apart. Titan tanks are
structurally independent, thereby minimizing this probability (except in the case
of an induced destruct, which for untended missions purposely opens both
tanks at their interface in order to facilitate burning and thereby reduce the
amounts of raw propellants reaching the ground). For the same reason, fire
propagates relatively slowly, allowing longer times for escape via a launch
escape system (LES).
Both HR Titans will be safer for crews than the Titan cargo launch vehicle (LV),
because (a) the HR T-IV has no solids and (b) each solid on HR T-IIS is small
(only 2 percent of the amount of propellant of one Space Shuttle SRB) and
located more than 50 ft from the crew capsule. Even failures involving larger
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solids, such as the 5.5 segment version, can allow sufficient time for escape if the
LES is activated prior to the vehicle destruct system. In the 1988 T-34D failure,
where the vehicle underwent on-board automatic destruct, more than 3 seconds
were available from the time of burn-through until the fireball reached the
payload area. Projectiles, apparently, only propagated outside a conical shadow
zone, preventing the payload zone from suffering direct hits by debris.
Architecture Cost Risk.- For the HTS, the Titan Family is defined as a
minimum set of readily-developed vehicle derivatives from the existing family
of operational LV's. Evolved vehicles are achieved by solid rocket additions or
improvement programs. As an example, the Titan IIS, incorporating strap-on
graphite-epoxy motors (GEM's) (or Castors), is already in advanced study and
being proposed for nearer-term applications, such as MLV-3, for next-phase GPS
deployment. The most significant new development would be LRB's for the
HR T-IV, involving a new core diameter and a cluster of multiple engines, with
engine-out capability. Development risk is mitigated by using existing core
engines and the same propellants.
Human rating of Titan is not considered a development risk because of the good
safety features of the LV and the personnel carriers being considered; the
Gemini-Titan system and the Space Shuttle return-to-flight assessment
heritages will aid the rating process.
Operational Flow.- At WTR, a two-pad Space Launch Complex is available for
Titan launches. Titan IVs are launched from complex SLC-4E; Titan IIs from
SLC-4W. A common Launch Operations Building also indudes the launch
control center, but each pad utilizes a separate mobile service tower and
appropriate consumables facilities. Currently, the LV's are assembled on-pad,
resulting in longer times between launches (appropriate to low launch rates),
but future plans call for off-pad assembly concepts.
At ETR, two Launch Complexes (LC-40 and LC-41) are now available for
launching Titan Ill and IV. With minor pad modifications, Titan II could also
be launched at these complexes, but studies underway address options for a
dedicated Titan II complex using existing facility infrastructure. To support
LC-40 and -41, a Vertical Integration Building has four ceils. A new solid rocket
processing facility provides stacking and checkout of the strap-ons. A planned
Centaur processing facility will be available in 1994. Separate modular servicing
tools (MST's) are provided for each pad. As at ETR, the required current launch
rate for Titans is low and pad processing times are correspondingly long, but
higher rates will be readily achievable in the future as they have been in the
past.
Typical current processing flows for Titan-family vehicles used in subsequent
architectures are shown in Figures 3.3.3.7-2 through -5. For high traffic models,
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Figure 3.3.3.7-2.- Titan IV NUS processing (ETR).
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Figure 3.3.3.7-3.- Titan IV NUS processing (WTR).
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Figure 3.3.3.7-4.- Titan !I/RUPC processing (ETR).
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Figure 3.3.3.7-5.- Titan W (human-rated) with LRB's processing (ETR).
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the flow times can be reduced through the use of more integrated components,
multiple shifts, and the addition of facilities.
Environment.- The only environmental impact considered significant enough
for evaluation is the effluents from the solid rocket motors. In all cases, these
emissions are considerably below the Space Shuttle launch emissions because of
the small quantities of propellants, with the T-US solids being a factor of 20 less
massive and the HR T-IV having no solids at all.
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3.3.3.8 Cargo Transfer Vehicle (CTV)
System Description
a, History.- The CTV is designed to deliver NLS 1 (the heavy lift launch vehicle
(HLLV)) strongback and attached payload elements to SSF. To do this, it must be
capable of raising the orbit perigee to a safe altitude, remaining in a phasing orbit
until an appropriate time in order to rendezvous with the SSF, circularizing the
orbit, conducting proximity operations, and hovering within reach of the Mobile
Remote Manipulator System for capture and berthing to SSF.
b* Configuration.- Raising the perigee altitude and then circularizing the resulting
orbit requires a propulsion system with sufficient thrust to accomplish these
objectives over reasonably short burn arcs. In addition, the CTV must have
structural and mechanical interfaces compatible with both the launch vehicle and
payload and/or payload carrier. Maneuvering large payloads in the vicinity of the
SSF requires six degree-of-freedom (6- degree-of-freedom (DOF) control capability
and communication/command capability consistent with SSF requirements on free
flyers operating in its command and control zone. Delivery of an 80 foot
strongback and payload weights of 100 000 pounds will require a forward
propulsion module (FPM) on the nose of the strongback which works in tandem
with the CTV during proximity operations to assure full 6-DOF capability. Delivery
of a single payload may be accomplished utilizing a shorter strongback (40, 50, 60
feet) and the CTV operating alone (no FPM) if the center of gravity is located within
an acceptable performance envelope (e.g. 50 klb payload and c.g. of 25 feet).
Operating in the SSF vicinity will require a high degree of reliability to insure crew
safety and protect the SSF resource. Figure 3.3.3.8-1 shows a notional version of a
CTV, FPM, and HLLV strongback. Weight summaries are given in Tables 3.3.3.8-1
and 2.
C° Operations.- The CTV is received from the manufacturer or from the recovery
vehicle if the CTV is reusable. The CTV is refurbished and processed for the next
flight in the CTV Processing Facility. The CTV Processing Facility consists of a
receiving area, two clean room processing ceils (class 100K), work areas, and a local
control area. Activities occurring in these areas include inspection, cleaning, and
purging; vehicle system test and checkout; and hypergolic propellant deservicing.
Automated control and checkout operations are accomplished with local Launch
Processing System (LPS II) stand-alone test equipment. Upon satisfactory
completion of CTV checkout the vehicle is shipped to the payload encapsulation
facility (PEF). The CTV processing flow is shown in relationship to the NLS
processing in Figure 3.3.3.8-2.
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Pictured as two physical CTV Circulation
elements. Might also be
1 physical structure witl_ _lodule, Proximity Operations Module Module will not be
requmng°mitteds°me".°f forthesame.missionsCOmponentSnot_\ a d Forward Propulsion Module _ lighterrequiredpayloadsfo shorter
Circulation Proximity _ Forward
Module Operations Strongback Propulsion
Module Module
Notes: (1) that the ACS and feeds are common with NLSUS. SSF requirements may drive the CTV ACS
and feed system to more redundancy that needed for NLSUS' mission.
(2) that prox ops are conducted with mon-prop. This is an issue to be worked with SSF. Current
plans are to utilize biprop for prox ops, just as the Orbiter does.
(3) that CTV will require "moderate avionics development. Avionics - Software development and
validation in particular - are a significant part of the program.
(4) ILS 2001 @ KSC
* Note that the reference CTV is reusable. If trades indicate no payoff for a reusable system, the
Shuttle-COmpatible fittings will not be needed. In addition, the C'I'V would not be driven by Orbiter
requirements for saling of the propulsion system or by the structural design requirements for landing
in the Orbiter.
Figure 3.3.3.8-1.- The CTV circulation module, proximity operations module, and
forward propulsion module.
3.3-61
Rev. E
TABLE 3.3.3.8-1.-CTV WEIGHT SUMMARY (POUNDS)
AVIONICS
Prime Power 0
Space Shuttle/SSF Umbilical 80
Cables 50
GN&C 35
Communications 0
Data & Instrumentation 12
Range Safety 150
FPN Umbilical 30
Subtotal
PROPULSION SYSTEM
Propellant Tank
Pressurant Tank
RCS Thrusters (12-25 Lbt)
Propellant Feed System
Subtotal
STRUCTURES (Includes Thermal)
Passive Berthing Mechanism
Berthing Adaptor/Support Structure
Forward Structure and Fittings
Main Frame Structure & Keel Fittings
Avionics Support Structure
Aft Structure & Fittings
Engine Support Structure
Tanks Support Structure
Grapple Fixture
Subtotal
CONTINGENCY (10%)
TOTAL DRY WEIGHT
RESIDUALS &GN2
TOTAL (BURN-OUT WEIGHT)
PROPELLANT LOADING
TOTAL LAUNCH WEIGHT
160
67
26
71
2O8
292
318
152
50
318
24
65
25
357
324
1452
213
2346
_19
1_3
3462
3.3_2
Rev. E
TABLE 3.3.3.8-2.- CTV WITH PROXIMITY OPERATIONS MODULES
WEIGHT SUMMARY (POUNDS)
AVIONICS
Prime Power
Space Shuttle/SSF Umbilical
Cables
GN&C
Communications
Data & Instrumentation
Range Safety
FPN Umbilical
Subtotal
THERMAL CONTROL
PROPULSION SYSTEM
Propellant Tank
Pressurant Tank
RCS Thrusters (12-25 Lbt)
Propellant Feed System
Subtotal
ill
STRUCTURES (Includes Thermal)
Passive Berthing Mechanism
Berthing Adaptor/Support Structure
Forward Structure and Fittings
Main Frame Structure & Keel Fittings
Avionics Support Structure
Aft Structure & Fittings
Engine Support Structure
Tanks Support Structure
Grapple Fixture
Subtotal
CONTINGENCY(10%)
TOTAL DRY WEIGHT
RESIDUALS &'GN2
TOTAL (BURN-OUT WEIGHT)
PROPELLANT LOAD_G
TOTAL LAUNCH WEIGHT
810
350
900
478
349
536
80
150
1045
289
197
317
208
292
864
904
500
864
48
130
25
3653
400
2062
3835
995
10945
609
11554
10000
21554
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ASRM PROCS
23 days
(Td-3sft)
ASSEMBLY/
PROCESSING
FACILITY
21 days
(7d-3sft)
PAYLOAD OPS
(non critical path)
CTV
26 days
P/L PROCS
XXX days
P/L ENCAP
42 days
ASRM
ii1-,--
CORE
P/L
VAB
ASRM STK
27 days
CORE/
BOOSTER
MATE
to MLP
13 days
MATE P/L
INTG C/O
5 days
(7d-3sft)
Total Time
in VAB
45 days
I_t MLP _]
REFURB
5 days
5d- 1sft
LV on
MLP
PAD
14 days
(7d-3sft)
5 day
turnaround
Figure 3.3.3.8-2.- NLS/CTV processing.
Performance
The performance characteristicsof the CTV/NLS are given in Table 3.3.3.8-3.
TABLE 3.3.3.8-3.- CTV/NLS PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Destination SSF Low LEO
Orbit Alt 220 X 220 160 X 160
Inc/Element 28.5 De_ 28.5 De_
CTV/NLS 1 101 Klbs 105 Klbs
CTV/NLS 2 26 Klbs 30 Klbs 30 X 15
Car_o Vol
Length X Dia
60 X 30
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Attribute Values
a° Funding Profile Summary.- The data shown in Table 3.3.3.8-4 was used in
calculating the CTV's contribution to the funding profile attribute in those
architectures utilizing the CTV.
TABLE 3.3.3.8-4.- FUNDING PROFILE SUMMARY CARGO
TRANSFER VEHICLE (MILLIONS OF $)
DDT&E
Non-Rec. Facilities
Total Cost
$461
$22
Non-Rec. Production $0
Rec. Production
Reusable Hardware*
Expendable Hardware*
Overhauls
Launch C_s.
Cost Per Flight
LC%
$25
RC%
$63 90% '100%
$16 90% 100%
$14 90% 100%
90% 100%
$25 Ave. For 79 Flights
* Reusable Hardware = Kickstage + Prox Ops Module
** Expendable Hardware = Strongback + Forward Prop Module
b.
C.
d.
e°
Probability of Mission Success.- The PMS of the CTV was not separately calculated.
The mission phases of the CTV were, however, included in the success trees of the
NLS and used to determine the PMS of the CTV/NLS combination.
Human Safety.- Not applicable, not flown with human-tended vehide.
Architecture Cost Risk.- Two of the three subattributes were based on
system/element values or scores. For the CTV, the NIT consensus values for those
subattributes, are shown in Table 3.3.3.8-5.
Launch Schedule Confidence.- Not applicable, not in critical path of NLS
processing.
f. Environment.- Not applicable, only operates outside atmosphere.
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TABLE 3.3.3.8-5.-CTV/NIO CONSENSUSVALUES
Technical Challenge
Non-recurring 4
Recurring 3
Operations 3
Program Immaturity 6
3.3-66
Rev. E
3.3.3.9 National Launch System (NLS)
System Description
a. History.- The NLS is a new space launch system that is evolutionary in nature
and is based upon the following engineering development and study activities:
The Space Transportation Architecture Study in 1985-1986; the "clean sheet
design approach" of the ALS studies in 1987 through 1989; the NASA Shuttle-
derived cargo vehicle (Shuttle-C) studies conducted in 1985 through 1990; the
Space Transportation Main Engine (STME) development starting in 1988 and
continuing to the present; and the Advanced Launch Development Program
system design and technology program in 1989 through to the present time.
A DOD Milestone Defense Acquisition Board, held in September 1988, validated
the requirements for a new, untended space launch system for cargo transport in
the late 1990's and beyond. This new family of vehicles is proposed to share
space launch traffic demands with the Titan, Space Shuttle, Delta, and Atlas
systems by providing increased launch capacity and availability at reduced cost.
The Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (i.e. the
"Augustine Committee"), December 1990, recommended the following:
• Offload Space Shuttle in all but the initial phases of the SSF deployment,
Provide an evolutionary vehicle potentially capable of fulfilling the SEI, SDI
support, lunar base and Mars trip requirements,
• Incorporate advanced launch vehicle technologies where and when feasible,
• Reduce operational personnel requirements,
• Be capable of being human-rated.
A meeting with Vice-President Quayle, DOD, NASA and Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) representatives on January 2, 1991 recommended that this
new launch system program would be jointly funded and managed by the Air
Force and NASA. The new program would:
• Provide a range of payload capabilities including heavy lift,
• Provide a human-rateable capability for some applications,
Provide for an evolutionary near-term capability and a longer term
capability that incorporates new technology,
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Achieve significant improvements in operations cost (particularly launch
support manpower) and operational resilience compared to existing
systems.
b. Configuration(s).- The following provides summary descriptions of the NLS
vehicle family.
NLS 1 - HLLV
The 100 klb class vehide has been designated as NLS 1 (HLLV). NLS 1 is comprised
of a propulsion module, a version of the common core (with propellant tanks), two
advanced solid rocket motors (ASRM's), a payload transition or adaptor section, and
a payload carrier section consisting of a payload fairing. This fairing has a strongback
to carry Space Shuttle payloads (in a similar manner as the Space Shuttle Orbiter).
NLS 1 has the capability to add a CTV with an orbital propulsion and avionics
system to deliver cargo to the SSF. All engines are pad ignited and the ASRM's
burn to their pro-pellant depletion, at which time they are jettisoned and recovered
from the ocean. The four STME engines burn to orbital insertion of a 30 x 200 nmi
orbit and are shutdown by a guidance computer signal. If required to maintain a
longitudinal acceleration limit, the STME's may be step- throttled down or two
engines cut off prior to orbital insertion. The payload is separated from the payload
adaptor and the remaining core is targeted for disposal with ocean impact.
The primary mission of NLS 1 is to deliver an 80 klb (net) payload to the SSF in a
220 nmi circular orbit. A configuration drawing is shown in Fig. 3.3.3.9-1.
NLS 2 (Stage-and-One-Half 50 k Vehicle)
NLS 2 has been designated as a stage-and-one-half (1.5 stage) vehicle reflecting the
engine burn profile. Six STME's are ground-ignited and burn until correct staging
velocity, at which time four are shut down and jettisoned. The remaining two burn
until orbit is achieved and are shutdown by a guidance computer signal.
NLS 2 is comprised of a propulsion module, propellant tanks ("common core"), a
payload transition or adaptor section, and a Titan W payload fairing. This
configuration is to deliver a 50 klb payload to an 80 by 150 nmi orbit at an inclination
of 28.5 ° . Any further orbital maneuvers will be performed by the payload, which
may include an upper stage. A configuration drawing is shown in Fig. 3.3.3.9-2.
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• ASRM Boosters
• Core Propulsion Module Located Under the
Propellant Tanks
- STME's (4)
-- 583Klb Vac. Thrust (650K Jan 92
-- 430.5 s Vac. Isp
-- 45:1 Exp. Ratio
- 6:1 MR
-- Step Throttleable (75%) Optional
- Engine Out Capability
- Propellant Feed System Commonality with NLS
2 (1.5 Stage) Propulsion Module
• ET Derived Core Tankage
- A1 2219 Construction
- 5 ft. Stretch in LH2 Tank
(Wp - 1.69 Mlb)
- Includes Structural Weight Penalty for
Commonality with 1.5 Stage
Titan IV Derived Payload Shroud with Space
Shuttle Compatible Attachments
- 15' x 80' Payload Envelope
• Kickstage / CTV for Circularization and SSF
Rendezvous & Dock
• 1990 Technology Avionics with Moderate
Development
• ILC ~ 2001 @ KSC
Figure 3.3.3.9-1.- NLS 1 HLLV.
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• Core Propulsion Module Located Under the
Propellant Tanks
- STME's (6 -- 4 Staged in Booster Module, 2 in
Sustainer)
- 583 Klb Vac. Thrust (650K Jan 92)
- 430.5 s Vac. Isp
- 45:1 Exp. Ratio
-- 6:1 MR
-- Step Throtfleable (75%) Optional
- Booster Module Initially Expendable
- Engine Out To Orbit Capability
- Propellant Feed System Common with Inline
NLS 1 (HLLV) Propulsion Module
• ET Derived Core Tankage
- A1 2219 Construction
- 5 ft. Stretch in LH2 Tank (Wp ~ 1.69 Mlb)
- Design for Commonality with Inline NLS 1
• Standard Titan IV Payload Shroud
- 15' x 61.7' Payload Envelope
• 1990 Technology Avionics with Moderate
Development
• ILC ~ 2001 @ KSC and 2002 @ CCAFS
Figure 3.3.3.9-2.-NLS 2 vehicle.
NLS 2 with NLSUS (Two-and-One-Half Stage (2.5 Stage)) Vehicle
The NLS 2 with NLSUS (2.5 stage) vehicle is so designated because it consists of the
basic NLS 2 (1.5 stage), plus a new, high energy upper stage, NLSUS. The primary
requirement for this vehicle is to deliver a 15 klb payload into geosynchronous
orbits. Another possibility is an 80 klb (net) NASA resupply payload to SSF. A
configuration drawing is shown in Figure 3.3.3.9-3.
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• Core Propulsion Module Located Under the
Propellant Tanks
- STME's (6 -- 4 Staged in Booster Module, 2 in
Sustainer)
- 583 Klb Vac. Thrust (650K Jan 92)
-- 430.5 s Vac. Isp
-- 45:1 Exp. Ratio
-- 6:1 MR
- Step Throtfleable (75%) Optional
- Booster Module Initially Expendable
- Engine Out To Orbit Capability
- Propellant Feed System Common with Inline
NLS 1 (HLLV) Propulsion Module
• ET Derived Core Tankage
- AI 2219 Construction
- 5 ft. Stretch in LH2 Tank (Wp ~ 1.69 Mlb)
- Design for Commonality with Inline NLS 1
• Standard Titan IV Payload Shroud
- 15' x 61.7' Payload Envelope
• 1990 Technology Avionics with Moderate
Development
• ILC - 2001 @ KSC and 2002 @ CCAFS
Figure 3.3.3.9-3.- NLS 2 with NLSUS.
NLS 3 (20 K Vehicle)
NLS 3 consists of an 18 ft diameter first or booster stage with a single STME, a
NLSUS second stage (common with the 2.5 stage vehicle), a payload adaptor,
and an Atlas-derived payload fairing. NLSUS will be powered by a one or two
RL-10A-4 derivative engine or equivalent. This vehicle satisfies user
requirements for advanced MLV payloads in low-Earth orbits. Current studies
will resolve what thrust level is needed in the booster STME (up to 640 k). A
configuration drawing is given in Fig. 3.3.3.9-4.
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• Core Tanks are 18 feet in diameter
- STME's (1 to 2)
-- 583 Klb Vac. Thrust (650K Jan 92)
- 430.5 s Vac. Isp
-- 45:1 Exp. Ratio
-- 6:1 MR
-- Step Throttleable (75%) Optional
- Booster Expendable
- Propellant Feed System Components Piece-part
Commonalty with Larger Propulsion Modules
• New Tankage Design
- A1 2219 Construction (AL-LI is Optional)
- (Wp ~ TBD Mlb)
- Design for Ease of Growth.
• Upper Stage is the NLSUS
• Standard Atlas Payload Shroud
- 10'x 21' Payload Envelope
• Advanced Technology Avionics
• IOC ~ 2004 @ CCAFS
Figure 3.3.3.9-4.- NLS 3 vehicle.
Cl
NLS High Energy Upper Stage
A high energy LOX/LH2 powered top stage is required for the high orbits of the
2.5-stage missions and also for the 2-stage, 20 k payload LEO mission configu-
ration. Tentatively, the NLSUS diameter is 15 ft., and contains about
47 000 Ibs of useable propellant (exact quantity is TBD). One or two RL-10A-4
derivative engines of -30 k vac thrust, or equivalent single engine, may be
required. When utilized, NLSUS will incorporate the standard avionics suite
developed for the family of vehicles. A configuration drawing is given in
Fig. 3.3.3.9-5.
Operations.- The goal of the NLS ground operations program is to influence
launch vehicle, facility, and equipment designs to the extent necessary to
produce an operations flow free of complicated equipment and labor intensive
activities, and which is characterized by rapid, dependable timelines.
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STAGE CHARACTERISTICS
• New Cryogenic Top Stage
- One or Two RL-10A-4 Equivalent Engines
- 20-40Klb Vac. Thrust (30Klb Nominal) - 450-465
sec. Vac Isp (455 sec Nominal)
- 100:1/300:1 Exp. Ratio (110:1 Nominal)
- 5.5:1/6.5:1 Mixture Ratio (6:1 Nominal) -
Retracted Nozzle Optional
• Advanced Structure (AL/LI) w/Mass Fr. 0.88
• Wp-47Klb
• Stage Weight (Wet) - 54Klb
• Length - 30 Ft.
• Diameter - 15 Ft.
• ILC - 2001 @ KSC
Figure 3.3.3.9-5.- NLS high energy, upper stage vehicle.
Streamlined operational concepts will be designed to accomplish launch vehicle
manufacturing, assembly, and checkout with as few facilities, tests, and labor
intensive operations as possible. This goal will be met through proper
application of existing and advanced technologies to satisfy the operability
requirements set forth in the NLS Systems Requirements Documents (SRD).
NLS ground operations are based on the Integrate-Transfer-Launch (ITL)
processing concept. Summary ground operations flows are shown in Figures
3.3.3.9-6 through 3.3.3.9-8. This process features the integration of the flight
vehicles off-pad with subsequent transfer to the launch pad on a mobile
platform. The process begins with the final assembly and/or checkout of large
vehicle elements adjacent to the launch site. After each vehicle element is
assembled and checked out, it is transferred to the Vehicle Integration Facility
(or Vertical Assembly Building) where all elements are integrated into a single
launch vehicle stack on a Mobile Launch Platform (MLP). The locations and
inter-relationships of the NLS operations facilities are shown in Figure 3.3.3.9-9.
3.3-73
Rev. E
RPSF
ASRM PROCS
23 days
(7d-3sft)
ASSEMBLY/
PROC ES SING
FACIUTY
21 days
(7d-3sft)
PAYLOAD OPS
(non criticalpath)
CTV
26days
PfL PROC S
XXX days
P/L ENCAP
42days
ASRM
CORE
PAYLOAD
VAB
ASRM STK
27days
CORE/
BOOSTER
MATE to l_r
13days
MATE P/L
INTG C/O
5days
(7d-3sft)
Total "lime
inVAB
45days
5days ] [
5d-lsft ] [
PAD
14 days
(7d-3sft)
LV 5 day
on ML P turnaround
Figure 3.3.3.9-6.-NLS 1 processing (NLS HL).
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Figure 3.3.3.9-7.- NLS 2 processing (NLS 50).
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Figure 3.3.3.9-8.- NLS 3 processing (NLS 20).
Figure 3.3.3.9-9.- NLS operations facilities.
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Individual spacecraft and upper stages are processed in dedicated (non-NLS)
facilities. When ready for integration, they are transported to the NLS Cargo
Integration Facility (CIF) where upper stages are mounted to the NLS standard
cargo adapter, and spacecraft are mounted either to the upper stages or to the
cargo adapter as required. After cargo interfaces are validated, all cargo elements
are serviced and NLS personnel assemble the fairing to encapsulate the cargo.
The integrated cargo, encapsulated in the fairing, is brought to the Vehicle
Integration Facility (VIF) and mounted on top of the stack. The cargo-to-vehicle
interfaces are then validated and the MLP moves to the launch stand. The
simplified interfaces between the MLP and the launch stand are mated and
validated with a final systems test. After the systems test, cryogenic propellants
are loaded and the vehicle is launched. Although there are no fixed towers or
mobile gantries at the launch stand, the MLP does incorporate an umbilical mast
to provide standard payload services.
The LCC supports prelaunch preparation and tests, launch and mission
operations, and performs facility monitoring. This operations approach
provides efficient planning and use of the launch stand(s), allows parallel
processing, isolates the launch stand from the build-up area, and facilitates
launch vehicle and payload changeout.
RecoverabIe vehicle elements (booster engines and possibly core propulsion and
avionics) are recovered and processed through refurbishment facilities to ready
them for their next flight.
Current siting concepts call for the eventual construction of launch operations
facilities at KSC, CCAFS, and VAFB.
Performance Characteristics
The performance of the NLS family of launch vehicles, including performance with
CTV, CTF, RPC, and CRV, is contained in Table 3.3.3.9-1.
Attribute Values
a. Funding Profile Summary.- The data in Tables 3.3.3.9.2 through 3.3.3.9-4 was
used as input for the calculation of the funding profile attribute.
b. Probability of Mission Success.- The flight phases used for calculating PMS are
based on the event trees for the NLS. These are described in the section
describing the PMS attribute. Vehicle characteristics, which effect the calculation
of PMS, follow.
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TABLE 3.3.3.9-1.- NLS VEHICLE FAMILY PERFORMANCE
VEHICLES/PERFORMANCE (1,000 LB)
Orbit* NLS NLS 100 NLS 100 NLS NLS 50 "NLS 50 NLS 20
100 W/CTV W/AUS 50 W/CTV W/AUS W/AUS
SSF 220X220 28.5 ° 101.0 26.0
LEO 160X160 28.5 °
150X1509(P
445X445 98.7 °
SSF xfer 30x220
28.5 °
45.0
105.0 49.7
31.0
13.6
30.0
4.0
NLS xfer 80x150 142.0 51.0 19.3
28.5 °
GTO 39.0 8.3
GEO 19.5 4.2
Usable Payload 90 x 30 60 x 30 30 x 15 60 x 15 30 x 15 30 x 15 30 x 15
Vol (L x D in Ft.)
*Only orbits used in manifesting are shown
TABLE 3.3.3.9-2.- FUNDING PROFILE SUMMARY NLS 20 VEHICLE
(MILLIONS OF $)
Total Cost TFU LC% RC%
DDT&E $218
Non-Rec. Facilities
Vert Proc Fac $139
i1
Horiz Prod Fac $154
MLP $62
i.i
Non-Rec. Production $0
m,
Rec. Production
Core $17 90% 87%
STME .... $14 "94% 94%
Shroud $1 90% 100%
AUS 90% 90%
Cost Per Flight For 64 Flights
$22
$64 Ave.
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TABLE 3.3.3.9-3.- FUNDING PROFILE SUMMARY NLS 50 VEHICLE
(MILLIONS OF $)
DDT&E
Non-Rec. Facilities
Pad
Vert Proc Fac
Horiz Prod Fac
Total Cost
$4,991
$278
$248
$57
TFU LC% RC%
MLP $144
Other $789
Non-Rec. Production $83
Rec. Production
Core $99 90% 87%
6 STME @ $14 94% 94%
Shroud $8 100% 100%
AUS $22 90% 90%
$87 Ave. For 310 Flil_htsCost Per Flight
TABLE 3.3.3.9-4.- FUNDING PROFILE SUMMARY NLS 100 VEHICLE
(MILLIONS OF $)
DDT&E
_qon-Rec. Facilities
Pad-Mods
Vert Proc Fac Mods
Car_oProdFac
MLP-Mods
Total Cost
$120
$70
$4
'$117
$82
1
$104
TFU LC% RC%
Other
Non-Rec. Production $0
Rec. Production
Core $99 90% 87%
4 STME @ $14 94% 94%
Shroud $18 100% 100%
AUS $22 90% 90%
ASRM $31 Rec Per Flil_ht (2 Motors)
$127 Ave. For 146 FlightsCost Per Flight
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• All vehicles have hold-down capability.
• The NLS 50 and NLS HL have engine-out capability.
The number and type of engines and stages are given in Figures 3.3.3.9-1
through 3.3.3.9-5 for each of the vehicles and/or elements.
The calculated values for PMS for each of the vehicles are as follows:
NLS 20 0.9435
NLS 50 0.9842
NLS 50/AUS 0.9455
NLS HL 0.9308
c. Human Safety.- The MLS safety is discussed as an integral element of safety for
the RPC and CLV systems.
d. Architecture Cost Risk.- Two of the three subattributes were based on system
values, or scores. For the NLS vehicles, the NIT consensus scores for the
subattributes, technical confidence and program immaturity, for each of the
vehicles are given below.
Vehicle Technical Confidence Program Immaturity
NLS 20 35.6 12.9
NLS 50 247.9 12.9
NLS HL 142.3 12.9
e, Launch Schedule Confidence.- As with ACR, two of the three subattributes
were based on system values, or scores. One of these, schedule compression,
was calculated to be zero for all NLS vehicles because the nominal flows for the
NLS, shown previously in this section, are based on three shift, 7-day per week
operations. The other, percent of flights with delays, was calculated to be 3.22
percent for all NLS vehicles. Both of these calculated values, along with the
schedule margin subattribute, were subsequently used with architecture-
particular flight rate data to roll-up the architecture LSC and value.
f. Environment.- The NLS 20 and 50 vehicles use all-LOX hydrogen propellants.
The NLS HL uses solid boosters in addition to LOX hydrogen propellants.
Using the appropriate propellant weights for each NLS configuration, the major
effluent constituents (in klbs) are shown in Table 3.3.3.9-5. These values are based
on equilibrium, non-afterburning calculations.
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TABLE 3.3.3.9-5.- EFFLUENT DATA FOR NLS
Exhaust Product NLS-20 NLS-50 NLS-HL
OD 0.0 0.0 542.6
CO2 0.0 0.0 48.2
H2 11.8 58.2 108.8
H20 331.2 1628.2 1813.9
HCI 0.0 0.0 479.9
N2 0.0 0.0 197.8
OH 0.0 0.0 4.8
H 0.0 0.0 2.4
A1203 0.0 0.0 851.3
Total Mass
per Flight
(klbs)
343 16_.4 4_9.7
Score 34 I69 6203
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3.3.3.10 Manned Launch System (MLS)
System Description
a. History.- One of the perceived objectives of any new human space
transportation system will be to maximize crew safety. For architectures that
include human elements boosted on an expendable (or partially reusable)
launch vehicle, the safety of the entire system is limited by the characteristics of
the booster. For the purposes of this study, we conceptualized a hypothetical
launch vehicle with features that could significantly enhance crew safety (as
opposed to a performance or cost-optimized design). This vehicle was dubbed
the MLS.
b. Configuration.- To enhance the credibility of comparisons between similar
architectures, it was decided to start with a booster design that was already
included in this study and make minor changes to that design to arrive at an
MLS. The NLS 50 k payload lift-capacity vehicle concept (or NLS-50, see section
3.3.3.9) is very close in performance to the requirement for a MLS. The NLS-50
also includes many of the features one would expect in a safety-driven booster
design: Although the specifics of what human-rating implies are still subject to
debate, certain booster attributes are desirable:
• Robust design - high factors of safety, weight margins.
Integral Vehicle Health Monitoring (VHM) - sufficient sensors and
processors to continuously evaluate system's health and to notify crew
and/or abort system(s) in timely fashion.
Engine-out capability - precludes the need to initiate abort procedures (which
are risky) in a large percentage of failure modes (many failures have included
propulsion hardware).
• Minimal correlated failure modes - maximize containment/isolation of
critical subsystems.
Eliminate rapid failure modes - abort systems and VHM are useless if there
is insufficient reaction time (for example, some solid propellant boosters
failures can be detected only milliseconds before a catastrophic detonation).
To encompass the range of missions for architectures using the MLS, a "family"
of vehicles is required. The core stage MLS, known as the MLS-X, is sized to
carry the RPC (see Section 3.3.3.11) with a small crew and no additional cargo to
the SSF orbit. The MLS-X is a stage-and-one-half design featuring six STME's
(four in expendable booster pods, and two sustainer engines) and a Shuttle
External Tank-derived LOX/LH2 fuel tank set. To carry larger cargo, or the
human-tended CLV (see Section 3.3.3.12), a larger version of the MLS-X called
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the MLS Heavy Lift (MLS-HL) was conceived. The MLS-HL features a LOX/LH2
upper stage in addition to the MLS-X core first stage. Figure 3.3.3.10-1 depicts the
two MLS configurations with untended cargo fairings. Figure 3.3.3.10-2 shows
the design of the upper stage.
186.87 ft
• MLS-X uane as MLS-HL except has new high en_gy
uppc¢ _Lage
• Sumdard Titan W payload shroud for cargo versiom
- 15 ft x 61.7 fl nominal payload envelope
• Core Wopulsion locatedu.nd_the propellantanks
-STMFs: 6 (4 stagedinboostermodule, 2 in susufinef)
- 583 Klb vlcumn thrust (650 Klb in Jmmay 92)
-- 430.5 seconds vscuum Isp
- 45:1 Expa_ion Ratio
- 6:1 Mixture Ratio
- Step throttlability (75%) optional
- Booster module initially expendable
- Engine out to or-bit capability
• ET derived core tankage
- AL 2219 conslntc-fion
- 5 ft. slretch in LH2 tank (Wp - 1.69 Mlb)
-1990 technology htwnan rated avionics with moderate
development
Weights for 80 X 220 ran Orbital Inseftlon Perfoenmnce:
Payload: 26,343 43,768
Margin: 13,615 -O-
Shroud: 2700 13,569
Launch Vetu (dry): 166,311 199,311
GLOW: , 1,9531968 | 060 870
81.56 ft I
(R f.) I
34.60 ft _
87.498
-0-
13,56_
207,6(/
2.059.095
I
Figure 3.3.3.10-1.- MLS configurations.
Co
Physically, the MLS differs little from the NLS configurations. There are
additional sensors and a communications bus running forward to supply VHM
data to the crew of a personnel capsule on top of the MLS. In both versions, the
cross beam provisions found on the NLS-50 core stage for using strap-on boosters
are absent.
Abort Modes.- In the event of an engine failure, the MLS can operate engine-out
and complete the nominal ascent profile. In the event of any other major
failure, the on board sensing system would warn the crew to initiate abort
procedures. The LES motor would be ignited, the MLS main engines would be
commanded to shut down, and the attachment fittings between the crew
element and the MLS would be severed.
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398.774
120.000
1 '
56.800
I
63.634 ! '
88]
6
3bs
g's
_-_ 1.5 g's
21.00
Payload Interface
Payload Adapter
LH2 Tank
160.000
42.260
69.080 tIntertank
\ Tank l
,,,Skin 30.51
\
Structure
NOTE: Dimensions
are in inches
Figure 3.3.3.10-2.- MLS upper stage configuration.
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d. Facilities.- The ground-processing facilities for the MLS are nearly identical to
those described for NLS (section 3.3.3.9). There is no requirement for solid
booster stacking or handling facilities, however. The launch pad will need to
accommodate human access and safety provisions for both the MLS-X/RPC
combination and the MLS-HL/CLV combination. The MLS launch pad
definition includes the additional access tower and personnel preparation areas.
eo Operational Flow.- As is the case for facilities, the operational flow is basically
the same as for the NLS (see Figure 3.3.3.9-9), with the exception that there are no
solid boosters to assemble or integrate. The MLS upper stage will follow a
launch operations processing flow similar to the NLS Advanced Upper Stage and
CTV flows (also described in the NLS section).
Performance Characteristics
The baseline MLS performance is based on the system's ability to place a reference
RPC into a SSF orbit. Accounting for the RPC's orbital maneuvering system
capability, this translates to the needed MLS-X capability of 43 768 Ibm to an 80x220
nmi (28.5 °) orbit. Similarly, the MLS-HL performance is sized to put a CLV (87 498
Ibm) into the same orbit.
Attribute Values
a. Funding Profile Summary.- The MLS-X and MLS-HL launch vehicles' family
cost estimates developed for this study are summarized in Table 3.3.3.10-1. All
estimates shown in the table are in constant-year 1992 dollars, at contractor cost
(the estimates exclude contractor fees, management reserves, and government
program support costs).
TABLE 3.3.3.10-1.- MLS FUNDING PROFILE SUMMARY
Develovment:
C/D Phase
Facilities
Total -
Production:
Theo. 1st Unit
Supt. Equip. Set
Oper. & Support:
Variable Cost
Fixed Annual
(1992 Dollars in
Millions)
MLS-X
Core Stg.
$ 5,309
1.562
6,871
244
15
34
92
MLS-HL
Uvver Sty.
. A u
$ 631
37 (mod.'s)
668
47
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b.
C,
d.
Acquisition Phase Estimates.- New development and production estimates
were developed by Boeing for MLS-X hardware using the Boeing-proprietary
Parametric Cost Model. New estimates for the MLS-HL Upper Stage
(MLSUS) were developed by McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company
using their proprietary parametric cost model. The two MLS estimates were
fully coordinated with the RPC and CLV program planning schedules for the
architecture cost estimate inputs. The MLS-X estimate was also coordinated
with the MSFC NLS estimate sources to ensure that the STME propulsion
subsystem estimates and schedule matched the MLS master schedule used
for the MLS development estimate definition.
• Operation and Support Estimates.- The operations' cost estimates data is
shown for MLS elements only.
Funding Profile Attribute Cost Inputs.- The data shown in Table 3.3.3.10-2
was estimated and evaluated for annual cost estimate spread factors using
the Figure 3.3.3.10-3 MLS program master schedule. The summary included:
percentage factors for cost spreads, cost improvement and realization curve
factors for theoretical first unit, cost estimate extensions to develop total
production fleet costs, and facility usage estimates. The MLS family cost
estimate input forms are provided in Appendix B.
Probability of Mission Success.- The flight phases used for calculating PMS are
the same as those for NLS (refer to the reliability tree of section 3.3.3.9). While
some definitions of human-rating stress maximize reliability, it was felt that it
would be unrealistic to claim any significant difference in component or system
reliability from those used for NLS. The MLS-X PMS is thus equal to 0.9842 and
the value for MLS-HL PMS is 0.9691.
Human Safety.- The MLS safety is discussed as an integral element of safety for
the RPC and CLV systems.
Architecture Cost Risk.- The risk assessment of the MLS flight elements is based
on preliminary program and design descriptions developed during the I-ITS
study. The NIT average of the non-recurring portion of the Technical Challenge
subattribute was a score of 4, reflecting the opinion that the MLS design is largely
state-of-the-art technology. The production Technical Challenge subattribute
score was also a 4 using similar reasoning. In the operations Technical
Challenge subattribute, a score of 3 indicated that, since the MLS uses many
existing facilities and procedures at KSC/ETR, there is a lower risk involved
with operations cost estimation. The Program Imaturity score was a 6, which
reflects the perceived level of design detail that exists at the time of this writing.
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Figure 3.3.3.10-3.- Preliminary master schedule for LCC analysis.
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e.
f.
Launch Schedule Confidence.- As with ACR, two of the three subattributes
were based on system values, or scores. One of these, schedule compression,
was calculated based on the MLS operations data; since compression is based on
additional shift utilization and MLS processing around three shifts, 7 day-a-
week operations, the compression is zero. The other, percent of flights with
delays, was calculated to be 3.22 percent. Both of these calculated values were
subsequently used with architecture-particular flight rate data to roll up the
architecture subattribute value.
Environment.- The MLS booster uses liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen as
propellants. The MLS-X has a propellant load of 1,704,222 Ibm which is identical
to the first stage of the MLS-HL. Although the MLS-HL features an upper stage,
this stages operates outside the sensible atmosphere and does not contribute to
the environment score as defined in this study.
Using the given propellant weights, the major effluent constituents (in klbs) are
shown in Table 3.3.3.10-2. These values are based on equilibrium, non-
afterburning calculations.
TABLE 3.3.3.10-2.- EFFLUENT DATA FOR MLS
Exhaust
Product
MLS-X MLS-HL
(30 0.0 0.0
CO2 0.0 0.0
58.2 58.2
1628.2 1628.2
0.0 0.0
,, ,,. ,,,
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
H2
H20
HC1
N2
OH
H
A1203
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3.3.3.11 ReusablePersonnel Carrier (RPC)
System Description
at History.- Previous space transportation architecture studies have shown that a
promising concept for human transportation involves a compact, reusable
personnel carrier launched on an expendable launch vehicle that would carry no
significant integral cargo. In recent years, several types of vehicles in this class
have been studied, most notably the JSC/Boeing Biconic PLS and the
LaRC/Rockwell HL-20 Lifting Body PLS. While the designs are different, their
basic mission, size, and costs are very similar, and any one concept should serve
as representative of the RPC and the architectures that feature it.
b. Configuration.- The design of the RPC is based on a moderate L/D capsule
configuration that was explored in a JSC/Boeing PLS concept definition study. 8
The biconic capsule is launched atop an expendable launch vehicle; in the HTS
study, launcher options include FIR Titan W, NLS-50, and the MLS-HL
(discussed individually in subsequent paragraphs). Figure 3.3.3.11-1 depicts the
fundamental vehicle features.
Crew OMS / Radiator
Forward Fairing Module Module
RCS Parachutes
Figure 3.3.3.11-1.-RPC general arrangement.
The Boeing RI_ biconic vehicle design includes both expendable and reusable
hardware subsystems. The vehicle has sufficient room for personal provisions
and perishable payloads on crew rotation missions to the SSF. In this design, the
orbital maneuvering system and radiators are discarded during the time the
reusable crew module section reenters the Earth's atmosphere. Other expendable
RPC items are the LES and forward aerodynamic fairing (expended after initial
ascent is accomplished) and most of the deployment landing parachutes
(removed after landing.)
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Kits for satellite servicing missions (not shown in the illustration) include a
small manipulator arm (attached to the fiat bulkhead); an additional EVA tunnel
adapter for mission specialists' ingress and egress in space suits is also an option.
C° Abort Modes.- The LES for the RPC provides for a rapid removal of the crew
module from the booster in the event of an emergency. This capability can be
initiated anytime from prelaunch through orbital insertion. The RPC landing
system includes redundant parafoils, which can be used just as effectively in the
event of a water abort landing.
d. Facilities.- The RPC is treated as a special payload for the launch vehicle options.
A separate processing facility (essentially a scaled-down version of the Space
Shuttle Orbiter Processing Facility) is used to maintain and refurbish the RPC.
Additional facilities include a mission and training facilities complex,
administration facilities, and refurbishment support facilities.
e. Operational Flow.- The operations flow for the RPC is shown as
Figure 3.3.3.11-2. The RPC design is considered sufficiently independent of the
booster design such that the integration of the flow with the launch vehicle is a
secondary effect.
Performance Characteristics
The R.PC is a personnel vehicle and therefore has no payload capability to contribute
to completing the cargo missions of the manifest. The vehicle is designed to carry
up to six astronauts with sufficient on-orbit functionality to perform SSF crew
rotation missions, orbital sortie missions and satellite servicing missions.
Attribute Values
a° Funding Profile Summary.- The cost estimates for the RPC program were
developed on a JSC study contract in 1991 (NAS9-18255). The estimates were
escalated from 1991 to 1992 dollars using a NASA inflation index.
Acquisition Phase Estimates. The Boeing PLS estimates used for the RPC
inputs to the HTS architecture evaluation tool were developed with the
Boeing-proprietary Parametric Cost Model, GE Price-S software cost model,
and NASA Space Shuttle historical databases at KSC (facilities and
equipmen0 and JSC (software, mission control, and training definition data).
In addition, planning estimates for the OMS engines, LES engine (RS-27), and
parafoil landing equipment was received from the source manufacturers of
current equipments. The development schedule is shown as Figure 3.3.3.11-3.
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Figure 3.3.3.11-2.- Operational flow for the RPC.
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Figure 3.3.3.11-3.- RPC development schedule.
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Operation and Support Estimates. Operation and support functions were
direct task human-load estimates and factor estimates.
Funding Profile Attribute Cost Inputs; Table 3.3.3.11-1 contains the cost
estimates summary for the RPC element.
TABLE 3.3.3.11-1.- RPC COST ESTIMATES SUMMARY
Development:
C/D Phase
Facilities
Total:
Productiqn:
Reusable TFU
Expendable TFU
Supt. Equip. Set
Oper. & Support:
Variable Cost
Fixed Annual
(1992 Dollars in Millions)
Reusable
Personnel Carrier
$3,693
434
$4,127
257
65
13
28
125
b. Probability of Mission Success.- The contribution of the R1K2 to mission success
is limited to its post-booster separation OMS burns and coast periods before its
destination orbit is achieved (on-orbit operations, such as docking and descent
phases are excluded from the current definition of mission success). Since these
represent additional branches in the ascent reliability trees, as compared to
untended launches using similar boosters, the PMS decreases slightly, as shown
in Table 3.3.3.11-2. Note that in two cases, the booster option is never flown
without the RPC.
TABLE 3.3.3.11-2.- RPC PMS
Booster PMS w/o RPC PMS w/RPC
NLS-2 0.9842 0.9544
MLS-X 0.9842 0.9544
HR Titan W n/a 0.9188
MLS-HL w/LRV n/a 0.9543
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Cl Human Safety.- The RPC design includes several features to enhance safety in
the event of a launch vehicle failure. A launch escape system is carried
throughout the entire thrusting ascent phase which would allow the crew to be
pushed away from the launch vehicle. The parachute landing system can also be
employed in the event of an unplanned water landing. Physical separation of
the crew element and the launch vehicle is maximized by locating the RPC on
top of the launch vehicle. The probability of loss, in the event of launch vehicle
failure with the RPC design, is shown in Table 3.3.3.11-3.
TABLE 3.3.3.11-3.- RPC SAFETY (PROBABILITY OF LOSS)
Booster PL w/RPC
NLS-2 0.00542
MLS-X 0.00543
HR Titan IV 0.01237
MLS-HL w/LRV 0.00641
d. Architecture Cost Risk.- The development of an RPC, reflected in the non-
recurring portion of the Technical Challenge subattribute score, was set at a value
of 5 by the NIT, indicating the design is largely existing technology with a few
areas that may be outside the technical state-of-the-art. The production and
operations technical challenge scores were both a 3, reflecting the relative
simplicity of the design and its operational scenario. Based on the status of the
design today, considered preliminary, a score of 6 was assigned for Program
Immaturity.
e. Launch Schedule Confidence.- The schedule compression subattribute is highly
dependent on which combination of booster and RPC is considered. Refer to
section 3.2.6.3 for the values related to RPC combinations. The other, percent of
flights with delays, was calculated to be 5.88 percent. Both of these calculated
values were subsequently used with architecture-particular, flight-rate data to
roll up the architecture subattribute value.
f. Environment.- The R.PC contributes nothing to the score of environment as it
operates exoatmospherically, outside the range of interest for this study's
definition of the environment attribute.
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3.3.3.12 Crew and Logistics Vehicle (CLV)
System Description
a. Requirements and Concept Selection.- To evaluate the impact of separating
people from cargo, it is necessary to compare the Space Shuttle not only with a
new people-only transportation system, but also with a new system which
carries cargo as well. The people-with-cargo system is required to carry enough
cargo to enable these additional missions:
(1) Pressurized logistics to and from SSF
(2) Sortie Science missions (e.g., Spacelab-type missions)
(3) Satellite servicing.
The cargo capacity requirement for these jobs is a tradeable variable against the
number of missions flown. But for this study, a weight requirement of 15 000 lbs
was levied to enable all the jobs with a minimum of remanifesting.
One additional requirement was levied. To enable this system to replace the ACRV,
it must be capable of up to 180 days' quiescent stay at SSF.
All currently studied personnel carriers for early availability were reviewed:
upgraded ACRV, upsized Boeing PLS, upsized Rockwell PLS, HL-20, and CLV. The
CLV, which is adapted from a study led by the Systems Definition Branch of the
Systems Engineering Division at JSC, was selected because its proposed missions
include logistics, sortie science, and servicing. The study does not recommend a
configuration; several of the above candidates could be modified to carry out these
missions. The configuration for CLV (shown in comparison) is provided in
Figure 3.3.3.12-1.
b. Configuration.- The starting point for CLV was a scaled-down Orbiter. Linear
dimensions are about 50 percent of Orbiter. The aft fuselage was tapered and the
OMS pods removed to reduce drag; wing modifications were adopted to move
the aerodynamic center forward. The following subsystem changes from Orbiter
were made:
• Thermal Protection - tile plus active cooling (water evaporation)
• Propulsion - bipropellent plus cold gas nitrogen system for use in proximity
to SSF
• Power - long-life restartable fuel cells (hydrogen-oxygen)
• Actuators - electromechanical
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Figure 3.3.3.12-1.- Representative PC concepts.
The CLV contains no main engines. It is designed to be launched on a human-rated
ELV. The NLS-1 heavy-lift vehicle could have been used, but has much more
capability than is needed. It was decided to adopt a series of human-rated boosters
from the NLS family which are optimized for human missions - the MLS family.
CLV is launched on the MLS-HL, whose GLOW is optimized for this purpose. See
section 3.3.3.10 for a more detailed description of the MLS-HL.
c. Abort Modes.- Abort coverage is provided during all launch phases as follows:
(1) First stage: abort motors provide contingency abort from liftoff; ejection
seats provided for crew escape to 90 000 ft. Above 90 000 feet, the CLV
would glide to a lower altitude for crew ejection.
(2) Second stage: abort motors provide press-to-main-engine-cutoff capability
from second stage ignition with one engine out for benign failures, or
intact abort (transatlantic or once-around) for catastrophic failures.
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do Facilities and Operational Flow.- The CLV takes over Space Shuttle facilities at
KSC as the Space Shuttle is phased out. The following figure shows the ground
processing flow for CLV.
OPF VAB
PadPad Ops _ Flight14 days SSF 180 daysSortie 7 days
7 day 3 shift Sat Svcg. 7 days[_ ostflight Refurb. &
Payload Integration
SSF 31 days
Sortie 50 days
Sat Svcg. 40 days
Booster
Integration
9 days
7 day 3 shift
I 6 day 2 shift
I
I
Contractor Facility
Major Overhaul t
- Avg. 6 days -
per mission
5 day i shift
Figure 3.3.3.12-2.- CLV operational flow.
Notes:
(1) Postflight refurbishment time is longer for sortie and satellite Servicing
missions because mission kit installation is required for these missions.
(2) Major overhaul is required every 30 flights or 4 years and takes 6 months.
Six-day time shown is prorated average per processing flow.
Ground processing time (neglecting flight time) varies from 60 to 80 days
depending on the mission (see Figure 3.3.1.12-2 above). The number of
flights per year, per CLV is most strongly dependent on flight duration, and
varies from four per year for sortie mission to three every 2 years for SSF
missions of 180 days' duration. If the CLV is not required to perform the
ACRV function, all vehicles can be utilized at four flights per year.
Initial Operational Capability is in June of 2000. Figure 3.3.3.12-3 shows the
DDT&E Schedule.
The CLV remains in use throughout the study period (to 2020).
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Figure 3.3.12-3.- CLV DDT&E schedule.
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Performance Characteristics
The following table shows the key performance characteristics of CLV.
TABLE 3.3.3.12-1.- CLV PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Launch Vehicle MLS - HL
GLOW fibs.) 86,700
Length (ft.) 54
Height (ft.) 28
Wingspan (ft.) 47
Pressurized Volume (ft3) 1,650
Cargo envelope
Cargo capacity (220 NM circ, 28.5 °)
Human Vehicle Crewcapability
Mission duration
Max Q
Max G
Delta V capability
Landing speed
Launch site limitations
7.5 ft. diam x 36.5 ft. length
15,000 lbs. (up & down)
Six (four plus vehicle crew )
5 + 2 d. active, 180 d. quiescent
1000 psf
4.5
1000 fps.
185 knots
Same as Space Shuttle
Attribute Values
a. Funding profile.- The following table shows the CLV/MLS-HL system costs.
TABLE 3.3.3.12-2.- CLV/MLS-HL SYSTEM COSTS, $M FY92
CLV
DDT&E 7,050
p31 7,410
ill fmr
Non-Recurrin_ Prod. Included in DDT&E
Facilities Included in DDT&E
Recurrin_ Prod. 737 per vehicle
Cost per Flight at 267*
10 Flights/year
MLS-HL
4,091
385
380
4,130
113 per vehicle
* Includes MLS-HL and wraps.
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b.
Co
d.
e.
f.
Probability of Mission Success.- Reliability estimates based on the CLV/MLS-HL
vehicle configuration (six engines in first stage, three in second stage, engine-out
capability in both), reliability tree, and historical data for characterized
subsystems results in a combination score of .9543.
Human Safety.- The PMS data given above predicts a launch failure rate of 45.7
per thousand flights. The loss rate per thousand flights for CLV is estimated as
6.41. The CLV's high score relative to other systems studied is attributable to its
full abort coverage and separation of people from the main engines.
Architecture Cost Risk.- The CLV received a Technical Challenge rating of
approximately 240 for "If" C (the range for all systems was 0 to 3000), and a
Program Immaturity rating of 21.5 (the range was 1 to 100). The CLV is judged
to require no new technology; only a few existing drawings can be used, but they
are based on a familiar product line.
Launch Schedule Confidence.- The ground processing flow is shown in Figure
3.3.3.12-2. The ability of CLV/MLS-HL to achieve schedule compression
depends on the mission, since, as shown in the figure, ground processing time
varies. An average compression is 20 days out of a processing flow of 72 days. It
was estimated that 14.58 percent of CLV/MLS-HL flights would experience
delays due to unscheduled maintenance.
Environment.- The CLV contributes nothing to the score of environment as it
operates exoatmospherically, outside the range of interest for this study's
definition of the environment attribute.
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3.3.3.13 Reusable Ultralight Personnel Carrier (RUPC)
System Description
The primary mission of this vehicle is to transport crew to and from Earth orbit,
with an emphasis on supporting crew rotation for SSF. The primary design
reference mission is for accommodating six persons for 5 days, although rendezvous
with SSF is nominally accomplished in four revolutions or less. Up to six SSF crew
persons may be returned because the RUPC entry-landing sequence is fully
automated and does not require a high level of piloting proficiency.
To provide a system which has the lowest feasible cost using an existing ELV, the
RUPC has been designed under the constraint that it can be lofted by a Titan-US,
which therefore requires a lower mass than comparable PLS designs. The penalty
for such a requirement includes higher development costs, using advanced
materials and advanced equipment, and designing for advanced manufacturing
techniques. These higher DDT&E costs are assumed to be compensated over the
long term by significantly lowered costs for launch, refurbishment, and other
recurring expenses. In many cases, the RUPC design capitalizes on previous
programs (e.g., Gemini aerodynamics, Apollo recovery system, Space Shuttle
thermal protection system (TPS), planetary mission and DOD-sponsored avionics
developments) and space infrastructure that did not exist when previous human
systems were developed (e.g., TDRSS, GPS, SARSAT).
The system indudes three units: a capsule, an adapter, and an escape tower, as
shown in Figure 3.3.3.13-1. The pressurized capsule is reusable for seven flights (on
the average), but the other two units are expended on each flight. Within the
capsule is a fully pressurized crew cabin, made from lightweight composite
materials, sufficient to house crew and small amounts of cargo for SSF, satellite
servicing, or modest sortie science. Configuration of the capsule accommodates the
following requirements: (1) aeroshield shape to satisfy reentry control and heating
requirements, (2) inclusion of a SSF passive Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM)
at the narrow end of the cone, and (3) aerodynamically compatible shape to
minimize afterbody heating (18 ° cone half-angle). Avionics, recovery systems,
forward RCS, and entry power systems are also located in the capsule. Thermal
protection is provided by advanced reusable insulation, derived from Space Shuttle
TPS materials.
The adapter configuration is determined by the necessity to provide the mechanical
support to transition from the larger-diameter RUPC to the 10-ft diameter Titan-II
second stage. Within the adapter are the main power system and the OMS and aft
RCS propulsion systems. The same system is also used for rendezvous
maneuvering and deorbit. Engine-out maneuvering capability is provided, as well
as redundancy in valving and valve drivers, and cross-strapped propellant feeds.
Storable hypergolic bipropellants (MMH and NTO) are utilized for all RUPC
propulsion.
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A. RUPC Capsule
T-If Launch Vehlc
Solids (10 GEM)--_
C. Launch Escape Syslem (LES)-_
Figure 3.3.3.13-1.- The RUPC/Titan IIS system.
An LES is provided to enable the capsule to be rapidly ejected from the launch stack
in the event of a major launch malfunction. This LES, containing a single solid
with multiple canted nozzles and a smaller jettison solid rocket, is modeled after,
but downsized from the Apollo LES (see discussion below under Safety attribute). It
allows both the rapid escape from a malfunctioning vehicle and also sufficient
altitude so that the parachute-based recovery system will be effective. RUPC is
intended for ballistic reentry, water landing, and retrieval by helicopter. Although
the nominal splashdowns will be targeted to occur within aircraft range of KSC,
abort via return-to-Earth elsewhere is always possible within less than one
revolution because of the high availability of alternative sea landing sites along the
ground track.
Performance Characteristics
The following capabilities are based upon injection into an 80 by 220 nmi initial
orbit at 28.5 ° inclination by the HR Titan IIS launch vehicle. The RUPC system has
the on board capability to drcularize, rendezvous, and berth with SSF, and
subsequently perform the deorbit burn.
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TABLE 3.3.3.13-1.-SYSTEMSUMMARY - RUPC
RUPC
Performance Summary and Specifications
Type
GLOW (Capsule+Adapter)
Pressurized volume
Crew
Cargo
Return capacity
On-orbit time
On-orbit propulsion
Configuration
Size
Launch vehicle
Ballistic capsule
12,000 lbs
**** ft 3
6 persons
1,000 lbs
7x4x4-ft
same as up
5days
1,080 ft/s
Biconic
14.5-ft dia.
15-ft lon_
Titan IIS
Attribute Values
The following are attribute data to be used in evaluating the RUPC system.
a. Funding Profile Summary.- The costs in Table 3.3.3.13-2 are in millions of 1992
dollars and are based on a 20-year program, after appropriate learning curves and
quantity rate reductions.
TABLE 3.3.3.13-2.- SYSTEM COST SUMMARY - RUPC
DDT&E
N/R Production
Facilities
O&C Mods
First flight article
Recurring
Pkoduction
_te_ration and Ops
p3DI
Cost (1992 MS)
1425
145
3
117
66
51
0
Per unit, assuming replacement of adapter and LES after each launch, and
replacement of capsule after seven flights.
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Development is assumed to begin phase C/D in FY95, with an IOC of FY00, as
shown in Fig. 3.3.3.13-2.
Figure 3.3.3.13-2.- Development schedule.
b.
C.
Probability of Mission Success.- The launch vehicle (see Titan family, section
3.3.3.6, HR Titan IIS) contributes approximately two-thirds of the PMS for the
system, while the RUPC only contributes the component for orbit
circularizafion to this attribute. However, for the generic assessments made by
this study, the unreliability for this OMS is taken to be the same as that for
booster propulsion systems, which is overly conservative because of the
multiple propellant tanks, valves, and plumbing routes that are embedded in
the RUPC design. Because this system must also be used to provide the life-
critical function of deorbit, with no other recourse, it is already designed to be of
extremely high reliability.
Human Safety.- The LES system provides escape from the relatively benign
environment of Titan failure modes (hypergolic propellants burning rather
than exploding when free together, compared to the possibility of a major
explosion of hydrogen or hydrocarbon/LOX launch vehicles). RUPC also has
the capability to survive or escape the potential explosion of one of the small
strap-on solids, although the hazard risk is small because these solid rockets are
the very high reliability monolithic grain configuration, are located 60-ft from
the capsule, and sized so that each has a total propellant load only 2 percent of
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f.
one Space Shuttle SRB. The LES provides uninterrupted escape capability from
the launch pad ("0, 0" conditions) through max-Q, solids firings, and second
stage ignition - after which it is jettisoned.
Architecture Cost Risk.- The RUPC is a new system. However, all subsystems
derive from components and/or technologies already developed or currently
under development for other flight programs. In addition, the design is
compartmentalized so that multiple vendors are available for most subsystems,
with the exception of contract integrator. The capsule, LES, and adapter could be
supplied by different sources, and integrated at KSC or another appropriate
facility. Because of clean interfaces, the lack of system complexity, and the
planned retirement of vehicles on a regular basis, this remains the case even for
rebuilds. Maintaining the competitive climate is part of the vehicle design
philosophy. The ratings of RUPC for Technical Challenge were 8 for non-
recurring development, 6 for production, and 3 for operations. The Program
Immaturity index was rated as 7.
Launch Schedule Confidence.- The RUPC human system utilization includes
several phases: flight mission (launch, on orbit operations, deorbit/landing),
post-landing recovery, refurbishment, reassembly, fuel and stack, and pad
operations, as delineated in Figure 3.3.3.13-3. Also included is a planned
contingency phase to provide margin in the processing flow. Post-landing
includes the helicopter acquisition of the capsule, transportation to the KSC
hazardous processing facility (HPF) to purge RCS propulsion, and then
movement to the O&C building. There the capsule is disassembled, then
refurbished and tested by multiple teams operating in parallel, with some tasks
accomplished on a double-shift schedule. Upon completion of reassembly and
functional verification tests, the capsule is transported to a suitable HPF (e.g.,
SAEbO for mating to the waiting adapter and LES. After fueling the capsule RCS
and mate and checkout of the units, the system is transported to the pad for
stacking on the log-viewer (LV).
Up to three flightRUPC's are refurbished in parallel using a single Servicing
Stand in the Operations and Checkout Building at KSC. Less than 45 calendar
days are required to ready a capsule for next launch. With a fleet of three RUPC
systems, allowing for recovery times, adapter plus LES mate, and pad processing,
the HR Titan IIS/RUPC could support up to 12 human flights per year.
Environment.- The RUPC does not affect the Earth's environment. The Titan-
IIS launch vehicle is covered in section 3.3.3.7.
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Note: Times shown are in days.
Figure 3.3.3.13-3.- RUPC processing flow.
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3.3.3.14 Cargo Return Vehicle (CRV) and Logistics Return Vehicle (LRV) Systems
System Description
a. History.- The original concept of a CRV was developed by NASA/MSFC and
General Dynamics Space Systems Division (GDSS) during the STIS. There were
three studies performed. The first was for a CRV for Space Station logistics,
which began in mid-1989. The driving requirements then included a minimum
return capability of one PLM of 40 000 lbs with dry land recovery. This CRV was
baselined to operate in concurrence with the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle
(OMV), but could also dock directly to the SSF with appropriate modifications.
The second study was performed in late 1991. This study incorporated SSF
restructuring and focused on design of a CRV that would be carried by a NLS.
The result was a cargo delivery and return vehicle that accommodated a 16 klb
mini-PLM and was renamed the LRV. With an NLS-1 and CTV available at
KSC, three LRV's can be launched together at a time. The third study examined
alternative CRV sizes and recovery modes, using previous studies as references.
The CRV concept selected for this study is the early CRV design (1989) and the
LRV concept is from the second study.
b. Configurations.- The CRV system is designed around a 15 by 25 foot cylindrical
cargo volume of the PLM. The result is a lifting body configuration with two
small aft canards and parafoil recovery system. Access to the payload area is
possible through two payload bay doors operating much like those on the Space
Shuttle. Figure 3.3.3.14-1 illustrates the CRV configuration.
Major subsystems of the CRV include its structure, tanks and landing gears,
orbital maneuvering and attitude control systems, recovery, avionics, power,
and thermal control systems. Total CRV dry weight amounts to just over
34 400 Ibs. The CRV is designed for lift-off with 40 000 lbs of payload and landing
with about 72 800 lbs of combined CRV and payload weight.
At almost 80 000 lbs lift-off weight, the CRV and its payload requires a heavy lift
booster capacity. For this study the CRV is integrated with the NLS-1 in
Architecture 4, and with the MLS-HL in Architectures 5, 6 and 7.
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Figure 3.3.3.14-1.- CRV baseline configuration.
The LRV system is designed to deliver and return the Mini-Pressurized Logistics
Module (MPLM) of 16 000 lbs. The basic cargo volume is 15 ft in both length and
diameter. The system has limited maneuverability and uses a skirt extension in
the aft section for trim stability. Access to the payload area is possible through
the back of the LRV where the MPLM can be seen exposed. Figure 3.3.3.14-2
illustrates the LRV configuration.
The LRV is also intended to deliver unpressurized logistics carriers, SSF
propulsion modules, and returning CTV's. The LRV could be optimized to
include an integral PLM, thus reducing some LRV/cargo structural redundancy.
Both the current configuration and future derivatives could be designed to
remain at the SSF (docked at a node) for the mission duration of its payload.
Major subsystems of the LRV include its structure, orbital maneuvering and
attitude control systems, drogue parachute and parafoil recovery systems, and
avionics, power, and aeroshield thermal control systems. The total LRV system,
including the MPLM, weighs about 31 400 lbs.
For this study, the LRV is integrated with the MLS-HL and RPCmin in
Architecture 7, and with the Titan W/CTF in Architectures 16 and 17.
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Figure 3.3.3.14-2.- LRV baseline configuration.
C. Facilities.-Since the CRV's main mission will be to support the SSF, the CRV
will only operate out of KSC. Regardless of which new booster will be selected
to launch it, the CRV will ride as a payload during launch. As such, the CRV-to-
booster integration and launch facilities are accounted for as part of the booster
system, namely the NLS-1 and MLS-HL. There is only one facility required by
and dedicated to the CRV system, the CRV Processing Facility. This is where
pre- and post-flight maintenance, system tests, and verifications of the CRV are
carried out. In addition, payload installation and removal are also done here.
The LRV system utilizes a decommissioning facility at the landing site in south
Texas and a refurbishment and processing facility at the launch site. Integration
into the booster occurs in the payload processing facility or vehicle assembly
building depending upon the launch system. In this study, the boosters for the
LRV are the MLS-HL and the Titan W/CTF. All launch and mission operations
support facilities are shared with those of the boosters.
3.3-108
Rev. E
do Operational Flow.- Figure 3.3.3.14-3 shows the CRV nominal operations flow at
KSC. The facilities called out in this section are generic. Their names describe
their functions only, and they are not necessarily associated with any specific
launch system.
The CRV will be processed together with its payloads in the CRV Processing
Facility. This is where system decommissioning, payload removal (for return
missions), and various system maintenance, verifications, and tests are done.
The new payload will be integrated into the CRV in this same facility. As this
phase is completed, the CRV and its payload will become a single payload from
the launch vehicle's perspective. They will then be transported to the Booster
Integration Facility (for new launch concepts with integrate-transfer-launch, ITL,
philosophy), where integration to the launch booster is performed. The vehicle
stack will then be moved to the launch pad for launch.
At the end of its orbital mission the CRV lands at KSC via parafoil, it is then
transported to the CRV Processing Facility where the cargo is separated and the
ground processing flow is repeated.
Satin 8
Recovery and Transport
to CRV I_'o_ Facility
Decommissioning
Payload Removal
CRV Maintenance
Engine Maintenance
Other Mainte_rLance and
System Verification
Integration Tests
Payload Installation
Transport to Booster
Integration Facility
CRV/Booster Integration*
Move to Pad
Launch Readiness
Ve_'ification
m
I
m
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Figure 3.3.3.14-3.- CRV ground-processing flow.
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Figure 3.3.3.14-4shows the LRV nominal operational flow at KSC. The launch
vehicle here was assumed to be configured with a main core with ASRM, but
any appropriate booster can be substituted with associated launch vehicle
processing.
In general, the LRV will be processed together with its payloads (mainly the
MPLM) in the refurbishment and processing facility. As this phase is completed,
the LRV/cargo will become a single payload from the launch vehicle's
perspective. They will then both be transported to the Vehicle Assembly
Building (for new launch concepts with integrate-transfer-launch, ITL, and
philosophy), where integration to the launch booster is performed. The vehicle
stack will then be moved to the launch pad for launch.
For launching on existing systems such as Titan IV, the LRV/MPLM and the
CTF system will be mated to the booster on pad in much the same fashion as
current Titan IV payloads.
At the end of the orbital mission the LRV lands in south Texas via parafoil.
CH-53 helicopters will retrieve the LRV to a facility near the landing site, where
the LRV is decommissioned. The cargo is transported on a C-5 to KSC for
processing and analysis, while the LRV is ferried to the refurbishment center on
a barge via the Intercoastal Waterway. The system is then prepared for its next
mission.
Performance Characteristics
The CRV has been designed to deliver and return with 40 000 lbs and at a total
landed weight of 72 800 lbs. It can carry approximately 7770 lbs of usable propellant
for orbital maneuvering including rendezvous, proximity operations, attitude
control, and deorbit burns. Table 3.3.3.14-1 shows the performance and physical
characteristics of the CRV and LRV used in this study.
The LRV has been designed to land with 16 000 Ibs and at a total landed weight of
29 000 lbs. It can carry approximately 2400 lbs of usable propellant for orbital
maneuvering, primarily for attitude control and deorbit burns.
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Figure 3.3.3.14-4.- LRV ground-processing flow.
TABLE 3.3.3.14-1.- CRV AND LRV PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
CRV LRV
GLOW (lbs) 82,924 31,400
Press. Volume (ft3) 0 0
Unpress. Volume (ft3) 4418 2651
Cargo Envelope (Ixd)
Cargo Capacity (Ibs):
220 nmi circ,28.5°
Return Capacity (Ibs)
Crew Capability(#)
Launch SiteLimits
25x15
40,000
15x15
16,000
East Coast
40,000 16,000
0 0
Eas't 'Coast
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Attribute Values
a. Funding Profile Summary.- The development and facility costs for both the
CRV and LRV are tabulated in Table 3.3.3.14-2. The LRV landing site facilities
are included in the "Other Facilities" category. Cost per flight (CPF) for the two
concepts are shown at various flight rates per year in Table 3.3.3.14-3. CPF
values are also shown for the CRV/booster and LRV/booster combinations used
in the architectures. Total architecture life cycle costs and funding profiles are
specific to individual architectures. These can be found in the architecture
results sections.
TABLE 3.3.3.14-2.- CRV AND LRV COST ESTIMATES
All Values in $92M CRV LRV
DDT&E 1,661 580
193N/R Prod 249
P3I 0
Facilities: i_iii!i!iii_ii!iIi_i_i!!_i!i!iii_!_iii_i_!i!_i_!ii_iii_!i_i_iiiiiiiiiii_i_i
Processing Facility 10
Other Facilities 0
0
29
26
TABLE 3.3.3.14-3.- CRV AND LRV COSTS PER FLIGHT
Costs Per Flight ($92M) 2
CRV 80.6
CRV/NLS-1 248.6
CRV / MLS-HL 227.6
LRV 69.2
LRV/CrF/Titan IV
Flights Per Year
4 6 8 10 12
41.5 28.3 21.6 17.5 14.8
205.5 189.3 179.6 173.5 167.8
188.5 175.3 168.6 163.5 160.8
35.4! 24.0 18.2 14.8 12.4
413.2 310.4 265.0 238.2 219.8 206.4
The CRV development schedule is shown in Figure 3.3.3.14-5. It includes an
extensive technology development program for large steerable parafoils,
advanced TPS, and autonomous rendezvous and docking capabilities. The
major schedule driver is the parafoil technology development which includes
several drop tests of an 80 klb recovery system before critical design review
(CDR). The CRV development results in an IOC approximately 8 years after
start of Phase A.
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PROGRAM MILESTONES
CARGO RETURN VEHICLE:
Requirements Definition
Vehicle Design
Avionics Development
Procurement
Planning, Tooling, Mockup
Vehicle Fab. & Sub-Assembly
Test Vehicle Fabrication
Test Program
Component Dev. & Qualify
Structural & Modal Tests
Sys. Integration Tests
Design & Mfg.-GSE, ASE
GSE Installation & Validation
Software
Final Assembly & Checkout
Ground Launch/Rendezvous
FACILITIES:
A&E
COF & Site Activation
TECHNOLOGY DEVEL.:
Recovery System
Advanced TPS
Autonomous Rendezvous
PROGRAM YEARS
1 I : 3 4 9110
I : q
SDR ATP CDR 1OC
7
Ph.i
I I
FLT TEST
DROP TESTS
Figure 3.3.3.14-5.- CRV development schedule.
The LRV development schedule is shown in Figure 3.3.3.14-6. The LRV
requires less technology development than the CRV because of its smaller size
and restricted operational capability. In fact, the technologies are enhancing, not
enabling, and there are state-of-the-art fallbacks for all systems. A parafoil
recovery system tailored for a 27 klb landed weight is significantly less aggressive
than the CRV requirement (80 klb). In addition, the LRV does not perform
orbital maneuvering other than attitude control and deorbit. Rendezvous and
docking is performed by another system (e.g., cargo transfer vehicle). The LRV
has an initial operational capability less than 8 years after Phase A start. The
LRV development schedule could be condensed, however, the earliest need date
for this study is the year 2000.
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Figure 3.3.3.14-6.- LRV development schedule.
b.
Co
Probabilty of Mission Success.- The CRV performs the same function
(rendezvous and docking) as a CTV during ascent with a similar orbital
maneuvering system, therefore the PMS scores are the same for CRV/NLS-1
and CTV/NLS-1. The LRV is passive throughout the ascent and rendezvous
phases and therefore requires a CTF to get to SSF. Further description of how
these numbers were derived is included in section 3.2.4.
Human Safety.- The CRV and LRV carry only untended cargos in the
architectures currently being examined in this study and, therefore, do not have
corresponding safety scores.
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TABLE 3.3.3.14-4.- PMS FOR CRV AND LRV MISSIONS
System PMS
CRV: '
CRV/NLS-1 0.9308
CRV/MLS-HL 0.9543
LRV:
0.9307LRV/CTF/Titan IV
d. Architecture Cost Risk.- Table 3.3.3.14-5 shows the risk scores for the CRV and
LRV. Section 3.2.5 describes the level of risk that these numbers represent. Note
that a technical challenge of 5 or less is still within state-of-the-art. However,
since there has not been a significant amount of detailed design work on either
concept, the program immaturity was ranked high. The booster risk scores are
discussed under the specific booster section.
TABLE 3.3.3.14-5.- RISK SUBATTRIBUTE SCORES FOR CRV AND LRV
Prgm. Immaturity
Subattribute
Technical Challense Subattribute
Non-Recurring Production Operations
4 3 3
3 3 2
CRV 7
LRV 7
e. Launch Schedule Confidence.- As with ACR, two of the three subattributes for
LSC were based on system values or scores. One of these, schedule compression
was calculated based on the operations data given earlier in this section. Its
value represents the ratio of nominal processing time to the shortest processing
time (maximum compression of the critical path). The other, percent of flights
with delays, was calculated based upon LIMA's for the system (see section 3.2.6).
Table 3.3.3.14-6 shows the above two subattribute scores for CRV and LRV. Both
of the subattribute values were subsequently used with architecture-particular,
flight-rate data to roll up the architecture level values. The schedule margin
subattribute score is architecture specific and is described in sections 3.3.5
through 3.3.11.
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TABLE 3.3.3.14-6.- LAUNCH SCHEDULE CONFIDENCE SUBATTRIBUTE SCORES
FOR CRV AND LRV
Schedule
Confidence
Attribute
Schedule Compression
Nominal
Processing
Time (Days)
Subattribute
Compressed
Processing
Time (Days)
CRV 42 13
LRV 106 33 0.311
Ratio:
Nominal to
Compressed
0.310
% Flights With
Delay
Subasttribute
15.95
5.61
fo Environment.- The CRV and LRV have no significant atmospheric effluents.
However the booster used to transport them will contribute to the Environ-
mental attribute scores. NLS-1, MLS-HL, and Titan IV effluents and
environment scores are discussed in sections 3.3.3.9, 3.3.3.10, and 3.3.3.7,
respectively.
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3.3.3.15 Single-Stage-To-Orbit (Vertical Take-Off and Horizontal Landing (VTOHL)
Rocket)
_ystem Description
The SSTO-VTOHL is a reusable space transportation system concept studied as part
of a DOD contract (Final Report #NA-91-277) by Rockwell International. The
concept concluded with VTOHL as the preferred configuration. Design goals of the
SSTO-VTOHL are: fail safe operation with engine-out capability during all portions
of powered flight; flight crew escape during ascent and entry; simplified vehicle
design to allow for 7-day turn around with 350 man-days effort; on-orbit
maneuvering velocity change (delta-V) of 600 ft/sec in addition to the reentry delta-
V; cabin pressure of 14.7 psia; and launch-rate surge to double the routine launch
rate and maintain that rate for 30 days. Two major modifications were made to
these goals. The first was to design the SSTO-VTOFIL payload bay volume so that it
could deliver a large portion of the payloads in its lift capacity. The second was to
stipulate that the vehicle must be able to fly in a piloted and unpiloted mode.
Figure 3.3.3.15-1.- The HTS rocket powered SSTO system is Rockwell's
vertical take-off, horizontal landing concept.
Performance Characteristics
The SSTO-VTOHL reusable space transport is designed to launch a crew of two and a
payload of 10 000 lbs to polar orbit. In an easterly inclination, payload capacity is
17 700 lbs to the SSF orbit. The 600 fps AV provides for delivery and return of the
17 700 lbs to or from SSF. Main propulsion is provided by an aerospike engine with
a modular design and the nozzle performance supported by computational fluid
dynamics analysis. Thrust vector control is provided by differential throttling and
gas injection. Triple-point LOX and LH2 is required to provide adequate propellant
density to meet performance parameters. A standard piloted mission allows for
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96 man-hours on orbit with a 96 man-hour contingency. SSTO-VTOHL's payload
volume is 3000 cubic feet, it has a maximum cross-rangeof 1150nmi, and an
approximate landing speed of 180kts resulting in a roll out of 5900ft after
touchdown.
TABLE 3.3.3.15-1.- SSTO-VTOHL PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Inclination Apogee X Perigee Payload
(deg) (nmi) (klbs)
28.5 160 x 160 17.1
28.5 220 x 220 15.0
90.0 100 x 100 10.0
a.
b.
Abort Modes.- The SSTO-VTOHL has a built-in, robust abort capability. It has
engine-out capability from lift off. Selected vehicle crossrange allows abort once-
around with return to the launch site for all inclinations. Abort modes and
their limitations are:
• RTLS - Available during launch when AV is less than 10 900 fps.
AOA - Opportunities are available much earlier than the last RTLS option.
Vehicle has a 1050 nmi cross range required to support AOA for polar
launches.
ATO - With full lift-off-thrust capability available throughout the flight
phase, SSTO-VTOHL can perform ATO over a large portion of the flight
phase.
Operational Facilities.- SSTO-VTOHL has five main facilities: Launch Pad,
Landing Site, Vehicle Maintenance Facility (VMF), LCC, CPF, and GSE
Maintenance Facility. The VMF provides adequate space for performing
between-flight maintenance on four operational vehicles and has three unique
maintenance cells: a vehicle maintenance cell (VMC), a logistics support cell,
and a vehicle isolation cell (VIC). Specialized work areas for pre- and post-flight
maintenance as well as cargo module loading are performed in the VIC. Spare
parts are stored in and distributed from the logistics support cell. Any "all clear"
maintenance or hazardous operations are performed in the VIC, allowing
normal processing of other vehicles to continue unabated. An operations flow
schematic is shown in Figure 3.3.3.15-2. SSTO-VTOHL's IOC for the HTS is in
2000 to reflect the early goals of this program.
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Figure 3.3.3.15-2.- SSTO-VTOHL operations flow schematic.
Attribute Values.
System input data related to each attribute, as well as system-specific attribute values
are discussed below. In most cases, system data is modified by flight rate or cost
associated with the particular architecture and/or "If" being evaluated. However,
some useful observations can be made at the system attribute level.
a. Human Safety.- Relevant system data for human safety consists of system
characteristics that enable the crew to detach or escape from the main body of the
system during ascent in the event of a mission failure. The SSTO-VTOH'L does
offer ejection seats for flight crew escape during ascent and descent operations.
In addition, several abort options (described earlier) exist and can be used in the
event of a non-catastrophic engine failure. They are: RTLS, AOA, and ATO. If
an ATO is executed, it is possible that the mission will be a success. Another
salient feature is that the crew module is in the same element as the liquid
engines and main propellant tanks.
b. Funding Profile.- Cost information provided to the HTS included the cost of
new facilities, new vehicles, variable and fixed costs per flight for each flight
element, and launch and flight operations. In addition, spread factors for each
cost item were provided, identifying how much of the total cost was spent in the
..... . • - ..... 7 .
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years preceeding the need or flight date. Table 3.3.3.15-2 presents a summary of
this data.
TABLE 3.3.3.15-2.-SSTO-VTOHL FUNDING PROFILE INPUT DATA
COST BREAKDOWN
CATEGORIES
TOTAL 'LEARN- RATE COST COST Y Y Y Y Y FLTI
ORTFU ING CURVE PER PER -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 OC
COST 'CURVE FLT YEAR YR
($M) (%) (%) ($M) ($M) (%)
NON-RECURRING
RDT&E 2705
PR(JDUCTION 0
P3I 13.5/YR
FACILITIES 630
RECURRING
NEW
VEHICLE (new)
PLUG NOZZLE ENG
(new)
FLIGHT TO FLIGHT
REFURBISHMENT
LAUNCH OPERATIONS
FLIGHT oPERATIONS
PROG MGMNT
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
15 22 28 25 10
25 30 30 15
579 100 100 15 55 25 5
74 90 90 10 85 5
1.4 11510 100
0.5 92.4 100
0.1 25.9 100
0.0 35.2 I00
Co Probability of Mission Success.- A system description and flight profile contains
the required input information for this attribute. In summary, the SSTO-
VTOHL has one liquid propulsion stage, 14 liquid engine modules (with engine-
out capability from lift off).
d. Architecture Cost Risk.- Two of three subordinate attribute values for ACR are
Technical Challenge and Program Immaturity. The NIT placed SSTO-VTOHL at
a scale rating of 9 (Non-recurring), 6 (Production) and 9 (Operations) for
Technical Challenge and an 8 for Program Immaturity, resulting in a value of
59.9, 12.9, and 59.9, respectively, for Technical Challenge in "If" C, and a 35.9 for
Program Immaturity (see section 3.2.5). The third component, Number of New
Systems, is an architecture-level value; SSTO-VTOHL's contribution to this
parameter is 1.
e. Launch Schedule Confidence.- As in AC'R, there are three subordinate attribute
values for LSC: Schedule Compression, Schedule Margin, and Delays (due to
unscheduled maintenance activities). Schedule Compression and Delays are
architecture independent, while Schedule Margin is architecture dependent
since its values are a function of annual flight rates and available facilities and
Orbiters. SSTO-VTOHL's Schedule Compression values are nominal cycle time
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- 13.3 days, compressed cycle time - 13.3 days, and compression ratio - 1.0. It is
estimated that SSTO-VTOHL will experience delays in 9.7 percent of its launch
attempts.
Environment_ Impact.- The SSTO-VTOHL uses liquid hydrogen and liquid
oxygen as its only propellants. Its propellant load includes oxygen -
832.029 klbm, and hydrogen - 139.671 klbm. Using the given propellant weights,
major effluent constituents were determined and areshown in Table 3.3.3.15-3.
These values are based on equilibrium, non-afterburning calculations.
TABLE 3.3.3.15-3.- EFFLUENT DATA FOR SSTO-VTOHL
Exhaust Space Shuttle
Product (klbm)
CO 0.0
co2 o.o
H2 32.8
H20 918.5
HC1 0.0
N2 0.0
OH 0.0
H 0.0
A1203 0.0
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3.3.3.16 National-Aerospace-Plane-Derived Vehicle (NDV)
The NDV is an air breathing SSTO vehicle that takes off and lands horizontally
(Figure 3.3.3.16-1). Its hydrogen-fueled engines accelerate it from the standstill
through hypersonic speeds to orbital velocities. As its name implies, NDV makes
full use of technologies developed in the NASP program. Its current design
requirements include commercial runway (12 000 ft) take off and landing (not
necessarily the one from which it left); acceleration to orbital velocity in the
atmosphere; coast-to-orbit apogee; orbit circularizafion with a reaction control
system; and payload deployment, recovery, servicing, and/or repair. Standard
mission length is 24 hours or less, but can be extended to 72 hours with kits. The
NDV's design reference mission is either delivery of 10 000 lb payload to or from a
100 nm circular orbit at an inclination of 90 °, or delivery and return of 20 klbs to and
from SSF (220 nm circular at 28 °) from KSC. With its unique ascent cross range, the
NDV can deliver approximately the same payload to a 0 ° inclined orbit as it can to a
90 ° one from a mid-latitude operational base. Extensive ascent and decent cross
range greatly facilitates operational flexibility, extends the launch widow, and
enables a full-envelope-abort capability. Payload capacity as a function of inclination
and altitude is presented in Table 3.3.3.16-1.
Figure 3.3.3.16-1.- Representative NDV concept.
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TABLE 3.3.3.16-1.-NDV PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Inclination Apogee x Perigee Payload Comments
(deg) (nmi) (klbs)
28.5 100 x 100 26.5
28.5 150 x 150 25.5
28.5 200 x 200 23.5
28.5 250 x 250 20.5
28.5 262 x 262 18.2 SSF Direct Access
28.5 300 x 300 17.5
57.0 180 x 180 18.0
57.0 324 x 324 9.5
90.0 100 x 100 10.0 Design Point
90.0 150 x 150 9.0
98.7 300 x 300 1.0 Goes to zero at 340 nmi
Designed for reliable, low cost, "airplane-like" operations, the NDV can be quickly
turned around for frequent flights. Designed-in supportability, extensive built-in
diagnostics, 200 man-hours per mission scheduled maintenance, and simplified
loading and unloading of containerized payloads in less than 4 hours enable routine
flight-to-flight process times of less than 3 days. The payload containerization
concept uses standard interfaces between the container and the vehicle for flexible
operations and versatility. Payload integration flexibilty is maintained by the
internal design of the container. Standard payload services provided by the vehicle
can be augmented with a wide range of kits that can be installed in the container.
The weight of the standard container and services are charged against the vehicle,
while the weight of additional special services and kits is charged against the
payload. Integration of the payload into the container is performed off-line and is
never permitted to delay the vehicle. Also, since the vehicle flight characteristics
are designed to accommodate a payload center-of-gravity located anywhere within a
volume concentric to the container envelope, with dimensions aproximately
50 percent of the container, they can be rapidly switched to fly on another vehicle in
the advent of a problem with the originally scheduled vehicle. Loading the payload
into the vehicle can be handled in a clean room environment and the payload
operators can have access until shortly before launch, although last minute access is
not encouraged.
ao Mission Abort Options.- The NDV has two basic abort options during the air-
breathing portion of its trajectory - return to any runway with adequate length
or crew module separation. Due to the nature of the NDV propulsion system,
failures resulting in significant vehicle damage are considered to be remote.
This feature, coupled with the engine design, which has eight air passageways
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support by four feed systems, enables the NDV to continue flight under
diminished power, enabling it to reach any of several airports within its range.
The loss of a propellant feed system or air passageway basically eliminates its
ability to achieve orbit. In the event that serious vehicle damage has occurred,
which may lead to loss of the vehicle, the crew module can be jettisoned. This
option is available to the crew throughout the NDV mission profile.
Following shutdown of its air-breathing engines, the NDV requires two rocket
burns to achieve orbit. The first burn inserts the vehicle into a transfer orbit and
the second is the circularization burn in its destination orbit. Engine-out
capability is not available during the first burn but is an option for the
drcularization maneuver. It is assumed that the NDV OMS system consists of
two engines, does not have a dual OMS tank system, and therefore does not
have cross-feed. These assumptions were made due to the unavailability of
OMS schematics.
Operational Facilities.- An overview of a typical NDV operations site is shown
in Figure 3.3.3.16-2. Operational facilities indude a 12 kft normal runway, a
cryogenic hydrogen or oxygen propellant loading station, a fuel conditioning
plant to produce densified, or slush, hydrogen (SH2), a maintenance building, a
payload loading and unloading facility, and a mission planning center.
NDV Attribute Data.- System input data related to each attribute, as well as
system specific attribute values, are discussed below. In most cases, system data
is modified by flight rate or cost associated with the particular architecture
and/or "If" being evaluated. However, some useful observations can be made at
the system attribute level. These will be discussed following the presentation of
the NDV system data.
(1) Human Safety. Relevant system data for human safety consists of system
characteristics that enable the crew to detach or escape from the main body
of the system during ascent in the event of a mission failure. The NDV's
air-breathing propulsion system, discussed above under Mission Abort
Options, provides the capability to return to any capable airport under
powered flight for most propulsion failures. For situations resulting in
significant vehicle damage or loss of control, the crew module can be
separated from the main body of the NDV. This protects the crew until the
module is returned to an altitude and velocity at which the crew can safely
eject from the module for parachute recovery. Other salient features
include having the crew module at the forward end of the vehicle, ahead of
the main hydrogen tank, and having limited oxygen on board for OMS and
RCS engine operation. Probable crew loss events by mission phase are
presented as part of the "PMS" discussion.
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Figure 3.3.3.16-2.-NDV fixed-base-of-operations concept overview.
Funding Profile. This information is from the NDV Operations and
Supportability Assessment completed by General Dynamics' Fort Worth
Division and presented as Task H8 Final Review on May 16, 1991. The
baseline total cost to bring NDV to operational status is $16.7 B in 1986
dollars. This is further defined as $8.9 B86 for DDT&E, $5.4 B86 for procure-
ment, and $2.5 B86 for Operations and Support. Its average cost per flight
for a 4-vehicle fleet flying 24 flights-per-year, based on a "Shuttle Down"
analysis, is predicted to be $14 M86. Based on discussions between Dan
Eimers of the GDSS Division in San Diego and Dr. Toten of their Fort
Worth Division, values for the HTS cost input sheet were developed from
existing program information. These are presented in Table 3.3.3.16-2. It
should be noted that since NDV is a fully reusable vehicle with airline-like
operations, all per-flight costs are expended in the year of the flight.
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TABLE 3.3.3.16-2.- NDV ACQUISITION FUNDING PROFILE INPUT DATA
NDV Cost Breakdown Total
OrTFU
Cost
($M92)
Non-Rrecurring
RDT&E 12517
Production
P3I (Annual After IOC)
Facilities
Development 243
Production 120
Operational 120
Recurring Unit
Cost
Protoflight #1 1120
Protofli_ht #2 1030
Flight Unit #1 2191
Flight Unit #2 1961
Launch/Flight OPS
Y-7 Y-6 Y-5 Y-4 Y-3 Y-2 Y-1
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
8 16 23 20 16 10 7
8 16 22 20 16 10 6
8-" 16 22 20 i'6 10 6
• n
8 16 22 20 16 10 6
LC RC Y-4 Y-3 Y-2 Y-1
(%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%)
100 100 15 55 25 5
100 100 15 55 25 5
100 100 38 58 14
100 100 38 58 14
IOC
Yr
(%)
2
2
2
VAR Fixed Yr Of
CPF CPY Flight
7 186
(3) Probability of Mission Success. The mission success tree and propulsion
systems descriptions are required to quantify the NDV PMS. Referring to
Figure 3.3.3.16-3, the NDV ascent trajectory has been divided into six
® S U
Figure 3.3.3.16-3.- NDV mission success tree.
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distinct flight phases, (1) rollout up to ramjet mode, (2) ramjet mode, (3)
scramjet mode through engine cutoff, (4) orbit insertion, (5) coast, and (6)
orbit circularization. During the first three ascent phases, propulsion is
provided by the air-breathing engines, which consist of eight flow paths
supported by four propellant pumps drawing from one propellant tank.
For purposes of our PMS process, the NDV has four air-breathing engines
and one liquid propulsion stage for the OMS/RCS system. Since all
engines are required for the NDV to achieve flight conditions necessary for
the OMS/RCS to successfully provide orbit insertion and circularization
maneuvers, the air-breathing portion of the NDV ascent profile does not
have engine-out capability.
Without benefit of an OMS/RCS schematic or description, the NDV is
assumed to have a two-engine system with a single set of tanks and feed
system. Both engines are required for the insertion burn while only one is
required to circularize. Based on this information, the equations defining
NDV PMS are as follows:
Flight Phases 1 - 3
Rp1-3 = (Ra/b4)(1/3).Ra(1/6)
Flight Phase 4
Rp4 = (Roms2),Rs,Ra(1/6)
Hight Phase 5
Rps = Ra(1/6)
Flight Phase 6
Rp6 = [(Roms2)+2.(1-Roms).Roms].Rs.Ra(1/6),
where Ra/b is the air-breathing NDV engine reliability, Rs is the NDV air-
breathing and OMS engine propulsion stage reliability, Ra is the avionics
reliability, and Roms is the OMS engine reliability. Values for these terms
and for the NDV, both by phase and cumulative through the ascent
trajectory, are found in Table 3.3.3.16-3. The values in this table are
somewhat higher than those used in the AET and in determining the
probability of crew loss, due to an error in the exponent for Ra in equations
1 through 4, above. Results used in the AET are based on Ra having an
exponent of I to 5, rather than 1 to 6. This error caused the final PMS value
to be 0.96458 versus the 0.964595 shown below, resulting in a 0.00650691
probable crew loss as opposed to 0.006583 shown in Table 3.3.3.16-3. These
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changes, plus a possible data-entry error in the crew loss rate in Phase 6
(0.071 vs. 0.0763), gives an estimated number of flights between crew loss
events of 153.7 versus the 151.9 in Table 3.3.3.16-3, or an error of
approximately 1 percent.
Architecture Cost Risk. ACR is composed of three distinct subattribute
values: Technical Challenge, Program Immaturity, and Number of New
Systems. NDV's Technical Challenge attribute values are 10 for the non-
recurring aspects, 10 for the production phase, and 9 during operations
(based on the HTS NIT range of 7-10). Its Program Immaturity level is
thought to be 10. Finally, it counts as one new system within an
architecture.
TABLE 3.3.3.16-3.- NDV PMS DATA
NDV
Reliability
Values
Ra/b
0.9999
By-Phase
NDV PMS Phase1
0.999850
Cumulative
Probable
Crew Losses
By Phase
Cumulative
0.999850
0.000019
0.000019
Rs
0.9847
Phase 2"
0.999850
0.999700
0.000025
0.000044
Ra
0.9999
Phase 3
0.999850
0.999550
0.000025
0.000069
Roms
O.9977
Phase 4
0.980159
0.979718
0.005343
0.005411
Phase 5
0.999983
0.979604
0.000001
0.005421
Phase 6
0.984678
0.964595
0.001169
0.006583
(5) Launch Schedule Confidence. This attribute is also a combination of three
subattributes: Schedule Margin, Schedule Compression, and Percentage of
Flight Delays. Schedule Compression and Percentage of Flight Delays are
system-dependent, while Schedule Margin is architecture-dependent.
Since NDV operations are based on 7-day, 3-shift weeks, the nominal and
compressed times are equal. The estimated number of Percentage of Flight
Delays for NDV is 10.44.
3.3-128
Rev. E
(6) Environmental Impact. The NDV uses hydrogen as its ascent propellant,
drawing in atmsopheric gases to provide oxygen for the combustion
process. In reality, this will probably produce nitrogen oxides and other
trace products in the exhaust stream, in addition to water vapor. However,
due to the uncertainty of the engine concept and its true combustion
characteristics, the HTS has opted to address only the impact of NDV's
dominant exhaust product - water. The amount of exhaust product is
determined by the vehicle propellant load. Specific design details such as
inert weight, propellant load, and engine schematics are restricted access
data. For evaluation purposes, the estimated hydrogen quantities on board
the NDV are approximately 800 klbs. Based on a mixture ratio of
6 to 1 (oxygen to hydrog6n), and equilibrium combustion, the exhaust
products consist of 5406.8 klbs of water and 193.2 klbs of hydrogen.
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3.3.3.17 Advanced Manned Launch System (AMLS)
System Description
The AMLS (Figure 3.3.3.17-1) configuration and operational concept is a two-stage,
fully reusable, launch vehicle defined by Langley Research Center and studied under
contract by Rockwell International, Downey, CA. The AMLS has its first flight in
2005 and is expected to fully replace Space Shuttle by 2010. The AMLS is comprised
of three major elements: an untended reusable booster, a personnel reusable
orbiter, and the Payload Containment System (PCS). The booster and orbiter are
fueled with Liquid Oxygen(LO2)/Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) propellants. All SSME-
derivative engines on the orbiter and booster are ignited on the ground prior to lift
off, with propellant transferred to the orbiter from the booster during first-stage
operation. After separation, the booster returns to the launch site for horizontal
landing while the orbiter with attached PCS continues on to the SSF or on-orbit
mission. After its mission is complete, the orbiter returns to the launch site for
horizontal landing.
PAYLOAD BAY
CREW_ARrq.3T_I _ 'J (15'Diameter x 30' Length)]_
TSTO C&CV ORBITER
DERIVITIVE
l t_IGINF__.S
TSTO C&CV BOOSTER
Figure 3.3.3.17-1.-AMLS configuration.
Performance Characteristics
The design reference mission is to provide cargo transport of 40 k payload/logistics
and to provide crew rotation of 10 personnel (2 flight crew and 8 passengers) to the
SSF (220 nmi at 28 ° inclination). Additional capabilities allow it to support on-orbit
servicing and repair missions.
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Attribute VaJues
a. Funding Profile.- No information supplied at this time.
b. Probability of Mission Success.- The AMLS has two liquid propulsion stages and
five liquid engines, per stage, with engine-out capability, per the abort
descriptions. The success tree is shown in Figure 3.3.3.17-2. Table 3.3.3.17-1
illustrates the mission success probability by phase.
Phase
Stage I and 2 Ignition
2 Stage I and 2 Burn
Comme.nts
Five SSMEs per vehicle - parallel
burn - one engine out in booster,
orbiter, or both
Engine out in each vehicle from lift
off
3 Staging
4 Booster Return to
Launch Site
Vehicle separation
Dead stick return
5 Stage 2 Burn Phase
6 Coast-to-Launch Apogee
7 Orbit Circularization
Engine out from separation, if no
previous failure
Two OMS engines, one can do job -
dual tanks with cross-feed
Figure 3.3.3.17-2.- AMLS success tree.
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TABLE 3.3.3.17-1.- AMLS MISSION FAILURES PER 100 MISSIONS
Phase
Stage 1 and 2 Ignition
L
Stage 1 and 2 Burn
Staging
Stage 2 Burn Phase
Coast-to-Launch Apogee
Losses Per 100 Missions
0.6442
0.6442
0.0117
0.2592
0.0117
Orbit Circularization 0.0117
Total Per 100 Missions 1.56
Ct Human Safety.- Relevant system data for human safety consists of system
characteristics that enable the crew and passengers to detach or escape from the
main body of the AMLS orbiter during ascent or descent in the event of a
mission failure. The crew and passengers may escape from the AMLS by
jettisoning the crew module from the main body of the AMLS orbiter. This
action may be performed from the time the duct system on the access tower at
the pad is no longer available to any time throughout the mission (except for a
small portion of the return trajectory). Additional AMLS orbiter abort modes
are available as described below:
Return to Launch Site (RTLS) - An RTLS would be performed for failures
occurring between liftoff and the point at which the AMLS orbiter can no
longer return to the launch site. An RTLS would be performed by
jettisoning the PCS (if required), after which the AMLS orbiter would land at
the SLF. During this time period, crew and passenger escape may also be
performed by jettisoning the crew module and destroying the AMLS orbiter.
Trans-Atlantic Abort (TAA) - A TAA may be performed after the point in
time when an RTLS is no longer possible. The PCS is jettisoned from the
AMLS orbiter and the AMLS orbiter lands at an alternate landing site.
Abort-to-Orbit (ATO) - An ATO may be performed if it is determined that
the AMLS orbiter can safely continue its mission. No jettisoning of the crew
module would be performed.
Probability of crew loss events (Table 3.3.3.17-2) were calculated for the AMLS
based on engine-out capabilities as follows: (1) one booster engine and one
orbiter engine can be lost during ignition and parallel burn, and (2) one orbiter
engine can be lost after booster separation if all five were working at booster
separation.
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TABLE 3.3.3.17-2.-AMLS CREW LOSS EVENTS BY PHASE -
PER 100 MISSIONS
Phase
Stage 1 and 2 Ignition
Probability of Losses Per
100 Missions
0.1_5
Stage 1 and 2 Burn 0.1129
Staging 0.0013
Stage 2 Burn Phase 0.0818
Coast-to-Launch Apogee 0.0009
Orbit Circularization 0.0001
Total per 100 Flights 0.319
d*
e.
Architecture Cost Risk.- The attribute values for ACR are Technical
Challenge, Program Immaturity, and Number of New Systems. The AMLS
Technical Challenge score is subdivided into Non-Recurring Production,
Production, and Operations. The AMLS Technical Challenge subattribute
values are Non-Recurring - 7 (ranges from 5 to 7), Production - 6 (ranges
from 4 to 7), and Operations - 6 (ranges from 4 to 7). The AMLS final score
for Program Immaturity was 8, with a range from 6 to 9. New systems
received a score of 1.6, ranging between 1 and 2.
Launch Schedule Confidence,- The three subordinate attribute values for
schedule confidence - schedule compression, schedule margin, and delays
due to unscheduled maintenance activities - are described below:
(1) Schedule Compression. The maximum number of calendar days
required for AMLS turnaround is 45.8 (including mission).
Operations for processing through transport to the launch pad are
performed on a 1-shift-per-day, 5-day-per-week schedule. The
calendar days required for ground processing can be reduced to 19.7
when all work is performed on a 3-shift-per-day, 7-day-per-week
schedule. The operational scenario is shown in Figure 3.3.3.17-3.
(2) Schedule Margin. Launch rates for the AMLS vary from a minimum
of 4 per year in 2005 to a maximum of 13 per year in 2019. Depending
upon individual facility usage, additional calendar days are available
for contingency processing. A high of 249 additional processing days
for a launch rate of 4 per year to a low of 14 processing days for a
launch rate of 13 per year are available.
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Figure 3.3.3.17-3.- AMLS operational scenario at the launch site.
f,
(3) Delays Due TO Unscheduled Mainte.nance Actions. Based on a flight
time of 168 hours and 35 hours of prelaunch checkout, the AMLS
orbiter is expected to have a total of 169.5 unscheduled maintenance
actions per mission, resulting in 33.9 line replaceable unit (LRU)
removals. Approximately 23 percent of flights may be delayed by
orbiter problems. The AMLS booster, with 35 hours of prelaunch
checkout and a much shorter 15 minute flight, is expected to have
only 15.9 unscheduled mainte-nance actions per mission and 4.2 LRU
removals. Approximately 5 percent of flights may be delayed by
booster problems.
Environmental Impact.- The AMLS uses LO2 and LH 2 as propellants. Toxic
fluids have been eliminated. Using the given propellant weight, major effluent
constituents were determined and are shown in Table 3.3.3.17-3. These values
are based on equilibrium, non-afterburning calculations.
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TABLE 3.3.3.17-3.- EFFLUENT DATA FOR AMLS
Exhaust Product AMLS (Klbm)
CO 0.0
CO2 0.0
H2 74.3
H20 2079.2
HC1 0.0
N2 0.0
OH 0.0
H 0.0
A1203 0.0
n,
Total per flight 2153.9
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3.3.3.18 Advanced Military Spaceflight Capability (AMSC)
System Description
The AMSC is a one and one-half stage, air-launched system with a 5000 lb LEO
payload capability. The system can be launched into any inclination. It uses three
LOX/LH2 engines in its main propulsion system. These are SSME-type engines
which generate approximately one-third the thrust of an SSME. The AMSC concept
was developed under a USAF study performed by Rockwell International. 9 The
study effort used specific vehicle configurations to identify technologies required for
an on-demand launch vehicle, and to provide a measure against which the needed
technologies could be evaluated. The AMSC system was one of two prime
candidates selected by the study team from a large number of possible
configurations.
Figure 3.3.3.18-1.- Rockwelrs AMSC concept used as a representative
air-launched personnel carrier for HTS study.
Performance Characteristics
The AMSC concept was designed to deliver a 5000 lb payload to a 160 nmi polar
orbit. Since this is the only performance value defined in the AMSC study, it was
used for all AMSC missions. This does tend to overstate the number of missions
required to support easterly launch requirements needed for most missions in our
data base. It uses LOX/LH2 propellants and expendable drop tanks. The carrier
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aircraft is a slightly modified Boeing 747 on which the fuel tank orbiter is carried to a
launch altitude of about 24 000 ft. This system provides favorable operational
characteristics, such as being air-mobile and having inherent offset launch and base
escape capabilities. A key system requirement characteristic was that the AMSC had
to be maintained in an alert status, capable of being deployed within hours of
notification. The use of existing transport aircraft for launch reduces system
acquisition costs. A primary concern with this concept is the use of expendable
tanks, which affect operational costs, and cause logistics, mating, and disposal
problems.
The drop tank orbiter is mated to the Boeing 747 in somewhat the same way as the
Space Shuttle is mated to its carrier aircraft. Fully fueled, this configuration has a
take-off weight of approximately 863 000 lbs, including the aircraft. Once airborne,
liquid oxygen and hydrogen are transferred from the dewar tanks in the aircraft to
the drop tanks; this continues until the aircraft is at approximately 24 000 ft. A
pullup maneuver is executed to provide a flight path angle-of-attack of
approximately 12 ° for AMSC separation. The separation-maneuver sequence
represents the most technically demanding aspect of the entire vehicle operation.
Once the AMSC vehicle and its attached drop tanks are separated from the aircraft,
the three main engines are ignited and the vehicle ascends into space. At the time
of separation, the GLOW is 277 000 lbs. After drop tank staging, 19 987 Ibs of
propellants remain in the AMSC vehicle to be burned by the three engines for final
orbit insertion. The advanced RCS, which provides on-orbit and deorbit delta
velocity, uses gasesous oxygen (GOX)/gaseous hydrogen (GH2) fed from high
pressure accumulators. A top-level, system mass statement is given in Table
3.3.3.18-1.
a, Abort Modes.- Two options for intact abort are available, depending on time
from separation from the aircraft. If the center engine is lost prior to
248 seconds, or an outboard engine is lost prior to 330 seconds, an abort to an
appropriate runway is initiated. After these time constraints, either the two
outer engines are throttled up, or the opposite outboard engine is shut down
and the center engine is throttled up to achieve an ATO.
b. Crew Escape Options.- A crew escape option was identified for the AMSC
system. The discussed option focused on an ejection seat system although a
detailed design was not included in the study. It is safe to assume that altitude
and velocity limits as identified for the Shuttle Evolution (section 3.3.3.2) would
approximate AMSC ejection operational limits.
C. Operational Facilities.- The ground facilities for the AMSC system could be
located at any air base capable of supporting a Boeing 747 that has equipment for
mating the AMSC vehicle and its attached drop tanks to the aircraft. While the
study did not define the ground facilities in detail, they were identified and
discussed. Most of the building requirements are similar to typical commercial
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TABLE 3.3.3.18-1.- AMSC MASS STATEMENT
System breakdown
747 Carrier aircraft
Oxygen
Hydrogen
Orbiter
Structure
Engines (3)
Oxygen- Ascent
Hydrogen - Ascent
Oxygen - RCS
Hydrogen - RCS
Payload
I
Total - GLOW
h
Mass (klbs)
581.6
Drop Tanks
Structure 8.9
185.1
30.8
25.5
4.7
17.1
2.9
1.2
0.2
5.0
863.0
airport hangars, while specific support equipment for mating is considered to be
small and portable, due to the small size and low empty-weight of the AMSC and its
drop tanks. Fuel and payload facilities also have to be present. This system is
designed to be mobile and launched from a variety of locations throughout the
world. Since one of the AMSC's key characteristics is its ability to remain on alert
status _th lift off within hours of notification, its ground facilities had to be capable
of continuously maintaining a full AMSC propellant load in the aircraft dewars. An
operations flow schematic is shown in Figure 3.3.3.18-2.
Attribute Values
System input data related to each attribute, as well as system-specific attribute values
are discussed below. In most cases, system data is modified by flight rate or cost
associated with the particular architecture and/or "If" being evaluated. However,
some useful observations can be made at the system attribute level. These will be
discussed following the presentation of the AMSC system data.
a. Human Safety.- Relevant system data for human safety consists of system
characteristics that enable the crew to detach or escape from the main body of the
system during ascent in the event of a mission failure. Two abort options
(described earlier) exist and can be used in the event of a non-catastrophic main
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engine failure. These are abort to nearest capable runway and ATO. If an ATO
is executed, it is possible that the mission will be a success. In addition, the crew
can eject from the vehicle with altitude and velocity constraints similar to those
defined for Shuttle Evolution (section 3.3.3.2).
OPF
22d
Mate
Tanks
To
Orbiter
2d
Mate
Orbiter/
Tank
To A/C
ld
Carrier
A/C
Id
Launch
A/C
OPF "
TPF -
D -
Orbiter Processing Facility
Tank Processing Facility
8 Hr Day/1 Shift
Turn Around 48 Hours (6-8 Hr Work Days Or 2-24 Hr Work Days) Possible
Drop
Tank
Then To
Orbit
7d
Figure 3.3.3.18-2.- AMSC operations flow schematic.
b* Funding Profile.- Cost information provided to the HTS included DDT&E; new
airframe, engine, and drop tank production; and vehicle refurbishment. Spread
factors for each cost item were also provided, identifying how much of the total
cost was spent in the years preceeding the need or flight date. General Dynamics
added annual preplanned product improvement, contractor fee, and
government wraps as agreed to by the NIT. Table 3,3.3.18-2 presents a summary
of this data.
3.3-139
Rev. E
TABLE 3.3.3.18-2.-AMSC FUNDING PROFILE INPUT DATA
AMSC TOTAL LEARN- RATE COST COST Y-5 Y-4 Y-3 Y-2
OR TFU ING CURVE PER PER
COST CURVE FLT YEAR
($M) (%) (%) ($M) ($M) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
20 25 30 20 5
COST BREAKDOWN
CATEGORIES
NON-RECURRING
RDT&E 6478
PRODUCTION 0
P3I 324/_'R '
FACILITIES
RECURRING
NEW
AIRFRAME
MAIN ENGINE
FLIGHT TO FLIGHT
DROP TANKS
REFURBISHMENT
LAUNCH
OPERATIONS
FLIGHT OPERATIONS
R & M/S'UPPORT I
Y-1 FLT
YR
(%)
669 90 100 9 16 26 30 19
21 90 90 8 17 27 30 18
14' 90 90 10 15 25 25 25
1.4 115.0 100
0.5 92.4 100
0.1 25.9 100
0.0 35.2 100
Co
do
e°
Probability of Mission Success.- A system description and flight profile contains
the required input information for this attribute. In summary, the AMSC has
one liquid-propulsion stage, three liquid engines (with engine-out capability per
the abort descriptions), and two solid motors used during the initial boost
period.
Architecture Cost Risk.- Two of three subordinate attribute values for ACR are
Technical Challenge and Program Immaturity. The NIT, under a consensus
process, assigned the AMSC a scale rating of 6 (Non-recurring), 4 (Production)
and 6 (Operations) for Technical Challenge and a 7 for Program Immaturity,
resulting in a value of 12.9, 4.6, and 12.9, respectively, in "If" C for Technical
Challenge and a 21.5 for Program Immaturity (see section 3.2.5). The third
component, Number of New Systems, is an architecture-level value. AMSC's
contribution to architecture scores for this component of ACR is one.
Launch Schedule Confidence.- As in ACR, there are three subordinate attribute
values for LSC: Schedule Compression, Schedule Margin, and Delays (due to
unscheduled maintenance activities). Schedule Compression and Delays are
architecture-independent, while Schedule Margin is architecture- dependent
since its values are a function of annual flight rates, available facilities, and
Orbiters. AMSC's Schedule Compression values are nominal cycle time - 41.2
days, compressed cycle time - 24,8 days, and compression ratio - 0.6. It is
estimated that the AMSC will experience delays in 9.9 percent of its flights.
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f° Environmental Impact.- The AMSC uses liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen as
propellants, as well as two solid strap-on boosters. Its propellant load includes
oxygen - 1361.936 klbm, hydrogen - 227.641 klbm, and solid propellant - 2216.0
klbm. Using the given propellant weights, major effluent constituents were
determined and are shown in Table 3.3.3.18-3. These values are based on
equilibrium, non-afterburning calculations.
TABLE 3.3.3.18-3.- EFFLUENT DATA FOR AMSC*
Exhaust AMSC
Product (klbm)
OD 0.0
co2 0.0
H2 8.0
H20 223.2
HC1 0.0
N2 0.0
OH 0.0
H 0.0
A1203 0.0
* Does not include 747 engine effluents.
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3.3.3.19 Air Launch Vehicle (ALV)
System Description
a. History.- Air launching a rocket from a subsonic carrier aircraft has several
advantages that should result in superior attribute scores. In the first part of the
HTS, the NIT selected a candidate air launch concept to build an architecture
around; refer to the AMSC description of section 3.3.3.18 of the HTS Final
Report. This particular vehicle turned out to be sized incorrectly for the mission
needs, and as a result, scored poorly in the AET. The NIT still believed that our
customer considered the concept of air launching to be attractive, and that a
more representative candidate should be included. The ALV is a configuration
developed under independent research and development (IR&D) by Boeing
Defense and Space Group and offered to this study as a concept better suited to
the HTS mission needs.
b. Configuration.- The ALV, see Figure 3.3.3.19-1, is a Boeing 747-launched, two
stage LOX/LH2 rocket that carries either a payload shroud or a small personnel
capsule. The ALV 747 carrier airplane is a modified 400 series freighter with
larger engines (PW4000's from the 777 program) that is capable of lifting
approximately 412 000 Ibm to the launch conditions of 30 000 ft at a speed of
770 ft/s. The ALV itself features an expendable wing, used for separation, a
recoverable propulsion module with one SSME (operated at 100 percent rating),
an expendable first stage tankset holding ~282 000 Ibm of propellant, and an
expendable second stage featuring one or two RL10A-4B engines and tankage for
about 40 000 Ibm of propellant. In the cargo version (CALV), a payload adapter
and shroud are included. The second stage features one RL10 to reduce the
recurring cost associated with expendable hardware. In the personnel version
(PALV), the second stage features two RL10 engines, with engine-out capability,
and an interface adapter to the human personnel carrier. The personnel capsule
is very similar to the RPC biconic, except that it is smaller, carrying a maximum
of four people for up to 3 days (72 hours) of travel time.
C. Facilities.- The ALV is capable of taking off from any conventional Boeing 747-
capable runway. Facilities for loading cyrogenic propellants are required in the
immediate vicinity. The human personnel carrier facilities are nearly identical
to those discussed in conjuction with the RPC. Figure 3.3.3.19-2 depicts a typical,
ALV launch facility complex at the primary, flight operations site.
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Figure 3.3.3.19-1.- ALV configuration.
Figure 3.3.3.19-2.- ALV Launch facility.
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Performance Characteristics
The PALV performance was sized to provide personnel-only-access for four
passengers to the SSF. For the CALV, the payload performance is listed in
Table 3.3.3.19-1.
Attribute Values
a. Funding Profile Summary.- The ALV estimates were developed from a variety
of cost-estimating techniques. The airplane modifications were estimated using
proprietary Boeing airplane modifications and actual cost information analogies
for each section of the 747 aircraft. The rest of the cost estimates for the funding-
profile-attribute inputs were developed using the Boeing Parametric Cost
Model. Table 3.3.3.19-2 is a summary of the system cost estimates.
TABLE 3.3.3.19-1.- CALV PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
Altitude
(nmi)
100 x 100
GTO
Inclination
(deg)
90
0
Payload (ibm)
17,247
8,104
150 x 150 28.5 20,914
30 x 220 28.5 22,425
220 x 220 28.5 16,681
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TABLE 3.3.3.19-2.- ALV COST ESTIMATES SUMMARY ("IF" C)
Development:
C/D Phase
Facilities
Total:
Production:
Carrier A/C TFU
Upper Stage TFU
Expendable TFU
Reusable TFU
Supt. Equip. Set
Over. & Suvvort
- . .
Variable Cost
Fixed Annual
(1992 Dollars in Millions)
CALV PLS-Lite/PALV Total
$ 3,277M
385M
$ 3,662M
$ 244M
41M
36M
162M
$ 10.5M
$ 26M
$ 56M
1,648M
1,905M
$ 4,925M
642M
$ 5,567M
(same as CALV)
53M (2 RL10's)
42M (OMS/LES)
196M (mini carrier)
(in DDT&E est.)
37M (first fit.)
(same as CALV)
Acquisition Phase Estimates.- The acquisition phase estimates were
accomplished using new system weight statements and aircraft modification
descriptions from a Boeing internal IR&D project activity.
The cargo mission flight tests would precede the human mission tests, but
the PLS-Lite drop tests and launch escape system tests can be done in parallel
with the cargo mission hardware testing. The schedules were compared with
Space Shuttle Carrier Aircraft, Airborne Optical Adjunct, and E-4 Command
Post modification actual program schedules for content and reasonableness.
The cryogenic stages development plan segment was compared with the
Inertial Upper Stage program and NLS study program schedules for
reasonableness and content. The SSME modification test schedule segment
was compared with some prior study information from Rocketdyne and
Phillips Labs.
TFU Estimates.- There are two configurations for the ALV cryogenic upper
stage, so there are two TFU values shown in Table 3.3.3.19-2. The CALV
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upper stage has one RL10 and the PALV upper stage has two RL10's
(including extra plumbing and control subsystem impacts,) thus, the upper
stage TFU cost estimates difference. Estimates are provided for expendable
(exp) and reusable hardware elements. The PLS OMS/LES is expended on
every flight.
Operation and Support Estimates.- The variable cost estimate for the PALV
configuration is higher to account for the PLS-Lite processing and
refurbishment requirements.
Funding Profile Attribute Cost Inputs.- The ALV master phasing schedule
includes the development plan for both CALV and PALV design and testing.
The cost spread data was generated using the 6-year development plan
illustrated in the preliminary ALV master phasing schedule. The funding
profile, attribute cost estimate input sheet with the cost spread data is
documented in Appendix B, section B.1.5.
Probability of Mission Success.- The mission success trees are listed in
Appendix B. For the PALV, the PMS = 0.96649; for the CALV, PMS -- 0.9473.
Human Safety.- The PALV includes a launch escape system that can provide for
escape in all phases of the ascent. The PD is equal to 0.00829, or an average of
120.6 flights between crew loss events.
Architecture Cost Risk.- The ALV elements were evaluated with the same
methods as other boosters. The Technical Challenge score was assigned a value
of 4 (for all phases) based on the low level of required technology. The NIT
accounted for the CALV and PALV as 1.5 "new systems", and agreed on a
Program Immaturity value of 8.
Operational Flow.- A summary operational flow for an ALV is shown in
Figure 3.3.3.19-3.
Environment.- The ALV is a LOX/LH2 system with a total Wp of 321 482 Ibm of
propellant, resulting in a score of 32; refer to Table 3.3.3.19-2.
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Figure 3.3.3.19-3.- Typical ALV launch operations preparation flow.
TABLE 3.3.3.19-3.- EFFLUENT DATA FOR ALV
Exhaust Product
CO
CO2
H2
H20
HC1
Effluent Mass
(klbs)
0
0
11.1
310.4
0
N2 0
OH 0
H 0
A12C)3 0
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3.3.3.20 Two-Stage-to-Orbit (TSTO) Beta II
System Description
The Beta II TSTO (Figure 3.3.3.20-1) is a concept developed at the Air Force Wright
Laboratory. NASA-Lewis selected it as its baseline TSTO concept in March 1990,
bringing Boeing under contract in July as part of the NASA-Lewis/Wright Lab study
team. Beta II is one of a family of TSTO's under investigation within and outside of
the United States. Other concepts include Sanger (Germany), HOTOL (UK/Russia)
STAR-H (France), and LACE Boosted TSTO (Japan). Beta II has an air-breathing first
stage, using turbofan and ramjet engines to accelerate up to Mach 6.5. Its orbiter has
a single SSME to propel it from its Mach 6.5 staging point up to orbit insertion. The
orbiter is loaded into the underside of the carrier aircraft. Performance design
criteria is 10 klb of payload delivered into a polar orbit. The reference source for the
Beta II is a NASA-Lewis briefing 10, as well as the Boeing _ team.
Figure 3.3.3.20-1.- The Beta II concept is representative of fully reusable
air-breathing/rocket TSTO systems.
Performance Characteristics
Beta II was designed to deliver a minimum of 10 klbs to polar orbit.
to other orbits of interest is shown in Table 3.3.3.20-1.
Its performance
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TABLE 3.3.3.20-1.- BETA II PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
USED FOR MANIFESTING PURPOSES
Inclination Apogee X Perigee Payload
(deg) (nmi) (klbs)
28.5 160 x 160 19.1
28.5 220 x 220 18.5
28.5 300 x 300 17.6
57.0 160 x 160 15.6
57.0 324 x 324 14.1
90.0 100 x 100 ....... 11.1
90.0 150 x 150 10.6
The Beta 1I orbiter is mated into the bottom of its carrier aircraft. It sits inside a
cavity during ascent or ferry operations. Its payload bay is 20 feet long with a 14-foot
diameter. System GLOW is 1.2 Mlbs, of which 651.2 klbs is propellant, consisting of
jet propellant (JP), liquid hydrogen, and liquid oxygen. A 20 percent and 10.6 percent
weight-growth allowance has been accounted for in the carrier aircraft and orbiter,
respectively. Total inert weight is 234.6 klbs. A top-level mass statement is shown
in Table 3.3.3.20-2.
TABLE 3.3.3.20-2.- BETA II MASS ALLOCATION
Mass Allocation Carrier Aircraft Orbiter
(lbs) (lbs)
Inert .... 181,677 52,948
Propulsion 218,215
Propellant 377,651 273,499
Crew and Residuals 9,815 2,901
Payload 345,160 10,000
Margin 79,976 5,595
Total 1,212,494 344,943
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There is a 217 lb discrepancy between the orbiter total mass and the carrier aircraft
payload. This may be due to propellant boil off between take off and staging, round-
off error, or other analytical discrepancies. However, this small difference could
easily be allocated to margin, propellant, or residuals in order to force numbers to
coincide.
Mission operations begin with take off from a Strategic Air Command-type runway
using air-breathing propulsion. A total of 10 NASA-Lewis Research Center turbine
bypass engines, using JP-fueled high speed civil transport technology, provide initial
thrust up through Mach 3. Beginning at Mach 1.5, hydrogen fueled ramjets are
brought on line at partial-thrust levels. They provide 100 percent of the thrust
between Mach 3 and Mach 6.5, where the orbiter is released. After staging, the
carrier returns to its base of operations under powered flight, using ramjets only,
down to a speed of Mach 3, and turbofans only from Mach 1.5 to landing. The
orbiter's SSME is ignited after release from the carrier aircraft to continue
acceleration through orbit insertion. Orbit circularization is provided by two RL10-
A4 engines, which draw propellant from the main propulsion tanks. An integral
GOX/GH2 RCS provides attitude and reaction control. At the end of its mission, the
Beta II orbiter deorbits and glides to its landing site just as the Space Shuttle Orbiter
does today.
a. Abort Modes.- Beta 11 abort modes are defined in Figure 3.3.3.20-2.
//_iter Trans-Atlanflc
/Abort Lancling
/ Options: .
[ 1. Morocco
i z c,,,_i,
I 3. 5pa/n (2 sites)
//__O_i_r Down-Range
[ Abort Landing
Options:
1. 5. Africa
7. I..iberla
3. Zaire
4. Australia
KSC Tackoff to Vehicle
Separation Options:
1. Go b_ck to KSC
2. Land at Loring AFB, Maine
3. Land at Arg_cia NAS, New Brunswick
4. Land at Halifax RCAFB, Nova Scotia
5. Land at Keflavik NA5, Iceland
Orbiter On-Orbit
AbortOptio_
Abort Once Around:
I. White Sands, N.M.
2. EAFB, Calif.
Abort-to-Orbit:
1. Rescue from KSC
2. Rescue from VAFB
3. International Rescue
Abort From Orbit:.
Forty (40) des_nated
NST5 eme_e_cy landin5
sties (.Shuttle plana.)
Figure 3.3.3.20-2.- Beta 11 abort and contingency operations.
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Crew Escape Options.- B-58-type ejection capsules enable crew escape from both
the carrier aircraft and the orbiter.
Operational Facilities.- An overview of basing facilities is given in
Table 3.3.3.20-3. This study assumed that only one site was developed since all
azimuths are available from any launch site for a two stage, fully reusable
launch system. Figure 3.3.3.20-3 shows the Beta II operational flow schematic.
TABLE 3.3.3.20-3.- BETA II FACILITIES OVERVIEW
Facility Kennedy Space Center Vandenburg Air Force Base
Runway 300 ft wide x 15 000 ft long. 200 ft wide x 15 000 ft long.
Taxiways Limited to none. Limited.
Orbiter Processing
Facility
Existing are 100 percent utilized by
Space Shuttle.
Existing former Space Shuttle
orbiter Maintenance and Checkout
Facility is not being utilized.
Booster Processing No hangar facilities - limited No suitable hangar facility.
Facility facilities at Patrick Air Force Base.
iJ, J
Existing Space Shuttle, Titan, AtlasSupport facilities - Shops,
Administrative, and
Logistics
Propellant Storage and
Distribution
Payload Processing
Facility
Mission Control Facility
and Delta launch support facilities
at KSC and CCAFS plus aircraft
maintenance facilities at Patrick
AFB.
Cryogenic propellant storage at
Launch Complex 39 pads;
Suitable distribution nonexistent;
Aircraft propellant storage and
distribution facilities are limited to
nonexistent.
Existing facilities to support Space
Shuttle, Titan, and Delta payloads
Titan, Atlas and Delta facilities
with communication links;
Established Test Range.
Existing Launch Control Center with
!Launch Processing System - probably
completely dedicated to Space
Shuttle;
Proposed "CORE" update to LPS
may be suitable and have required
capability.
i
Automated Test and
Checkout
Existing Titan, Atlas and ballistic
missile launch support facilities.
Extremely limited aircraft
maintenance facilities.
Cryogenic propellant storage at
SLC-6 launch pad;
Suitable distribution nonexistent;
Aircraft propellant storage and
distribution facilities are limited to
nonexistent.
Existing facilities in former Space
Shuttle Orbiter Maintenance and
Checkout Facility.
Titan and Atlas "on-pad" facilities
with communications links;
Established Test Range.
Space Shuttle equipment and
facility status unknown;
Ballistic missile programs' current
and future statusunknown;
Highly doubtful that suitable assets
exist.
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Attribute Values
System input data related to each attribute, as well as system-specific attribute values
are discussed below. In most cases, system data is modified by flight rate or cost
associated with the particular architecture and/or "If" being evaluated. However,
some useful observations can be made at the system attribute level. These will be
discussed following the presentation of the Beta II system data.
a. Human Safety.- Relevant system data for human safety consists of system
characteristics that enable the crew to detach or escape from the main body of the
system during ascent in the event of a mission failure. Several abort options
(described earlier) exist and can be used in the event of a non-catastrophic main
engine failure. They are abort to nearest capable runway and ATO. If an ATO is
executed, it is possible that the mission will be a success. In addition, the crew
can eject from either vehicle as described above.
PRE-LAUNCH PAD
OPERATIONS OPS FLIGHT
1.5 days ,..._..._ 0.8 days .---"- PHASE
(7d-3sft) (7d-3sft) 7 days
RECOVERY
PRE FLT I POST FLT (LANDING)
OPS I REFURB OPS
-" 1/6 day
3.8 days -" (Td-3sft)
(7d-3sft)
, I
A i
I I
[ MAJOR OVERHAUL [
[_ I EVERY 30 FLTS I
] 183 days _- _"
5d-lsft] I
Figure 3.3.3.20-3.- Beta II operations flow schematic.
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Funding Profile.- Cost information provided to the HTS included DDT&E,
production, vehicle refurbishment, and operations. Spread factors for each cost
item were also provided, identifying how much of the total cost was spent in the
years preceding the need or flight date. General Dynamics added annual pre-
planned product improvement, while the AET added contractor fee and
government wraps, as agreed to by the NIT. Table 3.3.3.20-4 presents a summary
of this data.
Probability of Mission Success.- A system description and flight profile contains
the required input information for this attribute. In summary, the Beta 11 has 3
liquid-propulsion stages consisting of 10 turbojet engines and 2 ramjets in the
first stage, 1 main rocket engine in the second stage, and an orbital maneuvering
system as the third propulsive stage. The PMS process does not use the air-
breathing stage to determine mission success rate. This is also true for the
AMSC concept.
TABLE 3.3.3.20-4.:-BETA II FUNDING PROFILE INPUT DATA
Beta II Total Learn-
Cost Breakdown Or TFU ing
Categories Cost Curve
($M) (%)
i
Non-Recurring
RDT&E 15538
_,T
Production 703
P3i 777/Yr
Facilities
Eafb Test Facility 348
Ksc Facilities 375
Vafb Facilities 452
Moc/Training 200
Flt Training A/C 100
Recurring
New
Carrier Aircraft 2940 95
Orbiter 703i 92
19% Rplcmnt Spares 692 92
Carrier #1 Mod 735 100
Orbiter #1 Mod 176 100
Launch Operations
Flight Operations
R & M/Support
Rate Cost Cost Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Fit
Curve Per Fit Per -8 -7 -6 -8 -4 -8 -2 -1 Yr
($M) Yr
(%) ($M) !(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
100
100
100
100
100
5 i 15 10 20 25
1C 55 25 8i 2
5 35 45 15
2 lC 50 35 3
1 51 20 38 30
2 2C 50 25 3
1 15 39 5i
310
120
46
13 10 2
4O
15 55
12 48
25 5
35 5
100
10
80 20
100
100
100:
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Architecture Cost Risk.- Two of three subordinate attribute values for ACR are
Technical Challenge and Program Immaturity. The NIT, under a consensus
process, assigned the Beta II a scale rating of 8 (Non-recurring), 7 (Production)
and 8 (Operations) for Technical Challenge in "If" C, and a 10 for Program
Immaturity, resulting in a value of 35.9 (Non-recur), 21.5 (Production), and 35.9
(Operations) for Technical Challenge and a 100 for Program Immaturity (see
section 3.2.5). The third component, Number of New Systems, is an
architecture-level value. Beta II's contribution to architecture scores for this
component of ACR is 1.
Launch Schedule Confidence.- As in ACR, there are three subordinate attribute
values for LSC: Schedule Compression, Schedule Margin, and Delays (due to
unscheduled maintenance activities). Schedule Compression and Delays are
architecture-independent, while Schedule Margin is architecture-dependent
since its values are a function of annual flight rates and available facilities and
Orbiters. Beta Irs Schedule Compression values for the orbiter are: nominal
cycle time - 14 days, compressed cycle time - 14 days, and compression ratio -
1.0. It is estimated that 8.9 to 14.8 percent of Beta II flights may experience a
flight delay. The estimate is based on assessing the orbiter and carrier aircraft
separately, with an orbiter estimate of 8.9 percent and 5.9 percent for the carrier
aircraft.
Environmental Impact.- The Beta II uses jet fuel, liquid hydrogen, and liquid
oxygen as propellants. Propellant load on the carrier aircraft is 377 651 lbs, of
which 250 010 Ibs is jet fuel and 127 641 lbs is liquid hydrogen. Approximately
half (122 270 Ibs) of the jet fuel is used during parallel operation of the turbofans
and ramjets. The remainder is allocated to take off and acceleration to Mach 1.5,
return propulsion, and contingency needs. The orbiter's 273 499 lbs of propell-
ant is 39.1 klbs of hydrogen and 234.4 klbs of oxygen. Using the given propellant
weights, major effluent constituents were determined and are shown in Table
3.3.3.20-6. These values are based on equilibrium, non-afterburning calculations.
TABLE 3.3.3.20-5.- EFFLUENT DATA FOR BETA II
Exhaust Beta II
Product (klbm)
CO 0.0
CO2 377.5
H2 11.0
H20 481.9
HC1 0.0
N2 0.0
OH 0.0
H 0.0
A1203 0.0
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3.3.4 Architecture Evaluation Process
Having defined the transportation architectures to be analyzed, described the systems
which comprise the architectures, and developed methodologies for measuring the
important attributes, it is now possible to evaluate the architectures using the tools the
HTS study developed. Figure 3.3.4-1 illustrates the architecture evaluation process and
the flow of data between the data analysis tools. The figure indicates the major
computer models and the data inputs and outputs of each.
The first step in the architecture analysis process is to gather or develop the basic
system data required to either determine architecture flight rates or attribute values,
such as ascent performance and reliability trees. Then the manifesting and mission
capture work is done. For the HTS study, this was accomplished using General
Dynamics' Transportation Systems Integration Tool (TRANSIT). TRANSIT applies
system performance data, various system constraints, and other data to the mission
model to produce a series of manifests. One manifest, which summarizes the total flight
requirements by year over the study time frame, is produced for each "If" activity
scenario of an architecture.
Once the mission capture analysis is complete and the architecture manifests are
produced, the next step is analysis of the ground operations flow. To do this, a top-level
flow diagram is developed for each launch system. These diagrams show the major
facilities required for a system and the length of vehicle processing time and shift
information for each. They also show which processes are done in parallel and which
are done in series. From these diagrams, the operations spreadsheet models are
developed. The models produce the system level, operations-related, attribute data
required for attribute calculation. This includes schedule confidence and schedule
margin data for the Launch Schedule Confidence attribute. The models also produce
data for the number of facilities and vehicles required for the architecture cost
estimation.
Information from the ground operations analysis, manifests, and system cost data
inputs are used to produce the cost data for each architecture. This is accomplished in a
spreadsheet model which was developed in previous studies and modified to produce
cost data in the format required by the study. Data produced for each system, in each
architecture, includes year-by-year costs for DDT&E, facilities, non-recurring
production, preplanned product improvement, operations, and recurring production.
The cost model also uses PMS and safety values to estimate the cost of vehicle losses
due to unreliability. The PMS values come from spreadsheet analysis based on
reliability success trees. Safety values come from spreadsheets, which tally the potential
losses and their effect on crew survival and abort for each flight phase.
Finally, data for the six study attributes, as well as the flight rate manifests, are input
into the HTS AET. The AET is a Macintosh-based evaluation model, developed
specifically for the FITS study, which utilizes system and element level data to generate
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Figure 3.3.4-1.- HTS process data flow.
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architecture-level attribute data and utility scores. It contains all algorithms necessary
to "roll up" the data, both across all systems in the architecture and over the study time
frame, into architecture values. The values are applied against utility curves to produce
attribute scores. These scores are then combined using attribute weightings to produce
architecture scores. Both attribute and architecture scores can be used to compare
architectures and help address various considerations. The AET is the final evaluation
tool for the extensive amount of data generated from the various FITS models, tools,
and processes.
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3.3.5 _ Reference - Architecture Option 1
The HTS Reference (Architecture 1) provides a benchmark for FITS study processes
and a comparative reference for potential replacement architectures. Systems in the
HTS Reference comprise the first 8 years of all architectures. NASA's Mixed Fleet
Manifest defines the system flights from 1992 through 1998. New systems or
capabilities are not introduced until after 2000.
3.3.5.1 Description
Current systems and operational characteristics, defined as those in place or under
development, comprise the HTS Reference Architecture. These include: Shuttle
with ASRM's; Atlas (E, I, and HAS); Delta II; and Titan (II, IN, and W) (see
figure 3.3.5.1-1). Facilities and operational flow paths are discussed in the relevant
system section. Small commercial vehicles (Pegasus, Taurus, Conestoga, etc.) or
sounding rockets (Scout, Aires, etc.) are not considered in this study.
I-L-
-! -I
!
SHUTTLE ATLAS DELTA TITAN II TITAN III
"-'1
_H
Figure 3.3.5.1-1.- Reference architecture launch system vehicles (not to scale).
Space Shuttle improvements incorporated in the baseline include the ASRM's and
EDO. The ASRM's increase payload lift capability by 12 klbs relative to the
redesigned solid rocket motors (RSRM's) now being used. The EDO increases on-
orbit duration capability from 10 days to 30 days. However, since all personnel
mission flights were assumed to be 7 days in length, the extended duration capability
is not considered. Also, it does not affect fleet size requirements, even though it
provides longer mission times.
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Atlas E and I flights are treated as IIAS vehicles from an operational viewpoint since
there are only 2 and 4 flights of each, respectively, out of 94 total flights. Also, since
there are only two Atlas flights from WTR, the operational analysis has been
simplified by assuming that all flights are out of ETR.
The single Titan III flight in the Mixed Fleet Manifest has been treated as a Titan IV
in the operational analysis. These simplifications are common to all architectures
since the flights occur between 1992 and 1998. They have no bearing on relative
comparisons between architectures.
3.3.5.2 Manifesting Philosophy
Missions between 1992 and 1997 are defined by the NASA Mixed Fleet Manifest in
effect in August 1991. For all scenarios ("If's") one DOD Space Shuttle mission was
included per year. Beyond 1997, all payloads going to the SSF, all human-tended
payloads, and all return payloads were manifested on the Space Shuttle. For other
destinations, as a priority, untended payloads were manifested onto expendable
launch vehicles without crews. The Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) was
delivered to and returned from SSF using the Space Shuttle. This philosophy
reflects the way payloads are currently or are planned to be handled using the
current systems. Two payloads identified in the CNDB and carried forward into the
FITS mission model ("If" D) were modified so the Space Shuttle could deliver them
to SSF; assembly payloads MB-19 (70 klb) and MB-24 (69.5 klbs) were split into two
equal-mass payloads, with no additional ASE added.
3.3.5.3 Manifesting Results
The ELV flights remain constant across all "If" scenarios, with Space Shuttle
increasing from 76 to 389 flights over the 29 years of interest in this study (Table
3.3.5.3-1). Annual rates for Space Shuttle begin at 3 in "If" A, increase to 4 in "If" B,
jump to 10 through 12 in "If" C, 11 through 15 in "If" D, 11 through 15 in "If" E-low,
and 11 through 17 in "If" E-high.
Annual Space Shuttle flight rates and their Orbiter fleet size for "If's" C and D are
shown in Figure 3.3.5.3-1. Space Shuttle flight rate peaks at 12 in 1997 (late FY91
Mixed Fleet Manifest), in 2000, and in 2007. Need for a fifth Orbiter is indicated at a
rate of 11 flights per year (approximately 2.5 flights per year, per Orbiter). This is
somewhat lower than KSC's estimate of achieving 12 flights per year with a four-
Orbiter fleet. A key difference in these rates may be the assumption that each Orbiter
is off-line 60 days per year to account for a 180-day major modification every 3 years.
"If" D generally requires one to two flights more than "If" C each year to support the
EMCC SSF, except in 2002, where the rate peaks at 15 per year during EMCC build up.
Thus, a six-Oribter fleet is required for "If" D, beginning in 2000.
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The highest traffic model ("If" E-High) Space Shuttle flight rate and Orbiter fleet size
is shown in Figure 3.3.5.3-2. Flight rates peak at 17 per year (2011) in this "If". A
seven-Orbiter fleet is required in 2007 to meet the demand of 16 flights that year.
Sixteen Space Shuttle flights are also required in 2015, 2018 and 2020.
TABLE 3.3.5.3-I.- REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE SYSTEM FLIGHT SUMMARY
SYSTEM
Atlas I
Atlas E
Atlas IIAS
Delta
Titan 1I
Titan HI
Titan W/Centaur
Titan W/NUS
Shuttle -"If' A
-"If" B
-'If" C
-"If" D
-"If" E-LOW
-"IF'E-HIGH
F
EAST
iNASA DOD
4
24 64
38 111
1
42 56
61
47 29
119 29
271 29
309 29
328 29
360 29
WEST
NASA DOD
l l
10 33
3 39
24 57
TOTAL
4
2
88
192
42
1
98
142
76
148
300
338
357
389
LATE FY 1991 MIXED FLEET MANIFEST
14
SHUTTLE 12
FLIGHT RATE / 10
FLEET SIZE 8
6
4
2
0
95 00 05 10 15 20
_ IFC FLT/YR -- -- -- IF C FLEET SIZE ]
I
I- - - IF D FLT/YR -- - -- IF D FLEET SIZE
Figure 3.3.5.3-1.- SSF support requirements raise Space ShuttIe flight rates
up to 16 per year and Orbiter fleet size to 6 per year.
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Figure 3.3.5.3-2.- "If" E-High drives Space Shuttle flight rate to a
peak of 17 in 2011 and fleet size to 7 in 2007.
Other than a new west coast pad for Titan and a new MLP, the only procurement
required for this architecture to satisfy the HTS-defined needs are new Orbiters. The
required fleet size increases from four to seven as the mission model expands from
"If" C to "If" E-High. With the predicted loss rate for the Orbiter (see section
3.3.5.4.1), the replacement requirements are greater than the fleet build-up
requirements.
3.3.5.4 Architecture Evaluation
The Reference Architecture provides a benchmark for the defined methodologies
and potential replacement architecture assessments. Therefore, discussion of
attribute values, the Space Shuttle's contribution to those values, and increased
asset requirements to meet various scenarios is presented.
Increased assets that enable the Reference Architecture to meet ETO requirements
include a Titan IV launch pad, Space Shuttle Orbiters, and an MLP. The operations
models indicate that all scenarios require an additional Titan IV pad on the west
coast in 1999 to support defined DOD flights. Additional Space Shuttle Orbiters and
MLP's to support scenarios which include SSF ("If" C through E-high). Annual
flight rates in "If's" A and B do not require additional Orbiters or MLP's. The
Orbiter fleet must increase from four to five in 1996 ("If's" C through E-high), from
five to six ("If" D through E-high) in 2000, and from six to seven ("If" E-high) in
2007. One additional MLP is required in 2003 for "If's" D through E-high.
Additional Orbiters are also required to compensate for probable vehicle loss due to
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catastrophic failures (two in "If" A, three in "If" B, six in "If" C, seven in "If's" D and
E-low, and eight in "If" E-high).
3.3.5.4.1 Attribute summary.
a. Human Safety - Figure 3.3.5.4.1-1 shows the projected number of crew loss
events (to the nearest tenth) by "If" for this architecture. The probability of crew
loss (0.02235) is solely attributable to the Space Shuttle, as it is the only personnel
system in this architecture. This value projects a crew loss event every 44 to 45
flights. Actual experience resulted in a crew loss event on the 25th Space
Shuttle flight. Through the end of calendar year 1992 there has been 1 crew loss
in 52 launches, for a demonstrated value of 0.019231.
CREW
LOSS
EVENTS
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
A B C D E-LOW E-HIGH
HTS SPACE PROGRAM ACTIVITY LEVEL (IF'S)
Figure 3.3.5.4.1-1.- Projected crew losses through 2020.
b. Funding Profile - Projected total architecture cost values and peak year funding
requirements are shown in Figure 3.3.5.4.1-2. Since expendable vehicle flight
rates in this architecture are constant across all "If's", increased cost values are
directly related to the increase in Space Shuttle flights as space program activity
increases from "If" A to "If" E-High. The Space Shuttle's contribution to the
Total Architecture Costs by "If" is shown in Table 3.3.5.4.1-1.
c. Probability of Mission Success - Table 3.3.5.4.1-1 shows the architecture PMS
value for each "If", which ranges from a low of 0.9317 ("If" A) to a high of 0.9354
("If" E-High) and is directly attributable to the increased number of Space Shuttle
flights for each successive "If". System PMS values, flight rates, and system
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contributions to the Architecture PMS for each "If" are shown also. The
Architecture PMS value varies by less than one hundredth of a point across the
time period of the study. Thus, any replacement system with a significantly
different PMS should be readily discernible when viewing the annual PMS
values.
TABLE 3.3.5.4.1-1.- SYSTEM CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ARCHITECTURE PMS VALUES
SYSTEMS Pms
Atlas E
Atlas I
Atlas IIAS
Delta II
Titan II
Titan I11
Titan IV/NUS
Titan IV/Centaur
Space Shuttle
0.9326
0.9326
0.9326
0.9319
0.9626
0.9307
0.9307
0.9100
0.9431
Architecture Total
SYSTEMS Pms
IFA
Pms*Flts
Flts Total Flts
2 0.002891
4 0.005783
88 0.127238
192 0.277402
42 0.062680
1 0.001442
142 0.204898
98 0.138263
76 0.111124
645 0.9317
IFB
Pros*Fits
Fits TotalFlts
2 0.002601
4 0.005202
88 0.114461
192 0.249546
42 0.056386
1 0.001298
142 0.184322
98 0.124379
148 0.249546
717 0.9329
Fits
2
4
88
192
42
1
142
98
300
869
IFC
Pms*Flts
Total Fits
0.002146
0.004292
0.094440
0.205897
0.046523
0.001071
0.152082
0.102623
0.325581
0.9347
Atlas E
Atlas I
Atlas IIAS
Delta II
Titan II
Titan III
Titan W/NUS
Titan IV/Centaur
Space Shuttle
Architecture Total
0.9326
0.9326
0.9326
0.9319
0.9626
0.9307
0.9307
0.9100
0.9431
IFD
Pms*Hts
Fits Total Hts
2 0.002056
4 0.004112
88 0.090483
192 0.197271
42 0.044574
1 0.001026
142 0.145710
98 0.098324
338 0.351452
907 0.9350
IF E-LOW
Pms*Hts
Flts
2
4
88
192
42
1
142
98
357
926
IF E-HIGH
Total Hts Hts
0.002014 2
0.004028 4
0.088627 88
0.193223 192
0.043660 42
0.001005 1
0.142720 142
0.096306 98
0.363592 389
0.9352 958
Pms*Flts
Total Fks
0.001946
0.003893
0.085666
0.186769
0.042201
0.000971
0.137953
0.093089
0.382949
0.9354
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Figure 3.3.5.4.1-2.- Total architecture cost and peak year funding requirement.
d. Architecture Cost Risk - Total values for the Technical Challenge sub-attribute
of ACR are shown in Figure 3.3.5.4.1-3. The values associated with "If's" A and
B represent the minimum values achievable, since each system in this
architecture for those "If's" is currently in operation and, therefore, has zero
risk. The change in the risk level for "If's" C and above is attributable to the
ACRV program. Program Immaturity for the Reference Architecture has a
value of one, reflecting the fact that all launch systems are operational
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throughout the architecture time frame. There is, however, one new system in
this architecture for "If's" C through E-high, namely, the ACRV. Thus, the New
System subattribute value for those "If's" has a value of one. These values were
developed by consensus using the scale defined in section 3.2.5.
50O
400
TECHNICAL 300
CHALLENGE
RATING 200
100
0
TECHNICAL CHALLENGE
tMDmM--m-----'==== _ _ _
I I _ I '" I _ I
A B C D E-LOW E-HIGH
HTS SPACE PROGRAM ACTW1TY LEVEL (IF'S)
Figure 3.3.5.4.1-3.- Reference architecture subattribute technical challenge value.
e.
f,
Launch Schedule Confidence - Operational considerations for the FITS
architecture comparison are contained in this attribute, which consists of three
sub-attributes: Schedule Compression, Schedule Margin, and Launch Delays.
Schedule Compression reflects the amount of time that system processing can be
shortened through maximizing personnel utilization; by extending shift
durations up to 50 percent and working shifts which are not part of the nominal
processing plan. The Reference Architecture can achieve slightly less than a 50
percent reduction in processing clock time (Figure 3.3.5.4.1-4). Schedule Margin
indicates how many additional launches can be made using existing assets at
nominal processing schedules. The evaluation of the Reference Architecture
indicates that an additional four to six flights per year across all systems could be
flown using assets required to meet the peak requirements from 1992 through
2020. The analysis indicates that launch delays due to unscheduled
maintenance actions would occur on 7 to 12 percent of the scheduled flights
between 1992 and 2020.
Environment - Figure 3.3.5.4.1-5 shows the relative environmental impact the
Reference Architecture has, based on nozzle effluents. These data only have
relevance as a reference for other architectures within this study. They should
not be used as absolute indicators of damage to the environment. Using "If" C
(SSF remains at PMC) as a comparative reference: "If" A has about half the
impact, "If" B has 67 percent of the impact, "If" D is 8 percent greater, "If" E-Low
is 12 percent greater, and "If" E-High is 19 percent greater. The biggest
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contributor in all but "If" A is the Space Shuttle, with its contribution to the
total growing from 48 percent in "If" B to 71 percent in "If" E-high. Titan
contributes the largest percentage of the value in "If" A, accounting for
56 percent of the total.
NOMINAL
SCHEDULE
REDUCTION
1.00
0.90
0_80
0.70
0.60
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0.10
0.OO
SCHEDULE COMPRESSION
A B C D E-LOW
H'_ SPACE PROGRAM ACTIVITY LEVEL (IF_)
E-HIGH
10.00
9.00 I
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7 1111
6.00
12HEDULE
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4.00
3.00
2.00
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Figure 3.3.5.4.1-4.- LSC subattribute values for schedule compression, schedule
margin, and launch delays due to unscheduled maintenance
actions.
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Figure 3.3.5.4.1-5.- Environmental impact attribute values.
3.3.5.4.2 Final scoring.- Figure 3.3.5.4.2-1 shows a stacked bar chart, delineating each
attribute in its unweighted and weighted proportions. Comparing the unweighted
to weighted scores for this architecture shows that the weighting factors increase the
importance of Funding Profile and Human Safety while decreasing the importance
of ACR, LSC, and Environment. It appears as though the attribute weights had
minimal impact on the relative contribution of PMS.
3.3.5.4.3 Analysis of score.- Reference Architecture and attribute scores provide a
basis for comparison with other architectures defined to address specific considera-
tions. As such, it is not possible to say if they are good or bad. The Reference
Architecture received a total score of 40 to 55 out of 100 for the various scenarios
considered. Architectures with higher scores than the Reference within a specific
"If" are deemed to be better than the Reference and may be viable alternatives for
the future. However, these scores are highly dependent upon the chosen utility
curves and relative weights of each attribute. Therefore, one must examine specific
attribute values and total score sensitivity to attribute weightings before discarding
or promoting specific architectures. It is possible to conclude that the nation finds
the attribute values associated with the Reference Architecture as acceptable
consequences, since the operation is continued.
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Figure 3.3.5.4.2-1.- Attribute score and weighting contributions to final score.
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3.3.6 Shuttle Evolution - Architecture Option 2
A viable way to increase capacity, improve capabilities, or provide more options at
low cost is by modifying existing systems. Examples abound in military and
commercial aircraft (e.g., B-52, B-l, Boeing 727 and 747, Airbus 300, etc.). The Shuttle
Evolution architecture employs this principal to enhance the capabilities of the
Space Shuttle, Atlas, Delta and Titan launch systems. Since all systems, except Delta,
incorporate evolutionary characteristics, the architecture title Shuttle Evolution is
something of a misnomer. This architecture was devised to show how well current
systems could handle future space activity requirements if they were improved
along a pre-defined path. Evolutionary aspects were not optimized based on initial
architecture evaluations or single attribute measurements.
3.3.6.1 Description
As in the Reference Architecture, Shuttle Evolution consists of current operational
systems (see Figure 3.3.5.1-1). However, specific performance and operational
characteristic enhancements are incorporated, beginning in 2000. Outward
appearance changes for Evolution include the replacement of solid motors with
liquid boosters on the Space Shuttle and an increase in the Titan IV core diameter
from 10 to 14 feet. Specific improvements in each system are described below and in
Table 3.3.6.1-1.
Space Shuttle improvements include ET and Orbiter modifications, replacement of
solid rocket motors (SRM's) with LRB's, crew ejection capability, and operational
flow reductions. Additionally, an unpiloted RCV has been added to the Space
Shuttle fleet. This element is a new vehicle with the Orbiter's outer mold line, a
unique pressurized volume for the avionics, and redistributed subsystems for
center-of-gravity improvements. Its enhanced characteristics allow it to deliver up
to 80 klbs to SSF. The impetus for developing the RCV is that it allows untended
cargo to be delivered to orbit without using a piloted vehicle, and yet makes full use
of the in-place Space Shuttle infrastructure and its fixed-cost base. After evaluation,
a second Shuttle Evolution was defined which used hybrid rocket boosters (HRB's)
instead of LRB's and incorporated a crew escape module (CEM) in the piloted
orbiters. The CEM Orbiters were introduced by replacing the entire existing fleet
with the new design. Old orbiters were converted to unpiloted orbiters rather than
building new RCV's.
Atlas improvements include reductions in processing flow times and modifications
to the Centaur upper stage. These changes reduce prelaunch pad time from 42 to 23
days. Thirty-seven work days with one shift each are reduced to 20 days, also with
one shift. The remaining 5 days are reduced to 3 days by going to 24-hour work days
at the equivalent of 1.75 shifts per day. On the Centaur, two RL-10 engines have
been replaced with a single, higher thrust, RL-10 derivative.
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TABLE 3.3.6.1-1.- SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS IN EVOLUTION ARCHITECTLrRE
SYSTEM ENHANCEMENTS
Space Shuttle
Fleet-wide
Light Weight External Tank
LRB's
SSME Limited to
100%
Single-Launch
I-Loads
After Major Modification
LDO
Advanced Thermal Protection
System
New Vehicles Only
Light Weight
Orbiter
Elcctromechanical
Actuators
Ejection Seats (8)
Reusable Cargo
Vehicle
Arias
Reduced Processing
Time
Single-Engine
Centaur
Titan IV
14-Ft Diameter Core
BRIEF EVOLUTION CONCEPT DESCRIFHON
3000 Lbs Weight Reduction
LOX/RP; 4 Engines per Booster; Engine Out
Each Booster
Increased Engine Reliability and
Operational Life
Reduction in Nominal Payload and
Mission Operations Costs
90-Day On-Orbit Capability to Support
Man-Tended SSF Operations
Reduced Maintenance Items Between
Flights
5000 Reduction in Orbiter Weight Due To
Material Changes
Elimination Of Hydraulic Actuation
System
Four Scats in Upper and Lower Flight
Deck
Orbiter Mold Line with Special
Pressurized Compartment for Avionics
and Redistributed Subsystems for CO
Improvement
Removes Centaur from Critical Flow
Path
Improves Overall Centaur Stage
Reliability; RL-IO Thrust Increased
Provides Increased Lift Capability -
Maintains SRMU'S
The Titan IV evolution concept consists of a 14-ft diameter core, versus the current
I0-ft diameter. It retains the two SRMU strap-ons to provide lift-off thrust. This
concept also includes modifications to the facilities and a reduction in operational
flow times. Performance is increased from 37.7 (28.5 x 160 nmi circular) for Titan W
to 62.1 for Titan Evolution.
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3.3.6.2 Manifesting Philosophy
Payloads were manifested following the same basic principles employed in the
Reference Architecture: Space Shuttle and Shuttle Evolution captured all human-
tended missions, SSF payloads, and return requirements. Untended payloads were
preferentially manifested on ELV's. The major difference between this architecture
and the Reference is the existence of the RCV as part of the Shuttle Evolution
system, which was used for all SSF payloads except crew rotation and SSF "Facility"
payloads. Since RCV's role was limited tO SSF support, it does not appear in the
architecture for "If's" A or B.
3.3.6.3 Manifesting Results
The ELV flights remain constant for all activity levels ("If's"), with Space
Shuttle/Shuttle Evolution increasing from 76 to 396 (Table 3.3.6.3-1). RCV accounts
for 83 Space Shuttle flights in "If" C and 97 in "If's" D through E-High. Annual
flight rates for Space Shuttle/Shuttle Evolution stay below five per year in "If's" A
and B. For "If's" C through E-high, the peak Space Shuttle/Shuttle Evolution flight
rate increases from 13 to 17.
Relative to the Reference Architecture, total ELV flights are unchanged except that
two-thirds to three-fourths of them are now on evolved systems. The Space
Shuttle, however, has considerable changes in its total flights, except in "If" A,
which has the same total as the Reference with two-thirds being on Shuttle
Evolution. Counting Space Shuttle, Shuttle Evolution and RCV flights, there are
eight fewer flights in "If" B, 27 more in "If" C, and seven more in "If" D through "If"
E-High. On the other hand, the number of human-tended flights is reduced by 0, 8,
56, and 90 for "if's" A, B, C and D through E-High, respectively. The decrease in
flights within "If" B relative to the Reference results from increased lift capability of
Shuttle Evolution. However, for "If's" C through E-High, the increase in Space
Shuttle System flights relative to the Reference Architecture is driven by the
manifesting process. The RCV was manifested first, ensuring that its payload bay
was full every time it flew. Orbiter flights were forced to fly four crew exchange
missions per year, splitting no more than a full RCV cargo bay over four Space
Shuttle flights. This utilized about 20 percent of the Orbiter's capacity, on average.
Reversing this strategy, i.e., filling the four Orbiters to capacity on crew exchange
flights and using the RCV only for what remains, could reduce total flights to SSF by
one or two per year.
The alternate Shuttle Evolution Architecture had an increase of nine Space Shuttle
system flights (327 to 338) due to the lower performance of the CEM Orbiter and
Unpiloted Orbiter relative to the Orbiter and RCV for "If" C. Unpiloted flights
remained unchanged at 83; Orbiter flights increased from 97 to 99; and 147 Evolution
Orbiter flights increased to 156 CEM Orbiter flights.
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TABLE 3.3.6.3-1.- EVOLUTION ARCHITECTURE SYSTEM FLIGHT SUMMARY
EAST WEST
SYSTEM TOTAL SUPER
NASA DOD NASA DOD TOTAL
Atlas I 4
Atlas E
Atlas IIAS 5 25
Atlas Evolution 19 39
Delta II 8 33
Delta Evolution 30 78
Titan II
Titan III 1
Titan IV/Centaur 7 17
Titan Evolution/Centaur 35 39
Titan IV/NUS 20
Titan Evolution/NUS 41
Space Shuttle - "If" A 18 8
Shuttle Evolution 29 21
RCV
Space Shuttle - "If" B 55 8
Shuttle Evolution 56 21
RCV
Space Shuttle - "If"C 89 8
Shuttle Evolution 126 21
RC'V 83
Space Shuttle - "If" D 93 8
Shuttle Evolution 126 21
RCV 97
Space Shuttle - "If" E-Low 93 8
Shuttle Evolution 145 21
RCV 97
Space Shuttle .- "If" E-High 93 8
Shuttle Evolution 177 21
RCV 97
4 4
1 1 2 2
30
58 88
6 6 53
4 27 139 192
3 39 42 42
1 1
24
74 98
4 18 42
20 39 100 142
26
50 76
63
77 140
97
147
83 328
101
147
97 345
101
166
97 364
101
198
97 396
Facility and reusable element requirements have been estimated based on the
required flight rates generated by the manifesting process, vehicle processing times,
and facility dwell times. Table 3.3.6.3-2 lists the quantities for each system element
comprising Architecture 2. Each system's flight and facility elements are listed in
the left hand column.
The column labeled "exist" indicates the number of each facility in 1992. Entries in
the "Growth" columns indicate the additional number of elements needed to meet
the required flight rate. "Replacement" entries tell the reader how many reusable
flight elements are required to offset probable losses due to catastrophic failure.
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TABLE 3.3.6.3-2.- FACILITY AND REUSABLE ELEMENT REQUIREMENTS
ARCHITECTURE ELEMENT EXIST GROWTH RE-_LACFMENT
l_ l A R C D E--I" E'HA R C D [E'l" E'H
Shuttle
Orbiter 4
Evolved Orbiter
Reusable Cargo Vehicle
Mobile Launch Platforms 3
Launch Pads 3
Orbiter Processing Facility 2
Vertical Integration Cells 2
Atlas
Booster Processing Facility
Centaur Processing Facility
Hazardous Processing Facility
Launch Pads - East
Delta
Booster Processing Facility
Launch Pads - East
Launch Pads - West
Titan HI/IV
Vertical Integration Building Cells
Solid Motor Assembly Building Cells
Titan Transporter
Launch Pads - East
Launch Pads - West
Titan II/[IS
Vertical Integration Building Cells
Shared with Titan IH/IV
Solid Motor Assembly Building Cells
Shared with Titan II//IV
Titan IIS Transporter
Launch Pads - East
Launch Pads - West
4
5
4
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 4 4 4 5
2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
3.3.6.4 Architecture Evaluation
Overall, the Evolution Architecture scores better than the Reference, except in "If's"
A and B. This is primarily due to the reduction in crew loss events caused by the
introduction of the RCV. In addition, Environmental values for the Evolution
Architecture are significantly reduced since the Space Shuttle SRB's were replaced by
hydrogen and oxygen LRB's.
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The Reference Architecture scored better in "If's" A and B because without SSF
thereis no need for the RCV, hence, no reduction in crew loss events. There is a
reduction in the Environmental Impact values but not enough to overcome the
increase in Funding Profile. In fact, the Reference fairs better across all "IFs" in
Funding Profile, ACR, and LSC. Environmental Impact (the lowest weighted
attribute) is the only attribute where the Evolution Architecture consistently
outscores the Reference.
PMS is higher for the Reference in "If's" C through E-High because Shuttle
Evolution's PMSdecreased due to the addition of LRB's. On the other hand, in
"If's" A and B, the Evolution Architecture faired better because Centaur modifica-
tions for Arias and Titan IV increased their PMS. This, along with Arias and Titan
having a greater percentage of total flights at these activity levels, raised the
Architecture PMS with respect to the Reference.
The Evolution Architecture scores can be improved in two ways: remanifest SSF
payloads so that the Orbiter's payload bay is full during crew exchange missions and
redefine Shuttle Evolution to provide greater crew abort capability or higher PMS.
3.3.6.4.1 Attribute summary
a. Human Safety - Figure 3.3.6.4.1-1 shows the projected number of crew loss
events (to the nearest tenth) by "If" for this architecture and the Reference
Architecture. The probability of crew loss is 0.02235 for the Space Shuttle and
increases to 0.02278 for Shuttle Evolution. These values equate to a crew loss
event every 44 to 45 (44.7) flights for Space Shuttle and 43 to 44 (43.9) for Shuttle
Evolution. Changes in Shuttle Evolution definition to used HRB's instead of
LRB's, and the incorporation of the CEM, decreased crew loss events by 0.7 (4.8
to 4.1) on over 150 flights compared to a 1.9 reduction (6.7 to 4.8) realized by
adding the RCV to the fleet.
ARCH CREW LOSS
EVENTS
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HTS SPACE PROGRAM AC'I]VITY LEVEL (IF'S)
Figure 3.3.6.4.1-1.- Projected crew losses through 2020.
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Even with this higher rate, projected crew loss events are lower for the
Evolution Architecture due to the addition of the untended RCV, which is used
to support SSF. The increase in probability of crew loss events is driven by the
PMS, discussed in the next paragraph, and mitigated by Shuttle Evolution
characteristics with regard to crew survivability. Specifically, these include the
ability to shutdown LRB's during the boost phase and the addition of ejection
seats in the Orbiter, and the addition of RCV to the Space Shuttle vehicle fleet.
The ability to shut down the LRB's and the addition of ejection seats just offset
the increase in mission failures attributed to the LRB's, as can be seen by the
similar crew loss events for "If's" A and B. The reduction in piloted missions
resulting from the addition of RCV is primarily responsible for the reduction in
crew loss events in "If's" C through E-high.
Funding Profile - Projected total architecture cost values and peak year funding
requirements are shown in Figure 3.3.6.4.1-2. Since expendable vehicle flight
rates in this architecture are constant across all "If's", increased cost values are
directly related to ELV and Shuttle Evolution costs and the increase in Space
Shuttle system flights as space program activity increases from "If" A to "If"
E-High. The increase in Total Architecture Cost incurred to implement the
alternate evolution concept is approximately $16B in 1992 dolI_s. This increase
is about equally split between DDT&E and fleet replacement.
Probability of Mission Success - Figure 3.3.6.4.1-3 shows the architecture PMS for
each "If" relative to the Reference Architecture. The absolute value is
somewhat higher than the Reference Architecture for "If's" A through C and is
lower for "if's" D through E-High. Actual PMS values for this architecture
range from 0.9347 ("if" E-High) to 0.9360 ("if" B). This is a function of the
relative number of reference and evolution flights for each system, especially
within the Space Shuttle system (including RCV). The decrease in PMS from
"If" B to "If" E-High is driven by Shuttle Evolution's lower value relative to
Space Shuttle and the constant ELV flight rates across "if's". System PMS
values, flight rates, and contributory portions for each "If" are shown in Table
3.3.6.4.1-1. For the alternate Shuttle Evolution definition, PMS recovers about
half the decrease it experienced between Space Shuttle and Shuttle Evoluation.
Architecture Cost Risk - Values for ACR, and each of its subattributes (technical
challenge, program immaturity, and number of new systems) are shown in
Figure 3.3.6.4.1-4. These values were developed by consensus, using
mathematical processes and scales defined in section 3.2.5. Overall risk
associated with this architecture is low, as there are no new technology or major
operational philosophy changes. The attribute value comes for modifying three
of four systems and operating an automated reusable element. This architecture
ranks second-highest in all "If's", except A and B. This is expected as all new
elements are based on current operational systems. There is an insignificant
difference in ACR between the two architectures featuring different Shuttle
Evolution approaches.
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Figure 3.3.6.4.1-2.- Total architecture cost and peak year funding requirements.
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Figure 3.3.6.4.1-3.- PMS values.
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TABLE 3.3.6.4.1-1.- SYSTEM CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARCHITECTURE PMS VALUE
SYSTEMS Pms
Atlas E
Atlas I
Atlas IIAS
Atlas Evolution
Delta 1I
Delata Evolution
Titan H
Titan IlI
Titan IV/NUS
Titan Evolution
Titan IV/Centaur
Titan IV/Cent EVO
Shuttle
Shuttle Evolution
RCV
Architecture Total
SYSTEMS Pms
IFA IFB IFC
Pms*Hts Pms*Flts Pms*Hts
Hts Total Fits Hts Total Fits Fits Total Fits
0.9326 2 0.002892 2 0.002631 2 0.002082
0.9326 4 0.005784 4 0.005261 4 0.004163
0.9326 30 0.043377 30 0.039461 30 0.031225
0.9326 58 0.083862 58 0.076292 58 0.060369
0.9319 53 0.076575 53 0.069662 53 0.055124
0.9319 139 0.200828 139 0.182700 139 0.144569
0.9626 42 0.062681 42 0.057023 42 0.045122
0.9307 1 0.001443 I 0.001313 1 0.001039
0.9307 42 0.060604 42 0.055133 42 0.043627
0.9519 100 0.147581 100 0.134260 100 0.106239
0.9100 24 0.033860 24 0.030804 24 0.024375
0.9166 74 0.105160 74 0.094979 74 0.075156
0.9431 26 0.038016 63 0.083802 97 0.102099
0.9290 50 0.072016 77 0.100893 147 0.152414
0.9290 ........... 83 0.086057
645 0.9347 709 0.9342 896 0.9337
Atlas E
Atlas I
Atlas IIAS
Atlas Evolution
Delta II
Delta Evolution
Titan II
Titan IlI
Titan IV/NUS
Titan Evolution
Titan IV/Centaur
Titan IV/Cent EVO
Shuttle
Shuttle Evolution
RCV
IF D IF E-LOW IF E-HIGH
Pros*Fits Pms*Fits Pms*Flts
Hts Total Flts Fits Total Flts Fits Total Fits
0.9326 2
0.9326 4
0.9326 30
0.9326 58
0.9319 53
0.9319 139
0.9626 42
0.9307 1
0.9307 42
0.9519 100
0.9100 24
0.9166 74
0.9431 101
0.9290 147
0.9290 97
Architecture Total
0.002041 2 0.001999 2 0.001933
0.004081 4 0.003998 4 0.003866
0.030611 30 0.029987 30 0.028993
0.059180 58 0.057975 58 0.056053
0.054038 53 0.052938 53 0.051182
0.141722 139 0.138836 139 0.134232
0.044233 42 0.043332 42 0.041896
0.001018 1 0.000998 1 0.000964
0.042767 42 0.04 1896 42 0.040507
0.104147 100 0.102026 100 0.098642
0.023895 24 0.023408 24 0.022632
0.074211 74 0.072699 74 0.070288
0.1__04216 101 0.102093 101 0.098708
0.149412 166 0.165288 198 0.190613
0.098592 97 0.096584 97 0.093381
914 0.9342 933 0.9340 965 0.9339
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Figure 3.3.6.4.14.- ACR subattribute values for technical challenge, program
immaturity and number of new systems.
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e. Launch Schedule Confidence - Values for the attribute as a whole, and each
subattribute are shown in Figure 3.3.6.4.1-5. Evolution's increase in LSC values
is attributable to the increase in processing flow margins of the evolved systems
(Atlas, Titan, and Space Shuttle). The increase in margins is primarily the result
of increased system-lift capacity (fewer flights) and reduced processing times.
There is some slight, but insignificant, change in schedule compression due to
processing time and shift changes. Also, the projected number of unscheduled
maintenance actions resulting in launch delays are virtually identical at this
level of system definition. There is very little difference in LSC values
associated with the two definitions for Shuttle Evolution.
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Figure 3.3.6.4.1-5.- Launch schedule confidence subattribute values for schedule
compression, schedule margin, and launch delays.
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f° Environment - The Evolution Architecture has about one-third the impact of
the Reference Architecture, independent of mission activity level (Figure
3.3.6.4.1-6). A key to this reduction is replacement of the Space Shuttle SRB's
with LRB's, although the advantage gained is offset in part due to the increased
size of the Titan IV core stage. This reduction is significant and indicates that
nozzle effluents should be a consideration for future launch system concepts.
The two Shuttle Evolution definitions evaluated exhibited a minimal difference
in Environmental Impact.
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
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Figure 3.3.6.4.1-6.- Environmental impact attribute values.
3.3.6.4.2 Final Scoring.- Ordinal ranking of all architectures by "If" places the
Evolution Architecture between fifth ("IPs" C through E-Low) and ninth ("If" A). In
"If's" B and E-High, this architecture is ranked sixth. Figure 3.3.6.4.2-1 shows the
total weighted architecture score for each "if". To show how unweighted attribute
scores compare to the weighted score, a stacked bar chart has been provided,
delineating each attribute in its natural and weighted proportions (Figure 3.3.6.4.2-2).
Relative to the Reference Architecture, the Evolution Architecture clearly scores
better within "if's" C through E-High, and is equivalent to the Reference for "if's" A
and B. The reduction in crew loss events (about two out of seven) resulting from
the introduction of the RCV is the biggest contributor to score improvement. Other
attributes with improved values include LSC and Environmental Impact. For "If's"
A and B, the improvement in crew loss events, PMS, LSC, and Environmental
Impact were offset by the increases in Funding Profile and ACR.
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Figure 3.3.6.4.2-1.- Total architecture score and ranking.
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Figure 3,3.6.4.2-2.- Attribute score and weighting contributions to final score.
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Figure 3.3.6.4.2-2 shows the impact that the relative attribute ranking has on the
make-up of the architecture score.
Overall, the evaluation of the two distinct Shuttle Evolution concepts with regard to
booster type and crew escape enhancements provided insignificant improvements
in overall architecture scores.
3.3.6.4.3 Analysis of score.- Upon reviewing the architecture scores and their key
contributors, Evolution comes out ahead of the Reference in two attributes: Human
Safety, the highest weighted, and Environmental Impact, the lowest weighted.
Funding Profile and ACR exhibit similar differences, with the Reference scoring
higher. Launch schedule confidence scores are equivalent across all "If's", while
PMS exhibits a reversal from "If" A to E-High. In "If_s" A and B, PMS is significantly
better for the Evolution Architecture, whereas, in "If's" C through E-High,
Evolution and Reference scores are equivalent, with the Reference lower in "If" C
and higher in "If" E-High.
Crew loss events are down because fewer human-tended missions are flown in the
Evolution Architecture relative to the Reference. Almost all of the reduction in
crew loss events can be attributed to introduction of the RCV. If PMS for Shuttle
Evolution could be improved, it would add a great deal to the value of the
Evolution Architecture, since the gains in crew safety due to LRB's and ejection
seats are offset by the decrease in predicted PMS value for the system. This can be
seen by comparing crew loss events in "If's" A and B. This requires further
examination of the definition of Shuttle Evolution.
Environmental Impact scores are vastly improved because the solid motors on the
Space Shuttle are replaced with LOX rocket propellant boosters. Titan Evolution
reduces the potential improvement somewhat, due to its increase in core diameter
and propellant load for improved performance. This increases Titan's
Environmental Impact value by slightly more than 20 percent.
The analysis of two different Shuttle Evolutions indicated that crew losses were
reduced (0.7 events or 41 percen0 but at a substantial ($25 B or 12 percent) increase in
cost. The customer needs to decide whether this should be spent to eliminate one
projected crew loss event.
3.3.6.4.4 Conclusions and recommendations.- Although Shuttle Evolution was
defined in a way that was believed to improve its PMS and Human Safety attributes,
it turned out that its PMS was diminished. Fortunately, its Human Safety
characteristics were enhanced so that it is about equal to that of the existing Space
Shuttle. The underlying reason for the reduction in PMS is replacement of the
SRB's with LRB's. The process for determining PMS uses historically-demonstrated
reliability values for large solid motors, liquid engines, and liquid propulsion stages.
Solid motors have the highest value, liquid engines have the next highest, and
liquid stages have the lowest. By replacing the Space Shuttle solid motors with
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LRB's, the system's PMS is significantly reduced during the initial ascent phases.
Enhanced crew safety was realized because of the ability to shutdown and eject the
LRB's during this same period, as well as the addition of ejection seats. As a result,
the cost of Shuttle Evolution did not produce a net decrease in crew loss events
since the enhanced crew safety features only offset the increased rate of mission
failures.
It is recommended that the definition of Shuttle Evolution be revisited to ensure a
net decrease in crew loss events. This may include retaining the SRB's,
incorporating a frangible crew module in the Orbiter design, using hybrid boosters
instead of liquid boosters, or using single-engine LRB's. The second Shuttle
Evolution definition incorporated a crew escape module with full-ascent capability,
and substituted HRB's for the LRB's. These changes provided very little in overall
architecture evaluation but indicated that the cost is considerably more to reduce
crew loss events by this means, than through the introduction of an unpiloted
orbiter.
Finally, the manifesting philosophy should be revisited with regard to RCV and
Shuttle Evolution for SSF payloads. It will be possible to reduce total Space Shuttle
system flights by one or two RCV's per year simply by filling the Shuttle Orbiter
cargo bay to capacity for crew exchange missions, thereby reducing mission failures
and unreliability costs through the reduction of total flights.
3.3-183
Rev. E
3.3.7 Alternate Access - Architecture_ 1, 3, and 4 Compared
3.3.7.1 Description
As referenced in section 3.2.12, the desirability of Alternate Access was addressed
through a set of comparative architectures, in addition to the attribute that was
dropped at the m/d-point of this study. The set of Architectures 1, 3, and 4 have
been structured to provide this comparison. While there is a clear advantage to
having an Alternate Access to space, it is difficult to quantify these benefits. With
the programmatic decision not to conduct a Monte Carlo (or similar) mission loss
simulation due to the cost and complexity involved, it was realized early-on that a
direct comparison between the existing baseline (Architecture 1) and the "baseline
plus (never used) Alternate Access" would address only the question of: "How
expensive is Alternate Access?" A Monte Carlo simulation could have developed
"probable costs" associated with Space Shuttle downtime and resulting forced
evacuations of SSF due to lack of Alternate Access. Such costs could then have been
used to offset the development costs of new systems. Past experience has indicated
NASA's reluctance to invest money in low-probability-of-usage backup capabilities,
with a preference to rely instead on making the primary system function as it
should.
Consequently, the comparison architectures were prepared from the standpoint of
simultaneously off-loading the Space Shuttle to reduce overall costs. First, in
Architecture 3, up-cargo was off-loaded from the Space Shuttle as much as possible,
using ELVes. In Architecture 4, people are also off-loaded from the Space Shuttle, by
means of an RPC, and a cargo return vehicle (CRV) is provided to facilitate meeting
down-cargo requirements. The specific selection of the Boeing biconic RPC with
minimum cargo capacity, implicitly introduces a "separation of people and cargo"
philosophy, which is treated in detail in Section 3.3.8. In both cases, the Space
Shuttle must remain fully operational in order to provide the reserve, alternate
access means, expensive as a result of high fixed costs with low flight rates, for those
off-loaded capabilities, either people or cargo.
The ACRV remains the emergency return vehicle for the SSF crew in all cases. It
would be rotated to and from SSF by the Space Shuttle under normal circumstances,
for periodic maintenance.
3.3.7.2 Manifesting Philosophy
The three architectures have only the following common elements:
• The Space Shuttle remains operational through 2020.
• The ACRV is the SSF crew emergency return vehicle.
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In Architecture 1:
• The Space Shuttle is improved through p3I, and remains the primary vehicle
for all human-related missions.
• All payloads to and from SSF go on the Space Shuttle.
• The Delta-Atlas-Titan family of ELV's preferentially carry payloads not
requiring human presence.
• No new families of ELV's or personnel/cargo carriers are developed.
In Architecture 3:
• The Space Shuttle continues to carry all personnel and all return-cargo.
• The Space Shuttle handles only those delivery-cargo needs that cannot be
carried on ELV's.
• The NLS-family of ELV's is introduced, replacing Atlas and Titan ELV's one
(5-year) period after the introduction of NLS-3 and -2, respectively.
• A CTV is introduced to transfer cargo from an NLS-element through
rendezvous with a specific orbital target (e.g., SSF).
In Architecture 4:
An RPC (Boeing biconic concept - minimum cargo capability) is introduced
for carrying personnel, and the Space Shuttle is used for personnel
transportation only when the RPC is inadequate or unavailable.
• A CRV is introduced that preferentially handles return cargo.
• NLS and CTV introductions are the same as in Architecture 3.
• The only preferential use for the Space Shuttle is non-SSF, "human-at-
receipt" missions (e.g., servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope).
3.3.7.3 Manifesting Results
Table 3.3.7.3-1, below, summarizes the flight activity for these three architectures for
"If's" C, D, E-Low, and E-High. Owing to the lack of SSF in "IF's" A and B, in terms
of which Alternate Access is defined, there is no relevant difference between the
architectures therein; the only differences are those caused by the phase-out of Atlas
and Titan in favor of the NLS-family.
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TABLE 3.3.7.3-1.- ALTERNATE ACCESS IN SUPPORT OF SSF
IF B (Reference)
Ar_l
Arch 3
Shuttle
(Numbers of Flights of Indicated System)
Total CTV:
(NLS-HL &
NLS-50)
NL.5-HL +
CRV
Total
Additional
Human
Total
Additional
_8hts
Grand Total
(Reference)
148
148
148
152
139
28 84
190
I63
44 85
209
182
44 104
241
214
44 136
717
707
Arch 4 707
IF Cminus B
Arch1
b'li_hts
152
139
136 112
190
163
153 129
2O9
182
153 148
241
214
153 180
Arch 3
Arch4
79
79
152
218
324
869
925
1031
IF D minus B
Arch I 190 907
Arch 3 24683
412
953
Arch 4 83 361 1068
IF E Lo minus B
Arch I 209 926
Arch 3 83 265 972
Arch 4 83 380 1067
IF E Hi minus B
Arch I 241 958
Arch 3 83 297 1004
Arch 4 83 1119
In Table 3.3.7.3-1, the "non-SSF' flight activity represented by "If" B has been
subtracted out for each architecture, leaving only the effects of SSF operations and,
in "If" E, the additional burden of SEI crew transportation. Such subtraction also has
the effect of removing the ELV system configurations which have constant flight
rates in support of unmanned operations. The reader is referred to in Appendix B,
section B.1.2 for the total flight numbers relative to these architectures.
By way of example, Table 3.3.7.3-1 shows that the "If" C configuration of SSF can be
supported by an additional 152 Space Shuttle flights in the Reference Architecture 1;
by an additional 139 Space Shuttle flights and 79 CTV flights in Architecture 3; or
with 28 additional Space Shuttle flights, 84 RPC flights, and 79 CTV flights in
Architecture 4. The RPC's and CTV's are carried on NLS boosters in these
architectures, but could just as easily be carried on appropriately rated Titan or MLS
vehicles. Also, it may be noted that the entire burden of supporting SEI crew
transportation remains on the Space Shuttle in Architecture 3, but is entirely
supported by the RPC in Architecture 4.
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3.3.7.4 Architecture Evaluation
3.3.7.4.1 Attribute summary.- Table 3.3.7.4-1 contains a summary of attribute values
for Architectures 1, 3, and 4, induding the presence of SSF.
TABLE 3.3.7.4-1.- ALTERNATE ACCESS ARCHITECTURE AR_I'RIBUTE
SUMMARY
Human Safet_ F,undin_ Profile($inMillions) PMS ACR LSC Environ. I Ov_¢ll
WT-29% WT=27% WT=I9% WT-13% w'r=8% w'r=4% LArc.hScore
Lomes Score Total$ Value Pk Yr $ Value Score Value Score Score Score Sccce Max 100%
EFS (Ren
Arch I 3.3 0.438 156,459 0.309 6,649 0.998 0.741 0.9361 0.234 1.000 0.656 0.100 55.6
Arch3 3.3 0.438 174,000 0.078 11,192 0.310 0.220 0.9478 0.934 0.721 0.149 0.546 49.0
A.rch 4 3.3 0.438 174,000 0.078 11,192 0.310 0.220 0.9478 0.934 0.721 0.149 0,546 49.0
IF C
Arch I 6.7 0.150 177404 0.679 7,303 1.000 0.929 0.9374 0.304 1.000 0.409 0.283 52.7
Arch 3 6.4 0.225 208,111 0.467 12r115 0.442 0.503 0.9468 0.737 0.746 0.256 0.527 47.9
Aa'ch4 4.4 0.2'25 275,616" 0.000 15,931 0.000 0.000 0.9454 0.673 0.563 0.315 0.442 45.4
EFD
Arch I 7.6 0.104 188,876 0.677 7583 1.000 0.921 0.9376 0.307 1.000 0.3o'I 0.280 50.6
Arc.h 3 7.0 0.229 212,372 0.479 12,575 0.413 0.490 0.9467 0.701 0.750 0.235 0519 46.9
A.rch 4 4.8 0.688 281,078 0.000 16,083 0.000 0.000 0.94,51 0.632 0.570 0.299 0.422 435
_l_ Lo
Arch I 8._J 0.]32 lt_,281 O._U 7,51_t 1.000 0._7 O.9577 0305 1.000 0.327 0.244 b'l.2
Arch 3 7.4 U.248 215,514 0.493 12,575 0.413 0.496 0.94_6 0.682 0,754 0.229 0.481 47.0
Arch 4 4.9 0.717 288,260 0.040 16,083 0.000 0.020 0.9483 0.627 0,573 0.309 0.428 44.8
IF E I-Ii
Arch1 8.7 0.000 192,109 0.646 8,153 0.993 0.867 0.9379 0.314 0.999 0.270 0.171 453
Arch3 8.1 0.113 219,794 0.466 12,575 0.413 0.482 0.9465 0.678 0,754 0.160 0.408 41.9
=
Arch 4 5.0 0.698 291r340 0.000 161058 0.003 0.000 0.9455 0.636 0,569 0.305 0.425 43.8
3.3.7.4.2 Final scoring.- Based on the "Overall Architecture Scores," Architectures 1,
3, and 4 are clustered closely together, roughly in the middle, scorewise, of all of the
architectures evaluated in this study. The maximum spread (7.3 percent of
Architecture 1 over 4 in "If" C) is only a weak discriminator. It is worth noting
however, that Architecture 1 (the baseline) ranks higher in overall score than either
Architecture 3 or 4 in all cases. A cursory examination shows that this is due to the
significantly higher Architecture 1 scores for Funding Profile (no DDT&E since
system already exists) and ACR (lowest risk since it already exists) overriding the
lower scores in the Human Safety and PMS Attributes. Except in "If" E-High, where
it appears to have become overburdened, Architecture 3 always ranks higher than
Architecture 4.
Based on the analyses in the following sections and the intangible benefits derived
from Alternate Access, it would appear that implementation of neither Architecture
3 nor Architecture 4 would be warranted. Based on the manifesting philosophies,
guidelines, and attributes utilized herein, the baseline (Architecture 1), with
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replacement of vehicle lossesand a better crew escape system, is clearly superior to
either of them.
3.3.7.4.3 Analysis of scores and considerations
ao Human Safety - The improvements in Human Safety arise from two sources, as
indicated in the right-hand side of Table 3.3.7.4-2. In Architecture 3, the
relatively modest improvement is due to the reduction in the number of Space
Shuttle flights. This was achieved by eliminating the need to carry cargo via the
Space Shuttle to SSF when there is no associated crew rotation requirement. In
Architecture 4, the additional improvements come from the off-loading of crew
rotations for SSF and SEI to the RPC, vehicle with its integral crew escape system
and more reliable NLS-2 booster.
Putting this in perspective, one may calculate a "Cost per Life Saved" by
assuming a typical crew size of six, multiplying that by the number of crew loss
events avoided by employing Architecture 3 or 4, and dividing the result into
the associated incremental cost. The results range from $7.3 B per life saved
down to $2.8 B in "If" E-High, both associated with Architecture 3. These
calculations are crude, and may be offensive to some. The intent, however, is to
show the extraordinarily poor return on the dollar in the Human Safety area.
Clearly, economical increases in human safety are insufficient justification for
implementation of Architectures 3 or 4. It would be more cost effective to
retrofit the Space Shuttle with a crew escape system that is effective from the
pre-launch, "on-pad" period throughout the launch phase.
b. Funding Profile - To assess the costs attributable to the provision of Alternate
Access, it is appropriate to again subtract "If" B from the other "If's." The results
are shown in Table 3.3.7.4-2. This has the effect of removing NLS-family
DDT&E costs from consideration, as these are incurred in "If's" A and B
regardless of whether alternate access is implemented or not. It should also be
noted that the RPC, CRV, and cargo transfer vehicle (CTV) are not used at all in
"If's" A and B since there is no SSF to support, so their DDT&E costs appear for
the first time in "IF" C. From such subtraction and comparison, it is readily
apparent that the incremental cost of supporting the basic SSF with "cargo-only"
Alternate Access is 1.63 times that of using the Space Shuttle exclusively.
Similarly, the cost of providing Alternate Access for both personnel and cargo,
as implemented in Architecture 4, is 4.85 times that of using the Space Shuttle
alone.
In the same vein, the incremental peak year funding requirements for the above
two cases are 1.41 and 7.25 times greater than with the Space Shuttle, although
the peaks do not necessarily occur in the same year from architecture to
architecture.
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The relevant incremental costs and ratios for the other "If's" are readily
discernible in Table 3.3.7.4-2. The cost increment ratios for each architecture
decrease with increasing flight utilization (i.e., going from "If" C to "If" E-High)
as the lower recurring cost per flight slowly amortizes the investment in
infrastructure and DDT&E that went into creating the new elements. In other
words, it takes a large number of missions for the lower cost per mission "non-
Space Shuttle" systems to show any significant payback of their required
investments. Unfortunately, the flight rates required, even in the "If's" E, are
insufficient to recapture those investments within the time horizon of this
study, much less yield savings.
TABLE 3.3.7.4-2.- ALTERNATE ACCESS COST AND SAFETY
"If" B (ReD
Arch I
Arch 3
Arch 4
Cost Comparisons Safety Comparisons
Total $
Funding Profile ($ in Millions) Safety Savings Lives Saved Cost per
Total Loss Over If Crew Life Saved
Events Arch 1 of 6 M$
156,459
Peak
Ratio Pk Yr $ Ratio
6,649 3.3
11r192 3.3
11,192 3.3
174r000
174,000
"If" C minus B
Arch I 20,945 654 3.4
Arch 3 34,111 1.63 923 1.41 3.1
Arch 4 101,616 4.85 4,739 7.25 1.1
"If" D minus B
0.3 1.8 7,314
2.3 13.8 5,546
Arch I 271417 934 4.3
Arch 3 38,372 1.40 1,383 1.48 3.7 0.6 3.6 3,043
Arch 4 107,078 3.91 4,891 5.24 1_5 2.8 16.8 4,742
"If' E l._w minus B
Arch I 281822 934 4.7
Arch 3 41,514 1.44 1,383 1.48 4.1 0.6 3.6 3,526
Arch 4 1111260 3.86 41891 5.24 1.6 3.1 18.6 4t432
5.4
4.8 0.6 3.6 2,818
4r866 1.7 3.7 22.2 31680
"IF' E High minus B
Arch I
_,_0 1,5_
Arch3 _,_4 1.28 1,3_ 0.92
Arch4 3.29 3.24117,340
Given the intangible nature of benefits from Alternate Access, it is not possible
to compute a Benefit-to-Cost ratio directly. However, the additional costs
involved in supporting SSF in this mode in the customarily constrained NASA
budgetary environment would appear to be an unacceptably high burden.
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C° Probability of Mission Success - In an attempt to quantify the costs of achieving
a greater number of flights with mission success through the implementation of
Alternate Access, Table 3.3.7.4-3 was developed. Unfortunately, Architectures 3
and 4 are not only significantly more expensive and somewhat more reliable
than the reference architecture, but due to the fact that a higher total number of
flights is required to fulfill the SSF and SEI needs, have more lost missions. Put
another way, more money is being spent to lose more missions (but not human
lives - see Safety, above) which is not an inducement for implementation of
either Architecture 3 or 4.
TABLE 3.3.7.4-3.- ALTERNATE ACCESS PMS SUMMARY
IF B (Ref)
Increment $
"IF' C - E Hi Absolute
Total $ over "IF' B PMS
Total #
of Flights
Missions
Not Accomp
Increment in
Missions Not
Acc over B
Cost per
Mission
Saved
,u
Arch I 156,459 0.9361 717 45.8
Arch 3 174,000 0.9478 707 36.9
Arch 4 174,000 0.9478 707 36.9
IFC
Arch 1 177,404 20,945 0.9374 869 54.4 8.6
Arch 3 208,111 34,11I 0.9468 925 49.2 12.3 -3,538
Arch 4 275,616 101,616 0.9454 1031 56.3 19.4 -7,467
IFD
Arch I 183,876 27,417 0.9376 907 56.6 10.8
Arch 3 212,372 38,372 0.9467 953 50.8" 13.9 -3,524
58.6281,078 107,078 0.9451Arch 4
117c340
21.71068
291,340
-7,277
IFELo
Arch 1 185,281 28,822 0.9377 926 57.7 11.9
. . . ,h,
Arch 3 215,514 41,514 0.9466 972 51.9 15.0 -4,060
Arch 4 285,260 111,260 0.9453 1087 59.5 22.6 -7,719
IFEHi
Arch 1 192,109 35,650 0.9379 958 59.5 13.7
Arch 3 219,794 45,794 0.9465 I004 53.7 16.8 -3,238
Arch 4 0.9455 1119 61.0 24.1
-7r851
d° Architecture Cost Risk - The Space Shuttle system was considered to be
programmatically risk-free since it is fully operational. Architecture 3 includes
the NLS development risk as well as that associated with the CTV. Its generally
high scores (upper quartile point) show that it is less programmatically risky
than many other approaches for getting cargo to the SSF. It may be noted that
return cargo from SSF is a significant consideration, and is not off-loaded from
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the Space Shuttle in this architecture. Architecture 4 adds the additional
programmatic risk of developing the RPC and CRV to that already in
Architecture 3. This results in its ranking only slightly above the median point
(0.563 to 0.573 scores). Inherent to the concept of providing Alternate Access is
the development of one or more new systems, which will infallibly increase the
programmatic risk over continued use of a mature system.
Launch Schedule Confidence - Architecture 3 consistently runs at slightly better
than half of the LSC associated with the reference architecture. Architecture 4,
with its heavy dependence upon ELV operations and facilities, initially
compares favorably with the reference architecture, and surpasses it as the flight
rate increases to the maximum in "If" E-High. Although it may appear from a
cursory examination of Table 3.3.7.4-1 that Alternate Access increases the LSC
Attribute when going from "If" B to C, the effect is really due to changes in the
numbers of Space Shuttle flights. In Architecture 1, the number of such flights
more than doubles, causing a decrease in LSC. Conversely, the number of Space
Shuttle flights goes down in Architectures 3 and 4 - and total (mostly ELV)
flights increase by only 31 to 46 percent, resulting in greater LSC.
Environment - Most of the environmental benefit of Architecture 3 over
Architecture 1 comes from the substitution of all-liquid NLS vehicles for the
solid-boosted Titan IV vehicles. The elimination of a few Space Shuttle flights
that were for cargo delivery only provides an additional increment. This is all
irrelevant from the standpoint of Alternate Access.
Architecture 4 is still an improvement over Architecture 1, but suffers due to
the greater total number of vehicles launched. This is a result of changing the
manifesting philosophy, not the provision of Alternate Access, to which it is
irrelevant.
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3.3.8 Separation of People and Cargo - Architecture Options 5, 6 and 7
3.3.8.1 Description of the Considerations
The principal consideration addressed by this group of architectures is whether the
attributes of a transportation architecture improve or worsen by separating people
from cargo for transportation to and from low Earth orbit. In the wake of the
Challenger accident, it was determined that the Space Shuttle should no longer carry
satellite payloads which did not require human presence, to reduce the chance of
another crew loss - that is, to improve safety.
But separating people completely from cargo carries penalties as well. It reduces the
flexibility of a human-tended system to carry out some sortie science and satellite
servicing missions. It mandates cargo transportation without humans to and from SSF,
requiring autonomous rendevous and docking systems and return systems. And it
may impair the utilization of the multiple systems needed through manifesting
inefficiencies.
The NIT devised Architectures 5, 6 and 7 to test these hypotheses by determining the
effect on all the study attributes - but especially on Human Safety, PMS, and Funding
Profile - of separating people from cargo or keeping them together.
The team made a careful distinction between two types of cargo: untended cargo,
which does not require people either during transportation or at its destination (i.e.,
untended scientific satellites); and "People at Destination" cargo, which does not
require people during transportation but does require them at its destination (i.e., SSF
logistics). Untended cargo is not carried with people in any of these architectures.
"People at Destination" cargo is the category being tested; it is carried with people in
some architectures, separated from them in others.
Comparing these three architectures with Architecure 1, the Reference Architecture,
permits a second important consideration to be addressed. Does it pay to replace the
Space Shuttle with a near-term, existing-technology personnel carrier? Architectures 5,
6, and 7 address this by phasing Space Shuttle out soon after 2000.
Both considerations will be addressed in this section.
3.3.8.2 Description of the Architectures
Architecture 5 keeps people and cargo together. The personnel carrier used is the CLV,
a winged vehicle with an internal cargo capacity of 15 000 lbs. This gives the CLV the
capability to accomplish pressurized logistics resupply for SSF, and (with mission kits)
to conduct science sortie and satellite servicing flights as well. The CLV is launched on
the MLS-HL.
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Architecture 6 separatespeople from cargo completely. Its personnel carrier, the
Boeing-developed PLS, a biconic, which is used in many other architectures, can carry
only crew and their "luggage". It is launched on the smaller MLS-50. Cargo is
launched separately in a CRV with a capacity of 40 000 lbs, on an MLS-HL.
Since the PLS has no cargo capability, science sortie and servicing missions must be
carried out differently than in Architecture 5. Sortie missions are accomplished by
rendezvousing and docking the personnel carrier with a separately launched science
payload. Satellite servicing requires that the personnel carrier and the servicing
hardware be separately launched, rendevousing first with each other, then with the
satellite to be serviced.
Architecture 7 launches people and cargo "in tandem" as separate payloads on the
same booster when both have the same destination. Its features are:
• The same people-only PLS is used as in Architecture 6.
The PLS is launched on the MLS-HL, and the excess capacity of that booster is
used to launch cargo on the same launch. The cargo is launched in a Logistics
Return Vehicle (LRV) with a cargo capacity of 15 000 lbs.
• The PLS has full-abort-coverage independent of the cargo.
The logistics return vehicle (LRV) is transported to SSF (or to a satellite requiring
servicing) by the PLS, and returns independently.
These arrangements permit these three architectures to carry out SSF crew transfer,
logistics resupply, science sortie, and satellite servicing missions without the Space
Shuttle. Space Shuttle is phased out early (between 2000 and 2005) in all three
Architectures.
Figure 3.3.8.2-1 shows the systems present in each architecture, their functions, and
their phasing.
3.3.8.3 Manifesting Philosophy
Each architecture had special manifesting ground rules as follows.
For Architectures 5, 6 and 7:
• All human-tended transportation is carried out by the CLV (5) or the PLS (6, 7).
This includes the ACRV function. Therefore, the duration of human-tended flights
to SSF matches the SSF crew rotation period at the time, e.g., 90 days at PMC,
increasing to 180 days after EMCC.
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Figure 3.3.8.2-1.- Architecture systems, functions, and phasing.
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• The Space Shuttle is phased out by 2005.
Architecture 5:
• Cargo delivery to and return from SSF is carried out by CLV to the extent possible
on crew rotation missions (this satisfies the pressurized cargo requirement). The
remaining cargo is carried on the CRV, launched on the MLS-HL.
Architecture 6:
• All cargo to and from SSF is carried on the CRV/MLS-HL.
Architecture 7:
• Cargo to and from SSF is carried by the LRV to the extent possible on crew rotation
missions. The CRV/MLS-HL carries any remaining cargo.
3.3.8.4 Flight Activity
Table 3.3.8.4-1 summarizes the flight activity in these architectures. It exdudes those
flights which are invariant across all architectures: the NASA Mixed Fleet Manifest
(1992-1997), DOD flights, and west coast flights. Architecture 1, the Reference
Architecture, is shown for comparison.
Some of the flights in the table can be ignored in this evaluation, because they do not
carry crew, and are constant across all architectures. They are:
• Atlas and Delta flights (columns 6 and 7 in the table).
• A group of 41 flights comprising the Titan W/Centaur flights (column 8), MLS-X
flights (column 9), and 26 of the MLS-HL flights in column 10.
The rest of the table will be used to compare and explain the differences in architecture
scores.
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TABLE 3.3.8.4-1.-FLIGHT ACTIVITY: ARCHITECTURES 1,5, 6 AND 7
ARCH. Space MLS- MLS- MLS- Atlas Delta Titan MLS- MLS- Total Total
Shuttle HL/ X HL IIAS II W/C X HL Humar All
CLV /RPC RPC Flights
+LRV
_A
1 38
5 9
6 7
7 9
_B
1 _ 0
5 15 115
6 12
7 14
_C
1 219 0
5 _ 195
6 42
7 46
_D
1 _7 0
5 58 225
6 41
7 46
ELo
1 2_ 0
5 58 244
6 41
7 46
EHi
1 308 0
5 58 276
6 41
7 46
31
29
81
159
165
227
166
227
185
19 227
217
51 227
23 35 41 0 0 38 137
23 35 7 8 26 38 137
23 35 7 8 57 38 168
23 35 7 8 26 38 137
n,,
23 35 41 0 0 76 175
23 35 7 8 26 130 229
23 35 7 8 I07 93 273
23 35 7 8 26 173 272
23 35 41 0 0 219 318
23 35 7 8 26 243 342
23 35 7 8 235 207 515
23 35 7 8 153 273 499
23 35 41 0 0 257 356
23 35 7 8 26 283 382
23 35 7 8 295 207 575
23 35 7 8 205 273 551
23 35 41 0 0 276 375
23 35 7 8 26 302 401
23 35 7 8 295 226 594
23 35 7 8 205 292 570
23 35 41 0 0 308 407
23 35 7 8 26 334 433
23 35 7 8 295 258 626
23 35 7 8 205 324 602
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3.3.8.5 Attribute Values and Scores
Table 3.3.8.5-1 summarizes the attribute scores for these Architectures. Note the
following features of the table:
• Weighting percentages used to derive total architecture scores are shown at the top
of the table.
The Funding Profile columns list the scores for its two subattributes: total cost and
peak-year cost. The Funding Profile score is the average of these two, weighted
equally.
• The Human Safety columns list the raw values of the attribute, which are the
number of spacecraft losses over the span of the architecture, as well as the score.
• The PMS columns list the raw value of the attribute, as well as the score.
• Raw or subattribute values are not shown for the other attributes. They are less
significant to the evaluation.
The "Score" in the last column is the total score for the given architecture and "If"
scenario - that is, the average of the individual attribute scores weighted according to
the percent weightings shown at the top of the chart.
These scores will differ significantly if different weights are assigned. For example, if
Funding Profile is given 100 percent weight, Architecture I scores highest.
•i,
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TABLE 3.3.8.5-1.-ATYRIBUTE SCORESFORARCHITECTURES 1, 5, 6 AND 7
ACR Env Funding Profile Human PMS LSC Score
Safety
Wgt: 13% 4% 27% 29% 19% 8% 100%
Total Peak Score Losses Score Value Score
"4
IFA
1 1.000 0.000
5 0.639 0.996
6 0.539 1.000
7 0.562 0.996
IFB
1 1.000 0.100
5 0.622 0.994
6 0.529 1.000
7 0.525 0.993
IFC
1 1.000 0.283
5 0.681 0.992
6 0.674 1.000
7 0.612 0.993
IFD
1 1.000 0.280
5 0.682 0.968
6 0.675 1.000
7 0.613 0.991
IF E LOW
1 1.000 0.244
5 0.685 0.969
6 0.680 1.000
7 0.618 0.991
IF E HIGH
1 0.999 0.171
5 0.679 0.967
6 0.675 0.998
7 0.614 0.989
0.234 1.000 0.679
0.377 0.293 0.341
0.238 0.000 0.082
0.377 0.482 0.455
1.700 0.100
0.900 0.900
0.800 1.000
0.900 0.900
0.932 0.133 0.532 41.02
0.947 0.967 0.254 68.00
0.947 1.000 0.063 61.73
0.947 0.967 0.185 69.53
0.308 0.998 0.740
0.229 0.301 0.300
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.013 0.078 0.052
3.300 0.435
2.400 0.826
2.000 1.000
2.700 0.696
0.933 0.179
0.947 0.967
0.948 1.000
0.948 0.989
0.679 1.000 0.929
0.405 0.338 0.412
0.294 0.189 0.268
0.208 0.191 0.221
6.700 0.150
3.800 0.875
3.300 1.000
4.000 0.825
0.935 0.259
0.948 0.894
0.949 0.926
0.949 0.917
0.678 1.000 0.921
0.338 0.359 0.383
0.246 0.166 0.226
0.178 0.192 0.203
7.600 0.104
4.200 0.813
3.300 1.000
4.000 0.854
0.935 0.265
0.949 0.861
0.949 0.891
0.949 0.883
0.690 1.000 0.927
0.351 0.359 0.388
0.225 0.166 O.239
0.208 0.192 0.218
8.000 0.132
4.300 0.830
3.400 1.000
4.100 0.868
0.935 0.267
0.949 0.843
0.950 0.873
0.949 0.860
0.646 0.933 0.867
0.310 0.359 0.366
0.225 0.166 0.213
0.162 0.192 0.193
8.700 0.000
4.500 0.792
3.600 0.962
4.300 0.830
0.935 0.275
0.949 0.852
0.950 0.877
0.949 0.869
0.656 54.64
0.344 65.24
0.123 59.86
0.022 51.35
0.409 51.76
0.213 68.01
0.131 67.64
0.000 59.24
0.351 49.85
0.162 64.31
0.093 65.55
0.000 58.96
0.327 50.52
0.169 64.70
0.098 65.66
0.000 59.40
0.270 44.47
0.136 62.82
0.082 63.74
0.002 57.75
The two following figures show the total scores graphically. Figure 3.3.8.5-1 shows the
total scores for Architectures 1, 5, 6 and 7. Figure 3.3.8.5-2 shows the total scores for all
Architectures, to illustrate how these Architectures ranked with the others in the study.
Note that only Architecture 8 ranked higher than 5, 6 and 7. Architecture I is in the
middle range of the group.
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Scores of Architectures 1, 5, 6 and 7
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Figure 3.3.8.5-1.- Total scores for Architectures 1, 5, 6 and 7.
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Figure 3.3.8.5-2.- Total scores for all :architectures.
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3.3.8.6 Fin_ngs
This section will describe and explain the significant differences between Architectures
1, 5, 6 and 7 in flight activity and Attribute scores. These findings will be used in the
subsequent sections to analyze the two considerations.
Note from the figures above that the relative rankings of these architectures do not
vary much with increasing flight activity; they are quite stable across the "If" scenarios.
Since no changes of significance appear above "If" C, "If" C is used as an example in
most of the findings.
3.3.8.6.1 Flight activity.- Referring to Table 3.3.8.4-1, and taking Architecture I as the
baseline for comparison, the other architectures show the following significant
differences across the period of the study.
• Architecture 5:
Finding - Human flights increase moderately (from 219 to 243 in "If" C). Total
flights increase by about the same number as human flights.
Rationale - The smaller cargo capacity of the CLV compared to the Space Shuttle
results in more flights being required to conduct science sortie missions. These
Spacelab-type missions are broken into smaller pieces for flight on CLV.
• Architecture 6:
Finding - Human flights decrease slightly (from 219 to 207 in "If" C).
Rationale - In Architecture 1, an occasional extra Space Shuttle flight is required
for SSF logistics. In Architecture 6, logistics flights do not carry crew; only the
minimum number needed for crew rotation are flown to SSF.
Finding - Total flights increase greatly (from 342 to 515 in "If" C).
Rationale - (1) Sortie science missions require two flights each, one of the PLS
and one for the science payload to rendevous with the PLS, (2) satellite servicing
missions also require two flights each, and (3) the PLS crew rotation flights to SSF
carry no cargo; they must be flown in addition to the same number of CRV cargo
flights as are flown by the Space Shuttle in the baseline.
• Architecture 7:
Finding - Human flights increase substantially (from 219 to 273 in "If" C).
Rationale - More sortie science launches are required. The LRV, used to carry the
science payload in tandem with the PLS (on the same booster), has only 15 000 lbs
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grosscapacity compared to Space Shuttle's 40 000 lbs, and has a lower "packaging
efficiency" than the 15 000 lb cargo CLV used in Architecture 5. Four or five more
flights per year are thus needed after 2005.
Finding - Total flights are greatly increased (from 318 to 499 in "If" C).
Rationale - (1) As in Architecture 6, the crew rotation flights to SSF must be
augmented by additional cargo flights. The added flights are not as many as in
Architecture 6 because the crew rotation flights carry some cargo in the LRV, and
(2) there are more human flights, as explained above.
Comparing Architectures 5, 6 and 7:
Table 3.3.8.6-1 contains a summary of flight activity in Architectures 5, 6 and 7
("It" c).
TABLE 3.3.8.6-1.- FLIGHT ACTIVITY: ARCHITECTURES 5, 6 AND 7
Architecture
5
Human Flights
243
6 207 515
7 273 499
Total Flights
342
3.3.8.6.2 Attribute Scores
This section will state and explain the significant differences in attribute scores
between these architectures.
The two most important attributes are Cost (Funding Profile) and Human Safety. The
ACR is closely related to cost, and PMS to Human Safety.
The following two figures show the scores of these architectures in Cost and Human
Safety. These attributes sharply distinguish Architectures 5, 6 and 7 from
Architecture 1.
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Figure 3.3.8.6-1.- Cost scores of Architectures 1, 5, 6 and 7.
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Figure 3.3.8.6-2.- Human safety scores of Architectures 1, 5, 6 and 7.
a. Funding Profile.- The following table shows the actual Funding Profile values for
Architectures 1, 5, 6 and 7 in "If" C. This data is shown because, although the
differences are substantial, the attribute scores shown in Figure 3.3.8.6-1 above
exaggerate them somewhat.
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TABLE 3.3.8.6-2.- ARCHITECTURE COST COMPARISON
Arch 1
Arch 5
Arch 6
Arch 7
Non-
Recur
25.1
28.5
21.0
22.5
UNWRAPPED
Recur Unrer Total Peak
136.8 14.3 176.2 7.3
118.0 9.4 155.9 9.8
138.8 7.8 167.6 10.6
144.6 10.2 177.3 10.5
WRAPPED
Non- Recur. Unrel' Total Peak
Recur
26.3 137.0 14.3
51.0 156.9 9.4
37.3 188.1 7.8
40.1 195.4 10.2
177.6 7.3
217.3 13.1
233.2 14.3
245.7 14.3
Comparing Architectures 5, 6 and 7:
Finding - Architecture 7 has the highest total cost.
Rationale - (1) It has many more human and total flights than Architecture 5, (2) it
has many more human flights than Architecture 6 (these are flown on the heavier
and more costly MLS-HL, compared to Architecture 6's human flights on the MLS-
X), and (3) it has a higher unreliability cost (the cost of replacing vehicles lost in
accidents) than Architecture 6 because of its lower safety score.
Finding - Architecture 5 has the lowest total cost.
Rationale - It has many fewer total flights. This more than compensates for the
higher DDT&E cost of developing the CLV.
Comparing of Architecture 5 with Architecture 1:
Finding - Architecture I total cost is 19 percent lower ($177.6B vs. $217.3B).
Rationale - (1) Architecture I has no DDT&E cost for new systems, (2) it has fewer
total flights, and (3) a larger proportion of its hardware is reusable, lowering
recurring costs. (CLV is reusable, but the MLS-HL is completely expendable
including all engines).
bo Human Safety.- The estimated number of crew loss events, which determines the
Human Safety score, is a function-of-probability of a catastrophic failure during as-
cent (the reciprocal of the PMS attribute), the probability of an unsuccessful abort,
and the number of flights.
Comparing of Architectures 5, 6 and 7:
Finding - Architecture 6 has the best Human Safety score.
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Rationale - (1) Architecture 6 has the fewest human flights, and (2) the PMS score
for the Architecture 6 human booster, the MLS-X, is slightly higher than for the
MLS-HL used in 5 and 7 (the MLS-X has no upper stage).
Finding - The Human Safety scores of Architectures 5, 6 and 7 are not significantly
different. The raw scores are 3.8, 3.3 and 4.0 respectively, well within the error
margin for the study.
Rationale - Architecture 5, 6 and 7 human systems all have engine-out
capability throughout the launch profile. They all have very low probabilities of
unsuccessful abort because they are designed with Launch Escape Systems (LES),
and with the people well separated from the engines.
Comparing of Architectures 5, 6 and 7 with Architecture 1:
Finding - All three of the new architectures have significantly better
safety scores than Architecture 1.
Rationale - (1) The Space Shuttle has a lower PMS (0.935 versus 0.948 for
Architecture 5) because of the gaps in its engine-out capability, and (2) Space
Shuttle has a lower probability of successful abort because it was not designed
with a full LES, and because of the proximity of the SRB's and SSME's to the crew.
3.3.8.7 Conclusions - First Consideration
• Should people and cargo travel together or separately? (Architectures 5 versus 6
versus 7)
Architecture 5 transports people and cargo together (as does the Space Shuttle in
Architecture 1). Architecture 6 separates them completely. Architecture 7
represents a hybrid solution, launching both on a single booster but with
independent abort and return capability, an attempt to evaluate reducing the
number of launches required.
- Summary of Findings
Finding 1 - Flight activity. Architecture 5 has the fewest total flights.
Architecture 6 has the most, but Architecture 7 has almost as many as 6. These
differences are reflected in the total architecure costs.
Finding 2 - Human Safety. Architecture 6 has the highest scores, and 5 is
slightly better than 7. But all score well, and the raw scores are very close.
3.3-204
Rev. E
Finding 3 - Cost. Architecture 5 is best, 6 intermediate, 7 worst. The actual cost
estimates (see Figure 3.3.8.6-1) are within 13 percent.
A possible additional consideration is operational complexity. Architecture 5,
with its cargo capability, can carry out all the missions without rendezvous.
Architectures 6 and 7 each present SSF with two vehicles to berth each trip; 6
requires rendezvous to accomplish a science sortie mission, and 7 requires a
docking maneuver.
The findings suggest that Architecture 7, the hybrid solution, is not the answer.
It scored lower than 5 or 6 overall and in every significant attribute. It is more
expensive and slightly less safe, and it has the most new systems to develop.
Conclusions
Conclusion 1 - If science sortie or satellite servicing missions continue, keeping
people and cargo together is the preferred solution.
Conclusion 2 - The PMS can be significantly improved by booster design
independent of the people-versus-cargo issue.
Conclusion 3 - Human Safety can be significantly improved by full launch
escape capability and separation of the people from the main engines,
independent of the people-versus-cargo issue.
3.3.8.8 Conclusions- Second Consideration
Does it pay to replace the Space Shuttle with a near-term, existing-technology
personnel carrier?
- Summary of Findings
Finding 1 - Architectures 5 and 6 score substantially better than Architecture 1
overall, given the present attribute weights.
Finding 2 - Human Safety. The new architectures score much better than the
baseline. In loss events, Architecture I has a 6.7 score, compared to 3.8 for 5,
and 3.3 for 6 ("If" C) - an improvement by a factor of 2.
Finding 3 - Cost. The baseline has the lowest costs, both total and peak.
A possible additional consideration is environmental impact. The new
architectures score much higher than 1; the Space Shuttle scores poorly because
of its solid boosters. This was not analyzed in detail because of the low weight
given to the Environment attribute.
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- Conclusions
Conclusion I - Replacing the Space Shuttle with a new personnel carrier can
realize major gains in Safety and Environmental Impact.
Conclusion 2 - Replacing the Space Shuttle with a personnel carrier in the near
term has not been shown to be cost-effective.
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3.3.9 Advanced Technology and New Concepts -Architectur_
Options 1, 8, 16, 17, 18, and 19
3.3.9.1 Description
The consideration addressed in this section is whether it is appropriate to introduce
a new human-tended carrier vehicle incorporating advanced technologies. Studies
in the past few decades have investigated such concepts and considerable potential
for improvement has been indicated. Typically, these new designs incorporate new
technology and/or new operational approaches that would result in a significant
improvement over existing systems with regard to some key attribute. Inclusion of
these designs in the I-ITS study was intended to help explore the overall
architectural potential, including the cost impacts of using new concepts.
Consequently, seven architectures were defined for assessment, each employing a
different advanced technology personnel carrier. These carriers spanned a range of
technologies, and developmental and operational philosophies. The criteria for
selecting these seven included: (1) the carrier must be representative of a class of
concepts, and (2) the availability of attribute data for use in this study. The advanced
technology architectures are numbered 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, and 19. The new concept
for Architecture 8 is a SSTO vehicle, operable either with or without a crew, that
includes a plug nozzle and lightweight materials to achieve its performance goals.
A vertical takeoff, horizontal landing two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) concept, the AMLS,
is the centerpiece of Architecture 9. Architecture 10 features an advanced
airbreathing, horizontal takeoff and landing, NDV SSTO. Architecture 16 features a
subsonic, air-launched concept, based on the Rockwell AMSC studies. For
Architecture 17, a personnel capsule, similar in crew size and functionality to the
RPC/launch vehicle system, called the RUPC is included. By using advanced
materials, the RUPC's weight is sufficiently low to permit using a smaller, less
expensive launch vehicle (a HR Titan ]I with 10 strap-on solid motors). A
supersonically staged, fully reusable TSTO system, called the Beta II, is featured in
Architecture 18. Finally, another subsonic ALV concept is used for both personnel
and cargo flights as Architecture 19.
Table 3.3.9.1-1 provides key data about the new vehicles of the architectures; the
reference architecture is inducled. The new technologies involved are shown, along
with the performance and implementation dates. Manifesting results are discussed
in detail below; however, it is relevant to indicate here that the cargo capacity of the
human-tended carrier has significant effect on the flight rates of the cargo vehicles.
The resultant typical flight rates of both the personnel and cargo vehicles are shown
(for mission model "If" C).
3.3-207
Rev. E
Arch.
No,
Demmuwl
Vehide
TABLE 3.3.9.1-1.- KEY CHARACTERISTICS
IOC Maju New Technologies
I Shuttle 981 • none
S SSTO '.0(30 • new enSine (plus nozzle)
• c_mposite tanks, blanket TPS
• lightweight materials
•_htw,ight _a_,t_
9 AMI.S !005 • composite tanks, blanket TPS
• lightweight matertd,
• llghtweisht m_ystema
10 NDV !010 • new e_gine (ah'breathin 8)
• lightweisht materials
• ]ightweisht subsystems
16 AMSC 005 • _'w engine
• _ la'o.n_ _ = 0.7)
17 RUPC !000 • lightweight materials
• liShtweisht ,ub_tema
18 BETA 2005 • Mr launch (M = 5.5)
• new airbreathin 8 en_e
• lightweight materials
19 ALV 000 • air launch (M = 0.8)
• recoverable propulsion rood.
Up' Cargo Capacity
220 nmi it 28.5°
46,000 n_
15,000 Ibm
"If' C typical annual flight rat.
1'_'°'_! I Tiv I ^tl,- J u,lt.
10 9 3 7
36 14 2 2
40,000 Ibm 18 13 2 3
18,0001bm 28 13 2 3
5,O00 Ibm 24 25 3 7
1,000 Ibm 12 36 3 7
18,500 Ibm " 29 13 2 3
lg.4OOlbm 11 22 I 0
The performance capabilities, turnaround times, and development and operational
costs of the advanced technology vehicles are primarily provided by the companies
and agencies which developed the concepts. The PMS, Human Safety, and ACR
Attributes were generated on a relative basis, which took into account differences
between the vehicles in the architectures. However, no assessment or leveling
between concepts has been made of the relative degree of technical conservatism
used in design, in estimation of system weights (including provision for weight
growth and unknowns), and in the estimation of operational characteristics and
costs. In most cases, new concepts either lacked the detailed definition, or were not
to be communicated to the NIT, to ensure complete accuracy when assessing
attributes. As the estimates of any new technology system's capabilities and costs are
the least reliable part of any architecture analysis, conclusions must be considered
only point assessments with a wide range of potential variability. In the course of
this study, limited resources determined the level to which input data could be
normalized, with respect to each other. Thus, direct comparison of, for example, a
rapid turnaround SSTO with an ambitious propellant mass fraction to a RUPC
capsule atop an ELV is difficult. The designs example used for this study are just
that - examples.
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It was not the intent of this architectural analysis to provide an answer to the
question of what the "best" new Concept might be. The issue is whether new
technologies have merit sufficient to warrant their incorporation into potential
architecture options.
3.3.9.2 Manifesting Philosophy
In each of the seven architectures considered here, the Space Shuttle is phased out
and the new concept is phased in to become the sole method of transporting people
up to orbit. The Space Shuttle flights are complete before 2005 in Architectures 8, 17
and 19. Space Shuttle is phased out before 2010 in Architectures 9, 10, 16 and 18. In
all seven cases, the ACRV is used for emergency crew return capability from SSF.
After Space Shuttle phase-out, the ACRV is launched on another vehide.
Cargo-up and-down capability is provided by the new element (although never
exclusively for "up" payloads) in Architectures 8, 9, 10, and 18. In Architectures 16,
17 and 19, cargo down is provided by using an LRV. In all architectures except for 9,
cargo-up capability is provided by the Delta, Atlas, and Titan CTF fleet (except in
Architectures 8, 10, 17 and 19, where this is no need for the Atlas/Delta CTF).
3.3.9.3 Manifesting Results
A summary of the total number of flights by each vehicle type is given in Table
3.3.9.3-1. Note the differences in the percentage of flights that have crews;
architectures that score well (e.g., in Funding Profile) significantly reduce the
number of ELV flights.
The SSTO of Architecture 8 operates both with and without a crew. Table 3.3.9.3-2
summarizes each type of flight for each mission model.
3.3.9.4 Architecture Evaluation
3.3.9.4.1 Attribute summary.- Table 3.3.9.4-1 summarizes the attribute scores for the
reference architecture and the seven advanced technology architectures. The study
consensus attribute weightings are shown at the top of the columns for information.
The architecture score is shown in the last column; a higher score is better than a
lower one. ACR and Funding Profile scores for Architecture 9 are not available due
to lack of cost data for the AMLS.
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TABLE 3.3.9.3-1.- TOTAL FLIGHTS BY VEHICLE TYPE FOR
ARCHITECTURES 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, AND 19
'If' Arch. Shuttle SSTO AMLS NDV AMSC RUPC Beta ALV
8 24
9 38
10 53
A 16 40
17 28
18 39
19 23
8 66
9 82
10 103
B 16 85
17 66
18 76
19 61
8 101
9 144
10 189
C 16 145
17 106
18 142
19 101
8 109
9 163
10 218
D 16 160
17 112
18 151
19 106
8 109
9 164
10 224
EL 16 160
17 112
18 151
19 106
8 109
9 164
10 231
EH 16 160
17 112
18 151
19 106
191
330
678
774
793
825
141
164
245
283
301
333
115
159
253
295
3O8
333
42
285
350
350
367
398
63
158
242
242
261
293
119
,T
192
r .,,
389
484
501
532
With Total %
Crew With
Crew
76 629 12.1
179 629 28.5
168 635 26.4
82 608 13.5
91 659 13.8
158 602 26.2
53 76 698 10.9
257 817 31.4
246 696 35.3
262 736 35.6
370 896 41.3
224 887 25.2
268 714 37.5
551 202 912 22.1
375 1285 29.2
389 903 43.1
442 1000 44.2
495 1314 37.7
348 1363 25.5
531 1046 50.8
801 315 1351 23.3
383 1388 27.6
446 989 45.1
513 1099 46.7
510 1395 36.6
354 1471 24.1
635 1172 54.2
722 320 1443 22.2
402 1407 28.6
465 1008 46.1
532 1118 47.6
527 1412 37.3
373 1490 25.0
652 1189 54.8
741 339 1462 23.2
434 1439 30.2
497 1040 47.7
564 1150 49.0
558 1443 38.7
405 1522 26.6
683 1220 56.0
773 371 1494 24.8
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TABLE 3.3.9.3-2.- SSTO PERSONNEL/CARGO-ONLY FLIGHT SPLIT
If Type Personnel Cargo-only Total
NASA 31 42 73
A DoD 21 70 91
WTR 0 27 27
Total 52 139 191
NASA 170 42 212
B DoD 21 70 91
WTR 0 27 27
re 1J
Total 191 139 330
NASA 253 307 560
C DoD 21 70 91
WTR 0 27 27
Total 274 404 678
NASA 253 403 656
D iDoD 21 70 91
WTR 0 27 27
Total 274 500 774
NASA 272 403 675
EL DoD 21 70 91
WTR 0 27 27
Total 293 500 793
NASA 304 403 707
EH DoD 21 70 91
WTR 0 27 27
Total 325 500 825
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TABLE 3.3.9.4-1.- NEW CONCEPTS/TECHNOLOGY ARCHITECTURES
ATTRIBUTE SCORING
"I f" Arch. ACR Env. FP Safe ty LSC PMS Arch.
13% 4% 27% 29% 8% 19% 100%
1 1.000 0.000 0.703 0.538 0.476 0.538 54.3
8 0.565 0.437 1.000 1.000 0.309 1.000 80.9
9 N/A 0.320 N/A 0.692 0.090 0.747 N/A
10 0.000 0.154 0.391 0.000 1.000 0.000 27.3
A 16 0.850 0.257 0.686 0.769 0.576 0.769 61.1
17 0.617 0.058 0.894 0.769 0.669 0.769 60.0
18 0.136 0.277 0.000 0.308 0.000 0.308 19.2
19 0.437 0.526 0.814 0.646 0.396 0.846 62.1
B
1 1.000 0.100 0.754 0.550 0.428 0.550 57.0
8 0.545 0.567 1.000 0.800 0.290 0.800 79.9
9 N/A 0.481 N/A 0.800 0.145 0.780 N/A
10 0.000 0.305 0.430 0.015 1.000 0.150 34.2
16 0.776 0.407 0.671 0.000 0.279 0.000 46.6
17 0.568 0.000 0.769 0.600 0.651 0.600 50.8
18 0.107 0.391 0.089 0.450 0.000 0.450 27.5
19 0.469 0.408 0.531 0.650 0.424 0.650 47.3
C
D
1 1.000 0.283 0.931 0.172 0.239 0.172 54.3
8 0.478 0.685 1.000 0.862 0.333 0.862 82.6
9 N/A 0.578 N/A 0.759 0.209 0.721 N/A
10 0.000 0.417 0.600 0.000 1.000 0.000 35.6
16 0.683 0.261 0.595 0.207 0.424 0.207 44.6
17 0.657 0.000 0.592 0.621 0.655 0.621 47.7
18 0.060 0.491 0.327 0.172 0.013 0.172 27.2
19 0.605 0.311 0.465 0.621 0.488 0.621 45.6
1 1.000 0.280 0.923 0.293 0.253 0.293 58.3
8 0.491 0.701 1.000 0.878 0.332 0.878 83.4
9 N/A 0.581 N/A 0.732 0.217 0.756 N/A
10 0.000 0.404 0.608 0.000 1.000 0.000 36.8
16 0.690 0.229 0.581 0.366 0.454 0.366 48.0
17 0.665 0.000 0.558 0.707 0.659 0.707 49.5
18 0.056 0.487 0.257 0.195 0.000 0.195 26.5
19 0.628 0.254 0.402 0.732 0.527 0.732 47.1
E low
1 1.000 0.244 0.931 0.311 0.244 0.311 59.1
8 0.501 0.705 1.000 0.889 0.343 0.889 83.5
9 N/A 0.583 N/A 0.756 0.223 0.759 N/A
10 0.014 0.394 0.614 0.067 0.989 0.067 38.9
16 0.695 0.231 0.599 0.422 0.451 0.422 50.2
17 0.670 0.006 0.573 0.711 0.668 0.711 50.1
18 0.072 0.484 0.278 0.267 0.016 0.267 29.3
19 0.636 0.261 0.424 0.756 0.532 0.756 48.4
E high
1 1.000 0.171 0.869 0.200 0.205 0.200 54.3
8 0.498 0.703 1.000 0.867 0.338 0.867 83.1
9 N/A 0.580 N/A 0.733 0.229 0.801 N/A
10 0.000 0.373 0.610 0.000 1.000 0.000 37.2
16 0.693 0.229 0.598 0.378 0.473 0.378 49.6
17 0.668 0.000 0.566 0.667 0.666 0.667 48.9
18 0.048 0.475 0.231 0.222 0.000 0.222 26.5
19 0.632 0.261 0.406 0.689 0.523 0.689 46.2
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3.3.9.4.2 Final scoring.- Figure 3.3.9.4-1 shows the overall scoring of all the
architectures for "If C". Three of the advanced technology architectures score well
(16, 17, and 19), but of them only Architecture 8 (the SSTO) was significantly
improved. Architecture 9 could not be scored at this time as cost data was
unavailable. Architectures 10 and 18 scored poorly, largely due to their respective
low score for ACR.
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Figure 3.3.9.4-1.- Architecture scores, "If" C.
3.3.9.4.3 Analysis of scores and consideration.- Figure 3.3.9.4-2 provides a ready
comparison of the relative scoring of the seven advanced technology architectures
and of the reference architecture (Architecture 1) for mission model "If" C. The
attribute weighting (e.g., safety weighting is 29 percent) is noted on each of the
columns.
a. Human Safety -
(1)
(2)
Observations concerning the scoring include:
All of the advanced technology architectures would enhance human flight
safety,
The current personnel system, the Space Shuttle, is less safe than other
potential personnel carriers,
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b.
(3) The SSTO and the RUPC provide the greatest safety increases. However, the
safety attribute scoring indicates that the greatest increase in safety would be
provided by other architectures (such as CLV or RPC launched by versions
of the MLS), and
(4) It is apparent that Human Safety could be increased, although none of the
advanced technology vehicles assessed may be the best choice. Figure
3.2.3.3-1 shows safety-relevant features for all the human-rated systems,
including the advanced technology launch systems, and offers some insight
as to why different concepts score well.
The RUPC has safety features similar to those of the RPC in that it features a full
launch escape system (not merely ejection seats) and humans are in a separate
unit from the main propulsion engines. However, the booster involved (Titan
II with 10 solid strap on motors) does not have the safety features of the MLS (all
liquid with full shut down capability and engine-out).
Funding Profile - The non-recurring costs of the architectures of interest are
compared in Figure 3.3.9.4-3. The cost elements are the preplanned product
improvement p3I and "other" composed of such items as vehicle development
costs (for new engines, structure, software, ground systems, etc.) and facilities
costs. Note that there is an approximate five-to-one ratio between the highest
and lowest non-recurring cost estimates. The Space Shuttle or the reference
architecture (Architecture 1 has effectively no development costs (they are
sunk), but only p3I costs as shown. Two of the above architectures employ
person-carrying modules launched by expendable boosters. In Architecture 17,
the RUPC is launched by a modified Titan II employing solid, strap-on boosters.
The development cost contributions of these human-carrying vehicle elements
are RPC, $3.01B and RUPC, $1.43B. The remaining advanced technology vehicle
development costs are: SSTO, $2.71B; AMSC, $6.47B; Beta, $15.54B, NDV, $12.5B;
ALV, $3.8B; AMLS cost data was not available.
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Human
Safety (29%)
100
0
Funding
Profile (27%)
100
8 (SSTO)
(AMLS)
17 (RUIn),
19 (ALV)
16 (AMSC)
(Shuttle), 18 (Beta)
10 (NDV) 0
8 (SSTO)
(Shuttle)
L._ 17 (RUPC)
100
PMS
(19%)
0
41-8 (SSTO)
._ 91-9 (AM_)
.,91- _7 CRUPC),
I 19 (ALV)
m
II- 16 (AMSC)
1 (Shuttle), 18 (Beta)
/
-__- lO (NDV)
ACR (13%)
100
1 (Shuttle) 100
16 (AMSC)
8 (SSTO)
18(Beta)
10 (NDV) 0
LSC
(8%)
I lO (NDV)
17 (RUPC)
19 (AI_.V)
16 (AMSC)
8 (SSTO)
1 (Shuttle)
9 (AMLS)
18 (Beta)
Environment
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m
- 4- 8 (_TO)
- 91-- 9 (AMLS)
- q_- 18 (Beta)
- 41-10 (NDV)
_19 (ALV)i 1 (Shuttle)
16 (AMSC)
0 17 (RUPC)
Figure 3.3.9.4-2.- Advanced technology architectures compared by attribute
(shown for "If" C).
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Figure 3.3.9.4-3.- Non-recurring costs compared ("If" C).
The recurring cost per flight of the various vehicles is, of course, a major
contribution to the total architecture cost (through the year 2020). The average
cost- per-flight (for the full time period) for the advanced technology
architectures and two others is shown in Figure 3.3.9.4-4. These costs are related
to a specific operations flow and an operating philosophy that may or may not
be comparable between concepts.
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Figure 3.3.9.4-4.- Average cost per flight of human rated vehicles ("If" C).
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Visibility of the contributions of the non-recurring and recurring costs can
enhance understanding of the total architecture costs. These totals are shown in
Figure 3.3.9.4-5. This figure also shows the effects of other factors on the total
costs; for example, it is evident that the payload capabilities of the AMSC and
RUPC force a large number of flights onto the major cargo vehicle (such as Titan
IV) of the architecture. The Space Shuttle cost contribution is low in
Architectures 8, 17, and 19 because Space Shuttle phase-out begins in 2000, not in
2005 as in Architectures 16 and 18, or 2010 as in Architecture 10. Costs in the
figure that are not included in either the Space Shuttle, new vehicle, or Titan,
are grouped as "other" (this category would include Delta, Atlas, LRV's, etc).
The above costs, along with annual peak funding, contributed to the cost
attribute scores that were shown in Figure 3.3.9.4-2.
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Figure 3.3.9.4-5.- Components of total architecture cost for "If" C.
C* Probability of Mission Success - Architecture 8 (SSTO) scores well above both
the reference architecture and the other advanced technology architectures. The
SSTO has high estimated reliability and flies many of the cargo-only missions.
Conversely, the NDV requires that many missions in Architecture 10 be flown
by the Titan IV (due to the requirement for heavier payloads than the SSTO can
accommodate), which has a relatively low system PMS, so that overall PMS is
reduced. The PMS scores for Architectures 16, 17, 18 and 19 are more strongly
driven by the increases they cause in ELV flight rates than by their own
reliability characteristics.
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Architecture Cost Risk - Intuitively, one might expect any new concept
architecture involving new technology to score poorly in the risk attribute. In
fact, only Architectures 18 (Beta) and 10 (NDV) scored very low. This is
primarily due to the cost- weighted nature of the attribute definition; the high
non-recurring cost of the Beta system resulted in a high risk value. The
Technical Challenge subattribute also worked against the SSTO of Architecture
8, but, in accordance with cost estimates used in this study, it was not weighted
as heavily as the Beta or NDV. Similarly, the Program Immaturity subattribute
penalized the new concept architectures, but the systems with higher estimated
systems cost (such as the Beta and NDV) lost ground relative to the other
architectures as the cost weighting was applied.
The Number of New System's subattributes seems to have little impact except
in the case of Architecture 17, where the number of vehicle types in the
manifest in "Ifs" that do not include SSF are relatively high (the RUPC does not,
in itself, replace the functional requirements for other launch vehicle types in
the architecture).
Environment - While many of the advanced technology architecture vehicles
have relatively little environmental impact, they force additional flights of the
Titan IV (which has SRB's), due to their limitations in payload performance.
The RUPC concept not only requires more Titan-IV flights, but itself employs
solid boosters on the Titan II plus graphite-epoxy motor (GEM) launch vehicle,
which have a negative impact on the environment score.
Overall Findings - With the possible exception of the SSTO, none of the
advanced technology architectures appear to offer significant advantage over the
MLS-boosted architectures (5, 6 and 7) or the Space Shuttle Architecture 1. This
is based on the summation of weighted scorings of attributes as described in the
previous paragraphs. The impact of the human-rated vehicles on the flight
rates of the cargo vehicles in the architectures, and the nature of these cargo
vehicles, seems to have more impact than does the type of human-rated vehicle
itself, except with regards to Human Safety (and even here the safety of the
booster has a large effect). The advanced technologies of the MLS (engine-out,
all liquid, hold down until all engines are lit, new high-reliability engine,
redundant avionics, etc.) have a large favorable impact. The results may
indicate that the best place for new technology may be in the cargo launch
vehicle, which is also used to boost the personnel vehicle. This allows one set
of new technology elements to benefit both personnel and cargo only flights.
Upon further reflection on the attribute scoring that produces a superior
architecture, one finds that perhaps the method of introducing new
architectures used in the study is too limited. After all, many informed people
suspect that some forms of new technology, incorporated appropriately into a
new architecture, should result in some significant improvement in space
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transportation. Why then, has it not? One hypothesis is that the score of new
architectures was adversely affected by introducing new systems in one, large
step which is difficult for the traffic to justify.
The limitation of introducing a new system is that we are faced with a no-win
choice: either (a) introduce a new system as soon as possible with the hope of
reducing operations costs significantly, while exacerbating poor scores in the
Funding Profile, because of peak funding, and ACR attributes, or, Co) delay
introduction, reducing ACR and Peak Funding, but moving the benefits (such as
lower operations and recurring production costs, safety improvements, schedule
confidence, and environment) so far in the future that the total architecture
score (which only runs to 2020) is dominated by the shortcomings of existing
systems. The only way to break out of this paradox is to propose elements with
radically reduced costs, which produces questionable results.
One proposed solution to avoid this dilemma is a phased approach to the
introduction of new technology. This is not necessarily just evolution or p3I
derivatives. Interim elements are used to create the funding wedge, reduce the
risk, prove the technology, etc., to get to the operational system that is desired.
These interim vehicles are developed with the knowledge that their life cycle is
purposefully short, and not the end-all solution. There is historical precedence
for this. One example is the Apollo/Saturn program, where several vehicles
(Gemini, Saturn I, etc.) were developed to provide the program maturity to
build the ultimate vehicle.
Why would this approach improve new architecture scores? Many people are
of the opinion, at the time of this writing, that the total space transportation
budget for the foreseeable future is likely to remain nearly constant. As such, it
is imperative for any new system, indeed critical to the idea of proceeding with a
new system, that the funds for development cannot significantly increase the
space transportation budget. The interim concepts can be described in general
terms as ones which could selectively incorporate features that could
immediately reduce operations costs and/or stretch key technologies beyond the
state of the art, but only if they are in the direction of the ultimate system.
Focusing on other attributes, such as safety improvements, may not be
warranted over the short life of the interim system. One possible scenario is the
use of a recoverable engine module to effect immediate reductions in recurring
production costs and provide for experience in reusable launch vehicle
hardware. By designing this module using existing engines (SSME's) and using
ET derivative tankage, the development cost does not have to be as large as a
completely new vehicle. The savings in operations' costs could be directly
applied to the development bill of the ultimate vehicle (presuming, of course,
that the government would not choose to apply those funds elsewhere).
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New technology has a place in improving space transportation. Within the
traffic levels envisioned by the _ study, however, the expense and risk of an
all-new system is not warranted, given the attributes the NIT has chosen to
evaluate.
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3.3.10 ACRV Commonality Architecture Options 11, 12 and 13
There are two feasible approaches to providing on-orbit Assure/:t Crew Return
Capability (ACRC).
The first utilizes a special-purpose "lifeboat" attached to SSF, designed only to return
the entire SSF crew to Earth in case of a medical or systems problem aboard or a loss
of Space Shuttle return capability. This is the approach planned today for SSF; the
vehicle is the ACRV.
The second utilizes the crew transport vehicle to and from SSF as the 'lifeboat",
leaving it docked to SSF during the crew's stay, available for return on need. This is
the approach taken by the Russians for MIR crews. Itwas also utilized by NASA for
the Skylab program, where the Apollo Command/Service Module remained docked
to the Skylab Workshop throughout the crew stays.
The first approach requires funding the development of the lifeboat, its
transportation to SSF in the Space Shuttle, and its return in the Space Shuttle at the
end of its operational life, if not used. But a simple vehicle with a long quiescent
lifetime is feasible, and life cycle costs are therefore low.
The second approach does not require the development of another personnel
vehicle. But it imposes the requirement on the human transport vehicle used for
SSF crew rotationthat it be capable of on-orbit stays of up to 180 days (the crew
rotation time for the SSF EMCC phase,) with attendant increases in complexity and
cost.
Architectures 11, 12 and 13 were devised to determine which approach resulted in
the best architecture, as measured by the HTS attributes.
3.3.10.1 Description of the Architectures
All three architectures have the following features in common, to permit the
differences in approach to ACRC implementation to dominate the results:
All retain the Space Shuttle for the full duration of the study (through the year
2020). All human missions except for SSF crew rotation are performed with the
Space Shuttle, and all cargo return missions are also performed with Space
Shuttle.
A people-only reusable personnel carrier is utilized for SSF crew rotation
missions as soon as it is available (this varies with architecture). The vehicle
concept used is the Boeing/NASA developed PLS, a biconic - the same vehicle
used in Architectures 6 and 7. It has no cargo capability. It is launched on the
NLS-50 (NLS-2) booster.
3.3-221
Rev. E
All utilize the NLS-50 for some non-SSF,cargo only missions, and for up-cargo
missions to SSFwhere there is no return cargo requirement (NLS cargo missions
require the use of the CTV as the NLS-50's payload).
• All utilize the Delta and Atlas boosters for the same missions as in the reference
architecture (Architecture 1).
• All phase out the Titan IV booster by 2005, in favor of the NLS-50.
Architecture 11 achieves ACRC with the PLS only:
• The PLS is available in the year 2000, and conducts all SSF crew rotation flights
(4 flights per year for 21 years, a total of 84).
There is no dedicated ACRV. The PLS is a long-duration version, capable of
remaining at SSF for full crew cycles of 90 days (during the PMC phase, "If" C) up
to 180 days (during the EMCC phase, "Ifs" D and E).
Architecture 12 phases the PLS in later:
• The PLS becomes operational in 2005, and is used for all SSF crew rotation flights
thereafter (4 flights per year for 16 years, a total of 64).
• An ACRV is developed, and is utilized for SSF emergency crew return until the
PLS is available in 2005. It is then phased out.
• PLS (the long-duration version) is used for SSF emergency crew returns after
2005, just as it is in Architecture 11.
• Space Shuttle is used for SSF crew rotation flights between 2000 and 2005.
Thereafter, it is used as in Architectures 11 and 13.
Architecture 13 utilizes both PLS and ACRV throughout:
PLS is phased-in in 2000 and handles SSF crew rotation flights - 84 flights, the
same as Architecture 11. But it is a short-duration PLS, designed only for
missions up to 7 days, and does not remain at SSF with its crew.
• ACRV is introduced in 2000, and is stationed at SSF thereafter for emergency
crew return.
The systems, functions, and phasing in each architecture are shown in Appendix B,
section B.1.1.
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Thus, these three architectures permit comparison between a dedicated ACRV and a
long-duration PLS ( Architectures 13 versus 11), and between early and late
introduction of the long-duration PLS ( Architectures 11 versus 12).
3.3.10.2 Flight Activity
Table 3.3.10.3-1 summarizes the flight activity in these architectures. It excludes
those flights which are invariant across all architectures: the NASA Mixed Fleet
Manifest (1992-1997), DOD flights, and west coast flights. The reference architecture,
Architecture 1, is shown for comparison.
Since we are addressing an SSF consideration (crew emergency return), "Ifs" A and
B are not relevant. And, since the results in "Ifs" D and E do not differ from those
in "If" C, only "If" C is shown and will be analyzed.
TABLE 3.3.10.2-1.- FLIGHT ACTIVITY, ARCHITECTURES 1, 11, 12 AND 13, "IF" C
Space NLS-50
Shuttle PLS
ARCH.
IFC
1 219
11 198 84
rr12 201 64
13 205 84
Atlas Delta Titan
IIAS 1I W/C
23 35 41
23 35 10
23 35 7
23 35 10
NLS-50
CTV
NLS-50
AUS
Total Total
Human All
Flights
0 0 219
79 31 282
79 34 265
79 31 289
318
460
443
467
The significant differences between architectures are restricted to the number of
Space Shuttle and PLS flights. (A manifesting anomaly resulted in three Titan
flights being manifested on NLS-50 in Architecture 12). These differences will be
explained in the analysis below.
3.3.10.3 Attribute Values and Scores
Table 3.3.10.4-1 summarizes the attribute scores for these architectures for "If" C.
Note the following features of the table:
• Weighting percentages used to derive total architecture scores are shown at the
top of the table.
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The Funding Profile columns list the raw dollar values for the two
subattributes: total cost and peak-year cost. The Funding Profile score is the
average of these two, weighted equally.
• The Human Safety columns list the raw value of the attribute, which is the
number of spacecraft losses over the span of the architecture, as well as the score.
• The PMS columns list the raw value of the attribute as well as the score.
• Raw or subattribute values are not shown for the other attributes. They are less
significant to the evaluation.
The "Score" in the last column is the total score for the given architecture and "If"
scenario - that is, the average of the individual attribute scores weighted according
to the percent weightings shown at the top of the chart. These scores will differ
significantly if different weights are assigned.
TABLE 3.3.10.3-1.- ATTRIBUTE SCORES, ARCHITECTURES 1, 11, 12
AND 13, "IF" C
ACR Env Funding Profile
Wgt: 13% 4% 27%
Score Score
IFC
1 1.000 0.283
11 0.787 0.521
12 0.714 0.519
13 0.709 0.5'03
Human
.... Safety
29%
PMS LSC Score
Total Peak Score Losses Score Value Score
173.0 7303 0.931 4.7 0.172 0.9477 0.431
236.7 14.3 0.228 4.6 0.207 0.9552 0.812
231.9 12.1 0.385 4.6 0.207 0.9553 0.817
240.5 14.4 0.204 4.7 0.172 0.9554 0.822
19% 8% 100%
Score Score
0.239 54.3
0.201 41.2
0.211 45.0
0.207 39.0
3.3.10.4 Findings
This section will describe and explain the differences between architectures in flight
activity and in attribute scores. These findings will be used subsequently to analyze
the consideration.
3.3.10.4.1 Differences in flight activity. - Finding - PLS flights number 84 in
Architectures 11 and 13, but only 64 in Architecture 12.
Rationale - As noted above, PLS is introduced late in Architecture 12; 5 years' crew
rotation flights to SSF are accomplished by Space Shuttle in this architecture.
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Finding - SpaceShuttle Fights decrease from 219 in Architecture 1 only, to 198-201,
and 205 in Architectures 11, 12 and 13 respectively. This reduction is much smaller
than the added number of PLS flights.
Rationale - Some Space Shuttle flights have been replaced by other vehicles
• SSF crew rotation flights are accomplished by PLS.
• Some up-cargo to SSF is accomplished by NLS-50/CTV
But the total number of Space Shuttle flights to SSF can only be modestly reduced
because of SSF's large down-cargo requirements, which can only be accomplished by
Space Shuttle.
Finding - Three more Space Shuttle flights are required in Architecture 12 than in
11, and four more are required in Architecture 13 than in 12.
Rationale - These flights are ACRV rotation flights. The study manifest does not
have any actual "emergency return" ACRV flights. Every 5 years, the ACRV at SSF
is returned in the Space Shuttle for overhaul, and another ACRV is launched.
3.3.10.4.2 Differences in attribute scores.- Finding - There is no significant
difference between Architectures 11, 12 and 13 in the foUwing attributes: ACR,
Environment, Human Safety, PMS, and LSC.
Rationale - All three architectures utilize the same systems (except for the absence
of an ACRV in Architecture 11).
This system commonality accounts for the virtually identical scores in Environ-
ment, PMS, and LSC.
The Human Safety score is dominated by Space Shuttle in all three architectures:
only 0.5 of the 4.6 and 4.7 crew loss events, in Architectures 11 and 13 respectively,
and only 0.3 of the 4.6 in Architecture 12, are due to PLS (which flies PLS 20 times
less).
The absence of an ACRV in Architecture 11 gives it a slightly higher ACR score than
12 and 13 (i.e., a lower risk of cost or schedule overruns), but the difference is not
significant.
Finding - Architecture 12 has a lower total cost than either Architectures 11 or 13
($231.9 B versus Architecture 11 at $ 236.7 B and 13 at $ 240.5 B).
Rationale - Architectures 11 and 13 both have higher costs than 12 because 12 has
the fewest total flights (and all of the difference is in human flights - the number of
cargo only flights is identical in each architecture).
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This is entirely due to the later introduction of PLS in Architecture 12. We noted
above (in section 3.3.10.5.1) that the introduction of PLS adds many more PLS flights
than it reduces Space Shuttle flights, because of the large up and down cargo
requirements of SSF, and PLS's inability to carry cargo. The introduction of PLS 5
years late in Architecture 12 saves 20 PLS flights at the expense of only 3 Space
Shuttle flights.
Finding- Architecture 11 is lower in cost than Architecture 13.
Rationale -The higher cost of Architecture 13 compared to Architecture 11 is based
on two factors:
• Seven additional Space Shuttle flights are required in 13 for ACRV rotation
PLS total costs in both architectures are the same; no additional cost is added for
long-duration PLS capability.
The second factor will be challenged in the analysis below, and a set of rationalized
costs for these architectures will be presented.
3.3.10.5 Analysis of the Consideration
We noted above that the long-duration PLS of Architectures 11 and 12 was assigned
identical costs, both non-recurring and recurring, to the short-duration PLS of
Architecture 13. Architecture 11 and 13 total costs for PLS were identical at $27.4 B;
Architecture 12 cost was somewhat lower at $23.01 B because fewer PLS flights were
manifested.
This is intuitively incorrect. But what cost increment is reasonable for an extended
duration, personnel vehicle?
A quick analysis of this question was conducted during the HTS study (the
conclusion was not available in time to affect the dollar figures used in our
architecture cost model).
Data was examined from the Boeing PLS study, from the CLV study, from the EDO
analyses, and from the preliminary studies of changes necessary for the Russian
Soyuz to certify it for 2 to 3 years on orbit. Changes were necessary in the following
systems:
Propulsion - The Boeing PLS utilized a "180-day retrofit kit" with isolation and
pyro valves and a GN2 purge system, to purge and seal the system for quiescent
on-orbit stay; a cold-gas system was added for stationkeeping and berthing, etc.
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Structure - Changes to external surfaces resistant to degredation by radiation
and atomic oxygen, and meeting micrometeoroid protection requirements, were
needed.
Power - Fuel cells or batteries were favored for short-duration missions. But
long duration required either a change in battery technology, or certified
restartable fuel cells, plus much more efficient cryogenic storage, or solar panels.
Thermal control - Recertification of flash evaporators, water boilers, and
ammonia boilers, or the addition of radiators. Water freezup during passive
stay was a problem; continuous circulation, addition of heaters, or elimination
of the water loop were proposed solutions.
Life support - Many of the above solutions apply. Cryogenic storage of 02 and
N2 are a particular problem; storage as high pressure gas is feasible, but adds
weight.
Other systems - Using one example from the Orbiter, numerous changes were
required to the Hydraulics and Water Spray Boiler subsystem, ranging from
reducing leakage of hydraulic fluid and pressurant gas, to landing gear strut
heaters; all system components required recertification.
Long duration requires technology advances, additonal weight, additional
certification testing, and more extensive overhaul between flights. The estimate
for the total cost of a system designed to meet these requirements might be 10
percent higher than that of a short-duration system of otherwise equivalent
capability.
Using that estimate, the following changes should be made to the total costs of
Architectures 11, 12 and 13:
• To Architecture 11- add $ 2.74 B for long-duration PLS.
To Architecture 12 - add $ 2.30 B for long-duration PLS:
add $177 M to correct for the anomalous
addition of three NLS flights in place of Titan
flights (see 3.3.10.3).
• To Architecture 13 - no additions. PLS is short-duration.
The corrected architecture total costs then become:
Architecture 11- $ 236.7 B + 2.74 B = $ 239.4 B
Architecture 12 - $ 231.9 B + 177 M
+ $2.30 B = $ 234.4 B
$ 240.5 B
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Architecture 13 - These cost revisions force us to restate the last finding in 3.3.10.5.2
as follows:
Finding - There is no significant cost difference between Architectures 11 and 13.
Rationale - The cost increase to ferry the ACRV to and from SSF is offset by the
increased life cycle cost of a long-duration PLS.
3.3.10.6 Conclusions
To the depth of analysis achieved in the HTS, there is no advantage in achieving
ACRC with a dedicated ACRV, as opposed to a long-duration-capable PLS. The two
options scored equally well.
Adding an additional PLS to a transportation architecture which retains the Space
Shuttle adds significant cost. Thus, delaying such augmentation saves cost by
avoiding additional human flights.
More detailed system trade studies are required to determine the true cost of adding
long-duration loiter capability to a PLS, as opposed to achieving return capability
with a dedicated ACRV.
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3.3.11 Which Boo.ster for Human Flight? Architectures4, 5, 6, 7, 14 and 17
3.3.11.1 Description of the Consideration
A variety of boosters were utilized in the HTS architectures to launch human
spacecraft. Both existing boosters (Titan II and Titan IV) and proposed new booster
families (NLS and MLS) were used. This was done in an attempt to determine
whether a best man-rated booster could be identified, and which of its characteristics
contributed most to cost-effectiveness, safety, and PMS.
New concept systems are not included in this consideration. The comparison is
limited to expendable launch vehicles used to transport cargo to orbit, that can
additionally be used to transport one or more of the human spacecraft that were
utilized to test other considerations in the study.
3.3.11.2 Description of the Systems
The spacecraft launched on these ELV's included:
• The PLS, a Boeing/NASA-developed personnel-only spacecraft. It requires a
40 000 lb class booster for transportation to SSF orbit.
The CLV, a scaled-down version of a Space Shuttle-type, winged vehicle
developed at JSC. It requires an 87 000 lb booster to reach SSF.
The RUPC, a Martin concept designed to be launched on the 20 000 lb class
Titan II booster.
The boosters used to launch these spacecraft - the key systems to be compared in this
consideration -were as follows:
• The NLS-50 was used to launch the PLS in Architecture 4.
The MLS-X, a Boeing concept which is a derivative of the NLS-50 optimized for
human launch, was used to launch the PLS in Architecture 6.
The MLS-HL, derived as above but in the 90 000 lb weight class, was used to
launch the CLV in Architecture 5 and the PLS, together with a cargo carrier in
Architecture 7.
• The Titan II was used to launch the RUPC in Architecture 17.
A human-rated version of the Titan IV was used to launch the PLS in
Architecture 14.
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Analysis of this consideration requires the comparison of system data, not
architecture data. Therefore, the architectures will not be described here, and
architecture flight activity and attribute data will not be used. Instead, the pertinent
characteristics of the boosters will be summarized. Booster cost data will be
normalized to equivalent launch rates.
3.3.11.3 Booster Characteristics
Table 3.3.11.3-1 shows the data for each booster which is relevant to its suitability for
launching crewed spacecraft.
TABLE 3.3.11.3-1.- HUMAN-RATED BOOSTER CHARACTERISTICS
Booster Spacecraft & PMS #Flts per Cost/Flight at
Architecture Crew Loss 350 Tot Fits
ii i
Titan II RUPC / 17 .9626 110 $52M
NLS-50 PLS/4 .9842 191 $91M
MLS-X PLS/6 .9842 191 $93M
Titan IV PLS/14 .9474 65 $172M
MLS-HL CLV/5 .9691 141 $177M
PLS/7 141
Note the following about the data presented in this table:
The PMS numbers are for the boosters alone, not for the booster and spacecraft
combination. These figures are discussed in detail in the Systems Description
section of this report.
The number of flights-per-crew loss event calculations utilize the PMS of the
booster and spacecraft combination and the abort characteristics of the spacecraft.
They are not pure booster numbers. They are induded because booster PMS
correlates highly with safety. They are presented as flights-per-loss event to
make them independent of the number of flights in an architecture. Thus, they
fairly represent the relative safety of the boosters.
The cost-per-flight numbers are for the boosters, not the spacecraft, and are
without wraps. They are normalized to 350 flights per year, a typical value in
many architectures. Thus, they represent fair comparisons between the booster
costs. It should be kept in mind that the payload launch capabilities of these
boosters vary widely.
One additional set of cost data is presented below in Table 3.3.11.3-2: typical
recurring costs for each booster.
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TABLE 3.3.11.3-2.- BOOSTERRECURRING COSTS
Booster Architecture
(Tot# Fits)
Recurrin_
Operations
5,336
Production
Costs ($ Millions)
Unreliability
712
Total
Titan II 17 (273) 10,037 16,085
NLS-50 4 (310) 4,819 36,284 909 42,012
Titan 14 (365) 17,230 45,484 3,754 66,468
IV
MLS X 6 (577) 11,296 95,338 2,319 108,953
and HL (272X+305HL)
This table shows the total wrapped recurring costs for each booster in the
architecture noted. The number of flights of that booster in its Architecture is given;
these have not been normalized.
The MLS costs include both the smaller -X and the larger -HL version; costs for each
were not broken out at the architecture level.
The purpose of this table is not to present a strict comparison between boosters, but
to show that the life cycle costs of all are dominated by recurring hardware
production costs.
3.3.11.4 Findings
Finding - The Titan boosters have the lowest PMS and the fewest flights per crew
loss event.
Rationale - These are the only existing boosters in the group. They were not
designed to carry human spacecraft, do not have engine-out capability, and do not
have a success history as good as that projected for the new systems.
Finding - Of the new systems studied, the larger booster (MLS-HL) has a lower PMS
than the smaller ones (MLS-X and NLS-50.)
Rationale - The MLS-HL requires an upper stage, whose failure probability adds to
that of the smaller vehicle. The other two have very similar system architectures,
and thus, identical scores.
Finding - The cost-per-flight of the three new systems are comparable, given their
payload launch weight capabilities.
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Rationale- All use similar technology and configurations. No cost-reducing
breakthroughs (such as recoverable engines) were utilized.
Finding - The total costs of all the boosters compared are dominated by recurring
production costs (see Table 3.3.11.3-2.)
Rationale - Both the existing and the new boosters studied are completely
expendable. The costs for new boosters, espedally engines, for each flight, far
exceeds the operational costs of these launch systems. This situation will continue
unless engine costs can be dramatically reduced, or the engines can be recovered for
reuse.
3.3.11.5 Conclusions
New human-rated boosters can be designed for significant improvements in PMS
and crew safety. Such an approach appears superior to modifying existing boosters.
A new booster should be designed for the spacecraft it is to carry. Excess-lift
capability means higher cost and lower PMS.
Booster technology development should emphasize the development of systems
which minimize recurring cost. Recoverable engines are one such possibility.
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3.4 NEW WAYS OF DOING BUSINESS (NWODB)
The final principal task of the study (Task 4) centered around gathering a set of data
regarding "new ways of doing business", and how those new business approaches
might reduce cost or increase productivity of space transportation systems. To
accomplish this task, the FI_ NIT distributed a survey to various functional and
program managers within the aerospace industry. Based upon responses to the
survey and an assessment of the impact on various stages of systems development
(e.g., Pre-Phase A through Flight Operations), the areas of greatest potential benefit
were identified. A description of received responses to the survey is found in
Appendix F of Volume II.
After gathering and compiling the survey input, the next step was to focus on
identifying the level of difficulty in analyzing and implementing the specific
NWODB suggestions. The intent was to identify any "low-hanging fruit" Which
could be integrated into government operations without much delay. In addition,
several "attack plans" were formulated for the NWODB suggestions deemed to
have the greatest potential benefit.
Most of the information presented below on how the Government could and
should do business differently is not new and has been identified in other activities.
However, specific suggestions were offered as to what steps should be taken to assess
NWODB and how these steps might be implemented with respect to current and
future transportation systems. In this study, no credit was taken for any cost savings
associated with NWODB, since it was felt the probability with which NWODB could
be successfully implemented could not be determined. Moreover, the agency in
general must be extremely cautious in taking any credit in estimates of future
program costs that assume the introduction of new business practices that have not
been demonstrated in NASA.
3.4.1 NWODB Analysis and Implementation Survey
Each NIT representative was asked to identify what they considered the top 10
NWODB options from their perspective and experience. Using these results, the
NIT evaluated the level of difficulty associated with analysis and implementation of
each suggested option.
The following is a short description of the intent of each of the NWODB options
identified.
Minimize the Government Role.- Focus the government role to definition of
the top level requirements of a system or mission, and allow the contractor to do
the technical job (deciding the best or most cost-effective way to get the job done).
Government program offices should be small, should shrink in proportion to
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the contractor work force reductions, and should be focused on verification that
requirements are being satisfied.
Cost Reduction Incentives.- Currently contractors are given incentives to meet
technical and programmatic milestones. Incentives should also be written into
contracts that encourage cost savings through contractor and employee sharing
programs. This encourages innovative approaches to getting the job done by
allowing the contractor to receive greater profits, while reducing the total
government expense.
Provide Program with Adequate Budget.- Provide multiyear funding at
adequate levels to ensure a thorough and efficient effort. Efficiency and
momentum are lost when a program has to rejustify its existence every year
during the government budget cycle. Stretching program lengths generally
increases the total program costs and, therefore, government expenditures.
Inadequate levels of funding usually result in a reduction in the focus of the test
program, which results in greater annual costs downstream, increasing the
overall life cycle costs.
Improve Tactical Planning .- A detailed plan with decision points and
technology insertion junctions would prevent many dead-end programs and
wasted government and contractor expenditures.
Cap Project Growth.- Plan development programs to occur over a 3 to 4 year
period. If this schedule cannot be met, then enabling technologies should be
pursued and demonstrated in the interim. In addition, projects should be
terminated if they significantly overrun their projected costs.
Design for Operations.- It is better to spend extra money up front during
development, than to suffer with a more complex and expensive ground
operations system over the life cycle operation of the system.
Modify Procurement Process.- Streamline and reduce the process of soliciting
and submitting a proposal and reduce the current proposal boilerplate. In
addition, include cost risk as an evaluation parameter to reduce the "low-
bailing" of contractor bids.
Modify Procurement Practices.- This option covers the government decisions on
which programs to solicit proposals for and the type of proposals solicited.
Separate technology development from operational system procurements. Do
not force fixed price contracts on development programs. Avoid abortive
procurements.
NASA Center Coordination.- Establish clear lines of authority and standardize
practices. This would provide for a more efficient and focused civil servant work
effort.
3.4-2
Rev. E
@Communication Enhancements.- Reduce the number of contract data
requirements, and the scope and number of formal reviews through electronic
communication, on-site visits, or co-location of government and contractor
teams.
Improve Management and Engineering Techniques - Utilize concurrent/systems
engineering philosophies early in programs, utilize Total Quality Management/
QFD methodologies throughout the program, and operate using a team
philosophy between the government and the contractor.
Streamline Contracted Research and Development Change Mechanism.- Reduce
the number of people and the amount of time required to make a contract
change.
Focus Program Requirements.- Program requirements should focus on what the
mission to be accomplished is and not on how to get the job done. These should
be specified up front and not modified unless significant cost savings can result.
3.4.2 Survey Results
Once all the inputs were gathered, the team met again to reevaluate the potential
" benefit, analysis difficulty, and implementation difficulty of the above options. The
following three criteria were used to determine how well each suggested option
could be implemented. The results of this assessment are shown in Table 3.4.2.
Potential Benefit
• High - Enables new mission and new system starts in the near term.
• Medium - Results in moderate cost savings to current programs that can be
reinvested (in technologies, personnel, or equipment) over time to make future
programs and systems more cost effective.
• Low - No significant cost savings to current or future programs and systems.
Availabi|i..ty and Access to Data (Analysis Difficulty)
• High - Data readily available with some research.
• Medium - Would require a dedicated NWODB study to quantify the potential
benefit.
• Low - Extremely difficult to find data, probably never be able to quantify.
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Probability of Implementation (Implementation Difficulty.)
• High - Program manager level implementation decision.
• Medium - Within NASA but at higher levels than program manager.
• Low - Outside of NASA, e.g., Act of Congress.
TABLE 3.4.2.- ASSESSMENT OF NWODB OPTIONS
NewWays d Doing
Business OFtions
1 _ximize fl_e GovemmentRole
2 CostReduction Incentives
3 Provide Prog. w/Adequate Budget
4 Improve Tactical Planning
5 Cap ProjectGrowth
6 Design forOperations
7 lVbdify Porcurement Process
8 Ivlodify Procurement Practices
9 NASA Ce nie r Coordina tion
i10 Communication Enhancements
11 ImFrove Mgt/Eng. Techniques
12 Streamline CRADChange lvkch.
13 Focus Program Requirements
Potential
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3.4.3 New Ways of Doing Business (NWODB) Attack Plans
The following outlines describe potential attack plans to address the top five areas
identified as having the greatest potential benefit.
General Considerations
Access to data.- To truly understand the impact of new business approaches, it is
essential to have quantifiable data such that architectures can be rerun with the
projected cost savings. However,
- some things may be difficult or impossible to measure, in which case one
would have to drop back to a qualitative measurement or discussion.
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some analyses may require more effort than can be reasonably expected, given
the finite study schedule and resources. In this case, one would identify the
potential benefit and recommend further analyses in a follow-on effort by the
appropriate agent (e.g., NASA, HTS NIT, OMB, etc.).
some useful data could be lost due to proprietary considerations. These will
be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
3.4.3.1 NWODB Area #1
Limit government role to oversight and verification that requirements are satisfied
and allow contractor to perform assigned role. Reductions in government oversight
should reduce the contractor costs as well as government costs to manage the
contractor (included in the wraps).
Several case studies were recommended for examination in this attack plan. They
included Atlas, Delta Star, and the EDO. The General Dynamics (GDSS) Atlas
launch vehicle program was selected to compare and contrast the impacts of
government oversight on launch costs and schedule, versus similar commercial
launches. Although the data research for this task was not completed during the
study, a good qualitative assessment was made.
Table 3.4.3.1 shows the level of government oversight categories that GDSS products
can be organized into, which ranges from full military to commercial levels of
oversight. In the interest of bounding the problem and reducing the amount of
research, it may be appropriate to look at an MLV II versus a commercial mission
like the payload BS-3H (highlighted in the table). To quantify the differences
between these two extremes, several discriminators were identified for which data
would be gathered. These discriminators are described below
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TABLE 3.4.3.1.- IMPACTS OF VARYING LEVELS OF OVERSIGHT ON SPACE
LAUNCH ACTIVITIES.
O o
@t-
oE
Commercial Rigorous CommercialFull Military Partial Military Government Commercial
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Number of Oversight Organizations.- As the number of organizations involved
in the oversight of a launch increase, the costs incurred by the supplier must also
increase. Commercial missions often have few (sometimes none) additional
organizations interfacing with the supplier, other than the customer. This is a
relatively easy discriminator to measure, but harder to translate into cost
impacts.
Costs.- This is obvious; the greater the oversight, the higher the cost for a
product or service. Again, it is an easy number to find, but would be company
proprietary. However, it can likely be documented in a relative sense (as a ratio
between government and commercial).
Action Items.- Generally, the more oversight, the more work will be generated
for which the supplier must respond. Action items are tracked, but are difficult
to normalize (i.e., which ones are the contribution from the added oversight
versus other factors). For example, interfacing with a foreign customer may
result in actions related to communication items because of the distance and
time differential.
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Engineering Changes.- This may not be a good discriminator for quantifying the
impacts of oversight. It is more likely a reflection of the technical challenge
associated with the job and would, therefore, have to be carefully normalized.
Integration Time.- This may also not be a good discriminator because so many
other factors enter into the equation, such as commonality with a previous
launch, payload availability, launch vehicle modifications, etc. Again, a careful
normalization would be required to determine the impacts of levels of oversight.
• Number and Type of Procedures.- This may not be a good discriminator for
Atlas because the procedures are fairly consistent across the spectrum.
• Amount of Documentation.- This item is fairly easy to measure and translate
into costs.
Level of Empowerment.- This item is hard to quantify andtranslate into costs
but may be interesting to see and compare. However, one could show a chain-of-
authority diagram with key decision makers identified.
Suggested Attack Plan
1. Identify programs that have limited government oversight (e.g., comparison of
commercial vs. government ELV launches).
2. Identify the benefits derived from limited government oversight.
3. Determine how the level of oversight was established or negotiated.
4. Develop justifications to support implementation of reduced oversight (e.g.,
architecture costs with or without limited oversight).
5. Develop methods for implementation of reduced government oversight to
current and future programs.
6. Identify candidate programs for implementation of reductions in government
oversight.
7. Present results and recommendations to NASA and Industry representatives.
Seek feedback, consensus, and commitment to change.
8. Track implementation of reduced government oversight on programs and
document process (i.e., lessons-learned, innovative approaches, road blocks,
etc.).
j ..
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3.4.3.2 NWODB Area #2
Place more emphasis on project accomplishment rather than reporting,
documentation, justification, etc. Reporting allows the government to ensure that
progress is being made towards the desired goal, and allows the results to be
preserved for future reference and to inform a wider distribution of interested
parties. The focus here must be to obtain an optimal mix to increase the efficiency of
taxpayer contributions.
Suggested Attack Plan
I. Identify the standard reporting and documentation requirements for various
programs.
2. Assess the need for each data product in terms of government decision making
and program direction maintenance.
° Identify and analyze other ways to satisfy government needs in lieu of excessive
reporting or documentation (e.g., co-location of government and
contractor program teams, electronic network communications, etc.)
° Recommend reporting and documentation alternatives available to govern-
ment program managers that sufficiently cover needs, without hampering
productivity.
3.4.3.3 NWODB Area #3
Provide multiyear funding. This would be extremely difficult to accomplish.
be much easier to analyze the problem than to define a solution that does not
require divine intervention.
It will
Suggested Attack Plan
1. Select and examine several programs that have been severely impacted by the
lack of multi-year funding (e.g., SSF or NLS).
2. Assess the impacts quantitatively and qualitatively.
° Identify changes in government procurement and contracting policies,
procedures, reguiationS, and/or laws necessary for multiyear funding
commitments. If no changes are required, understand how it is authorized.
4. Recommend and justify the characteristics of programs that should be
authorized for multiyear funding.
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5. Identify programmatic approaches that would reduce the magnitude of the
impacts (e.g., program funding risk assessments and mitigation plans).
3.4.3.4 NWODB Area #4
Institute a rigorous systems engineering approach to definition and development of
projects. Application of a systems engineering approach to any program will entail
philosophical and operational modifications. The systems engineering approach
should be implemented from the very beginning, starting with initial requirements
generation and continuing throughout all phases and levels of a program. This
approach should be utilized by both contractor and government to assure successful
implementation.
Suggested Attack Plan
1. Identify systems and concurrent engineering references.
2. Determine the benefits for application of systems engineering methods to
programs of various sizes and focus.
3. Recommend a functional breakdown for a concurrent engineering team.
3.4.4 Conclusions
@ The HTS NIT consensus (plus others in the aerospace industry) is that there may
be great potential to free up money for new missions and new systems through
implementation of NWODB.
Based upon limited analysis, it is apparent that the availability and access to data
prohibits a full understanding of new business impacts. A separate study or
group of studies is required to quantify the benefits of NWODB options.
Many of the NWODB options are under the direct control of NASA, although
they need the support and authority of upper level NASA management for
implementation.
There is a need to involve the upper management of NASA and industry to
assure the access to data, the commitment to change, and the demonstration of
NWODB viability through implementation into existing programs. Until such
time as new business practices can be demonstrated within NASA, the agency
should be extremely cautious in development and use of future project cost
estimates including NWODB.
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3.5 SENSITIVITY STUDIES
At the completion of the main body of work for the HTS study, there were a series of
questions, sensitivities, or trades which the study team felt were important to
address. These included the sensitivity of the results to differing mission needs,
additional refinements of the methodology used to calculate attributes, and
additional definition of the systems and architectures of the study. This additional
work is described in the following paragraphs.
3.5.1 Needs Model Sensitivity
3.5.1.1 SSF Logistics Return Requirement Reduction
Introduction
This section documents the impact of reducing SSF logistics return mass on the
study architectures and their attribute values. Among the results reported are the
flight rates and the three major contributing attributes of the architecture scores;
Human Safety, Funding Profile, and Probability of Mission Success. Since together
they make up 75 percent of the architecture scores, only these attributes will be
described in the following architecture results.
For the HTS study the return mass is made up of the ISF, Satellite Servicing, Sortie
Science and SSF payloads. Most of this mass is included in the SSF program in the
form of scientific payloads and pressurized and unpressurized logistics payloads. To
assess the effect of reduced SSF return requirements on the architectures, a
sensitivity analysis was performed in which portions of the SSF logistics return
mass were reduced. In addition, all ISF and Sortie Science missions were eliminated
(both delivery and return).
Based on this analysis, several generalized observations were made. Emphasis was
placed on understanding both architecture-dependent and architecture-independent
impacts.
An analysis of the SSF mass return requirements showed that, on average, SSF
scientific payloads make up only 14 percent of the return mass (Figure 3.5.1.1-1).
Eighty-six percent of the return mass is attributed to the logistics payloads; 30 percent
unpressurized and 56 percent pressurized. In performing the sensitivities analysis,
three possibilities were examined:
• Return all mass required in the HTS Mission Model (100 percent return
required),
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• Return only 50 percent of the pressurized and unpressurized logistics payloads
and all SSF scientific payloads (57 percent SSF return required), and
• Return only the scientific payloads (14 percent SSF return required).
In both the 57 percent and 14 percent cases, both the ISF and Science Sortie mission
requirements were excluded as mentioned above.
:._' ' "':_.'.'.. :.:'::._:S:.Y,':_:_.', K._.:_.::::-_:_$-_:::,x:× .:._. ' ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: " _::.x.'.'.'." "....._. +:.:.'
/
0
O0 O! 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
CALENDAR YEAR
Figure 3.5.1.1-1.- SSF return mass distribution.
Ground Rules and Guidelines
The sensitivity analysis conformed strictly to the HTS manifesting and costing
ground rules and assumptions, except for the missions (ISF, Sortie Science and SSF
logistics) that were modified, rearranged, or deleted.
Although return mass was eliminated, the corresponding delivered mass was still
required in the analysis. By doing this, it was assumed that the basic mission
requirements and objectives (with specific mass delivered to orbit at specific time)
must still be satisfied. Also assessed was the possibility of disposing of the logistics
return mass, together with its consequences on the architecture, but not the effect of
additional costs or other requirements on the SSF program itself.
Summary of Results
This section documents the results and observations obtained from the return
reduction sensitivity analyses. In most cases, only the baseline manifesting ground
rules were used, with the different mass return level being the only change. Some
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other sensitivities, such as maximizing manifesting efficiency or substituting other
appropriate vehicles in the architecture, were performed.
The following sections discuss the flight rate impacts followed by architecture
impacts of reducing SSF logistics return mass.
a. Architecture 1 - "If" C.- For this case, reducing the SSF return mass does not
necessarily reduce Space Shuttle flights, since the Space Shuttle must deliver
payloads to the SSF regardless of how much return mass is eliminated. The
cause of the reduced number of flights shown in Figure 3.5.1.1-2 is the
elimination of ISF and Sortie Science missions in the 57 percent and 14 percent
cases. From the architecture standpoint, this saved one crew loss event, cut the
total cost by more than $5 billion, and reduced the number of reflights by more
than five flights (Table 3.5.1.1-1).
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Architecture 1-"If" C
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• Space Shuttle I
100% 57% 14%
SSF Mass Return Percentage
Figure 3.5.1.1-2.- Architecture I - "If" C reduced return requirement
sensitivity flight rates.
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TABLE 3.5.1.1-1.- ARCHITECTU'RE 1 - "IF" C REDUCED RETURN SENSITIVITY
ATTRIBUTE RESULTS
SSF
Return
Case
100%
57%
14%
Flight Rate
Space
Shuttle RI_ CTF/CTV CRV/LRV
300 0 0 0
207 0 0 0
207 0 0 0
Attributes
Safety Peak
(Crew Loss Total Cost Funding
Events) ('92 SB) ('92 SB)
7 97.6 5.28
5 92.1 5.15
5 92.1 5.15
Note: The 57% and 14% cases do not include ISF and Sortie Science Missions.
b.
_,rchitecture 1A - "If" C.- This architecture has two systems flying SSF missions:
the Space Shuttle and the Titan W/CTF. Reducing SSF return mass from
100 percent to 57 percent helps decrease the number of Space Shuttle flights,
while increasing CTF flights, as shown in Figure 3.5.1.1-3. The ISF and Sortie
Science missions deleted in the 57 percent case further contributes to Space
Shuttle flight reduction. The Space Shuttle must continue at least four crew
rotation flights per year to the SSF in all cases, including the 14 percent case,
therefore its usage does not show any significant reduction. On the other hand,
because more SSF logistics payloads which can be off-loaded from Space Shuttle
exist in the 14 percent case, the CTF flight rate is increased.
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Figure 3.5.1.1-3. Architecture 1A - "If" C reduced return requirement sensitivity
flight rates.
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As a sensitivity to Architecture 1A, some of the mission capture groundrules and
assumptions to maximize payload manifesting on the Space Shuttle before a CTF
is utilized were modified. For this case, the Space Shuttle flight rates are
maintained at the levels of the previous case. In addition, the manifest on the
Space Shuttle flights using SSF payloads with no return mass requirements were
optimized. The net effect is to increase Space Shuttle usage, with the few
remaining missions having no return mass able to go on the CTF. This results
in a somewhat lower number of CTF flights in both the 57 percent and 14 percent
cases (Figure 3.5.1.1-4) as compared to Architecture 1A - "If" C.
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Architecture 1A-"If" C
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100% 57% 14%
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Figure 3.5.1.1-4.- Architecture 1A (maximum efficiency) - "If" C reduced return
requirement sensitivity flight rates.
Attribute values of Architecture 1A (with maximummanifesting efficiency) are
shown in Table 3.5.1.1-2. Because more one-way payloads fly on the CTF in the
14 percent case than the 57 percent, the total architecture cost and number of
reflights are slightly higher. However, the improvement in safety may be worth
the extra $1.7B to eliminate one crew loss event.
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TABLE 3.5.1.1-2.- ARCHITECTURE 1A (MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY) - "IF" C
REDUCED RETURN SENSITIVITY ATTRIBUTE RESULTS
SSF
Return
Case
100%
57%
14%
Flight Rate
Space R_PC CTF/CTV CRV/LRV
Shuttle
292 0 78 0
228 0 54 0
220 0 74 0
Attributes
Safety Peak
(Crew Total Cost Funding
Loss ('92 $B) ('92 $B)
Events)
7 106.4 5.4O
6 98.1 5.26
5 99.8 5.31
Note: The 57 percent and 14 percent cases do not include ISF and Sortie Science
Missions.
C. Architecture 3 - "If" C.- The result for this architecture is almost identical to that
of Architecture 1A. Here the Titan W/CTF is replaced by the NLS-HL/CTV,
which has more than twice the Titan IV/CTF performance (101 000 lbs vs.
40 000 Ibs). Therefore, the Space Shuttle flight rate trend is similar, while the
NLS-HL/CTV flights are less than half of the Titan/W/CTF in the previous case
(Figure 3.5.1.1-5).
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Figure 3.5.1.1-5.- Architecture 3 - "If" C reduced return requirement
sensitivity flight rates.
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Similar to Architecture 1A-Maximum Efficiency, Architecture 3 with maximum
efficiency was also analyzed. In this case,the Space Shuttle flight rates are roughly
the same. In addition, the manifest on the Space Shuttle flights with SSF payloads
having no return mass were optimized. The net effect is to maximize Space Shuttle
payload usage with only the few remaining missions having no return mass flying
on the CTV. This results in a somewhat lower CTV flight rate in both the 57 percent
and 14 percent cases (Figure 3.5.1.1-6) as compared to Architecture 3-"If" C.
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SSF Mass Return Percentage
Figure 3.5.1.1-6.- Architecture 3 (maximum efficiency) - "If" C reduced return
requirement sensitivity flight rates.
Similarly, for the architecture attributes, there is a drop in the total cost and number
of reflights when reducing to the 57 percent mass return level. However, again this
slightly increases in the 14 percent case due to additional NLS-HL/CTV flights, as
shown in Table 3.5.1.1-3.
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TABLE 3.5.1.1-3.- ARCHITECTURE 3 (MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY) - "IF" C REDUCED
RETURN SENSITWITY ATTRIBUTE RESULTS
SSF
Return
Case
100%
57%
14%
Fli_ht Rate
Space RPC CTF/CTV CRV/LRV
Shuttle
287 0 79 0
222 0 28 0
218 0 41 0
Attributes
Safety Peak
(Crew Loss Total Cost Funding
Events) ('92 SB) ('92 $B)
7 124.0 9.37
5 117.3 9.49
5 118.6 9.50
Note: The 57 percent and 14 percent cases do not include ISF and Sortie Science
Missions.
d.
.Architecture _ - "If" C.- In Architecture 5, the Space Shuttle is phased out by a
combination of MLS-HL/CLV, MLS-HL/CRV, and MLS-HL/CTF. The CLV can
carry a crew of ten and 15 000 lbs to the SSF.
Figure 3.5.1.1-7 shows the total flight results. As less mass needs to be returned,
the untended CRV is less likely to be required, until there is no need for it in the
14 percent case, as shown in the figure. On the other hand, as more one-way
delivery mass is available, the CTF usage increases. The CLV flights must be
maintained to provide the crew rotation function.
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[] MLS-HL/CTF
• Space Shuttle
Figure 3.5.1.1-7.- Architecture 5 - "If" C reduced return requirement
sensitivity flight rates.
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An attempt was made to maximize payload manifesting, as shown in
Figure 3.5.1.1-8. Becausepayload manifesting was maximized on already existing
CLV flights for crew rotation and CRV flights, there is no need for the CTF in the
57 percent case. Conversely, in the 14percent case,only the CLV and the CTF is
required payload delivery. This result is similar to the result above, with a lower
number of flights due to greater manifesting efficiency. Table 3.5.1.1-4
summarizes the major architecture attributes.
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[] MLS-HL/CTF
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Figure 3.5.1.1-8.- Architecture 5 (maximum efficiency) - "If" C reduced return
requirement sensitivity flight rates.
TABLE 3.5.1.1-4.- ARCHITECTURE 5 (MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY) - "IF" C
REDUCED RETURN SENSITIVITY ATTRIBUTE RESULTS
SSF
Return
Case
100%
57%
14%
Flight Rate
Space
Shuttle CLV CTF/CTV CRV/LRV
108 216 0 89
92 140 0 106
92 145 97 0
Attributes
Safety Peak
(Crew Loss Total Cost Funding
Events) ('92 SB) ('92 SB)
4 142.2 10.1
3 130.1 9.7
3 127.8 9.3
Note: The 57 percent and 14 percent cases do not include ISF and Sortie Science
Missions.
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e. Architectur_ 6 - "If" ¢.- In Architecture 6, the Space Shuttle is phased out by a
combination of MLS-X/PLS, MLS-HL/CRV, and MLS-X/CTF systems. All
payload return is provided on the MLS-HL/CRV. The flight rate results are
shown in Figure 3.5.1.1-9.
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Figure 3.5.1.1-9.- Architecture 6 - "If" C reduced return requirement
sensitivity flight rates.
Because all one-way payloads, including SSF logistics, are launched on the MLS-
X/CTF, which has less capacity, the total number of flights increased in the
14 percent case. The MLS-HL/CRV still is used for returnable payloads,
including SSF scientific, Satellite Servicing and some Base payloads.
The attribute values for this architecture indicate clearly the impact of reducing
the return mass requirements (Table 3.5.1.1-5). As the return mass is reduced,
and as the Space Shuttle is phased out, the PLS must continue flying to provide
crew rotation missions. In addition, both the CTF and CRV flight rates must
increase to carry all the payloads. This also increases the MLS-X and MLS-HL
flights (since they serve as booster stages for both CTF and CRV), thereby
increasing the total cost. Similar results were obtained for Architecture 7 as well.
In this case, both a CRV and an LRV (launched on a larger booster concurrently
with the PLS) are used to replace the Space Shuttle.
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TABLE 3.5.1.1-5.- ARCHITECTURE 6 - "IF" C REDUCED RETURN SENSITIVITY
ATTRIBUTE RESULTS
SSF
Return
Case
100%
57%
14%
Fli[_ht Rate
Space
Shuttle RPC CTF/CTV CRV/LRV
102 186 0 230
87 148 96 146
96 148 137 142
Attributes
Safety Peak
(Crew Loss Total Cost Funding
Events) ('92 $B) ('92 SB)
4 147.3 11.3
3 144.5 11.6
3 149.1 11.6
Note: The 57 percent and 14 percent cases do not include ISF and Sortie Science
Missions.
Generalized Finding8
The following discussion is based mainly on examination of the 57 percent and
14 percent reduction case results. Because the 100 percent case includes the ISF and
Sortie Science missions, it is not directly comparable to the other two cases. Future
analyses should provide consistent requirements across all cases for a more accurate
comparison.
In all cases, the CTV (or CTF) capability made sense only for delivery-only type
missions, i.e., when their return mass requirement is reduced. This is obvious since
that is what it is designed to do. However, merely reducing return mass does not
necessarily improve architecture attributes. In some architectures, the 14 percent
case is better than the 57 percent case (Architecture 1); in others it is not
(Architectures 1A, 3, and 6). The main issue involves knowing how much to
reduce SSF logistics mass required and to balance its usage, given development and
per-flight costs.
On the average, elimination of either half (57 percent case) or nearly all (14 percent
case) of SSF logistics return requirements gives similar flight results for the Space
Shuttle. Both scenarios indicate savings of two SSF logistics flights per year and one
non-SSF logistics flight per year.
With the elimination of SSF logistics return requirements, the combination of the
CTF and CLV systems is adequate to replace the Space Shuttle. In this case, there is
no need for a separate CRV.
By reducing the requirement for return cargo, as in the 14 percent case, the need for
a separate CRV is eliminated in Architecture 5, because of the cargo return capability
of the CLV. However, in Architecture 6, where the PLS has no cargo capability, a
separate CRV is still required.
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3.5.1.2 Flight Rate Smoothing Analysis
A principal study groundrule was that manifesting of each payload would occur in
the year identified by the mission model. However, it might be more efficient to
allow payloads to float into adjoining years if a facility or element limitation
(provided launch window constraints are properly met) was encountered.
To understand this impact, the cost savings that could be achieved, over the baseline
case, by allowing an architecture to fully spread its flight rate requirements across the
study time frame has been examined. This would level facility, equipment, and
reusable element usage. This can be compared to the average flight rate for a system
with the flight-rate-delineated trigger points for each facility, equipment, and
reusable element (i.e., when new purchases are required) that are accounted for in
the cost analysis. The savings are the costs for the triggers that were avoided by
flight rate smoothing when compared with the peak annual flight rate of the given
architecture. Figure 3.5.1.2-1 depicts this analysis process.
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Figure 3.5.1.2-1.- Flight rate smoothing sensitivity methodology.
Architectures 1, 2, 5, and 6 were selected for analysis in "If" Scenario C only. Tables
3.5.1.2-1 through 3.5.1.2-4 present the results of this analysis, respectively. The
results range from a cost savings of $2.2B to $3.0B for architectures whose total costs
range from $131B to $234B. The maximum savings could be 2.3 percent (3.0/131) or
less. Therefore, flight rate smoothing alone was not considered to have a significant
impact upon the total architecture cost. Research into the year in which the
triggered costs were incurred showed that they did not coincide with each other or
with the PYF in the funding profile curve. Therefore, flight rate smoothing alone
was not considered to have a significant impact on the attribute. Thus, this
manifesting groundrule was found to have a non-deleterious impact on the study
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results. However, if a budget-wedge analysis were performed and used as a relative
measure of goodness, the smoothed flight rate savings could have a more signifi-
cant impact. This was not done on this study.
TABLE 3.5.1.2-1.- ARCHITECTURE 1 - "IF" C FLIGHT RATE SMOOTHING
Arch System
1C Space Shuttle-
ETR
1C Delta-ETR
1C Delt-WTR
1C Atlas-ETR
1C Titan IV ETR
1C Titan IV WTR
1C Titan II-WTR
Peak/
Site
12
7
3
3
8
4
2
Trigger Ops Yrs Fits/Site Ave $ Savings
Flt/Yr
Orbiter @ 11 (1) 29 292 10.1 1637
23 127 5.5
23 34 1.5
23 69 3.0
23 135 5.9
SLC @ 4 (1) 23 68 3.0 596
23 31 1.3
2233Savings =
TABLE 3.5.1.2-2.- ARCHITECTURE 2 - "IF" C FLIGHT RATE SMOOTHING
Arch System Peak
/Site
2C Space Shuttle- 12
ETR
2C Space Shuttle 8
Ev-ETR
2C RCV-ETR 5""
2C All Space 13
Shuttle
2C Delta-ETR 7
2C Delta-WTR 3
2C Atlas-ETR 3
2C Atlas Ev. -ETR 3
2C Titan IV-ETR 8
2C TIV Evol-ETR 7
2C Titan IV-WTR 4
2C TIV Evol-WTR 4
2C Titan II-WTR 2
Trigger Ops Yrs Fits/Site Ave $ Savings
Flt/Yr
Orbiter @ 11 (1) 97 8.1 163712
i,
21 147 7.0
21 83 4.0 0
29 327 I1.3
23 127 5.5
23 34 1.5
6 11 1.8
21 58 2.8
5 20 4.0
21 115 5.5
SLC @ 4 (1) 5 9 1.8 596
21 59 2.8
23 31 1.3
Savings = 2233
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TABLE 3.5.1.2-3.- ARCHITECTURE 5 - "IF" C FLIGHT RATE SMOOTHING
Arch System Peak/Site Trigger Ops Yrs Fits/Site Ave $ Savings
Flt/Yr
5C Space 12 Orbiter @ 12 108 9.0 1637
Shuttle-ETR 11 (1)
5C CLV-ETR 13 CLV @ 12.5 21 216 10.3 738
(1)
5C CRV-ETR 7 CRV @ 5 .... 21 89 4.2 68
(1)
5C MLS-ETR 24 21 417 19.9
5C MLS-WTR 3 21 49 2.3
5C Delta-ETR 7 23 127 5.5
5C Delta-WTR 3 23 34 1.5
5C Atlas-ETR 3 23 69 3.0
5C Titan W-ETR 8 5 23 4.6
, ,...,
5C Titan IV- 4 SLC @ 4 (1) 5 9 1.8 596
WTR
5C Titan II-WTR 2 23 31 1.3
Savings= 3039
TABLE 3.5.1.24.- ARCHITECTURE 6 - "IF" C FLIGHT RATE SMOOTHING
"Arch
6C
System
Space Shuttle-
ETR
Peak/Site Trigger Ops Yrs Fits/Site Ave
Flt/Yr
12 Orbiter
@ 11 (1)
12 102 8.5
$ Savings
1637
6C PLS-ETR 16 21 186 8.9
6C CRV-ETR 13 21 230 11.0
6C MLS-ETR 30 21 528 25.1 93CIF @
25.2 (1)
6C MLS-WTR 3 21 49 2.3
6C Delta-ETR 7TT 23 127 5-5
6C Delta-WTR 3 23 34 1.5
6C Atlas'ETR 3 '' 23 69 3.0
6C Titan W-ETR 8 5 23 4.6
6C Titan IV-WTR 4 SLC @ 4 5 9 1.8 596
(1)
6C Titan II-WTR 2 23 31 1.3
Savings= 2326
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3.5.1.3 Comparison of HTS Needs Model With Current FY92
Civil Needs Data Base (CNDB)
The conclusions of the HTS study are based on data derived and modified from the
1990 CNDB. A question arose over whether or not the conclusions of this study
would be changed if the data from the 1992 CNDB was used in place of the data from
the 1990 version. A sensitivity study was performed to address this question by
comparing the transportation requirements identified for SSF in the HTS modified
1990 CNDB and the unmodified 1992 CNDB.
As noted previously, the data from the 1990 CNDB has been adjusted and modified
for use in the Frrs study and, as such, includes some extrapolations and data
smoothing. These modifications have been discussed in other parts of this report.
In the following discussion, all references to the 1990 CNDB refer to the
modified version.
This study compared the transportation requirements, for SSF as documented in the
1990 and 1992 CNDB's. These transportation requirements were identified for the
Base and Expansion phases of the project. The Base phase covers all of the SSF
activities up to and including PMC and extending through four crew operations.
The Expansion phase includes all of those activities needed to establish and
maintain eight crew operations at SSF. Delivered and retrieved cargo masses were
tabulated on both an annual basis and a cumulative basis for the Base and
Expansion phases, as well as for their combined total. This analysis was performed
by extracting all of the SSF payloads from the respective editions of the CNDB, and
then using Excel spreadsheets to manipulate, sort, and plot the data.
Total Annual Delivered Masses
Figure 3.5.1.3-1 compares the total annual delivered mass requirements for SSF
(PMC phase). Data is shown for the 1990 and 1992 CNDB's.
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Figure 3.5.1.3-1.- Total annual delivery mass requirements for SSF (PMC Phase).
There is reasonably good correlation between the two models out through the 2010
time frame, at which time the data from the 1992 CNDB shows a significant
reduction relative to the data from the 1990 CNDB. This can be attributed to
modifications that were performed to the 1990 CNDB to include additional
requirements for logistic support, which were beyond the planning horizon of those
providing the payloads inputs. (It was assumed that a steady-state operation of the
PMC station would not have such a drop-off in the 2010 time frame.) Although
differences exist in these two models prior to 2010, these differences are basically
fluctuations around the values from the 1990 CNDB that can be attributed to
differences in when specific payloads are manifested and to the evolution of the
mass estimates for specific payloads.
Total Annual Return Masses
Figure 3.5.1.3-2 compares the total annual return mass requirements for SSF (PMC
phase) for the 1990 and 1992 CNDB's.
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Figure 3.5.1.3-2.- Total annual return mass requirements for SSF (PMC Phase).
Again, this chart shows reasonably good correlation between the 1990 and 1992
CNDB results. The trend lines are similar although there are some significant
variations from year to year. However, note that the differences generally average
out, i.e., the two curves fluctuate around each other. The only time this is not true
is in the post-2010 time frame and those differences are thought to be attributable to
the smoothing of the 1990 CNDB data described above.
Cumulative Total Delivery Mass
Figure 3.5.1.3-3 compares the cumulative delivered mass requirements. As one
would expect, this curve shows considerably less scatter than the annual delivered
mass charts previously shown. As with the previous charts, there is a good
correlation between the 1992 and 1990 CNDB results, although the cumulative mass
values from the 1992 CNDB are slightly lower than those from the 1990 CNDB. The
two curves show their most significant divergence in the post-2010 time frame. It is
significant to note the similarity of the slopes of the two curves in the pre-2010 time
frame. The differences between these two curves can largely be explained by
postulating a time shift of roughly 12 to 18 months between the two traffic models.
This suggests that the 1992 CNDB can be viewed as a slightly delayed version of the
1990 CNDB. This is consistent with the schedule changes that have occurred in the
SSF program subsequent to the development of the 1990 CNDB. Thus, the 1992
CNDB does not represent a change in the mass delivery requirements for SSF,
instead it is just a slight adjustment to the schedule for the delivery of that mass.
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Figure 3.5.1.3-3.- Cumulative delivery mass to SSF (PMC Phase).
(_umulative Total Return Mas_
Figure 3.5.1.3-4 compares the cumulative retrieved mass requirements. Notice the
very high degree of correlation between the two curves. There are only slight
differences between these two curves until the 2010 time frame, and after that time
the differences remain small.
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Figure 3.5.1.3-4.- Cumulative return mass to SSF (PMC Phase).
Maximum Annual Mass Transport Requirements
Table 3.5.1.3-1 compares the maximum delivered and return masses for the 1990 and
1992 CNDB's for the various SSF operational phases. The purpose of this is to
quantify when the peak transport requirements occur, and to identify their
magnitude.
TABLE 3.5.1.3-1.- MAXIMUM ANNUAL MASS TRANSPORT
REQUIREMENTS FOR SSF
CNDB Model
Delivered Payioacts
1990
1992
Return Payload.s
1990
1992
Max Annual Mass (lbs) Year
291,941
262,847
178,700
213,836
2000
2002
2O05
2010
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Notice that the peak delivered payload transportation requirement for the 1992
CNDB occurs roughly 2 years after the peak for the 1990 CNDB. This is consistent
with the notion that the dominant difference between the two CNDB's is that the
1992 CNDB is time-shifted relative to the 1990 CNDB, due to stretch outs in the SSF
program that occurred after the 1990 CNDB was formulated. Although there are
differences between the maximum annual delivered masses between these two
models, those differences are relatively small and are not thought to be significant.
The 1992 CNDB has its maximum annual return mass requirements occurring at a
later time than shown in the 1990 CNDB. Again this can be attributed to a stretch
out of the SSF program. However, it is significant to note that the 1992 CNDB has
larger return mass requirements than the 1990 CNDB, although the absolute value
of these differences is relatively small.
Conclusions
This study has shown that although there are some differences between the SSF
transportation requirements identified in the 1990 and 1992 CNDB's, these
differences are relatively small and do not alter the conclusions of this study.
The annual differences in mass delivery and return requirements reflect the normal
adjustments in payload manifesting as missions are planned and flown. This is not
expected to alter the conclusions of this study because, in general, slightly higher
manifesting rates in any given year are compensated for in other years by
correspondingly smaller rates. This conclusion is enhanced by reviewing the
cumulative mass delivery and retrieval rates. It becomes obvious that the data in
the 1992 CNDB can be viewed as a time-shifted version of the data from the 1990
CNDB. That is to say, the total mass transport requirements have not changed, only
the schedule for delivering those masses has been shifted by 12 to 18 months to
accommodate on-going changes in the overall schedule of the SSF program.
Likewise, there are no significant differences in maximum delivery or retrieval
rates. The changes in other payload requirements were not examined, since SSF
comprises two-thirds of all transportation requirements, and is, by far, the largest
driver to an architecture's required flight rates. None of the factors investigated
gives any reason to alter any of the conclusions of this study.
3.5.2 Attribute Model Refinements
3.5.2.1 Safety Model Refinement
The current method for estimating the number of crew loss events has a qualitative
step whereby a judgment is made on the failure distribution across six primary
causes of flight emergency: explosion, fire, loss of control, damaged vehicle,
hazardous environment, or benign.
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This process, developed by Boeing Defense and SpaceGroup, allocates mission
failures to specific causes,and then assessesimmediate crew survival and abort
probabilities. Values for each were developed by Boeing through an expert opinion
process based on system configuration and ascent flight phase. To define this model,
effort was focused on failure allocation and replacing expert opinion with historical
failure types and relative occurrence by stage. The data base used to define these
relative failure rates was the same as that used to develop engine and stage
probability of success values for the PMS attribute. As part of this tool enhancement
process, a more rigorous error checking on the original values was performed and
the impact of discovered discrepancies was noted. Findings due to a new failure
allocation process were shown relative to the original and updated (due to process
errors) Human Safety values.
Two other options for enhancing Human Safety were considered and rejected due to
time and budget constraints. One option required a geometric definition sufficient
to develop metrics for crew module location relative to propellant tanks, solid
boosters, engine position, explosive yields, and crew escape methods. This was
rejected primarily due to the lack of, restricted, or dynamic state of, system design
data for new concepts (AMLS, AMSC, NLS, SSTO-VTOHL, NDV). The other option
called for extending the PMS success trees along the mission failure branches by
adding failure types, probable rate of failures, and an uncertainty band. Cumber-
some documentation and the fact that the selected approach provides similar
insight and product were reasons for excluding this option.
Failure scenarios were devised for each of the six failure types defined during the
original study (see Figure 3.5.2.1-1). The trigger event shown is the failure type, the
protective event (against crew loss) is the inherent system design which precludes
immediate loss of life, while the mitigating event is the system's abort capability.
Estimated crew survival rates in each mission phase is the sum of PMS and the
product of mission failure rate (1-PMS), probability of immediate survival (Ps), and
probability of successful abort (Pa). Failure at either the protective or mitigating
event results in crew loss. Virtual scenarios (a spreadsheet of failure allocations,
probability of immediate survival, and probability of abort) were created for all
ascent phases of each piloted system.
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Figure 3.5.2.1-1.-Failure scenario description for crew loss events.
A new approach to quantifying the frequency of each failure type was employed as
an enhancement to the original expert opinion approach. Using the same data base
that established the probability of success for liquid engines, solid motors, and
propulsion systems, previous failures were categorized by type and their relative
frequency was noted by stage (Table 3.5.2.1-1).
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TABLE 3.5.2.1-1.- HISTORICAL LIQUID ROCKET FAILURE DATA
Published Cause
Of Failure
First
Stage
(%)
Explosion
Second
Stage
(%)
Third
Stage
(%)
All
Stages
(%)
Control 18.92 20.00 0.00 15.19
Electrical 13.51 8.00 11.76 11.39
21.62 4.00 0.00 11.39
Fuel
Frozen Valve
Guidance
8.11 16.00 5.88 10.13
0.00 0.00 17.65 3.80
8.11 4.00 11.76 7.59
2.70 12.00Hydraulics
I_nition
0.00 5.06
0.00
Lubrication 2.70
24.32
0.00
16.00 17.65 8.86
0.00 0.00 1.27
12.00 35.29 22.78
0.00 2.53
Propulsion
Separation
Totals
8.00
r i_1 i
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
In order to retain the defined process for determining crew loss event rates, it was
necessary to map the failure types from Table 3.5.2.1-1 into the previously defined
categories: fire, explosion, loss of control, damage to vehicle, crew environment,
and benign. Control and explosion are the only categories that map directly from
history to the previously defined list. The balance of historical failures tend to be
immediately benign to the crew. However, propulsion and separation failures were
mapped into two different categories (propulsion - fire or benign; separation -
damage to vehicle or benign), creating a range for probability of crew loss. In
addition, for those systems with solid motors, their historical failure rate was added
to the percentage of explosions, reducing the benign failure rate. Figure 3.5.2.1-2
illustrates this mapping process.
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Figure 3.5.2.1-2.- Mapping of historical failure types into previously
defined categories.
Findings
Relative failure rates shown in Table 3.5.2.1-2 were allocated at the stage level, using
the following guidelines: first stage rates were applied to any and all stages or
engines that ignited at ground level; second stage rates were applied to any and all
stages that ignited at altitude, except for the circularization stage; and third stage
values were assigned to the circularization stage only. The last column is shown for
information purposes only.
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TABLE 3.5.2.1-2.- COMPARISON OF CREW LOSS EVENT RATES
System Was Corrected New-Low New-High
AMSC 0.008340 0.008337 0.009264 0.006979
Beta II 0.006240 0.010528 0.009818 0.006105
MLS-HL/CLV 0.006410 0.007080 0.007793 0.006467
MLS-X/RPC 0.005430 0.005228 0.004994 0.003676
NLS-2/RPC 0.005420 0.005225 0.004990 0.003671
TITAN IIS/RUPC 0.010330 0.009065 0.009266 0.007706
HR Titan IV 0.012370 0.010528 0.011975 0.010101
Space Shuttle 0.022350 0.022350 0.023228 0.017550
Shuttle Evo 0.022780 0.017792 0.022338 0.017626
SSTO-VTOHL 0.007020 0.007024 0.012650 0.006005
While applying this process to the piloted systems, differences were found in 7 of 10
systems addressed (MLS-HL/CLV is identical to MLS-HL/LRV/RPC and is
documented as a single system), and it was found that the range in crew loss
frequency can be very large, depending on the severity of propulsion problems and
frequency of separation problems. However, the two methods do provide similar
values in terms of flights between crew loss events (Tables 3.5.2.1-2 and 3.5.2.1-3 and
Figure 3.5.2.1-3), i.e., the corrected values are within or near the range predicted
using historical failures and their relative occurrence.
TABLE 3.5.2.1-3.- MEAN NUMBER OF FLIGHTS BETWEEN
CREW LOSS EVENTS
System Was Corrected New-Low New-High
AMSC 119.9 120.0 107.9 143.3
Beta II 160.3 95.0 101.9 163.8
MLS-HL/CLV 156.0 141.3 128.3 154.6
MLS-X/RPC 184.2 191.3 200.2 272.1
NLS-2/RPC 184.5 191.4 200.4 272.4
Titan IIS/RUPC 96.8 110.3 107.9 129.8
HR Titan IV 80_8 r. 94.9 83.5 99.0
Space Shuttle 44.7 44.7 43.1 57.0
Shuttle EVO 43.9 56.2 44.8 56.7
SSTO-VTOHL 142.5 142.4 79.0 164.9
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Figure 3.5.2.1-3.- Projected flights between crew loss events.
The new range of crew loss events per system and architecture, by "If", are compared
against the original values in Table 3.5.2.1-4. This new process shows the
uncertainty in crew loss events and relative architecture goodness.
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TABLE 3.5.2.1-4.- CREW LOSS EVENTS COMPARISON
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The following table (Table 3.5.2.1-5) summarizes mathematical errors discovered in
the original process during this task. These corrections are the basis for the
differences between the "Was" and "Should Have Been" values for probability of
death (Pd) and mean flights between crew loss events.
TABLE 3.5.2.1-5.- CORRECTIONS TO PREVIOUS HUMAN SAFETY PROCESS
System
Beta II
MLS-Hl/CLV
MLS-X/RPC
NLS-2/RPC
Shuttle
Evolution
Titan II/RUI_C
HR Titan
IVIRPC
Phase Failure
2 Benign
3 Explosion
9 Benign
6 Benign
8 Beni_
6 Benign
8 Benign
3 Benign
9 Benign
1 Explosion
Correction
Changed 85 To 80 So Total Failures Total 100 Rather Than
105.
Pd Changed To 0.00004 (Product Of 1"0.08" 0.05), It Was 0.05.
Change 89 To 88 So Failures Total 100 Rather Than 101
Chan[_ed 89 To 88 So Failures Total 100 Rather Than 101
Changed 89 To 88 So Failures Total 100 Rather Than 101
Changed 89 To 88 So Failures Total 100 Rather Than 101
Changed 89 To 88 So Failures Total 100 Rather Than 101
Changed 29 To 55 So Failures Total 100 Rather Than 74
Changed 89 To 88 So Failures Total 100 Rather Than 101
Changed Pd From () To 0.038 To Reflect Product Of Failures,
Ps And Pd.
Benign Changed 89 To 88 So Benign Failures Total 100 Rather Than
101
Discovered math errors did not have a major impact on architecture ranking within
the Human Safety attribute except for Architecture 18 (Beta 1I). The corrected error
reduced flights between crew loss events from 160.3 to 95.0, which translated into an
architecture ranking change from 8 or 9 to 15 for "If's" C through E-High. In "If" A,
Architecture 18 was already ranked fifteenth of 15 and in "If" B, its rank dropped
from fifth to fifteenth.
Using historical data to allocate failures into the six categories identified in the
original process provides a band of uncertainty for Human Safety. This band is due
to the allocation of propulsion failures to either the fire or benign categories and the
allocation of separation failures to either the loss of control or benign categories. In
general, the corrected system values fall within the band created under the new
method of failure allocation, except for MLS-X/RPC and NLS-2/RPC, where the new
minimum is 200 flights between crew loss events versus the corrected value of 191.
The various band widths of each system cause considerable changes in architecture
rankings when comparing cases using the maximum or minimum flights between
crew loss events. Scrutiny of the HTS Human Safety calculation process should be
continued, and should focus on determining the probability of survival and
probability of abort to ensure consistent treatment across all systems with similar
configurations and mission phases.
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3.5.2.2 Probability of Mission Success Attribute Model Refinement
During the study extension period, two changes were made to the PMS model.
These are detailed below.
Launch Pad Hold-Down
A function was added to the PMS model to account for the effects of launch pad
hold-down on vehicle reliability. A review of historical launch data and a
presentation on launch vehicle failure probabilities 2 indicated that over 50 percent
of propulsion system failures develop within 5 seconds after engine start. The HTS
study team decided that the ascent failure rate of liquid engines started on the pad
should be reduced by half if a vehicle had a hold-down period (to determine engine
health) prior to lift-off. The following is an example of how the equations were
modified:
Phase 1 - SSME ignition and thrust buildup
Rpl = AR 1/8 * RS11/4 * (RL3) 1/4
Example Modification:
Phase I - SSME ignition and thrust buildup
Rpl = AR 1/8 * SQRT(RS11/4 * (RL3) 1/4)
Note: for probability of success numbers greater than or equal to .91, the square root
of reliability is mathematically equivalent to reducing the unreliability by half. This
simplified approach was used to develop these equations.
OMS Engine Redundancy
In developing the PMS value for each system in the HTS architectures, all liquid
engines and liquid stages, from first stage through orbit circularization, were treated
identically and assumed to have the same reliabilities. This produced a lower PMS
value than would be expected due to redundancy inherent in the orbit
circuiarization stage of piloted vehicles. For example, first- and second-stage liquid
propulsion systems have single-string propellant lines and valves between the tank
and engines. However, the Space Shuttle OMS system consists of two separate pods,
with cross feed capability from the left pod to the right engine, and vice versa. Also,
each propellant line has redundant valves between the tank and engine. This
provides redundancy in the propulsion stage that had not been accounted for in the
current process. In addition, there are generally-dual OMS engines, each capable of
performing the circularization process independently.
Because the stage reliability number is based on a single flow path between tanks
and engines, it was decided to incorporate OMS redundancy into the PMS model.
Probability of success equations were developed for each system that reflect this
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configuration and all of the possible success paths for functioning of the orbit
circularization engines. These equations were then added to the model.
System Results
Table 3.5.2.2-1 contains the PMS values for the launch vehicles used in this study.
Additional columns show the results of accounting for hold-down and OMS engine
redundancy refinements.
TABLE 3.5.2.2-1.- PMS VALUES
Original I With With OMS and
Vehicle Study Results I Hold down Hold down
0.9770AMSC
Atlas IIAS
Atlas EVOL
Beta II
Delta
MLS-X (CTV)
MLS-X (RPC)
MLS-X (non SSF)
MLS-HL (NUS)
MLS-HL (CTV)
MLS-HL (RPC/LRV, CLV)
0.9577
0.9326
0.9369
0.9652
0.9319
0.9455
0.9544
0.9842
0.9691
0.9499
0.9543
0.9528
0.9618
0.9919
0.9767
0.9573
0.9617
0.9572
0.9618
0.9595
0.9617
NLS-20
NLS-50 (CTV)
NLS-50 (RPC)
NLS-50 (NUS)
NLS-50 (AUS)
NLS-HL (CTV)
NLS-HL (CRV)
RCV
SSTO
Space Shuttle
Shuttle Evolution
Titan II
Titan III
HR Titan II
Titan IV (Centaur)
Titan IV (NUS)
HR Titan W (RPC)
Titan IV (CTF/LRV)
Titan Evolution
Titan Evolution/Centaur
0.9435
0.9455
0.9544
0.9842
0.9455
0.9308
0.9309
0.9290
0.9691
0.9431
0.9290
0.9626
0.9474
0.9323
0.9100
0.9474
0.9189
0.9242
0.9519
0.9186
0.9519
0.9528
0.96i8
0.9919
0.9528
0.9380
0.9381
0.9394
0.9768
0.9537
0.9394
0.9417
0.9426
0.9519
0.9572
0.9618
0.9423
0.9762
0.9584
0.9768
0.9730
0.9584
0.9562
0.9426
0.9307
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In looking at the original study results, the NLS and MLS vehicles scored well
primarily due to the engine out capability of the first stage and OMS engines. When
hold down effects are accounted for, the engine-out capability in the first stages is
less significant. The final change reflecting OMS engine redundancy results in a
higher reliability value for the Space Shuttle.
It is important to note that the purpose of this analysis and of the PMS calculation
methodology development in general was to provide a way of comparing relative
reliabilities of different launch systems, and not to develop a point reliability value.
In addition, since the avionics reliability value was a single multiplier used on all
systems and did not contribute any comparative information, it was eliminated
from the final score.
3.5.2.3 Alternate Ground Operation Attribute
During the FITS Study basic contract period, the NIT defined the LSC attribute as an
indication of any given architecture's ability to meet its launch schedules. The LSC
was a combined measurement of three subattribufes: Schedule Compression,
Schedule Margin, and Percentage of Flights with Delays. Schedule Compression and
Schedule Margin provided an intuitive measurement of architecture and flight
system resiliency or the ability to effect schedule recovery. The Percentage of Flights
with Delays was a measurement of architecture and flight system availability or
dependability, based upon an unscheduled maintenance data base derived from a
given flight systems mass, complexity, and mission length. The deficiencies in this
methodology are that both the Schedule Compression and Schedule Margin
subattributes failed to sufficiently address the relative differences in the proposed
launch system designs. The Percentage of Flights with Delays subattribute value was
partially derived from the estimated mission length, which is a valid parameter for
reusable flight systems only. In addition, it was felt that the attribute gave
insufficient insight into how system design choices would affect the ability to
operate a proposed system. For these reasons, an alternate approach was considered.
This new ground operability attribute (GOA) definition was refined to consist of the
probability of achieving any given launch date, or sustaining any given launch
manifest, for any given launch system or space transportation architecture. This
revised attribute is expressed as a relative value or Figure of Merit (FOM), rather
than an absolute value. The preferred methodology selected in this study measures
this attribute as a function of the scheduled event burden plus the Unscheduled
event burden. The scheduled event burden is equal for all launch systems and all
architectures since it is requirements-dri_cen and is therefore a non-discriminator.
The remaining variable in the equation is the unscheduled event burden. The
unscheduled event burden is defined as a function of the weighted utility of a series
of ground operation's complexity factors or subattributes.
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The 10 ground operation's complexity factors are described below. The complexity
factors were down-selected from a lengthy candidate list and represent only the
value-added factors that may effect LSC and the unscheduled event burden variable.
The weight percentages and utility values were developed through the application
of engineering judgment by a team of launch site engineers with operations
experience in the ground processing of the Space Shuttle, Atlas I, Titan III, Titan IV,
Centaur upper stage, and Fleet Ballistic Missiles.
(1) Number of Fights is the total number of flights for all launch systems in the
selected mixed fleet manifest. The analysis is at the architecture level, weighted
at 14.1 percent.
(2) System Commonality is the ratio of common types of flight elements to the
total types of flight elements for all launch systems in the selected mixed fleet
manifest. The analysis is at the architecture level, weighted at 10.8 percent.
(3) Number of Elements is the total number of significant flight elements for each
launch system in the selected mixed fleet manifest. The analysis is at the
launch system level, weighted at 11.7 percent.
(4) Crew Rating is the factor which distinguishes between a crew-tended and
untended launch system configuration. A high value mission with no crew is
also addressed under this complexity factor. The analysis is at the launch
system level, weighted at 12.5 percent.
(5) Processing Concept distinguishes between the launch site processing concepts
of Integrate on Pad (IOP), Integrate/Transfer/Launch (ITL), and mixed ITL/IOP.
The analysis is at the launch system level, weighted at 6.7 percent.
(6) Reliability is the complexity factor which addresses the predicted level of
unscheduled system maintenance. The analysis is at the launch system level,
weighted at 4.2 percent.
(7) Number of Fluids is the total number of fluids for each launch system in the
selected mixed fleet manifest. The analysis is at the launch system level,
weighted at 10.0 percent.
(8) Expendable Recoverable Hardware is the complexity factor which distinguishes
between recoverable or refurbishable, and expendable flight hardware. The
analysis is at the flight element level, weighted at 9.2 percent.
(9) Propellant Type is the propellant (if any) utilized by the flight element. The
analysis is at the flight element level, weighted at 7.5 percent.
3.5-32
Rev. E
(10) Number of Significant Components is the total number of significant
components for each flight element. The analysis is at the flight element level,
weighted at 13.3 percent.
A total of 40 existing ETO launch systems or conceptual ETO launch system designs
were identified and incorporated into the various HTS architecture options by the
NIT. For each launch system, a complexity factor data sheet was developed using
resource data provided by the NIT or extracted from HTS Study interim reports and
other current source material defining the existing or proposed launch system
configurations.
Figures of Merit for this attribute were calculated for each launch system and
architecture. Refer to Volume II, Appendix B.1.10 for a summary of the analysis.
The FOM's for the individual launch systems varied from a low value of 0.5947 for
the conceptual SSTO configuration to a high value of 0.8836 for the conceptual NLS-
20 configuration. In general, the reusable human flight systems ranked lower than
the expendable flight systems. The relative rankings of the existing Atlas, Delta and
Titan launch system configurations are comparable. These results are intuitive, and
consistent with the experience base for ground processing of domestic launch
systems.
The FOM's for the architecture options vary from a low value of 0.5036 for
Architecture 8 (Advanced Technology Phasing/SSTO) to a high value of 0.7288 for
Architecture 17 (New Concept Option/RUPC). Architecture 2 (Shuttle Evolution
Option) is the preferred architecture, based on the highest average FOM across all
architecture options (A through E High). Architectures 8, 16 (New Concept
Option/AMSC) and 18 (New Concept Option/TSTO Beta II) values rank at the low
end of the distribution. These three architectures rely extensively on new, reusable,
human flight systems.
3.5.3 Improving System and Architecture Scores
3.5.3.1 New ELV Cost Sensitivities
Architectures 5 and 6 both scored well in the overall architecture evaluations.
However, both have higher architecture costs than the reference, Architecture 1.
Architecture 5 has high recurring cost in the early years due to the relatively high
recurring production costs associated with the procurement of the reusable crew
carriers. These costs occur in the years that the DDT&E costs are tailing off, with the
combination producing the high peak costs in the years 1998 to 2003. Beyond 2003
there is a quasi-steady-state period for the costs. To justify the high initial costs,
these out-year costs must be substantially lower than those of the baseline
architecture. Since the cost associated with the architecture is dominated by the
annual costs during this time period, sensitivities to ELV costs were examined.
3.5-33
Rev. E
These sensitivities are shown in Figure 3.5.3.1-1. The effect on total architecture cost
of varying different ELV cost categories, both singly and in combination over the
architectural time frame, is presented in the figure. As can be seen, the single most
sensitive cost (steepest slope) is associated with recurring production (as represented
by the filled triangles). Conversely, wide variations in either non-recurring or
operations cost produced relatively small variations in total cost. Also shown for
reference is the total cost of Architecture 1, as represented by the horizontal dashed
line. Within the range of the sensitivities shown, the reduction of no single cost
category produced a cost for Architecture 5 which was at or below that of the
baseline. Since the costs during the out-years was of greatest interest (in terms of
justifying the up-front costs), the combination of recurring production and
operations costs was investigated. This sensitivity, represented by the open triangles
in the figure, showed that at a reduction of about 50 percent for both these cost
categories, Architecture 5 costs were equivalent to those of the baseline. The actual
required reduction in the combination of ELV recurring production and operation
costs over the life of the architecture, for equivalence with Architecture 1, was
calculated to be 50.33 percent.
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Figure 3.5.3.1-1.- MLS cost sensitivity - Architecture 5C.
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The recurring production cost of the new ELV's (MLS, NLS, Spacelifter, etc.) has a
large effect on the total architecture cost due to the relatively high flight rate
combined with the MLS design assumption of expendability. Reducing this cost in
ha!f, under the current design assumptions, is probably not achievable because of
the large amount of expendable hardware. This realization led to the effort to define
a partially reusable MLS design and evaluate its use in a revised architecture (5A).
The partially reusable MLS concept, developed by Boeing, uses a module with SSME
engines on the one and one-half stage and the addition of the equipment necessary
to recover the engines and avionics from the stage. The half-stage engines are
parachuted to the water in protective waterproof enclosures and recovered from the
ocean, down range from the launch site. The engines and avionics on the first stage
orbit once-around, reenter in a protective module, and parachute to a land recovery.
These units are returned to the launch site, refurbished, and flown again on
subsequent launch vehicles. As such, both the development and recurring
production costs are appreciably lower than the new development ELV.
Table B.1.6.2-16 of Volume II shows vehicle cost input used for this comparison
with the baseline Architecture 5.
As can be seen in Figure 3.5.3.1-2, Architecture 5A shows a marked improvement in
the annual cost during the operational phase (2003 and beyond), when compared to
Architectures 5 and 1. All of the following comparisons are done for "If" C, unless
otherwise noted.
14000
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Figure 3.5.3.1-2.- Architectures 1, 5, and 5A - "If" C annual cost comparison.
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The net reduction in recurring cost is a result of the change in the concept from an
all-expendable MLS (Architecture 5) to a partially reusable MLS (Architecture 5A).
This concept change produced a reduction in the recurring production cost as seen
in Figure 3.5.3.1-3. There was, however, a slight increase in the operations cost, due
to the added requirement to refurbish the recovered components.
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Figure 3.5.3.1-3.- Architectures 5 and 5A - "If" C recurring
production cost comparison.
The initial trade study identified a need to reduce the combination of recurring
production and operations cost a factor of 50 percent to achieve cost parity with
Architecture 1 ("If" C), not including the cost of unreliability. As can be seen in
Figure 3.5.3.1-4, the total of recurring and non-recurring cost for Architecture 5A is
still slightly higher than that for Architecture 1 in "If" C. When the cost of
unreliabiiityis added, the difference is reduced, since there is improved reliability of
Architecture 5A over 1. As can also be seen, the effect of reducing flight rate, "If's" A
and B, is to further reduce the cost of Architectures 5 and 5A compared to
Architecture 1.
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Figure 3.5.3.1-4.- Architectures 1, 5, and 5A - "Ifs" A through D
total architecture cost comparison.
3.5.3.2 Space Shuttle Impacts
3.5.3.2.1 Space Shuttle design improvements.-The conceptual definition for
Shuttle Evolution used in the study resulted in reduced PMS and equivalent
Human Safety (crew loss events rate) relative to the current Space Shuttle system.
Titan Evolution also resulted in a lower PMS relative to its current model.
Since these attributes were highly weighted, it was attempted to redefine an
evolution concept that provided improved PMS and a lower crew loss event rate
than the current Orbiter stack offered in the Evolution Architecture. The ELV's in
the Evolution Architecture would not be changed in this effort so the impact of
Shuttle Evolution changes could be readily identified.
Suggested improvements were to: (1) retain SRB's in Evolution Concepts, (2)
provide for crew module separation and recovery for Space Shuttle Orbiter, (3) use
hybrid boosters instead of liquids, and (4) retain SRM's on HR Titan W.
For Shuttle Evolution redefinition, three key changes would have a dramatic
impact on our attribute values: retain ASRM's, replace them with hybrids, or define
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a means for crew escape for the entire mission. Retention of ASRM's will maintain
the Reference Architecture's PMS value. With increased crew survival due to the
addition of ejection seats and the reduction of piloted missions due to the RCV,
Human Safety should be improved dramatically. Hybrids will offer a less degraded
PMS than liquids but should regain credit due to non-catastrophic failure and
shutdown capabilities. Applying a means for crew escape over the entire ascent
phase will greatly decrease the number of crew loss events. Due to the way the
Evolution Architecture was manifested, only non'SSF flights will see an increase in
flight quantity due to loss of performance caused by the addition of the frangible
seam and recovery system of the CEM.
Shuttle Evolution, induding the RCV, is redefined as follows for this analysis:
ASRM's replaced by HRB's is with identical performance as the LRB's used
previously; ejection seat concept replaced by separable crew module with lanyard
rocket ejection capability; and manifest crew exchange flights to capacity, with
remaining cargo placed on RCV. All other aspects of Shuttle Evolution as initially
defined remain the same. A summary of attribute input data is shown in
Table 3.5.3.2-1.
TABLE 3.5.3.2-1.- SUMMARY COMPARISON OF "IF" C FINDINGS
FOR SHUTrLE EVOLUTION II
Attribute
Architecture Cost Risk
Tech Challenge
Program Immaturity
New Systems
Reference
168.700
1.000
0.970
Evolution
370.80(3
2.74(3
2.60G
Evolution II
419.000
2.754
2.600
Improvement
(EVO To
EVO II)
(48.200)
(0.014)
(0.00)
Environment 27825450 2067017
Funding Profile (M$92)
Total 177,404 209,653
Peak Year 7303 11485
6.7 4.8Human Safety
(Crew Losses)
LSC
Compression
Margin
Delays
PMS
0.425
4.429
11.800
0.408
5.684
12.000
2086503 (19486)
224,537 (14884)
13605 (2120)
4.1 0.7
0.9374 0.9354
0.407
5.474
I2.200
0.001
0.210
(0.200)
0.933 0.00_
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Data required for complete analysis included: a recheck of flight rates based on a 20k
reduction in Orbiter capacity with the separable crew module (report estimated
15k - add-on of 33 percent additional assumed) and fully-manifesting crew exchange
missions; recalculate PMS based on HRB stage reliability of 0.99232 (square root of
0.9847 due to single fluid path) and HRB engine reliability of 0.99491 (square root of
product of liquid engine and segmented solid engine reliability); reestimation of
probability of survival and abortability based on separable crew module;
reestimation of program risk; propellant quantities for environmental; and cost
estimates for new orbiters to replace existing fleet at one per year from 2000. It is
assumed that schedule delays will not be appreciably changed for Shuttle Evolution
with this modification to the Orbiter.
Table 3.5.3.2-2 shows a comparison of attribute values for Space Shuttle, Shuttle
Evolution, and Shuttle Evolution II Architectures, "If" C. A full assessment of the
changes made to Shuttle Evolution is to be completed.
3.5.3.2.2 Cost reduction impacts.- The objective of this "quick-look" analysis effort
was to assess the impact of a fixed per-year reduction in resources on the Space
Shuttle flight rate and total architecture cost.
Using the study attribute and architecture analysis tools, Rockwell incorporated a
fixed percentage reduction in Space Shuttle costs with 1992 as the base year and each
subsequent year being reduced, relative to the previous year, by that fixed
percentage. The reduction per year was defined so that a total cost reduction of 5, 15,
30, and 50 percent was realized by 1997. This was used because the FITS Funding
Profile attribute is a summation of costs for flights between 1998 and 2020, inclusive.
Figure 3.5.3.2.2-1 shows the results of this analysis. Based on this analysis, a good
rule of thumb is that for every one percent decrease in Space Shuttle operations cost
achieved by 1998, the HTS Reference Architecture total cost is reduced by $1B.
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TABLE 3.5.3.2-2.- EXTENSION TASK INPUT DATA FOR SHUTI'LE EVOLUTION II
Attribute
Human Safety
Separable Module (Figure)
Crew Escape (Fis_re)
Funding Profile
DDT&E
Orbiter *
Booster/`
First Unit
Orbiter #
Booster ^
Production
Orbiter #
Booster ^
Fleet Replacement Logic
PMS
Booster Stage Success Rate
Booster Engine Success Rate
ACR
Technical Challenge
Non-Recurring Costs
Production
Operations
Program Immaturity
Number Of New Systems
(Figures Attached)
LSC
Schedule Compression
Schedule Margin
Percent Delays
Environmental Impact
Liquid Oxygen
Liquid Hydrogen
RP-1
Solid Propellant
Previous
Value
N/A
Eiection
$1.966 B(92)
$1.140 B(92)
$1.756 B(92)
$0.176 B(92)
$1.756 B(92)
$0.176 B(92)
@ 90% Lc/88%
Rc
Attrition
3
2
3
4
0.93
85/128
797.42 i
24.02
2032.9 Klb
227.6 Klb
268.7 Klb
N/A
New
Value
Entire Mission
Extraction
$6.7 B(90)
Same As LRB
In DDT&E
62% Of LRB
$2.5 B(90)
62% Of LRB
1/Yr (2000-2004)
+ Attrition
0.99232
0.99491
4.2
2.8
3.6
4.0
1.0
85/128
797.42
24.02
2951.9 Klb
227.6 Klb
N/A
600.0 Klb
*Spread over 8 years: 1, 4, 10, 15, 25, 30, 15, 5.
^Use the same spread as for the LRB's.
#Use the same spread as for the Orbiter
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Figure 3.5.3.2.2-1.- Space Shuttle cost reduction impact on total architecture
costs of FITS reference architecture.
3.5.3.3 Improving Architecture Scores
As a result of the work performed in the HTS study, and the extension, it was
discovered that improved architectures could be found by learning from the
shortcomings of the existing architecture set. Improving or modifying existing
architectures, as well as looking at what a new, clean-sheet architecture would look
like is discussed below.
3.5.3.3.1 "Improved" architectures.- Features of systems that score well in the HTS
methods of quantifying attributes are listed in the following paragraphs. This is
essentially a compilation of study findings; there are many other ways to improve
each attribute, but some produce secondary improvements and/or cannot be
measured by study metrics. It is interesting to note that, in some cases, the desirable
vehicle concept features are contradictory across two or more attributes.
a. Human Safety
A system should feature full flight, envelope escape capability (maximize P^),
maximum separation of crew from propellants and propulsion (maximize Ps),
and no SRM's (maximize time for warning and initiating abort). Also, a system
should minimize correlated failure potential (maximize Ps and P^) by physically
isolating flight critical systems, such as control actuators, from sources of likely
hazards (such as turbomachinery).
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b. Probability of Mission Success
High scores are obtained for those systems that have engine-out capability,
ground start of as many engines as possible, hold-down on the pad, minimum
number of engines, and a minimum number of staging events.
c. Funding Profile
(1) Peak Funding: Successful architectures and elements minimize new
development, separate engine development from airframe development,
incorporate appropriate reusability (relates to the total number of flights;
however, some components designed for reuse may not be justified by some
traffic model flight levels), and minimize recurring production buys during
development or slide buys of recurring hardware until later.
(2) Life Cycle Cost: Elements score well if they feature high reusability
(minimize or eliminate recurring production) and if manifesting is done at
most-favorable flight rates and payload levels. In addition, a system should
be designed for 'operability' - here defined as minimizing fixed costs and
short turnaround times, including minimizing the recurring production
hardware introduced into the cycle.
d. Architecture Cost Risk
In an ideal situation, architectures ideally would minimize the number of new
systems, minimize technology advances, and minimize development costs.
e. Launch Schedule Confidence
Successful architectures maximize number of operational sites, include the
ability to launch with failures (minimum equipment list), plan for nominal one-
shift operations, and plan on less than 80 percent facilities utilization.
f. Environment
The best scores are obtained with systems that feature no solid rocket motors and
minimize the launch vehicle size for a given payload.
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3.5.3.3.2 "Better" architectures.- For the purposes of this section, an architecture is
considered "better" within the context of the overall HTS study rather than the
current set of architectures (i.e., using the consensus-based approach of determining
weighted attributes deemed important to the customer). Therefore, one would
conclude that the "best" possible architecture would be reflected in scoring higher in
each and every attribute, rather than any other architectural option. Therefore, the
approach for developing a better architecture starts with an examination of what
design or operational features result in high attribute scores. As noted in the
previous section, there are identifiable features of better scoring systems. An
objective search of all concept options is then performed to reveal maximum
correspondence between desirable features, and concept and architecture
characteristics.
The ideal architecture would meet all these constraints. Since some are
contradictory, this is impossible, so the best architecture should conform with most
of these constraints. At this point in the study, NIT members were invited to
submit proposals for a "best" architecture. These architectures were compared to the
reference architecture and Architecture 8 (SSTO), which scored the highest in the
HTS architecture evaluation process using the NIT's weightings of attributes. As a
result, two architectures comprised of two similar launch vehicle families, are
discussed below.
Family "X" flies people and cargo together in a glider (although external shape is
secondary to the findings) that can carry an eight-person crew and a 15 ft diameter by
40 ft long payload bay. This is essentially a larger (135 klbs) version of the CLV, the
40 klbs of payload capacity is more closely optimized to the manifesting
requirements than the CLV. The launch vehicle is based on a family approach,
whereby the development costs of the new systems are offset by improvements in
reliability, safety, operability, and lower recurring production costs of all the vehides
in the architecture. Figure 3.5.3.3.2-1 depicts the vehicles used in the architecture.
Engine-out capability, existing SSME's (at 100 percent power level), all-engine
ground start on human flights, and NLS-type health monitoring, etc., are all
hallmarks of an architecture that would score well in the HTS architecture
evaluation process. Note that other non-study considerations are addressed as well:
heavy polar missions from ETR without overflights, an excellent commercial class
launcher, and ready-growth path to current SEI launcher plans.
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Figure 3.5.3.3.2-1.- Family "X".
Family "Y" essentially separates the job of flying people and cargo, although the FITS
findings would indicate that it is desirable to include some small amount of cargo
on all human flights; the throw-weight capability of the launch vehicle (to SSF
transfer orbit) is approximately 65 klbs, which is adequate for an eight-person crew
and some limited cargo. Figure 3.5.3.3.2-2 depicts the elements of the architecture.
The glider (again, shape is not that important) would be flown in two versions
called "A" and "B". The external shape and many of the subsystems are identical.
In configuration "A '°, there is a 15 ft by 22 ft cargo bay with no provisions for a crew;
configuration "B" has accommodations for an eight-person crew and a small
pressurized cargo compartment. The desirable features of the launch vehicles are
similar to those explained for Family "X °' above.
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Figure 3.5.3.3.2-2.- Family "Y".
The two reference architectures (Architectures 1 and 8) and the two proposed
architectures are compared in Table 3.5.3.3.2-1. In this case, it is less the intent to
propose a right answer than it is to show how using features of the current concepts
and attribute weightings can derive new architecture options. It remains to be seen
how future architecture can score better than the options proposed here, but it is
likely that based on the analysis of attributes, better architectures than this original
set can be formulated.
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TABLE 3.5.3.3.2-1.- ATTRIBUTE COMPARISON OF PROPOSED "BETTER"
ARCHITECTURES WITH REFERENCE ARCHITECTURES
Human Safety
Escape Capability
Max Separation
No SRM's
Min Correlation
PMS
Engine-Out
Ground Start
Hold-Down
Min Engines
Sta_in_ Events
Fund Profile-Peak
Min New Dev
Sep Eng A/F Dev
Reuse/Init Buy
Fund Profile-Total
Reusability
Favorable Manifest
ACR
Min New Systems
Min Technology
Min Dev Costs
LSC
Max Op Sites
Launch w/failures
One Shift Operation
Fac Util <80 percent
Environment
No SRMs
Min LV Size
Ref (1)
0
0
tt X tV
O
O
O
?
?
I1 y 11
O
O
?
?
SSTO
O
?
?
?
• Significantly Better
O - Somewhat Better
? - Need More Data
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SECTION 4
FITS FINDINGS: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
4.1 DETAILED FINDINGS BY ARCHITECTURE PATH
The significant findings relevant to pursuing each of the possible paths are provided
below. This information is provided to aid agency planners in determining how to
best meet the nation's transportation needs. These results are also useful for
understanding the consequences that may likely result along a potential path should
they choose not to use attributes and their associated priorities in determining
which path to follow. In other words, it quantifies the impact of a customer's
decision. Of course, all findings, conclusions, and recommendations are based on
the assumptions, methodologies, and data presented in this report. When findings
lead to recommendations that can be substantiated by the data, they are cited in
section 5.0 of this report.
As a result of the HTS study, the NIT has developed the following findings and
consequences that would be encountered as a function of the chosen path. Unless
otherwise noted, findings apply to the "If" C activity level (continue current
missions plus SSF PMC). Similar findings for the "If" B mission activity level
(continue current missions only) can be obtained from the architecture data in
Volume II, Appendix C.
If we retain current systems, then the HTS process indicates that:
New Space Shuttle Orbiters are likely to be needed for future demand and/or
probable losses, since the flight demand is driven by SSF deployment and
support, and other transport.
• An additional MLP is the only Space Shuttle facility element needed to support
this implementation.
• HTS needs model cannot be supported with the eight flight-per-year restriction
on Space Shuttle.
If we evolve current systems, then the HTS process indicates that:
a. For the baseline Space Shuttle evolution compared with current systems
Total architecture costs increase $20B to $27B, with a $3B higher peak
funding requirement and a $3 to 4B higher unreliability cost.
• Crew loss events are reduced 12 to 34 percent.
• - Architecture risk increases 12 to 16 percent, inversely with activity level.
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Piloted flights decreaseby 0 to 90 from "If" A through "If" E-High due to the
introduction of the RCV and increased Space Shuttle performance.
Unpiloted flights increase by 0 to 97 from "If" A through "If" E-High due to
the introduction of the RCV.
Mission success is not significantly affected.
Environmental impact is reduced 12 to 33 percent for "If's" A through
E-High due to Space Shuttle LRB's.
Additional Space Shuttle facility elements are not required.
b. For evolution including HRB's and CEM's compared with current systems
Piloted flights decrease by 45 with respect to current systems and increase by
11 with respect to baseline evolution due to the introduction of the RCV,
and the decreased Space Shuttle performance due to the addition of a CEM.
Unpiloted flights increase by 83 with respect to current systems due to the
introduction of the RCV.
Mission success is not significantly affected.
Total architecture costs increased by $47.1B over the current systems and by
$14.8B over the baseline evolution case. In addition, the peak funding
requirement was $6.3B higher than the current systems and $2.2B higher
than the baseline evolution case. Unreliability costs were increased $6.3B
over current systems and $2.2B over the baseline evolution case.
Crew loss events are reduced by 39 percent with respect to current systems
and 15 percent with respect to baseline evolution.
Cost risk increases 13 percent with respect to current systems and 0.5 percent
with respect to evolution architectures.
Environmental impact is decreased 25 percent with respect to current
systems and increased 1 percent with respect to baseline evolution.
Additional Space Shuttle Orbiters are likely to be needed for future demand
and/or probable losses.
The CEM's contributed less than 0.7 of 2.6 crew loss reduction.
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If we replace current systems with new systems, then the HTS process indicates that:.
Significant improvements in safety can be achieved by several alternative
transportation architectures. This is due to the addition of features such as
vehicle hold-down on the pad, engine-out capability, abort capability during
all ascent phases, and careful selection of the major propulsive systems. The
additional cost to achieve this added safety ranges from $40B to $60B, for
Architectures 5 and 6 respectively.
If we augment the current systems with new systems, then the HTS process
indicates that:
Total architecture costs increase $55.6B to $ 94.9B, with a $2.5B to $9.6B
higher peak funding requirement and a -$6.4B to + $1.5B change in
unreliability cost
• Crew loss events vary from -48 percent to +7.5 percent
• Architecture risk increases 15 percent to 40 percent
• Piloted flights vary by -61 to +70 for "If" C through "If" E-High
• Unpiloted flights increase by 68 to 222 for "If" C through "If" E-High
• Mission success does not vary significantly
,, Environmental impact varies from -21 percent to +10 percent
4.2 RESPONSES TO VIEWPOINTS
Prior to the HTS study, there were several inconsistent viewpoints common among
discussions concerning the need for a next transportation system. These viewpoints
usually began with a statement born out of some frustration with the Space Shuttle,
and were followed by some expression of desire for a replacement system. Too
often, however, these viewpoints were contradictory and provided no useful
direction for agency planners. We believe it is important to specifically respond to
these viewpoints, since they impact discussions of whether or how new systems can
or should be justified.
As a result of having evaluated the data relative to these questions during the
course of this study, and the extreme emphasis put on definition and measurement
specifics during the HTS study, the NIT can provide their insightful responses to
these conflicting viewpoints.
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"The nation should not buy a new Orbiter OR the nation should continue to rely
on the Space Shuttle for the next 20 to 30 years."
Without taking attrition into account, the current fleet does not support
transportation requirements which would continue current missions and
subsequently add SSF build-up and support ("If" Scenario C), if it is necessary to
fly the payloads in the year in which they are currently planned. However, the
current fleet can support these requirements with the addition of an additional
Space Shuttle Orbiter and a MLP. The bottom line is: the decision on the
number of required orbiters in the future must be based both on potential
attrition and the expected usage rate required to meet future demand.
"The Space Shuttle costs too much to operate."
This viewpoint incorrectly assumes that operations costs are the dominant
attribute the agency is trying to minimize, when in fact, minimizing the agency's
annual expenditure on transportation is the objective we are trying to achieve.
A decision made on only one component of cost (DDT&E, operations, or
production of components) which comprises an annual expenditure will almost
certainly be a bad one. Other than the single-stage-to-orbit (vertical take-off and
horizontal landing) concept studied, the current transportation systems
(Space Shuttle, Delta, Atlas, Titan) have the lowest total architecture cost
(integrated annual expenditures from the present to 2020) based on current ways
of doing business. All other Space Shuttle replacement architectures add at least
30 percent to transportation costs over this study time period. This finding
applies if we engage in transportation activity levels greater than or equal to
assembly and support of SSF. For less aggressive transportation models, some
architectures {5, 6, 7, 14, 16, 17 ("If" A)} and {14, 16, 17 ("If" B)} become cost
competitive with the current systems.
"We need alternate access to space in the event of an extended Space Shuttle
downtime."
To provide alternate access for people and cargo, the nation should be prepared
to spend an additional $50 to $100 billion between now and 2020 to develop,
operate, and maintain this capability. The range depends upon whether
alternate access is provided for cargo-up only, cargo-up and -down, or people-and
cargo-up and -down. The sheer expense of providing alternate access dictates
that we develop a strategy for minimizing the contribution of non-technical
reasons to "Space Shuttle downtime".
4-4
Rev. E
• "We should separate people from cargo in the name of safety."
The presence of some cargo capability on the human-tended carrier was not
found to have a deleterious impact on the number of crew losses that could be
expected.
"We should separate people from cargo in the name of cost."
The presence of some cargo on a personnel carrier can be cost advantageous
when crew and cargo are being delivered to the same destination. This is
especially true of vehicles with higher cargo capacity, given that the support of
SSF comprises the majority of our transportation activity.
As a replacement for existing systems, new systems currently under study which
either combine or separate people from cargo are still more expensive than
continued use of current systems.
"New systems based upon newer technology promise significant improvements,
and therefore we need to develop new systems."
SSTO, with its reliance on more advanced technology relative to many of the
other options studied, would be a cost effective alternative to the Space Shuttle
were it to actually achieve its stated cost goals. However, the low confidence
level in the cost data provided puts this finding in serious question.
"There should be commonality between the ACRV and the next I-ITS."
Architecture level trades, such as the HTS study, do not possess the fidelity
required to evaluate this point. From a total architecture standpoint, whether a
new personnel carrier should also double as the ACRV or not is a secondary
concern, due to the relatively low cost and usage rate of the ACRV, and not a
primary factor in determining the transportation system. Once that basic
decision is made, assessing commonality with the ACRV would be in order.
"Air launch systems promise significant attribute improvements for any new
transportation system."
Candidate air-launched systems evaluated in this study did not fare well due to
the small cargo levels and the resulting high flight rates associated with them.
Life cycle architecture costs were still dominated by the cost of ELV's to fly heavy
payloads.
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SECTION 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 CONCLUSIONS
From the extensive work performed in this study, the NIT has gained a unique
insight into the quality and consistency of work performed by both industry and
government on candidate transportation systems. From this unique vantage point,
the NIT concludes the following:
a. Many of the systems defined in section 3.3.3 have sufficient definition so that
vehicles in their class can be evaluated and specific systems down-selected
without further study at the architecture level. (Of course, once the architectural
path is selected, there would be additional system definition required.)
"Sufficient definition" is defined here as either (a) having enough level of detail
in an absolute sense, or (b) improving the system definition beyond the current
point is not warranted since architecture considerations dominate. Those
concepts having sufficient definition at this time are:
• MLS (NLS)
• Space Shuttle/Shuttle Evolution
• Beta 1I
• AMSC
• - CLV
• Titan (including human-rated versions)
• personnel-only carriers (e.g., PLS, RUPC, etc.)
b, Further system concept definition is required on the following concepts before
they can be evaluated for their suitability in a future personnel transportation
system.
• SSTO
• NASP-derived vehicles
• advanced TSTO concepts (e.g., AMLS)
• air-launched concepts
C° Sufficient definition of potential new ways of doing business exists, and it is
now time to quantify and verify these new business practices on the existing
systems.
d, Providing alternate access by developing new dedicated U.S. assets is not cost
effective.
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Significant improvements in crew safety were realized through the introduction
of launch escape, engine-out, and hold down on new systems.
There is no inherent safety benefit from separating crew and cargo. (This does
not mean that untended payloads should be placed aboard human-tended
vehicles. It means that if the crew will be working with the payload while in
orbit, having both delivered on the same launch vehicle, in and of itself, does
not adversely impact safety.)
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
The intent of the HTS study was to provide the information necessary for senior
agency management to make a determination on the path to follow for the next
HTS, and not to recommend the specific architecture. To reach recommendations
on the transportation system for the future, the HTS study process requires
prioritization of desired transportation attributes by the NASA administrator. Since
he or she is the ultimate transportation customer and the executive branch's
steward of the nation's space program, any reco_endations are a direct: function
of his attributes and their relative priority. As a result, while the study did compare
architecture options based on the team's assessment of missions and attributes, the
study team is not able to recommend a preferred or optimal transportation
architecture, or any specific concepts which are a part of them, at this time.
However, the FITS study process provides a very valuable tool to aid the
administrator's evaluation of options for the next human transportation system
once his or her requirements are known.
There are however, recommendations that can be made as a direct result of the
experience gained during this study. They are:
a.
b.
Development of Mission Requirements and Evaluation Criteria -Prior to
deciding what the next transportation system should be, focus senior agency
management on customer-desired attributes, their measurements, and
mission requirements for new systems, rather than on system or vehicle
concepts. Acceptance of this recommendation will allow convergence more
quickly on the desired human transportation system. For a national program,
space program managers, the DOD, and other potential users should be
included in the working group to define desired attributes and their
measurements.
New Ways of Doing Business - Implement a plan for instituting new
business practices immediately on existing systems. The plan should be
constructed so that any actual savings realized should be "banked" first for
verification accounting and confirmation purposes, before using the savings
to pay for new programs.
!
!
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Crew Escape Modules on Space Shuttle - Do not pursue retrofit of a crew
escape module on the existing Space Shuttle fleet due to the high cost and
small improvement in safety.
Human-Tended versus Untended Transportation - Consider both the
human-tended and untended aspects of transportation simultaneously (at the
architecture level) when considering what the next human transportation
system should be.
Separation of People and Cargo - Do not pursue development of a
transportation system which separates people from cargo in the name of
increased safety. Architectural considerations (i.e., additional flight rates) and
other transportation requirements were found to dominate over safety. Since
the HTS study found that the presence of cargo capability with the human-
tended vehicle has little effect on safety, and that other architectural consider-
ations dominate, the amount of cargo capability in any next human trans-
portation system should be predominantly driven by providing the trans-
portation needs in an effective manner. (For the mission model used in this
study, SSF resupply and logistic support was the largest driver of delivery and
return requirements.)
New Personnel Vehicles Derived from an ACRV - Do not base the decision
as to what the future transportation system should be based on whether the
ACRV function should be common with the primary transportation
function, since the inclusion of an ACRV had negligible effect on the
architecture attributes. Once the overall transportation architecture decision
has been made, the decision as to whether an ACRV is even required, or
whether its function should be provided by the basic transportation capability,
would be determined by whether it produced a favorable impact on the
primary system-level attributes.
Areas of additional study - Redefine new technology programs in such as way
as to support a go/no-go commitment for these approaches within a total
transportation architectural context. While new technology solutions such as
SSTO appear advantageous, the fidelity of the cost and technical data does not
currently allow commitment to this alternative. For example, the SSTO
requires further definition in ground processing turnaround to validate the
costs relative to other transportation alternatives that have much better cost
definition. (The HTS study results indicate that the total SSTO program costs,
DDT&E, production, and operations, would have to increase by a factor of
only 2.3 to negate any cost advantage over the Space Shuttle.) Redefining the
early SSTO definition activities to obtain that data for comparison on an equal
architectural basis would foster an early decision from among the trans-
portation alternatives. This also holds true for NASP-derived vehicles,
AMLS, and air-launched concepts with significant cargo capacity.
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SECTION 6
SUMMARY
The NIT arrangement proved to be an excellent forum for conducting this type of
study. Bringing the combined analytical capabilities of industry and NASA to bear
on a single objective yielded more thorough study results than could have been
achieved otherwise. This approach also allowed the evaluation of more architec-
ture and system options, to a greater level of detail, than could otherwise have been
evaluated. One primary reason for this is because the team often had one or
multiple "models", "tools", or "techniques" already available to it, which had been
developed and refined with significant monetary investment. In fact, the tools
available to us were in some cases better than our ability to use them in the 1 year
available for this study.
Although the industry team members each had vested interests in particular system
concepts, this did not present a problem as long as the concepts were all passed
through the same analytical process and reviewed by the entire NIT. In fact, this
approach had the significant advantage of providing the built-in checks and balances
that are often missing in studies conducted by single organizations, whether
government or contractor. It was the consensus of all participants that this approach
warrants more consideration for similar architectural evaluations.
6-1
Rev. E

References
1. Deming, W. E., Out of the Crisis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA, pp. 276-287, 1986.
. Leonard, B. D., and Kisko, W. A., Liquid Propulsion Considerations in
Projecting Launch Vehicle Failure Probabilities, AIAA Paper 92-1334, March
1992.
. Atmospheric Effects of Chemical Rocket Propul¢on: Repor_ of an AIAA
Workshop, Sacramento, California, 28-29 Iune, 1991, American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Washington, D.C.,1991.
4. "Scheduled Overtime Effect on Construction Projects," A Construction
Industry Cost Effectiveness Task Force Report, November 1980.
5. Report of the Advisory. Committee on the Future of the U. S. Space Program,
Norman R. Augustine, Chairman, Washington, D. C., 1990.
6. Biggs, R. E., "SSME Reliability Determination," internal Rockwell
memorandum, May, 5, 1992.
7. Atmospheric Effects of Chemical Rocket Propulsion.
8. "Conceptual Designs Study for a Personnel Launch System (PLS) Final
Report", Boeing Document D180-32647, December 4, 1990.
. Ehrlich, C. F., Figard, R. L., Cervisi, R. P., Gore, D. C., and Gaynor, T. L.,
Advanced Military Spaceflight Capability (AMSC) Technology,
Identification Study: Final Technical Report. AFWAL-TR-83-3055, Air Force
Wright Aeronautical Laboratory, Dayton, Ohio, June, 1983.
10. "Beta-Two-Stage-to-Orbit Launch System," NASA-Lewis Research Center
briefing, August 19, 1991.
7-1

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE _o,mApproved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of Information i$ estimated Io average 1 hour per resoons@, including the time for reviewing instruction_, search:nq e,t4,t_r_g dat_ _,ur_es _Jalher_nq _n4
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of _nformMion Send comments req_rdmq this burden estlm,t(@ or ,tny other .t'*Oe_l of thrs colf_cDot_ o,f *nf,)rmM:on
including suggestions for reducing lhis burden, to Washington Headquarters _erv:ces. Directorate for infocm4tlon Operations 4nd R_'lx)tt$, I_1b Jefferson I/,tv*_ tI,Qhw,i¥. _.ude 12_)4. Act.nq|1on, VA
22202-.43Cl2. and (o the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Prolec[ (0)'04-0188), Weshington. PC 20503
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
October 1993 Technical Memorandum
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5 FUNDING NUMBERS
Human Transportation System (HTS) Study
Final Report, Vols.Iand II 906-11-01-01
6. AUTHOR(S)
N. Lance, M. S.Geyer, and M. T. Gaunce
7, PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
New InitiativesOffice
Johnson Space Center
Houston, TX 77058
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
OfficeofSpace Systems Development (DD)
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C.
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
S-739
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
NASA 'rM 104779
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
12a. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITYSTATEMENT
National Technical Information Service
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield,VA 22161
(703)487-4600
SubjectCategory: 16
12b DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 wordsJ
This reportsummarizes work completed under the Human Transportation System Study. This study was
conducted by the New InitiativesOfficeatJSC with the technicalsupport of Boeing, General I)ynamics,
Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, Martin Marietta, and Rockwell. The study was designed togenerate information
on determining the appropriate path tofollowfornew system development tomeet the Nation's space
transportation needs. The study evaluates 18 transportationarchitectureoptions using a parametric set of
mission requirements. These options include use ofcurrent systems (e.g.,Shuttle,Titan,etc.)as well as propo._ed
systems (e.g.,PLS, Single-Stage-to-Orbit,etc.)toassess the impact ofvarious considerations,such as the cost of
alternate access,or the benefitofseparating people and cargo. The architectureoptions are compared toeach
other with six measurable evaluation criteriaor attributes.They are: funding profile,human safety,probability
of mission success,architecturecost risk,launch schedule confidence,and environmental impact. Values forthese
attributesare presented forthe architectureoptions,with pertinentconclusions and recommendations.
14.
17,
SUBJECT TERMS
unmanned spacecraft;space transportation;expendable launch vehicles;Space Shuttle;
evaluation;manned spacecraft;criteria
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT
Unclassified
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified
15. NUMBEROF PAGES
991
16. PRICE CODE
20 LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
L:I,
514nd4rd Form ,)gB trey _-89)
Prescribed by AN_I $ld. _ jaJ. I_
/',JU.10_'

